R. v. Roeters, 2026 ONSC 3065

CITATION: R. v. Roeters, 2026 ONSC 3065

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00000173-0000

DATE: 2026-05-25

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

NICOLAS ROETERS

J. Renaud and B. Plourde, for the Crown

S. Sabourin, for the Accused

HEARD:

March 10, 2026 (Sentencing Submissions)

April 20, 2026 (Sentencing Decision)

REASONS ON SENTENCING

cULLIN J.

1The accused, Nicolas Roeters, was found guilty of one count of Dangerous Operation of a Motor Vehicle Causing Death, contrary to s.320.13(3) of the Criminal Code following a trial conducted before a jury. After receiving oral submissions, I reserved my decision on sentence. On April 20, 2026, I delivered an oral decision, with written reasons to follow. These are those written reasons.

2For the purpose of these reasons, I have referred to the offence at issue as “dangerous operation causing death”.

The Offence and Findings of Fact

3At trial, the facts establishing many of the essential elements of the offence were agreed upon by the Crown and the defence.

4It was agreed that, on February 6, 2022, a motor vehicle collision occurred between two vehicles on Highway 11 within the jurisdiction of Fauquier-Strickland in the district of Cochrane. The accused, Nicolas Roeters, was the operator of a 2018 blue Chevrolet Silverado truck. He was involved in a collision with Omer Ethier (“Mr. Ethier”), who was operating a 1998 green Ford F-150 truck. Mr. Ethier was pronounced dead at the scene of the collision. His cause of death was blunt force trauma resulting from the motor vehicle collision.

5At trial, two elements of the offence remained to be determined. First, had Mr. Roeters operated his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public, considering all the circumstances. Second, had Mr. Roeters' manner of operating his motor vehicle caused Mr. Ethier's death. The Crown and the defence agreed that, if the jury were satisfied that the first element had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then the Crown would also have proven the second element beyond a reasonable doubt.

6For the purpose of sentencing, then, I must determine what facts the jury found in determining that Mr. Roeters operated his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public, considering all the circumstances. In making this determination, I am governed by s. 724 of the Criminal Code, which provides as follows:

724 (1) In determining a sentence, a court may accept as proved any information disclosed at the trial or at the sentencing proceedings and any facts agreed on by the prosecutor and the offender.

(2) Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court

(a) shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury's verdict of guilty; and

(b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact.

7In making findings of fact, I must "find only those facts necessary to permit the proper sentence to be imposed in the case at hand": R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 SCR 96, at para. 18.

8The defence submits, and the Crown does not contest, that it is probable that the jury found that Mr. Roeters operated his vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public because he attempted to pass when it was unsafe to do so due to poor visibility caused by blowing snow. Based on the evidence before the jury, I accept that this is probable.

9Based on the evidence before the jury, for the purpose of sentencing, I find that Mr. Roeters was following a tractor-trailer on Highway 11 which was travelling at approximately the posted speed of 90 kilometres per hour. He made an intentional decision to pass the tractor-trailer by pulling into the eastbound lane. The roadway where the pass was undertaken was straight and the roadway marking was a single dashed yellow line, however Mr. Roeters was unable to ascertain whether the pass could be completed safely, due to blowing snow and poor visibility. Before completing the pass, while Mr. Roeters was alongside the tractor-trailer, he collided head on with Mr. Ethier’s vehicle, which was travelling eastbound in the eastbound lane. Mr. Ethier succumbed to the injuries suffered in the collision.

10Based on the evidence before the jury, for the purpose of sentencing, I find that Mr. Roeters was otherwise operating his vehicle reasonably on the day in question. I find that there is no credible evidence that, prior to the offence, he was driving erratically, that he was weaving in and out of traffic, or that he was driving at excessive speeds. On this point, I would note in particular that I found the evidence of Ronald Carriere to be more persuasive than that of Trevor Legault.

Circumstances of the Accused

11In determining an appropriate sentence, I must consider not only the offence but also the offender. Information regarding Mr. Roeters was provided through a pre-sentence report (“PSR”), letters of support from friends, family, and community members, and the submissions of counsel.

Biographical Information

12Nicolas Roeters was born on March 29, 1999. He was 22 years of age at the time of the offence. He is presently 27 years of age.

13Mr. Roeters is an only child who was raised in a stable, loving environment. His mother was a teacher. His father owned a construction business and later transitioned to employment as an operations supervisor at a provincial park.

14By all accounts, Mr. Roeters enjoyed an enviable upbringing. Both of his parents were highly supportive of him and actively involved in his life. Throughout his childhood and continuing to today, his immediate and extended family enjoyed spending time together, often going to their cottage and engaging in recreational activities outdoors. As a child, Mr. Roeters enjoyed mechanics and hands-on work, an interest which he shared with his maternal grandfather.

15Mr. Roeters has carried his strong family foundations into his own committed relationship of eight years with his common-law partner. They own a house and are actively making future plans together. His partner is employed at a local mill as a supervisor. She also enjoys a close relationship with her extended family, and they have embraced Mr. Roeters as one of their own.

16It was clear from the PSR and from the letters of support filed on his behalf that Mr. Roeters benefits from a strong support network of family and friends. He was described by all as an honest, affable, community-minded individual who not only enjoys, but has earned, the admiration and respect of those around him.

Education, Employment, Community Involvement

17Mr. Roeters attended elementary and secondary school in Hearst, Ontario. He completed his education in French, earning a Grade 12 diploma. He entered the workforce immediately after high school.

18Mr. Roeters’ educational journey was not without challenges. He was diagnosed with dyslexia as a child. Fortunately, his parents addressed this issue proactively and accessed supports for him. Dyslexia motivated Mr. Roeters to enhance his oral communication skills from a young age, which assisted him as he moved through the educational system.

19Mr. Roeters’ recreational enjoyment of mechanics and hands-on work followed him into his educational pursuits. In high school, he completed a co-operative education program in welding. He participated in skilled trades and technology competitions, including one involving robotics. He participated in educational trips, including a humanitarian excursion to the Dominican Republic.

20While he was in high school, during the summer months, Mr. Roeters worked for a large construction company in Hearst. This led to full-time employment following his completion of high school. While employed with that company, Mr. Roeters earned his A-Z licence and became a heavy equipment operator. In 2022, Mr. Roeters pursued an opportunity to work at a mine in Nunavut. After eight months, he returned to Hearst and bought himself a tractor-trailer to transport timber for a local mill.

21Presently, Mr. Roeters is self-employed. He owns a company called NHR Contracting. Much of his work involves landscaping and outdoor renovations.

22Mr. Roeters was described in the PSR as a pro-social individual who never hesitates to provide assistance when he encounters someone in need. He is actively involved in his community. He helps the local ski club with trail maintenance. He assists with site set-up for local events and festivals. He is a volunteer firefighter.

Physical Health, Mental Health, and Addictions

23Mr. Roeters presents with no physical or mental health challenges, and no substance abuse issues. He rarely consumes alcohol and has never consumed illegal drugs.

Criminal Record and Prior Driving History

24Mr. Roeters presents before the Court with no criminal record.

25The Crown filed a driving abstract which discloses no substantial record of offences. Mr. Roeters presented with two minor speeding offences in 2018 and 2019 that the Crown conceded were not egregious. The Crown did not rely on Mr. Roeters’ driving history in their sentencing submissions, citing it as a neutral factor.

Collateral Consequences

26Mr. Roeters presently has a Class AM licence with an air brake endorsement. His Class A licence permits him to drive all vehicles, including tractor-trailers. His Class M licence permits him to drive motorcycles.

27Pursuant to s.41(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990. c.H.8 (“HTA”), following this first conviction for dangerous operation causing death, Mr. Roeters is subject, at minimum, to a one-year driver’s licence suspension.

28This suspension period may be extended in the discretion of the Court. Pursuant to s.41(4)(a) of the HTA, following a conviction for dangerous operation causing death, the Court may extend the minimum driver’s licence suspension for any period that it considers appropriate. Pursuant to s.320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, the Court has a similar discretion following a conviction to issue a driving prohibition for any period that it considers appropriate.

29The loss of Mr. Roeters’ driver’s licence is a significant collateral consequence of his conviction.

30Having a driver’s licence has been and continues to be an important component of Mr. Roeters’ employment. Historically, he has required his licence to operate some of the equipment used in his work. Presently, he requires his licence to travel to and from job sites and to complete daily employment-related and personal tasks. The loss of his driver’s licence will require Mr. Roeters either to hire a driver for his company or to explore alternate employment which does not require him to drive. His counsel submitted that he may be required to undertake retraining.

Victim Impact Statements

31A Victim Impact Statement was filed by the Crown, prepared by Mr. Ethier’s brother, Antonin Ethier. He provided no information regarding Mr. Ethier or the impact of the offence. He requested information regarding the sentence imposed and its administration.

32Probation and Parole Services spoke to Mr. Ethier’s sister, Solange Veilleux, when preparing the PSR. She described sharing a close relationship with her brother; she was saddened by his passing. Notwithstanding this, Ms. Veilleux expressed that she, “did not wish [Mr. Roeters] to further carry the weight of the incident on his shoulders.” Instead, it was her hope that he would learn from the incident.

Sentencing Positions

The Crown

33The Crown submitted that an appropriate sentence for Mr. Roeters would be a term of incarceration in the range of 3 to 3.5 years, and a 5-year driving prohibition. The Crown also requested an order requiring Mr. Roeters to provide a DNA sample; the offence at issue is a secondary designated offence.

34In response to the defence request for a Conditional Sentence Order (“CSO”), the Crown argued that this is not a matter for which a CSO is available or appropriate, based upon a sentencing range in excess of two years and the circumstances of the offence. They argued that there were no significant mitigating factors or unusual circumstances which would warrant a CSO. They submitted that denunciation and deterrence were key considerations in sentences for dangerous operation causing death that would not be adequately addressed by a CSO.

The Defence

35The defence acknowledged that a period of imprisonment was appropriate given the circumstances of the offence but submitted that this was an appropriate case for that sentence to be served under the terms of a CSO. They asked the Court to impose a CSO for a period of 18 months to 24 months (less one day), and a 1-year driving prohibition. They took no issue with the requested DNA order.

36The defence acknowledged that denunciation and deterrence were important considerations in sentencing Mr. Roeters but urged the Court to consider Mr. Roeters’ low moral blameworthiness and excellent prospects of rehabilitation, as well as the impact that the driving prohibition will have upon him and his employment.

The Law

General Sentencing Principles

37Section 718 of the Criminal Code identifies principles and objectives which the Court must apply when imposing a sentence following a criminal conviction. They include: the denunciation of unlawful conduct; the deterrence of the offender and other potential future offenders; the separation of offenders from society; the rehabilitation of offenders; the provision of reparations for harm done to victims; and the acknowledgment of the harm done to victims.

38No one of these principles or objectives takes precedence to the others; they must all be balanced. Sentencing is an individualized process that requires the Court to have regard to the circumstances of the specific offence and the attributes of the specific offender: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206, at paras 43-45. The court must also recognize, however, that proportionality and parity are guiding principles that must be reconciled in the balancing process: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 SCR 1089, at para 53.

39When sentencing a youthful first offender, the principle of restraint is an important consideration. As noted by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, at para. 31:

Sentencing judges must also respect several other settled principles when sentencing youthful offenders for their first criminal offence. First, they must practice restraint. This requires them to avoid imprisoning young adults when possible. When imprisonment is necessary, it also requires them to make the sentence as short as possible to achieve the principles and objectives of sentencing…Second, they must prioritize rehabilitation as the paramount sentencing objective. Where necessary, they must also prioritize specific deterrence…Third, they cannot focus exclusively on denunciation and general deterrence or elevate those objectives above rehabilitation and specific deterrence...Fourth, they must consider young adults’ reduced moral culpability and the harsher impact that incarceration causes them due to their stage of life. [Citations omitted.]

Conditional Sentences - Considerations

40The imposition of a term of imprisonment is a punishment of last resort. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code directs that:

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:

(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

41When considering imprisonment, one path available to the Court is a conditional sentence order. While not an incarceration, a CSO is recognized as a form of imprisonment: R. v. W.(L.F.), 1997 10868 (NL CA); R. v. Quilty, 1997 14660 (NL CA), at para 9.

42The Court’s authority to impose a CSO is set out in s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. This section provides that, where the Court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, it may order that the offender serve their sentence in the community. Except as specifically provided by statute, no offences are excluded from being eligible for a CSO nor are there any presumptions for or against a CSO for specific offences: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 SCR 61, at paras 80-81, 127.

43The Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx at paras. 58-61 found that, absent an agreement regarding the appropriate range of sentence, a Court faced with opposing submissions regarding the availability of a CSO must engage in a two-stage analysis. First, it must exclude the possibility of either probationary measures or a penitentiary term as an appropriate sentence. If those possibilities are excluded, it may then determine whether a CSO would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing established in the Criminal Code.

44There has been some debate about whether exceptional circumstances must exist before a conditional sentence can be imposed for offences where denunciation and deterrence are prioritized.

45The role of exceptional circumstances in the context of conditional sentences was discussed in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Pike, 2024 ONCA 608, at paras. 179-182. In that decision, the Court of Appeal concluded at para. 182 that exceptional circumstances are a “shorthand for personal circumstances and mitigating factors that are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate”. The decision also recognized at para. 181 that, for offences where denunciation and deterrence have been prioritized, while there is no presumption against conditional sentences, the nature of the offences may, “require more compelling personal circumstances, mitigating factors, and/or the absence of aggravating factors, to justify a conditional sentence than might have been the case when Proulx was decided more than two decades ago”.

Sentencing for Dangerous Operation Offences

46On December 18, 2018, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts ("Bill C-46") came into force. It created Part VIII.1 of the Criminal Code, which represented a comprehensive harmonization of criminal driving offences. The maximum penalties for several driving offences increased, signalling Parliament's intention to adopt a stronger approach to punishing driving offences: R. v. Boily, 2022 ONCA 611, at para. 51. Particular emphasis has been directed to the deterrence of dangerous operation offences: R. v. Wolfe, 2024 SCC 34, at para. 84.

47Following the amendments, the range of sentences available to be imposed upon individuals convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death continues to be broad. Pursuant to s.320.21 of the Criminal Code, the statutory minimum punishment for a first-time offence is a $1,000 fine. The maximum punishment is life imprisonment. However, as noted in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 SCR 424, at para. 100 and R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, at para. 64, the Court must be mindful that Parliament’s prioritization of denunciation and deterrence supports an upward departure from existing precedents and sentencing ranges for driving offences.

48Prior to Bill C-46, it was clear that reformatory sentences, which would be eligible for a CSO, were within the range of appropriate sentences for individuals convicted of dangerous operation causing death. In Proulx, the seminal case on the application of conditional sentences, the Supreme Court found that an 18-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit for an individual who was convicted of dangerous operation causing death and dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following an incident aggravated both by the use of alcohol and extremely erratic driving. Although the Court upheld the sentencing judge’s decision not to grant a CSO, Lamer C.J. noted at para. 130:

I hasten to add that these comments should not be taken as a directive that conditional sentences can never be imposed for offences such as dangerous driving or impaired driving. In fact, were I a trial judge, I might have found that a conditional sentence would have been appropriate in this case. The respondent is still very young, he had no prior record and no convictions since the accident, he seems completely rehabilitated, he wants to go back to school, he has already suffered a lot by causing the death of a friend and was himself in a coma for some time. To make sure that the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence would have been sufficiently addressed, I might have imposed conditions such as house arrest and a community service order requiring the offender to speak to designated groups about the consequences of dangerous driving, as was the case in Parker, supra, at p. 239, and R. v. Hollinsky (1995), 1995 8929 (ON CA), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 472 (Ont. C.A.).

49Post Bill C-46, the appropriate sentence range for dangerous operation causing death is the subject of some debate due to the absence of appellate guidance: R. v. Kerr, 2024 ONSC 1514, at para. 55; R. v. Kalyan Trivedi, 2024 ONSC 3936, at para. 88. To date, the Court of Appeal has declined to fix a range, although it has observed that Bill C-46 has signaled Parliament’s intention that sentences should increase: Lojovic, at para. 64; R. v. Georgopoulos, 2026 ONCA 27, at para. 26; Boily, at paras. 51, 73. It has also recognized that an accused’s good character will not necessarily carry significant weight in sentencing because driving offences are often committed by individuals who are otherwise of good character: Georgopoulos, at para. 20.

50Post Bill C-46, the range of sentences that has emerged at the trial level for dangerous operation causing death include CSOs at the low end and double-digit penitentiary terms at the high end: Kerr, at para. 56; R. v. Kuzio, 2025 ONSC 2654, at para. 40. In imposing sentence, a Court must be mindful of the broad range of conduct encompassed by the offence: Lojovic, at para. 64. It should carefully review cases which have considered similar conduct in an effort to achieve parity: Kaylan Trivedi, at para. 9.

51Counsel provided several cases for the Court’s consideration. I found the following to be of particular assistance:

a. In R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922, the Court imposed a two and a half year sentence of incarceration and a six-year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following a trial that resulted in a conviction for dangerous operation causing bodily harm. The accused was operating a high-performance sports car. He collided with a parked vehicle in the curbside lane while he was overtaking a Toronto streetcar on its right side at a high speed. His passenger sustained catastrophic injuries. He had no criminal record, no relevant driving violations, and a strong employment history. He also had a family and substantial community support. Subject to a minor variation of the driving prohibition imposed, the sentence was upheld on appeal: 2026 ONCA 27.

b. In R. v. Kuzio, 2025 ONSC 2654 the Court imposed a three and a half year sentence of incarceration and a five year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following a five-day trial that resulted in a conviction for dangerous operation causing death. The accused was engaged in a race with another vehicle and was operating at a high speed. He lost control of his vehicle and collided with an oncoming vehicle, resulting in the death of the driver. The accused was a young man with no prior criminal or driving record. He also sustained serious injuries in the collision, including a brain injury and multiple fractures.

c. In R. v. Goulet, 2009 ONCA 786, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 18 months’ incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following a guilty plea for dangerous operation causing death and dangerous operation causing bodily harm. The accused collided with an oncoming vehicle after passing on an s-curve. The accused had been driving recklessly prior to the incident. He was young and had no prior criminal record. The sentencing judge considered, but declined to order, a CSO. The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and declined to interfere with the sentence.

d. In R. v. Naveed, 2025 ONCJ 268, the Court imposed a CSO of two years less a day, with house arrest for the full sentence, followed by three years’ probation. The sentence also included an order to perform 180 hours of community service and a five-year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following a guilty plea for dangerous operation causing death. While test driving a car, the 18-year-old accused drove at speeds approaching 140 km/h in a 50 km/h posted senior safety zone. While entering an intersection, he collided with and killed a 60-year-old driver who had just initiated a left turn. The accused had no prior record.

e. In R. v. Kandola, 2024 ONCJ 659, the Court imposed a CSO of 2 years less a day, followed by 30 months’ probation. The sentence also included a five-year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following a guilty plea to one count of dangerous operation causing death. The accused accelerated to speeds approaching 156 km/h in a 70km/h zone while attempting to pass traffic. He struck a vehicle as it was attempting to execute a left turn. The accused was an 18-year old university student with no prior record. He experienced post-traumatic stress disorder following the incident for which he was receiving counselling. He had extensive family and community support.

f. In R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197, the Court imposed a CSO of two years less a day and a four and a half year driving prohibition. The sentence was imposed following an uncontested trial that resulted in convictions for dangerous operation causing death and dangerous operation causing bodily harm. The trial was necessary because the accused was unable to remember the incident. It was found at trial that he had attempted to pass a line of cars at a point on the highway where he could not see oncoming traffic. He collided with an oncoming vehicle, causing the death of one of its occupants and serious injuries to two others. The accused was also seriously injured in the collision. He had no prior criminal or driving record.

52The decisions in R. v. Obermok, 2023 ONCJ 401 and R. v. Park-Romain, 2023 ONCJ 302, both referenced by the Crown, involved the presence of alcohol and were distinguishable. I did, however, note the sentencing principles discussed in both decisions. The appeal decision in R. v. Singh, 2019 ONCA 872, which involved a collision on the same highway as the present incident, and also occurred in winter road conditions, was distinguishable as it involved a commercial motor vehicle and findings that the accused had engaged in a course of reckless driving leading up to the incident at issue.

53I also considered the decision in R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247, a case which occurred in the context of commercial driving but also involved a collision that occurred in adverse weather conditions. The accused was charged after failing to stop at an intersection. The Court found that he failed to reduce his speed notwithstanding darkness and the presence of fog. Following a five-day trial, he was convicted of one count of dangerous operation causing death and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm. In sentencing the accused, the Court noted the accused’s young age, the absence of a prior criminal or driving record, and the collateral consequences of the conviction. The Court also found that the offence involved low moral blameworthiness. It imposed a CSO of two years less a day and a concurrent CSO of 18 months, followed by three years of probation. It also imposed a seven-year driving prohibition.

Discussion

The offence and the offender – relevant considerations

Moral Blameworthiness

54As noted in my review of the case law, the range of sentences imposed for dangerous operation offences is broad, even following the legislative amendments in Bill C-46.

55In crafting an appropriate sentence, the Court must consider, among other things, the moral blameworthiness of the conduct giving rise to the offence. As noted by the Court of Appeal in R. v. J.L., 2000 15854 (ON CA), at para. 3: “The more that the conduct tends toward demonstrating a deliberate endangerment of other users of the road and pedestrians, the more serious the offence and the more likely that a lengthy prison term will be required.”

56In my view, Mr. Roeters’ conduct in committing this offence falls at the lower end of the spectrum of moral blameworthiness. As I have noted, I do not find on the evidence that Mr. Roeters was driving recklessly prior to the offence; he was neither weaving in and out of traffic nor operating at excessive speeds. He was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The dangerous driving that led to the offence before the Court was not protracted. Instead, Mr. Roeters’ conduct was borne of a brief, but extremely serious, lapse in judgment, with tragic consequences. That lapse of judgment was not merely negligent; as a jury of Mr. Roeters’ peers found, it was criminal. While it warrants a sentence commensurate with criminal conduct, it does not warrant a sentence that would be appropriate for offences demonstrating higher moral blameworthiness.

Aggravating Circumstances

57While Mr. Roeters’ conduct as a whole places him on the lower end of the spectrum of moral blameworthiness, the Court must also consider whether there are features of the offence itself which are aggravating.

58The Crown asks the Court to consider Mr. Roeters’ choice to pass as an aggravating factor in sentencing. They note that the attempt to pass was unnecessary. There was no reason to pass as the tractor-trailers proceeding ahead of Mr. Roeters were travelling at or about the speed limit.

59The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 SCR 366, at para. 70, noted that “choices which demonstrate a reckless disregard for human life increase not only the gravity of the offence but the moral culpability of the offender and may amount to an aggravating factor in sentencing”. While the “reckless disregard” in Parranto occurred in a different context, in my view the underlying principle remains the same: conduct that endangers others is aggravating when it is undertaken by choice.

60In this case, Mr. Roeters not only made an unnecessary decision to pass, but he also made that decision when he was unable to ascertain whether the pass could be completed safely, due to blowing snow and poor visibility. His conduct demonstrated a reckless disregard for the lives of other drivers on the road.

61I find that this is appropriately considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

Mitigating Circumstances

62In addition to considering aggravating circumstances of the offence or the offender, I must also consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. In Mr. Roeters’ case, the mitigating circumstances include the following:

a. Mr. Roeters appears before the Court as a youthful first-time offender.

b. While Mr. Roeters did not enter a plea of guilt, there is evidence that he understands the consequences of his actions and is remorseful. In his PSR, it is noted that he feels regret for what happened. Immediately after the collision, he was reported to be visibly upset, crying, and asking repeatedly about the condition of the other driver. He continues to have difficulty speaking about the collision, and in its aftermath has experienced a recurrence of a stress-related skin condition.

c. Mr. Roeters has a strong pro-social background, strong family and community supports, and a stable employment history. Each of these factors contribute to excellent prospects of rehabilitation.

Other Personal Circumstances

63As noted previously, Mr. Roeters will suffer collateral consequences due to the mandatory suspension of his driver’s licence as he is required to drive for his employment. Those consequences will be amplified by any additional driving prohibition imposed by the Court.

64In R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, at para. 48, Justice Moldaver noted the following:

Though collateral consequences are not necessarily “aggravating” or “mitigating” factors under s. 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code — as they do not relate to the gravity of the offence or the level of responsibility of the offender — they nevertheless speak to the “personal circumstances of the offender” (Pham, at para. 11). The relevance of collateral consequences stems, in part, from the application of the sentencing principles of individualization and parity: ibid.; s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code. The question is not whether collateral consequences diminish the offender’s moral blameworthiness or render the offence itself less serious, but whether the effect of those consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances. Like offenders should be treated alike, and collateral consequences may mean that an offender is no longer “like” the others, rendering a given sentence unfit.

65While the impact of a suspension or prohibition is not a mitigating factor to be considered in sentencing Mr. Roeters, I find that it is a relevant factor to be considered in assessing the proportionality and parity of the available sentencing options for him. I have considered it as such.

Stage One: Can the possibility of either probationary measures or a penitentiary term be excluded as appropriate sentences for Mr. Roeters?

66It is undisputed that a period of imprisonment is appropriate in this case. As noted, however, the Crown submits that Mr. Roeters’ offence warrants a period of imprisonment in excess of two years, which would make him ineligible for the CSO proposed by his counsel.

67I find, having regard to the totality of circumstances in this case, that a penitentiary term would not be an appropriate sentence for Mr. Roeters. While Mr. Roeters’ offence resulted in the gravest of consequences, the death of Mr. Ethier, that fact alone cannot inevitably lead to a penitentiary sentence. By legislating a fine as the mandatory minimum sentence, Parliament has given the Court a broad discretion to craft sentences that reflect the spectrum of conduct that can result in a dangerous operation conviction.

68In this case, Mr. Roeters’ conduct, while criminal, bore none of the hallmarks of dangerous operation offences that have historically attracted penitentiary sentences. Mr. Roeters was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the offence. His driving was not impaired by the effects of alcohol or drugs. His driving prior to the offence was not reckless. While making the choice to unnecessarily pass when visibility was poor is aggravating, when considered in the context of Mr. Roeters’ driving as a whole, it does not elevate the moral culpability of his conduct to a range that would require a penitentiary sentence.

69The scale is further tipped away from a penitentiary sentence when one considers Mr. Roeters’ personal circumstances. Mr. Roeters is a youthful first-time offender who benefits from the Court’s restraint in imposing a sentence. Mitigating circumstances and the collateral consequences of the mandatory suspension of Mr. Roeters’ driver’s licence on his employment further assist his position on sentencing.

70In my view, when these factors are weighed, and when one considers the recent comparable cases in which reformatory sentences were determined to be appropriate following convictions for dangerous operation causing death, a reformatory sentence, not a penitentiary sentence, is the most fitting sentence for Mr. Roeters.

Stage Two: Would a CSO be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing established in the Criminal Code?

Denunciation and Deterrence

71The objectives of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing are the most challenging issues to address in determining an appropriate sentence for Mr. Roeters.

72The challenge of addressing sentence in cases involving dangerous operation were well-described in the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Bosco, 2016 BCCA 55, at paras. 37-39:

Dangerous driving causing bodily harm is widely recognized as an offence of considerable gravity. Pursuant to s. 249(3) of the Criminal Code, the maximum sentence is ten years' imprisonment. When an offender drives dangerously the public is needlessly placed at great risk of harm, sometimes with life-altering consequences. While the consequences are unintended, the risk-taking that produced them is undertaken by choice: Rawn at para. 41; R. v. Gill, 2010 BCCA 388at para. 25.

General deterrence and denunciation are the primary sentencing goals in dangerous driving cases. Members of the public share its highways and are entitled to do so in the expectation of reasonable safety based, in part, on responsible use of motor vehicles by all concerned. As Madam Justice Epstein emphasized in Rawn at paras. 49-50, driving is a privilege that can wreak great havoc when it is exercised recklessly. Accordingly, sentences for dangerous driving must unambiguously express society's condemnation of the conduct and serve to warn like-minded others that it will not be tolerated.

Driving offences are unusual in that otherwise law-abiding citizens like Mr. Bosco may be inclined to commit them without fully appreciating their criminality. Driving is a commonplace activity, and, to varying extents, human frailties like impatience, inattentiveness and impulsivity are ubiquitous. When drivers irresponsibly indulge such frailties from behind the wheel they imperil others in their orbit, sometimes with catastrophic consequences. All drivers are expected to know this and govern themselves accordingly. When they do not and harm ensues, the result is no mere accident. It is a true crime: R. v. Giles, 2012 BCSC 775at para. 25; Johnson at para. 30.

73In my view, an appropriate sentence in this case not only must speak to drivers generally but also must speak specifically to drivers who operate on the Highway 11 corridor where this offence occurred. That corridor has been the scene of prior dangerous driving incidents: R. v. Singh, 2018 ONSC 386 aff’d 2019 ONCA 872; R. v. Verma, 2025 ONSC 4667.

74Like Mr. Roeters, both Singh and Verma involved vehicles (in those cases commercial vehicles) attempting to pass on the two-lane highway during the winter. Similar to the present case, Singh occurred in an area where there was a dashed yellow line on the roadway, but visibility ahead was obscured by blowing snow.

75These collisions are not isolated incidents. On December 24, 2025, the CBC reported that Fleet management and safety company Samsara identified the stretch of Highway 11 between Kapuskasing and Hearst to be one of the 20 most dangerous winter roads in Canada: The most dangerous winter road in Ontario is not the 401. Here’s where it really is. (n.d.). https://www.cbc.ca/lite/story/9.7027665.

76Clearly, users of Highway 11 must come to understand that unless they adapt their winter driving to the presenting road conditions, avoidable tragedies will continue to occur.

77I find that a lengthy CSO with stringent conditions, and a lengthy driving prohibition will satisfy the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. Such a sentence is consistent with sentences imposed on other youthful first-time offenders convicted of dangerous driving offences that involve lapses in judgment as opposed to outrageous driving conduct. In my view, a lengthy driving prohibition, in particular, will serve the objectives of general and specific deterrence given its impact on Mr. Roeters’ employment. This favours the imposition of a CSO.

Safety of the Community

78If Mr. Roeters were to commit further serious driving offences (or any offences) during the term of his sentence, he could pose a risk to the safety of others in his community and on the roadway. As such, I must assess the likelihood that he will re-offend if he is sentenced to a CSO.

79In my view, Mr. Roeters poses an extremely low risk of re-offending. In the four years since this incident occurred, he has continued to drive, without incident. His pre-offence driving history raises no significant cause for concern.

80There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Roeters will not comply with a driving prohibition or the terms of a CSO. He has the support of his family and friends to assist him with challenges that may arise as he serves his sentence.

81I find that permitting Mr. Roeters to serve his sentence in the community would give rise to no safety concerns. This favours the imposition of a CSO.

Reparations to the Victim and the Community

82Reparations are intended to act as a form of restorative justice, for harm done to the victim or the community. In this case, of course, there is nothing that Mr. Roeters can do to repair the harm that he has brought to Mr. Ethier and his family. They will live with the consequences of what he has done for the rest of their lives, and he will have to live with the knowledge that he visited those consequences upon them.

83Mr. Ethier’s sister noted in the PSR that, for her, reparations would demonstrate that Mr. Roeters had learned from this incident.

84There have been sentencing decisions which have found that, in cases involving dangerous driving causing death, reparations to the community may be made through the imposition of an order for community service: R. v. Manahan, 2010 ONCJ 360; R. v. Armitage, 2023 ONCJ 182. As noted by the Court in Proulx at para. 107, community service orders may, in some cases, also have a deterrent effect:

Moreover, a conditional sentence can provide significant deterrence if sufficiently punitive conditions are imposed and the public is made aware of the severity of these sentences. There is also the possibility of deterrence through the use of community service orders, including those in which the offender may be obliged to speak to members of the community about the evils of the particular criminal conduct in which he or she engaged…

85Mr. Roeters has prior involvement in community service projects and would be an ideal candidate for a community service order. I find that a community service order that requires him, among other things, to make speeches to schools and other community service organizations regarding his offence and his experience in the criminal justice system would be a fitting means by which he can make reparations to the community. It would also ensure that not only will Mr. Roeters learn from this incident, but others will as well.

86A community service order can be imposed either in a CSO or in a probation order following a reformatory term. A CSO would permit Mr. Roeters’ reparations to the community to commence immediately, which favours the imposition of a CSO.

Appropriate Sentence

87I have grappled with how best to craft a sentence that reflects the gravity of Mr. Roeters’ crime and denounces the conduct that led to it, that deters other drivers from committing similar acts of dangerous driving on Highway 11 and elsewhere, and that addresses the appropriate sentencing objectives for Mr. Roeters as an individual.

88It is not lost on me, and I suspect it was not lost on the jury, that under most other circumstances Mr. Roeters’ driving would have been perfectly acceptable. He was passing in a flat, straight area that was identified with road markings as a safe place to pass. I have little doubt that encountering Mr. Ethier on the roadway was just as much a shock to Mr. Roeters as it was to Mr. Ethier. I fully accept Mr. Roeters’ statement in the PSR that, if he could change the events of that day, he would.

89In sentencing Mr. Roeters, I am also mindful of the fact that Mr. Ethier’s death was not the intended outcome of his actions. Rather, it was the collateral consequence of a dangerous lapse in judgment. While not determinative, this distinction appears to be recognized by Mr. Ethier’s family, who have called for some measure of leniency in sentencing to permit Mr. Roeters to move forward without carrying the weight of this incident into the next chapter of his life.

90These considerations must, however, be balanced against the gravity of Mr. Roeters’ offence. With their decision, the jury sent a clear message that, by passing in conditions of poor visibility, Mr. Roeters’ driving was not merely negligent or careless, it was a serious criminal offence. In imposing sentence, the Court must make it equally clear to the public, and in particular to users of the Highway 11 corridor, that it is an offence that will attract serious criminal consequences. It is only by imposing a deterrent sentence that the Court can hope to eliminate the senseless loss of lives that occur when drivers operate their vehicles dangerously on our roadways.

91I find that a CSO is consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing established in the Criminal Code, but that it should be a CSO that extends for the maximum period allowable by law, and that the majority of it should be served under house arrest conditions.

92In addition to carceral conditions, it is my view that the sentencing objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation will be fulfilled by imposing the following conditions in the CSO:

a. That Mr. Roeters will be required to engage in community service, which will include a requirement that he make presentations in his community regarding his experience with dangerous driving. The purpose of this order is not only to make reparations to the community, but also to deter others from engaging in similar dangerous driving conduct.

b. That Mr. Roeters will be required to engage in counselling and rehabilitative programs, including a program addressing his driving skills.

c. That Mr. Roeters will be prohibited from consuming alcohol and other substances throughout the term of his CSO. While Mr. Roeters does not abuse substances, this condition will support his good conduct throughout the term of his CSO. It will also support the credibility of his CSO by reinforcing to him and to the public that he is serving a term of imprisonment. Were he incarcerated, he would not be consuming, and in my view, it is fitting that his conditions of house arrest should be similarly restrictive.

93Pursuant to s.320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, the Court has the discretion following a conviction for dangerous operation causing death to issue a driving prohibition for any period that it considers appropriate. In reviewing the case law, it appears that a driving prohibition of 5 years has been considered an appropriate range following a conviction for dangerous driving causing death under similar circumstances. In my view, there are no circumstances in this case that would warrant a departure from this range. Although Mr. Roeters will experience collateral consequences from a lengthy driving prohibition, in my view a lengthy prohibition is necessary to serve the objectives of general and specific deterrence in this case.

94The Crown has requested that an order be made requiring Mr. Roeters to submit a DNA sample to the national database. This request was not opposed by Mr. Roeters. Given the nature of the offence at issue and the facts of this case I am satisfied that the Crown has demonstrated that a DNA order would be in the best interests of the administration of justice.

95Neither the Crown nor the defence took a position with respect to the victim fine surcharge. Mr. Roeters is employed, and, in my view, there is no reason to dispense with the requirement to pay a victim fine surcharge. He will be ordered to pay it but given a reasonable amount of time to satisfy that obligation.

Disposition

96For these reasons, I am imposing the following sentence on Mr. Roeters:

1. Ms. Roeters is ordered to serve a conditional sentence of imprisonment for two years, less one day.

2. In addition to any statutory and reporting conditions, the terms of the conditional sentence order shall be as follows:

a. For the first 18 months of his sentence, he shall be confined to his current residence, or such other residence as may be approved by his supervisor. The only exceptions to this confinement shall be:

i. On Saturdays between 10am and 4pm to acquire the necessities of life;

ii. For any medical emergencies involving himself or any member of his immediate family;

iii. For going directly to and from and being at school, employment, court attendances, religious services, and legal, medical, or dental appointments;

iv. For going directly to or from and being at assessment, treatment, or counselling sessions;

v. For going directly to or from and performing community service hours;

vi. For carrying out any legal obligations regarding compliance with this conditional sentence order; and,

vii. Any other exception that may be approved in writing by his supervisor; he shall carry that written approval with him.

b. During his period of home confinement, he:

i. Shall not change his place of residence without first obtaining the written permission of his supervisor; and,

ii. Shall present himself at his doorway upon the request of his supervisor or a peace officer for the purpose of verifying his compliance with his home confinement condition.

c. For the remaining 6 months (less one day) of his sentence, he shall be subject to a curfew to be fixed by his supervisor. The only exceptions to this curfew shall be:

i. For any medical emergencies involving himself or any member of his immediate family; and,

ii. For any hospital visit or funeral attendance;

iii. For travelling directly to, from, and while at his school or employment;

iv. Any other exception that may be approved in writing by his supervisor.

d. During his curfew period he shall present himself at his doorway upon the request of his supervisor or a peace officer for the purpose of verifying his compliance with his curfew condition.

e. For the purpose of subparagraphs (a) and (c), Mr. Roeters’ schedule shall be provided to his supervisor and approved in advance.

f. He shall not buy, possess, or consume alcohol or other intoxicating substances.

g. He shall not possess or consume any unlawful drugs or substances (refer to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) except with a valid prescription in his name or those available over the counter.

h. He shall attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by his supervisor and complete them to the satisfaction of his supervisor, including but not limited to programs for stress management, bereavement and grief issues, and driving skills.

i. He shall sign any release of information forms as will enable his supervisor to monitor his attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed.

j. He shall provide proof of his attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed.

k. He shall participate in 100 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by his supervisor but must be completed within 18 months of the start date of this Order.

l. He shall make at least 4 presentations to groups in his community regarding dangerous driving and his experience with dangerous driving. At least one presentation must be at a high school. The presentations shall be organized in conjunction with and approved by his supervisor.

3. Mr. Roeters shall be prohibited from driving for a period of five years from the date of sentencing.

4. Mr. Roeters shall attend and provide a sample of his DNA for the national database. His attendance shall also be a condition in his CSO.

5. Mr. Roeters shall pay a Victim Fine Surcharge of $200 within 90 days.

cULLIN J.