Zaidi v. Zia, 2026 ONSC 291

CITATION: Zaidi v. Zia, 2026 ONSC 291

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00000075-0000

DATE: 2026-01-14

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

491 Steeles Avenue East, Milton ON L9T 1Y7

RE: Rubaid Zaidi, applicant

AND:

Sarina Khalid Zia, respondent

BEFORE: Justice M. Kurz

COUNSEL: Farrah Hudani and Jessica Luscombe, for the applicant

Fadwa Yehia and Astha Dhanda, for the respondent

Archana Medhekar, Office of the Children’s Lawyer

HEARD: November 24 – 28, December 3, 9, 22, 2025, January 2 and 6, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

Introduction

1The Applicant father, Rubaid Zaidi (the “Father” or “Rubaid”), applies under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the “Hague Convention”), for the return of his two children, an eight-year-old daughter whom I describe as “L” and a five-year-old son whom I describe as “Y” (collectively the “Children”).¹

2The Father argues that the Children are habitually resident in the United Kingdom (the “UK”), where they were born, grew up, attended school and spent almost all of their lives until the Respondent mother (the “Mother” or “Sarina”) wrongfully retained them in Oakville. While he concedes that he had briefly discussed a move to Canada with the Mother in May 2025, he contends that he changed his mind within days. Since then, he has consistently made clear to the Mother that he would not consent to the Children’s move to Canada. While he did consent to the Mother’s request to take the Children to Oakville for their annual holiday trip to visit her family, his consent was explicitly limited to a “temporary stay”. It was not a consent to relocation. It was only granted after the Mother obtained return plane tickets. The Father says that he was clear and consistent, that he never consented to or acquiesced to the relocation of the Children to Canada.

3The Mother and Children were due to return to the UK on September 4, 2025, the return date on their plane tickets. But they failed to do so. On that date, the Mother sent a message to the Father that she was “delaying” her return flight because she was “not well”, and the Children were “having fun”. The Father states that the Mother’s statement about a “delay” in the Children’s return was untrue. The Mother had no intention of returning with the Children. In response, he told her that he would commence these proceedings.

4The Mother claims that the Children are habitually resident in Canada as well as the UK because of their annual visits to see her family in Oakville. Thus, the Hague Convention does not apply to her retention of the Children in Canada. If the court does not accept that argument, the Mother asserts that all three of the exceptions to the return of the Children found in Article 13 of the Hague Convention apply. In particular, she asserts that:

1. The Father consented or acquiesced to her retention of the Children in Canada;

2. If the Children were ordered to be returned to the UK, they would be at a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or would otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation. The Mother makes this claim based on two grounds. First, she asserts that the Father subjected her and the Children to a “cumulative, repetitive and unrelenting pattern of domestic violence” during both the parties’ marriage and following their separation. Second, she is the Children’s primary caregiver. Since she refuses to return to the UK, if the Children were ordered to return to the UK, they would suffer intolerable emotional harm from the deprivation of her care.

3. The children object to being returned to the UK. At the ages of five and eight, they have attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views.

5The Office of the Children’s Lawyer (the “OCL”) is fully aligned with the Mother’s position, even with regard to issues in which the Children do not appear to have offered any evidence or views.² The only area in which the OCL differs from the Mother is with regard to the timing of the Children’s habitual residence in Canada. Rather than saying that the Children were always habitually resident in Canada, the OCL says that the Children became habitually resident in Canada during the 29 days between their arrival in Canada on August 6, 2024 and the date that the Mother refused to return them, September 4, 2025.

6For the reasons which follow, I find that the Children are habitually resident in the UK and make the orders and declarations cited below, including an order for the Children’s return to the UK.

Background

7The Mother and the Father (collectively the “Parents”) are both of Pakistani Muslim heritage, although each has a different approach to their background and religious practice. Each is a British citizen, although the Mother is also a Canadian citizen. While the Children have lived in the UK all of their lives, save vacation trips abroad, they are also Canadian citizens. The Children also hold Pakistani National Identity Cards, which may qualify them for Pakistani citizenship.³ The paternal grandparents reside in Pakistan, where the Children have visited them, in the uncontested words of the Father, “a handful of times”.

8The Mother was born in Bahrain but describes herself as raised in Pakistan. The Father was born in Pakistan and primarily resided there until he was 17 or 18, other than a three-year period between the ages of 12 -15, when he resided in Canada. The Parents met in high school in Pakistan but were in different social circles.⁴ The Mother and her parents emigrated to Canada in 2005, when the Mother commenced university. She later left university to study fashion design.

9In 2012, the Father contacted the Mother by Facebook. They communicated virtually for a year before the Father visited her in person in 2013. They dated for 1 ½ year before telling their families about their relationship and another 1 ½ years before marrying.

10The Parents married in Manchester, UK on April 29, 2014. They later engaged in a religious marriage ceremony in Pakistan on December 23, 2014. They separated in October or November of 2024 and jointly applied for a divorce in the UK on December 18, 2024. On March 13, 2025, before the civil divorce was granted, the Mother applied for and later obtained a religious divorce in Pakistan, known as a Khula. Both divorces were on consent although, as set out below, there was some contention regarding the grounds for the Khula and the Mother’s disclosure of those grounds to the Father before he consented to it. The Parents’ civil divorce was finalized in the UK on August 11, 2025.

11After they married, the Parents first lived together in Manchester before moving to the smaller village of Wilmslow. They lived there with the Children until the Mother brought the Children to Canada on August 6, 2025. The Father works in a British real estate and development firm. The Mother was a stay-at-home parent and primary caregiver since the time of the first child’s birth.

12When each child reached the age of two, the Parents enrolled her or him in the private Ryleys School (“Ryleys”), near their residence in Wilmslow. The Children remained at Ryleys until they were retained in Canada in September 2025. They had been enrolled in Ryleys for the current academic year. By all accounts, the Children were quite successful at Ryleys. They were doing well academically and even winning grade level awards. The Children had a number of friends in their school. They were also enrolled in activities such as soccer for Y, dance for L and swimming for both.

13In Wilmslow, the Children (and the Parents) spent a great deal of time with their paternal uncle, Uzair Zaidi (“Uzair”), aunt Sidra Nasir (“Sidra”), and their two children. Those four children are close in both age and affection. Each of the Children is within one year of the age of their paternal cousin of the same sex. They have been collectively described, without contention, as being akin to siblings.

14The parties’ relationship was fractious, apparently from early on. They argued a great deal, particularly after they had the Children. The Mother accuses the Father of various forms of abuse to herself and the Children; physical, emotional, and sexual (towards her after they separated). She also accuses him of coercive control, including financial control.

15The Mother asserts that the Father:

1. Repeatedly exposed her to physical and verbal assaults during the marriage;

2. Swore at and threatened her, often in Urdu;

3. Once grabbed L by the collar when she was two and misbehaving in a restaurant;

4. Once threw Y on a couch;

5. Propositioned her and exposed himself to her after their divorce;

6. Controlled her finances, including the three properties which were purchased, using money gifted by the Mother’s parents (the “Properties”). The Parents co-owned the Properties, and the Father was a party to their mortgages. He also managed their rentals, at least until their divorce (and perhaps longer). The Mother contends that the Father’s coercive financial control included his refusal to co-sign a new lease for her and the Children in Wilmslow, after her lease expired in August 2025. It also included the gift of a car that had been in her name to the Father’s brother.

16The Father denies the allegations of abuse, although he does not deny the fact that the parties often disagreed. But he downplays the level of their disagreement. He describes the Mother’s various allegations of abuse and coercive control as either false or over-stated. He states that he never assaulted the Mother, although he admits to once grabbing her hand during an argument when she was angry and began screaming at him.

17The Father’s submission is essentially that in arguments, the Mother (adopting the vernacular), gave as good as she got, even using extreme profanity to refer to both him and his family. He adds that far from controlling, he was an equal and respectful partner, who did not attempt to dominate the Mother. He only asked for the respect he afforded to her. Even when the Mother accused him of serious abuse in order to obtain a Pakistani Khula or religious divorce, allegations he strongly denies, he was willing to consent to her request for that religious divorce. He also agreed to allow her to travel to Canada to visit her family each summer, including this past one.

18Regarding finances, post-separation he voluntarily paid her £2,700/month without the need for a court order. Those payments went towards the rent of the large home she continued to occupy with the Children after separation, paid for certain other expenses on her behalf and allowed her to draw up to £1,000 per month on his credit card for family expenses. That, he asserts, is far from coercive financial control.

Relevant Provisions of the Hague Convention

19The objects of the Hague Convention are set out in its Article 1, as follows:

Article 1

The objects of the present Convention are –

a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and

b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.

20Article 3 sets out when the removal or retention of a child is considered to be wrongful. It states:

Article 3

The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where -

a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

21Here, no party questions that the Father was exercising the Hague Convention’s broad understanding of rights of custody over the Children prior to the Mother’s retention of the Children in Ontario: see Thomson v. Thomson, 1994 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at p. 580.

22Article 12 of the Hague Convention requires the immediate return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained as set out in Article 3, and less than a year has elapsed between the time of removal and retention and the commencement of the judicial proceedings for the return of the child. However, as set out below, that provision is subject to Article 13, cited below.

23Article 13 sets out three exceptions to the mandatory return of a wrongfully removed or retained child. It states:

Article 13

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -

a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or

b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.

In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence.

24Here, both the Mother and the OCL claim the applicability of all three Article 13 exceptions, if the Children are found not to have been habitually resident in Canada at the time of their retention. I will have more to say regarding Article 13 below.

25As set out in Article 19, “[a] decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” The point was emphasized by McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, at para. 24:

24 The Hague Convention is aimed at enforcing custody rights and securing the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence: see Article 1; Thomson v. Thomson, 1994 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at pp. 579-81. The return order is not a custody determination: Article 19. It is simply an order designed to restore the status quo which existed before the wrongful removal or retention, and to deprive the "wrongful" parent of any advantage that might otherwise be gained by the abduction. Its purpose is to return the child to the jurisdiction which is most appropriate for the determination of custody and access.

26In Thomson, at p. 579, La Forest J., writing for the majority stated that “the primary object of the [Hague] Convention is the enforcement of custody rights” (emphasis omitted).

27The Hague Convention seeks to protect the best interests of children in general by deterring child abduction and promoting prompt resolution of custody (i.e. parenting) disputes: Balev, at para. 34. In their dissenting opinion, albeit not on the point⁵, Côté and Rowe J.J., on behalf of themselves and Moldaver J., state, at para. 125:

125 The object of a legal proceeding under the Convention is not to determine whether an order returning the child to another country, or residing with a particular parent, is in the child's best interests. This follows from Article 16, which states that a court "shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention". Subject to the specific exceptions to return in Article 13, custody proceedings, not Convention proceedings, are the appropriate forum for this analysis. The Hague Convention can be seen as addressing a more preliminary question: in which jurisdiction should a custody determination be made? … This is how the system is intended to work. It is in those subsequent proceedings, not in the initial Hague Convention application, that a court is entitled (and in the best position) to assess the individual child's best interests with respect to custody.

28In other words, as the Ontario Court of Appeal put it in Cannock v. Fleguel, 2008 ONCA 758, 303 D.L.R. (4th) 542, at para. 23:

23 The philosophy of the Hague Convention is that it is in the best interest of children that the courts of their habitual residence decide the merits of any custody issue. Adhering to this philosophy ultimately discourages child abduction, renders forum shopping ineffective, and provides children with the greatest possible stability in the instance of a family breakdown.

29In Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, 437 D.L.R. (4th) 517, at para. 19, Tulloch J.A. (as he then was) further explained the purposes of the Hague Convention’s prompt return object. He wrote for the court:

19 …The object of prompt return serves three purposes: it protects against the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention, it deters parents from abducting the child in the hope of being able to establish links in a new country that might award them custody, and it aims at rapid resolution of the merits of a custody or access dispute in the forum of a child's habitual residence: Balev, at paras. 25-27.

30Under Article 16 of the Hague Convention, once a timely proceeding is commenced, the court charged with the proceeding “shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention…”: see also Ludwig, at para. 19. Practically, that means that this court can only assume jurisdiction to determine parenting of the Children under the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (the “CLRA”) if it refuses to order their return to the UK.

Issues

31This case raises the following issues:

1. Are the Children habitually resident in Canada? If not, do the three following defences under the Hague Convention apply?

2. Did the Father consent or acquiesce to the Mother’s retention of the Children in Canada?

3. Is there a grave risk that the Children’s return to the UK would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation?

4. Do the Children object to being returned and have they attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views?

Credibility and Reliability

32Before I deal with the issues cited above, it is important in a case like this, in which the credibility and reliability of the claims and denials is central, to consider the credibility and reliability of the parties and other witnesses.

Authorities Regarding Credibility and Reliability

33In R.L. v. M.F., 2023 ONSC 2885, aff’d 2025 ONCA 595, 19 R.F.L. (9th) 39, I described, at paras. 118-124, the tools which the court must use to determine the credibility and reliability of witnesses as follows:

118 In assessing the evidence that I have heard, it is important to note the differences between credibility and reliability. The Father strongly attacks the credibility of the Mother, making it one of the centrepieces of his written argument. The Mother defends her credibility and points to problems with the credibility of the Father.

119 In R. v. Sanichar, 2013 SCC 4, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the dissent below of Laskin J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, 2012 ONCA 117, which included the following instructions about the difference between credibility and reliability:

69 I accept that reliability is not the same as credibility; that is well established. Credibility has to do with the honesty or veracity of a witness' testimony. Reliability has to do with the accuracy of a witness' testimony. Many cases of mistaken identification have shown that a credible witness may give unreliable evidence.

70 The reliability of a witness' testimony is often gauged by the witness's ability to observe, recall and recount the events at issue: see A. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 41. The passage of time may have an effect on the witness' ability to do so accurately.

120 In Sunwing Airlines Inc. v. Mora, 2021 ONSC 1376, at para. 98, Ferguson J. reviewed the applicable caselaw to offer the following summary of factors that a court may rely upon in determining the credibility of a witness:

In assessing each witness's credibility, this court should consider:

(a) the witness's demeanour: are they honestly endeavouring to tell the truth; are they sincere and frank; or are they biased, reticent and evasive?;

(b) how probable or improbable is the witness's evidence? Is it in "harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions"? Does it "make sense" and "conform to the way we expect people to behave in the circumstances?"; and

(c) is the witness's evidence internally consistent? While minor inconsistencies may not diminish the credibility of a witness unduly, a series of inconsistencies in a witness's evidence can lead to the conclusion that the witness is not credible. There is no rule as to when inconsistencies rise to this threshold; the trier of fact "must look at the totality of the evidence to assess the impact of the inconsistencies in that evidence on questions of credibility and reliability pertaining to the core issue in the case".

[Citations omitted]

121 Ferguson J. concluded her review of credibility caselaw by citing this aphorism, offered by Rothstein J. for the Supreme Court of Canada in F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, at para. 76: "[i]n the end, believing the testimony of one witness and not the other is a matter of judgment."

122 One factor highlighted by Rothstein J. in F.H. v. McDougall was the consistency of the evidence offered by a witness, between what is said in the witness box and otherwise. At para. 58, Rothstein J. wrote: "[t]he trial judge should not consider the plaintiff's evidence in isolation, but must look at the totality of the evidence to assess the impact of the inconsistencies in that evidence on questions of credibility and reliability pertaining to the core issue in the case."

123 A helpful list of factors to be considered in determining credibility was offered by Fryer J. in J.M.G. v. L.D.G., 2016 ONSC 3042, at para. 41, where relying on other authorities, she wrote:

41 In Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702, 2016 CarswellOnt 1433, Nicholson J. summarized some aspects of the credibility assessment as set out in Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283, 269 N.S.R. (2d) 84, at paras. 36-37:

a) The ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness's evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness' testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

b) The ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness' testimony.

c) The ability to assess whether the witness' testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is "in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions", but in doing so I am required not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behaviour.

d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanour of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution (R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 [at paras.] 70-75).

e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence. R. v. J.H. 2005 253 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No.39 (OCA) [at paras.] 51-56).

There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness's testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness's evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness's evidence. (See R. v. D.R. 1996 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).

[Emphasis omitted.]

124 Like all conflicting evidence and narratives, I must use the tools cited above, including consistency, reference to internal and external sources of information, and common sense to determine what findings I make. In using my common sense, I remind myself that I must be careful to avoid reliance on myths and stereotypes about the manner in which allegedly abused and controlled persons can be expected to act. I must also consider the notion that credibility is not an all or nothing idea, as set out above.

34To emphasize a point made at para. 124 of R.L. v. M.F., in dealing with issues of alleged domestic or family violence, I must be careful to avoid reliance on myths and stereotypes asserting what an allegedly abused person would do in the face of such violence. I am also aware, as Karakatsanis J. wrote for the Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at para. 144, that “[d]omestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove”. See also V.K.G. v. I.G., 2023 ONSC 6329, 94 R.F.L. (8th) 283, at para. 120.

35Further, it is “important to be aware of the social and legal barriers to women disclosing family violence in family law proceedings”: Barendregt, at para. 183.

36On the other hand, while considering the factors cited above, the court must be open to the notion that allegations of domestic abuse or family violence may be untrue or exaggerated. As Chappel J. wrote at para. 122 of V.K.G.:

…Being closed-minded to these possibilities poses an equally serious threat to the furtherance of justice in cases where family violence claims are advanced, and the courts must therefore meticulously assess the evidence in its totality to ensure that family violence allegations are credible and are not being maliciously advanced to obtain a litigation advantage.

[Citations omitted.]

Credibility and Reliability of the Father

37In her final submissions, the Mother‘s counsel described the Father as avoiding “direct responses at all costs; opting to draw out his explanations in order to run out the clock”. Here, she was referring to the fact that both counsel were subject to time-limited cross examinations of the witnesses at trial.⁶ The Mother’s counsel also argued that some of the Father’s testimony was simply false.

38The Mother’s counsel pointed in particular to a text exchange of October 2, 2024, shortly before the parties separated. The Father was in the nation of Georgia, on business. The parties were discussing problems in their relationship. In his text message, the Father decried the extent of his responsibilities to be at both work and home. At one point, to which the Mother refers, the Father writes “[m]an the problem is. A person like me cannot be with his family 24/7”.⁷ He makes a number of similar comments in the text, which imply that he feels a need for distance, at times from his family, while also having to work for a living. At one point, he speaks about having to do “kids nonsense…[s]tupid shit like [that]” while still being the “bread winner”.

39When cross-examined about the “24/7” statement, the Father offered the context that he was away from home at the time he sent the text, and missing his family. He described his response as offering “a cry for help”. He added that what he meant was that he was actually with his family 24/7, while also managing the Mother’s personal properties. He described himself as a very “hands-on dad”, while “looking after all the income side of things”.

40The Mother argues that the Father refused to admit that she was complaining about his abuse in that text exchange, even though she accused him of being abusive. Instead, the Father claimed that he was unsuccessfully trying to improve their relationship. She says that his explanation is not credible.

41In the relevant portion of the text exchange cited above, the Mother began by telling the Father that they have to have a serious conversation upon his return. She spoke generally of the Father’s “temper” and “abuse”. She complained that she “can’t even talk to you about how [I’m] feeling without you losing your shit”. She said that she cannot “live with an abusive person” who “makes [her] feel so little”. She complained that she is “not well mentally”, that she was “breaking” and that she could not take his behaviour anymore.

42In his text responses, the Father did not directly respond to the Mother’s claims. Rather, he wrote at some length about his feeling of being torn between his work and family responsibilities. He wrote of his need not to be at home as often. He testified that he was not ignoring her concerns but was instead talking about improving their relationship by taking some of the load off of himself. In both his texts and testimony, the Father did not show himself to be very responsive to the Mother’s concerns.

43The Mother also points to contradictions in the Father’s testimony regarding his involvement in the three Properties they jointly owned, which had been gifted in part to her by her parents and for which the Father was a joint mortgagee. In chief, the Father said that he managed those Properties throughout their ten-year marriage, at the Mother’s behest. But in response to a question in cross-examination about the present tenantless status of the Properties, the Father stated that he “stopped managing her rental properties and I guess that’s what she did”.

44The Father further testified that “right after the separation, I gave the Properties back to the mom to look after”. That being said, the Father later added that “while we are sitting here [i.e. in court], I’m still managing her commercial property in terms of leasing it to a new tenant and have zero benefit from the property.” That is a contradiction which the Father failed to clear up at trial.

45The Mother also states that the Father omitted relevant evidence when he said that all of the rental income from the three Properties went to the Mother when in fact, they were untenanted.

46I agree with the Mother that the Father’s evidence was not fully responsive at times. I noted, even during the trial, that he tended to ramble, offering at times unfocussed answers. I took him to task for this tendency more than once during his testimony.

47That being said, I do not find that he was being deliberately evasive. Rather, his responses seemed to reflect what I would describe as a scattered approach. He appeared to me to be thinking of more than one thing at a time, or moving quickly from one thing to another, and having his answers reflect that penchant. Much of the first text exchange set out above reflects the Father’s approach, where the Mother seeks to confront the Father about one thing and he responds with another. Having read a number of their texts, some of which are discussed below, I see a couple talking past each other, often angrily so.

48That being said, I agree with the Mother that in his testimony, the Father attempted to minimize the extent of the conflict between the parties and his role in that conflict. The evidence cited below demonstrates that conflict between the Parents was consistent through most of their relationship, particularly following the birth of the Children.

49In her cross-examination of the Father, the Mother’s counsel sought to focus on financial issues regarding the Properties which the Father agreed to transfer to the Mother as part of their civil divorce. There was a difference of opinion, but no objective evidence presented, one way or another, as to whether he has already done so. Issues regarding the Properties and the Parents’ finances in general appear to have little relevance to parenting. However, that evidence and line of cross-examination are presumably offered to buttress the Mother’s argument of coercive financial control. But there is no contradiction in the Father saying that he managed the Properties during the marriage and then relinquished them to the Mother at separation. But there is a contradiction in the Father’s evidence regarding whether he is managing the rental of her British properties now that she is in Canada. Nonetheless, the issue was not explored in sufficient depth to allow a determination. The same can be said as to allegations regarding whether the Father actually transferred his interest in the Properties to her as part of their divorce settlement and whether there is even a binding divorce settlement. Those may be issues for another day and another court.

50I add though, and perhaps more to the point of credibility regarding alleged financial coercive control, the court has been presented with no evidence which contradicts the Father’s assertion that he never pocketed any of the rents from the Properties.

51Much of the Father’s cross-examination was focused on his text comments that he demanded respect, as a man, from his wife and the Children. The cross-examination attempted to portray him as a traditionalist, controlling chauvinist. He admitted to the desire for respect but not the view that men are better or more entitled to respect than women. Rather, he portrayed himself as a somewhat progressive man within his cultural milieu. Whether that is the case, he and the Mother adopted traditional Western family roles, with him as the breadwinner and her as the stay-at-home wife. That fact, which applies to numerous families of varied backgrounds, does not detract from his credibility.

52In sum, the Father was an imperfect witness. As the Mother has pointed out, there are contradictions in his evidence: an attempt to underplay the conflict between himself and the Mother, a tendency to paint a far rosier picture of their interactions than the evidence supports and a desire to avoid making himself look bad. Those are fair comments regarding the Father’s evidence. But as set out above, I do not see that as a reason to believe that he was deliberately attempting to mislead the court.

53But I also cannot find all of the Father’s evidence to be fully reliable either. He may well have a rosier outlook regarding events than they merit. Certainly, in his texts with the Mother, he demonstrated a tendency to change the subject when the Mother raised concerns about his conduct, including what she described as his abusive conduct. Despite protestations to the contrary, he also showed himself capable of using abusive language to her (as she was to him). But that in itself is not proof of the Mother’s abuse allegations.

54I add that it is trite law that a prior consistent statement, such as the Mother’s text assertions to the Father and the narrative which she provided to the OCL regarding abuse, are presumptively inadmissible for the truth of the facts asserted. As Hourigan J.A. wrote for the majority of a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114, 136 O.R. (3d) 520, at para. 41, leave to appeal refused, 2017 49991 (S.C.C.): “such evidence cannot be used for the prohibited inference that consistency enhances credibility, or the incorrect conclusion that the simple making of a prior consistent statement corroborates in-court testimony”: citing David M. Paciocco, "The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent Statements: Let's Get It Right" (2013), 17 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 181, at p. 199. That being said, a prior consistent statement may be used for narrative context and to explain the timing of a complaint: Khan, at paras. 31, 35, citing R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 37.

Credibility and Reliability of the Mother

55Like the Father, the Mother offers evidence which is imperfect. However, I find that the concerns raised by her evidence are more significant than those of the Father. They include statements in her pleadings which she has withdrawn without fully explaining the contradictions, inconsistencies between her pleadings, affidavits, and oral testimony; contemporaneous evidence set out in the text exchanges between the parties, as well as outright fabrications.

56Starting first with the Mother’s pleadings: her Answer contained a number of serious allegations which she later withdrew, many by simply striking them out. Each of those amendments offers a variation of the Mother’s narrative, with her unilaterally withdrawing or changing some of her most serious claims against the Father. In particular:

1. In her original Answer, the Mother pleaded that her relationship with the Father did not end “peacefully and amicably”. She pleaded: “[i]t was the respondent who was left helpless and had no other option but to surrender herself as per wishes of applicant”. But she then deleted that pleading in her Amended Answer. When cross-examined about this pleading and its subsequent deletion, the Mother delayed in responding but was unable to articulate a comprehensible answer.

2. In her original Answer, the Mother pleaded that she and the Father “are from different backgrounds; [she] is a progressive, modern Canadian Muslim girl.” In her Amended Answer, she deleted that statement and pleaded something different instead, pointing to her traditionality. She pleaded that she:

grew up in a traditional household insofar as her father worked and her mother stayed home to raise the children. She also followed Pakistani Muslim religious and cultural traditions; they form an important part of her values. The Respondent’s parents did not allow her to date or have sleepovers and getting to know someone was for marriage only. The Respondent’s parents also maintained a halal household in that certain foods were restricted as was the consumption of alcohol.

When cross-examined about the deleted and added pleadings, which she felt important enough to change, the Mother denied that there is any contradiction between the two statements – she is progressive in some ways and traditional in others. Yet in her oral evidence, the Mother emphasized the importance to her of her traditional Pakistani Muslim culture as being relevant to the issue of the grave risk of harm which she says the Father poses should the children be returned to the UK.

3. In the same paragraph of her Amended Answer, where she withdrew her statement of being “a progressive, modern Canadian Muslim girl”, the Mother deleted from her original pleading that Mr. Zaidi is “conservative”, leaving the pleading to read: “Mr. Zaidi is conservative, controlling, coercive, intimidating, threatening, authoritarian and dictatorial.” [Strikethrough in the Amended Answer.]

4. In her Amended Answer, the Mother removed those portions of the following sentence from her Answer which are struck through below:

If the children were returned to UK without their mother, they may be taken to Pakistan, ~~a ~~ country where rule of law does not prevail; as father's parents live in Pakistan and children are also citizens of Pakistan or they would be placed with an abusive and violent father or in foster care, and their mother would not be there to protect them.

The Mother made the same claim in her first affidavit in this proceeding, of October 17, 2025.

5. In her evidence in chief, the Mother described the expression of her fears first set out and then deleted above. She stated that the last statement deleted was an “improper statement”. She stated that she is not afraid of the Children being placed in foster care if they are returned to the UK. Rather, what she meant is that the Father cannot take care of the Children. Then in cross-examination, she attempted to withdraw her withdrawal of the claim that if the Children were returned to the Father in the UK, they would be exposed to an abusive and violent father. She stated that she only meant, in withdrawing her original pleading, to withdraw the portion about her fear of foster care. I add that no evidence has been offered that the Father contemplated abducting the Children to Pakistan.

6. In her Amended Answer, the Mother made a number of other deletions from her original pleading, including the following (strikethroughs in the Amended Answer):

a. She “is a member of a particular social group who faced domestic violence and persecution at the hands of the applicant for years”;

b. “The respondent's relationship with applicant during marriage and after separation and divorce was characterized by power imbalance, duress, coercion, violence, assaults, mental, physical and sexual ~~harassment. If the respondent and her children were not Canadian citizens, they would have to apply for a convention refugee status to protect themselves from the persecution ~~of the applicant.”

c. The respondent fled from refused to return to the United Kingdom to escape years of domestic violence, including psychological and physical abuse, financial and emotional abuse, sexual harassment and sexual abuse and controlling behaviour of the father.

d. In 2024 the respondent had her hysterectomy, the applicant kicked the respondent in her back and he also told respondent that she was now no good because she couldn't bear more children for him So, if he "hit respondent too hard" it didn't matter. The applicant would still leave the respondent. [Emphasis in the original.]

e. Following are the instances of whatsapp communication between the applicant and respondent signifying that the marriage did not end peacefully and amicably. It was the respondent who was left helpless and had no other option but to surrender herself as per wishes of applicant. Respondent: "I cant even talk to you about how im feeling without you losing your shit on me".

f. The respondent left these properties, her valuable items, personal belongings due to the continuous abuse by the applicant the respondent had been rendered helpless. She wanted nothing but her safety and her children's safety. The respondent wanted a house for her children which is peaceful and nurturing contrary to the one in United Kingdom where the children were left distressed due to the constant yelling of applicant, his abusive conduct and cruelty. These are the compelling circumstances which forced the respondent to leave United Kingdom even though she owns valuable properties.

g. ~~The counsel of the Mother to explore whether the children face a serious harm pursuant to Section 23 of Ontario's Children's Law Reform Act, sent a questionnaire to the father to explore how the things will be conducted, the applicant refused to fill the questionnaire which could have provided necessary information how the well being of the children is maintained. ~~

57Further, in both her original and Amended Answer, the Mother pleaded that the Father “made sure that [she] barely spoke to her parents. The [Father] wanted the [Mother] to break all ties with her family so that he can control her.” Yet in cross- examination at trial, the Mother admitted that she spoke to her family every other day during the marriage. She also offered evidence that she and the Children travelled to Canada for a month every summer (with one exception due to Covid) to stay with her parents. She relies on these trips to support her claim that the Children are habitually resident in Canada as well as the UK. During the trial, the court also learned that at various times, each of her parents visited her in the UK.

58In her British family court application, the Mother made a number of claims regarding her fear of the Father, which she had to admit in her cross-examination were not true. They included the following:

1. The Mother pleaded that the Father required supervision of his parenting time. She made the same allegation in the last paragraph of her October 17, 2025 affidavit in this proceeding. Yet:

a. In cross-examination, the Mother admitted that the Father’s actual consensual, unsupervised parenting time was irreconcilable with both her UK pleading and her October 17, 2025 affidavit. As set out below, the Father had unsupervised parenting time with the Children numerous times per week post-separation, including overnights. That post-separation parenting time took place in the UK before the Mother filed her British application.

b. From when he came to Canada for these proceedings in early October, onwards, the Mother has consented to the Father seeing the Children at least three times per without supervision. He has seen them on two non-overnight weekday evenings and one overnight each weekend, all on consent and without supervision. He has taken the Children away on a number of weekends, including overnight visits to Niagara Falls (twice), and Blue Mountain. All visits occurred without reported incident.

c. The Mother conceded in cross-examination that it was not true that the Father required supervision of his parenting time, despite her statements above to the contrary. When asked whether she would concede that the Father had been a safe parent in Canada, the Mother stated that she was unable to say, even though neither she nor her counsel expressed any concerns with his parenting time while in Canada.

2. In her British pleading, the Mother asked for an order that the Parents have separate entrances and exits available to them in court because she did not wish to suffer a panic attack in court. However, the Mother admitted in cross-examination that following the separation, she was in a car with the Father almost every weekday, delivering the Children to and from school and then at times, driving with the Father alone to a place where he would work, all without incident. The Father provided further, uncontradicted evidence of numerous occasions in which the Parents socialized together following separation. They are described below. I note that during the course of this trial, I observed the Mother being fully able to exercise her entrance and egress from the court room without any noticeable trouble. I add that the Father displayed no behavior during the trial which would warrant separate entrances for the Parents.

59In her examination-in-chief, the Mother changed certain aspects of her original, October 17, 2025 affidavit in this proceeding, as follows:

1. At para. 37, the Mother deposed:

I fear the Applicant may harm or manipulate the children if unsupervised access is granted. I have reported incidents to the authorities and request this Honourable Court’s protection.

Yet:

a. In chief, the Mother conceded that she had never reported any such incidents to any authorities while in the UK. Rather, her former counsel contacted the Halton Regional Police, the RCMP and the local British police after she failed to board her return flight to the UK and the Father stated that he would commence these proceedings.

b. Further, in her cross-examination, the Mother admitted that she is not worried about the Father’s unsupervised parenting time with the Children. Rather, her concern is that she does not think that he can parent them alone, on a long-term basis.

2. At para. 41, the Mother deposed that, post-separation, the Children’s contact with the Father has been “occasional, often involving yelling and profanity, causing [L] visible distress”. However, in cross-examination, the Mother admitted that post-separation in the UK, the Father saw the Children almost daily during the week, when picking them up and dropping them off for school (frequently with her present in his car). He also saw the Children for unsupervised overnights on Saturdays through Sundays (although the Mother claimed that the Saturday overnights were not consistent, a claim that the Father denied).

3. At para. 44, the Mother deposed that when she came to Canada, she left “behind valuable belongings in the UK”. She pleaded to the same effect in her Answer. She did leave her furniture in her in-laws’ garage. But in chief, she testified that she brought all of her valuable belongings to Canada and that in fact, the Father accompanied her to the bank when she emptied her safety deposit bank. She relies on that fact to buttress her claim that he consented to her relocation of the Children to Canada.

4. As set out in greater detail below, I do not find the Mother’s claims regarding the Father’s consent or acquiescence to her retention of the Children in Canada to be credible. They run in the face of the Father’s clear text statements to the contrary, the return ticket with which she and the Children flew to Canada, and the wording of the temporary travel consent, which the Father prepared, she printed out and the Father signed the day before her travel to Canada. That consent used the terms “temporarily” and “temporary” to refer to the travel and stay to which the Father was consenting.

5. The Mother’s own words, on the day she refused to board the return flight to the UK, were to the effect that she was delaying her return flight because she was not “well” and the Children were “having fun”. But in fact, she had no intention of returning to the UK with the Children.

6. I recognize that the Mother claims that many of her actions and omissions were motivated by a fear of the Father. I will have more to say about that below. But at the time the Mother claimed to be delaying her flight, for example, the Father was more than an ocean away.

60In her October 17, 2025 affidavit, the Mother also deposed that: “[The Father] failed to support the family financially; I alone paid school tuition and household expenses. His financial disclosures falsely reported low income.” However:

a. The court learned during this trial that the Children were actually on a 70% bursary granted by the Ryleys School to the family.

b. In chief, the Mother stated that the Father did pay one-quarter of the Children’s school tuition for their last year at the Ryleys School (which I understood to mean half of the tuition for the school’s second term).

c. It is not disputed that after separation, the Father actually contributed a total of £2,700 per month to the Mother, which included a portion of her rent (the evidence was not clear as to whether that covered half or more of the Mother’s rent), some expenses and up to £1,000 per month in expenses on the Father’s credit card. All of these payments were made voluntarily and without the requirement of a court order. The Father stopped making those payments when the Mother refused to return the Children to the UK.

61I understand that the Mother amended her Answer and filed a subsequent affidavit when she changed counsel. But she signed both the original and Amended Answer. She also swore to the truth of her original affidavit. From her oral testimony, it is clear that she is an intelligent and well-educated person, with perfect facility in English. She knew what allegations she made in her original Answer and withdrew in her Amended Answer.

62There are other elements of the Mother’s evidence which cause me to question her credibility. One is her false statements to the Father regarding her application for a Pakistani religious divorce or Khula. About three months after the parties jointly applied for a British civil divorce, the Mother applied for a Khula in Pakistan, with the assistance of her father. In her November 5, 2025 affidavit, the Mother explained the rationale for her application for a Khula. She knew that it would take “several months to complete” the British civil divorce and that both parties would have to sign further papers to complete the divorce. She stated that “I was afraid that the Applicant would withdraw his consent, and it was on that basis that I applied for an Islamic divorce in Pakistan”. She added that a religious divorce was important to her. However, she offered no evidence or rationale to believe that the Father had threatened to prevent or even delay the completion of the civil divorce. In fact, that divorce was granted on consent, with the Father as a joint applicant .

63In her Pakistani application form, titled “Suit for Dissolution of Marriage by way of Khula” (which I describe as the “Khula application”), the Mother pleaded:

3. That the marriage between the parties was an arranged marriage held due to referral by family friend of parties.

4. That [the] defendant’s mood swings were observed as ADHD and at the utmost tolerated by plaintiff from the onset of their marriage. [His] erratic behaviour, sudden outburst and taunts were ignored by plaintiff to give defendant plenty of time and space to correct himself and go for therapy and medications, but the defendant failed to cooperate at any stage.

5. That the defendant had been verbally and at times physically abusive, which was informed to all family members of plaintiff as well as defendant, but defendant did it to a point where it was normal to treat the plaintiff like this in front of family as well as children. Due to which the plaintiff cannot let her children grow up in an environment that will affect their mental health as well as [the] plaintiff’s.

6. That the plaintiff has suffered enough and she cannot see herself and her children living in agony under toxic environment, the plaintiff after deep consideration, decided to exercise her rights to seek dissolution of marriage through Khula.⁸

64The Khula application was not served on the Father. However, he learned of it and texted the Mother on February 18, 2025 to inquire about it. The text exchange took place between 5:14 and 5:58 a.m. The relevant exchange begins with the Mother telling the Father, regarding a potential response to the Khula application: “Im not sure if they even need to go to court…[a]s no defence is needed.” Relevant further exchanges in the text chain include the following:

a. The Father asked “[w]hat are the materials… related to this complaint?” The Mother responded: “Dont know”. As she admitted at trial and even the text exchange itself below demonstrates, that statement was false. The Mother knew the exact contents of the Khula application.

b. The Mother then went on to state that “[i]t just states I wasnt happy and need a divorce”. That too is untrue. The Father responded “OK” with a thumbs up emoji. The Mother then tried to convince the Father that no one need attend court and that the Khula can be granted without his response.

c. The Father nonetheless requested that the Mother just send him “a copy of the complaint. Need to see it”, with a thumbs up emoji. The Mother then responded, again untruthfully: “I dont have it bro”. She then added “It literally said I couldnt keep up with your attitude towards me. And I wasnt willing to live like that anymore. That was it”.

d. The Father remained insistent, requesting that she obtain the application from her father, that “I need to see it”. The Mother responded: “No I cant that illegal”. As she admitted in cross-examination, that statement was false.

e. The Parents continued to exchange texts regarding the Khula application, with the Father stating that he needed to see it and the Mother attempting to deflect. She then responded with a partially true response regarding the content of the Khula application, writing: “[t]hat you were verbally abusive towards me and I cant live like that anymore. I am unhappy and I want a divorce. What else do you want”. The Father responded that he wanted to see the “actual complaint”. He expressed the concern that “if I ignore the letter, that means I am accepting the complaint without knowing what it is.”

f. The Mother responded with further but still incomplete details of the Khula application, writing:

I am telling you what it is. Rubaid’s mood swings were observed as ADHD and at the utmost tolerated by me from the onset of our marriage. His erratic behaviour, sudden out burst and taunts were ignored by me to give him plenty of time and space to correct himself and go for therapy and medications but he failed to cooperate at any stage. He had been verbally abusive which was informed to all family members. He did it to a point where it was normal to treat me like this in front of family including our children. I cannot let my children grow up in an environment that will affect their mental health as well as mine.

While this represented partial disclosure of the contents of the Khula application, it omitted the pleadings about physical abuse. It also demonstrated that the Mother knew the exact contents of the Khula application at the time she denied knowing what was in it or having a copy of it.

g. The Parents continued back and forth, with the Mother attempting to convince the Father not to respond and allow the Khula to proceed uncontested.

h. In her examination-in-chief regarding this correspondence, the Mother claimed that she did not tell the Father the truth about the Khula application because she was afraid of him. She claimed that he told her not to tell anyone about his abuse and that this was the first time that she did so publicly. She was afraid of him and what he would do.

i. In cross-examination, the Mother admitted that she deliberately lied to the Father regarding her Khula application; claiming again that she did so because she was afraid of him.

j. However, even after obtaining a complete copy of the Khula application, the Father consented to the Khula. He did so even though his “Written Statement” response strongly asserted that the Mother’s abuse claims were false. There is no evidence that the Father threatened or took any steps to harm the Mother or any of her family members as a result of the Khula application, even after discovering its true contents.

k. Nonetheless, in her October 17, 2025 affidavit in this proceeding, the Mother stated that “[she] sought and was granted Divorce by Khula before the Karachi Family Court on March 13, 2025, on grounds including: “Verbal and Physical Abuse: Repeated verbal and physical assaults by the Applicant, normalized in front of family members and children” [emphasis added]. However, a review of the order of Judge Ghulam Mustafa, a family judge of Karachi East, demonstrated that the Khula was granted only on consent. There was no finding of fault, let alone abuse.

l. Even in her second affidavit of November 5, 2025, prepared with the assistance of her new counsel, the Mother implied that she received a Khula on the grounds of family violence and cruelty. She added that she “was willing to forfeit my financial rights in order to be free of the Applicant.” However, the evidence at trial disclosed that the financial right she forfeited was her Islamic Mahr, which was worth CAN$50.

m. Further, in cross-examination, the Mother admitted that her statement in the Khula application that her marriage to the Father was an arranged one was false. It was, in her words, a “love marriage”; that is one in which the Parents themselves, rather than their families chose their partners. The Mother testified that she misled the Pakistani court for cultural reasons, because of the true nature of her “love marriage” to the Father. Nonetheless this is another untrue statement to a court in order to obtain a remedy she desired.

65A further topic in which the Mother’s evidence is not credible is with regard to the rental of a new residence in Wilmslow after her lease ran out on August 4, 2025. In particular:

a. The Mother and Children continued to live in their rented home after the parties separated in October or November of 2024 and the Father moved out. The Father continued to pay at least half of the rent as part of his voluntary support obligations.

b. The Mother complained to this court that between August 5 and 25, 2025, she attempted to get the Father to agree to co-sign another lease in Wilmslow (even though she had not selected a new home). She also claimed that his refusal was a form of financial abuse and coercive conduct. Yet he had been willing to pay her support (which included part of her rent) and demonstrated no intention to refuse to continue to do so.

c. The evidence disclosed that the Father was assisting the Mother in her search for another residence with three bedrooms in Wilmslow before she left for Canada. They even attended together to look at a residence before she left for Canada. The Father produced texts and WhatsApp messages that the parties exchanged regarding his attempts to help her find a new home in Wilmslow. He even wrote to her about potential rentals after she and the Children travelled to Canada.

d. Yet the Mother claimed in her testimony that it was actually her assisting the Father to find a three-bedroom home for himself. She claimed that she did so after he had agreed that she can move to Canada with the Children. The idea that the Father would look for a three-bedroom home for himself after he agreed to the Children moving to Canada is simply not credible on two fronts. First, why would he need such a large home if he were agreeing to the Children moving across the ocean? Second and conversely, how likely is it that he would agree to such a move if, as the Mother contends, he was looking to secure a residence large enough for himself and the two Children?

e. The more credible account is that of the Father. That account is backed up by his texts to her, pointing out potential homes and even an email sent directly to her by a realtor regarding a potential home rental in Wilmslow. One particularly telling text which the Father sent to the Mother on August 25, 2025, stated:

Hey serena. Need to sort out your house. Why dont you narrow down 2/3 and uzair [the Father’s brother] will [do] the viewing? Otherwise you are planning to stay in airbnb? Let me know what you are thinking, dont want it to be overwhelming for the kids and you.

f. In response to this message, the Mother wrote to him that she is planning to stay in Canada, beginning her text as follows:

Since you cannot provide food and shelter for the kids and I. There’s no place for us to come back to. We have a roof over our head here and the kids can go to a good public school nearby till I have an income and can get an apartment.

Nothing in that text referred to the Father’s consent to her relocation in Canada with the Children. Nothing in the extensive text and WhatsApp communications between the parties showed or inferred that the Father was unwilling or unable to “provide food and shelter for the kids”.

g. The Father wrote back two days later, setting out an offer to allow her and the Children to use his home until she found one in Wilmslow, pay for the Children’s school and otherwise work out the finances. At that time, she was still able to use his credit card as well.

66In cross-examination, the Mother admitted to lying to the Children regarding their relocation to Canada – not telling them before boarding the plane and then telling them after they landed that she would not return to the UK.

Conclusion Regarding Credibility and Reliability of the Parents

67As set out above, I have concerns with the credibility and reliability of both parties’ evidence but have more concerns with many facets of the Mother’s evidence. The Father was not always responsive to questions in cross-examination, mainly because of his tendency towards digression, desire to be perceived in a positive manner, and attempts to underplay the conflict between himself and the Mother. Regarding the Mother, she was forced to retract many of the allegations she originally included in her pleadings. Her cross-examination, as set out above and further particularized below, exposed many areas in which she had not been honest with the court or the Father, to the point of outright lying. There are others in which she exaggerated her evidence regarding the Father.

68I pause here to mention the Mother’s assertion that I must consider the cultural context of the Parents, both being of Pakistani Muslim culture. The Mother offered evidence that the Parents’ culture must be a lens through which to consider their conduct. While I do not deny that the Parties’ culture is very important to each of them, albeit in different ways, culture does not overcome the serious problems I have found with the Mother’s evidence and ultimately, her credibility. I speak here in particular of the Mother’s numerous misstatements, exaggerations and outright lies regarding factual matters, which cannot be ascribed to culture.

69For both Parents, I must look at their evidence on an issue-by-issue basis. I instruct myself that credibility and reliability are not necessarily an all or nothing matter. In my fact-finding exercise, I further rely on whatever objective evidence is available, including contemporaneous accounts found in text and WhatsApp communications between the Parents. Those communications are particularly instructive, as they record what the Parents said to each other at the time or shortly after many of the events that are central to this case and before these proceedings began.

Credibility and Reliability of Collateral Witnesses

70Each of the Parents offered the evidence of collateral witnesses: the Father offered his brother, Uzair, while the Mother offered both of her parents, Khalid Zia, her father, and Rema Zia, her mother. Each is close to, closely aligned with and supportive of the Parent who tendered their evidence. None deliberately attempted to mislead the court. But the evidence of each must be seen within the context of their support for their very close relative.

Uzair Zaidi

71Uzair Zaidi (“Uzair”), the Father’s older brother, is probably the collateral witness with the closest involvement with the Children prior to their retention in Canada. The Mother does not dispute Uzair’s evidence that he, his wife, Sidra, and their children frequently saw the Parents and Children, both before and after their separation. Uzair and Sidra lived just a five-minute drive from the Parents’ home in Wilmslow. At one point before moving to Wilmslow, both families lived in the same apartment building. They regularly socialized and spent holidays and important days like birthdays together. They also vacationed together. Sidra became very close to the Mother. The two sets of children were like siblings, rather than mere cousins.

72Uzair deposed that he had “never witnessed [the Father] being [physically] or emotionally abusive to [the Mother or the Children]”. He mentioned that even following separation, the Father was “entrusted to travel with the children without [the Mother]. We have taken various trips to national parks such as Peak District and even to Llandudno in Wales where we would stay overnight”.

73Uzair spoke of his “utmost confidence” in the Father’s ability to care for the Children should the Mother not return to the UK. Should the Father gain primary care of the Children, he and his wife, Sidra, would support him in numerous ways “including but not limited to picking up the children from school and/or assisting with childcare if [the Father] is working late, on an as-needed basis. That is the same family structure we have had in place since 2017 and that the children have been raised in – where they go freely between my home and [the Father’s] home and are surrounded by a wealth of family.”

74In cross-examination by counsel for both the Mother and the OCL, Uzair was open about the closeness of his relationship with his brother. The Mother’s counsel questioned him about the Father’s temper. He stated that his brother’s temper depends on the situation. The Father has argued with the Mother in public, but in Uzair’s words, “yelling” is a strong word for their disagreements. Uzair said that his brother’s disagreements with the Mother involved a tone which was the same as he or friends or any couple would use while disagreeing.

75Uzair was very clear in his rejection of two suggestions put to him by the Mother’s counsel. The Father does not rely on him and Sidra to care for the Children when they are in the Father’s care. He and his wife do not take on the parenting responsibilities when the Father and Children are with them. Rather, they all parent together. Uzair feels that the Father is competent to care for the Children on his own. Further, Uzair strongly disagreed with the contention that he and his family accompanied the Mother and Children to the airport as a final goodbye. Rather, they simply made a day of it for both families.

76When cross-examined by OCL counsel, Uzair credibly spoke about the notion that the Children are his “blood”, that is, part of his family. That fact is meaningful to him. While it was put to Uzair that this view reflects the centrality of family name, implying a problematic patriarchal view, Uzair was firm that what was important to him was their family tie rather than surname.

77In short, Uzair’s evidence must be seen within the context of his support for the Father. He does not wish to place his brother in a bad light. But I note two things about his evidence. First, as set out above, he is the collateral witness who has had the most contact with the Parents and the Children as a family. Second, despite his support for the Father, he never spoke ill of the Mother.

Rema Zia

78Both of the maternal grandparents originally filed two affidavits, each dated October 16 and November 5, 2025.

79In the first affidavit of the maternal grandmother, Rema Zia (“Rema”), the hearsay and direct observations are so intermixed that it was hard to separate the proper evidence from its improper counterparts. It was ultimately withdrawn. That being said, I do not find that the evidentiary errors in Rema’s first affidavit should affect her credibility.

80In her second affidavit, Rema deposed that at various times, she visited the Mother and Children in the UK. She was present when L was born, and claims that the Father did little to assist, whether in the hospital or when the baby came home. She was also present when the Mother had a hysterectomy procedure in May 2024. She criticizes the Father for failing to be present for the procedure but mentions that he brought the Children to the hospital for 15 minutes when the procedure was over; implying that he was caring for the Children at the time. She adds that the Mother asked them to leave because she did not wish to have the Children see her in pain. Rema adds that the Father did no cooking, cleaning or childcare while she was present for two weeks following the Mother’s surgery.

81Rema recounted an incident between the Father and her daughter, Mahek before the Parents married. She deposed that Mahek and the Mother had engaged in a “disagreement”. Rubaid, in Rema’s telling, unnecessarily involved himself, presumably on the Mother’s behalf. Rema deposed that the Father verbally attacked Mahek and in Rema’s words, “charged” towards Mahek, without touching her. Rema says that she attempted to calm the Father down by putting her hand on his shoulder, but he pulled his shoulder back “aggressively” and “shouted… not to touch him”. He calmed himself down sufficiently to apologize, but then “would go back to screaming at Mahek”. Rema felt that this behaviour was “strange”. She feared a further escalation and tried to get her other children to avoid engaging the Father further.

82Rema also spoke of an attempt to engage with the Father at court during an attendance for this trial. She tried to convince him to allow the Mother and Children to remain in Canada. She deposed that she was frightened by his response. He said that he planned to take the Children away and “just see what I will do”. The Mother then approached him and asked whether he was threatening her. He answered: “[y]ou don’t know what I have planned for you, just wait and see”.

83Rema concluded that she fears the Father will cause the Mother harm if she returns to the UK. She also fears that he will “resort to any means in order to remove the children from [the Mother’s] care”.

84In cross-examination, Rema said that she had proposed to the Father that if he allowed the Mother to keep the Children in Canada, he could have them summers, Christmas, “anytime he wants”. She stated that she has no problem with him taking the Children on vacation. She admitted that the Father’s counsel was present during this out-of-court conversation with the Father. But their backs were to the conversation.

85During their conversation, Rema begged the Father to stop the trial. He responded: “how could you have written those awful lies about me?” She denied the suggestion put to her by the Father’s counsel, that she said that she did not mean any of it. Rather, the Father said that he was being accused of sexual harassment and dirty things like that. Rema responded that she was not accusing him; these are things that were told to her. She did not call security regarding this conversation. She was not afraid.

86Rema strongly supports the Mother and clearly thinks ill of the Father. Her views and observations are based in large measure on what she has heard from the Mother, as well as her limited observations regarding what she perceives to be the Father’s abuse and insufficient support of the Mother. I do not doubt that Rema intends to tell the truth. But her truth, including her evidence about the Father’s perceived threats at court, is informed by her feelings and fears regarding the Father. She is directly involved in the conflict between the Parents, hosting the Mother and Children and going so far as to attempt to negotiate on her daughter’s behalf.

Khalid Zia

87Much of the first affidavit of Khalid Zia (“Khalid”) also contained impermissible hearsay, with numerous paragraphs withdrawn by the Mother’s counsel. Again, I do not rely on those errors in my consideration of Khalid’s evidence.

88In his first affidavit, Khalid deposed that he “personally witnessed” the Father throwing Y, then aged two, on a sofa “with significant force”. In the earlier parts of that affidavit, Khalid spoke of his financial assistance to the Mother, transferring money for a downpayment on three properties and purchasing her a car. He ended by stating that the Father’s abuse of the Mother and Children had “taken a devastating toll on [his] physical and mental health”.

89In his second affidavit, Khalid sought to correct a statement in his first affidavit regarding the disagreement between the Father and the Mother’s sister, Mahek. In his first affidavit, Khalid claimed to have “personally witnessed” the Father engage in an argument with Mahek. In his second affidavit, Khalid admitted that he was not present for the event. He claimed that he failed to read the affidavit thoroughly when it was presented to him. He cited the “urgent manner” in which the affidavit was filed. He sought to deflect blame for the error by saying that “this fact was incorrectly placed” in his affidavit while it should have been placed in Rema’s affidavit.

90Khalid further deposed that he made inquiries regarding the Father before the Parents married. He spoke to a mutual acquaintance of himself and the paternal grandfather, who vouched for the Father. Khalid deposed that when he discovered the “abusive manner in which [the Father] had been treating my daughter”, he tried to obtain the assistance of that acquaintance, to no effect. I frankly do not see the relevance of that evidence, other than to demonstrate Khalid’s involvement in the conflict between the Parents.

91Khalid further set out his negative view of the Father in his second affidavit, stating “I felt as if [the Father] did not appreciate my efforts to support them and that he resented my assistance which came form a place of love and support particularly for my daughter and grandchildren.” Khalid then offered his opinion about Muslim cultural traditions regarding marriage and divorce, which he felt reflect badly on the Father. He concluded by opining that the Father’s “lack of respect” towards the Mother in what Khalid understood to be the Father’s post-divorce sexual advances towards the Mother shows that the Father has “no respect”. That means, in Khalid’s opinion, that the Father “has no boundaries and… [would] not hesitate to harm my daughter.” He added that “I fear he will take steps to punish [the Mother]”.

92In testimony in chief, regarding the Father’s throwing of Y on a couch, Khalid stated that he was upstairs when he heard a child crying. When he came down to inquire, the Father told him that it was none of his business. He then saw the Father throw Y on the couch. He asked the Father why he was doing that so forcefully, to which the Father said that he was disciplining the child and that it was none of Khalid’s business. Y was crying. Khalid then left the room.

93When cross-examined by the Father’s counsel, Khalid denied that the incident he witnessed was play. When asked whether the Father was a good parent, Khalid would not say but added that he is aggressive.

94From all of this, I believe that I have to be careful regarding Khalid’s evidence, for three reasons. First, he was careless with the truth in his first affidavit. While he implicitly blames the Mother’s former counsel for the incorrect statement that he had personally witnessed an argument between the Father and his daughter, Mahek, he signed the affidavit. While I note that the Father testified with an interpreter, both of his affidavits were sworn without the assistance of one.

95Second, Khalid was simply not present very often with both parents and the Children. He rarely visited the Parents and Children in the UK and when he did, it was for a short period of time.

96Third, it is clear that Khalid holds the Father in low regard, if not contempt. He believes that the Father acted badly towards his daughters and that the Father was unappreciative of his financial assistance. But he goes further, seeing the Father as a threat to harm his daughter and grandchildren. In fact, he has deposed that what he perceives as the “prolonged abuse and suffering endured by my daughter and grandchildren have taken a devastating toll on my mental and physical health”. He states that he has “experienced extreme emotional distress, weight loss, and declining strength as a result of witnessing their pain”. Khalid is very far from an impartial observer of the events he seeks to recount.

Conclusion Regarding Credibility and Reliability of the Collateral Witnesses

97The three collateral witnesses are each, in their own way, invested in the dispute between the parties and they support their blood relative. That investment is relevant to the credibility and even reliability of each of them. Uzair defends his brother but does not attack his sister-in-law. Rema thinks ill of the Father. But despite that, she was also willing to propose to him that he have the Children for extended periods in the summer, Christmas and whenever else he wishes. Khalid’s strong paternal feelings and enmity towards the Father mean that I must take his evidence with especial care.

Issue No. 1: Are the Children habitually resident in Canada?

98The Hague Convention is implemented in Ontario through s. 46(2) of the CLRA: Balev, at para. 31.

99All parties agree that if the Children are habitually resident in Canada, the Hague Convention does not apply and this court has the jurisdiction to decide parenting under the CLRA: see Balev, at para. 36.

100In Balev, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the proper approach to the determination of habitual residence is a hybrid approach. As McLachlin C.J. (as she then was) explained for the majority at para. 43: the judge is required to determine the “focal point of the child’s life – ‘the family and social environment in which its life has developed’ - immediately prior to the removal or retention.” The judge “considers all relevant links and circumstances” to each of the countries in question. No single factor dominates the analysis; the court looks to the entirety of the circumstances. The age of the child is relevant, particularly when the child is an infant: Balev, at para. 44.

101The circumstances of the parents, including their intentions, may be important, particularly in the case of infants and young children, but undue reliance should not be placed on that factor: Balev, at para. 45. It follows then that there is no rule preventing one parent from unilaterally changing the habitual residence of the child. Such a rule would detract from the court’s task to evaluate all circumstances relevant to the child’s habitual residence at the date of the wrongful retention or removal: Balev, at para. 46.

102As Tulloch J.A. pointed out at para. 28 of Ludwig, in adopting the hybrid approach, the Supreme Court in Balev, at para. 41, rejected the “child centred approach” proffered by the OCL, whereby parental intention is irrelevant, and the sole focus is “a child’s acclimatization in a given country”.

103As Tulloch J.A. found in Ludwig, this means that the determination of habitual residence is a two-step process. The first step “is to determine when the alleged wrongful removal or retention took place, and the second step is to determine in which state the children were habitually resident immediately prior to that removal or retention”: at para. 23.

104In regard to the second stage, Tulloch J.A. summarized at paras. 30-31 the following determinations made in Balev:

30 The aim of the hybrid approach is to determine the "focal point of the child's life - the family and social environment in which its life has developed - immediately prior to the removal or retention": at para. 43. To determine the focal point of the child's life, the majority required judges to consider the following three kinds of links and circumstances:

1. The child's links to and circumstances in country A;

2. The circumstances of the child's move from country A to country B; and,

3. The child's links to and circumstances in country B.

31 The majority went on to outline a number of relevant factors courts may consider in assessing these three kinds of links and circumstances. Considerations include the child's nationality and "the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the [child's] stay," along with the circumstances of the parents and parental intention: at paras. 44-45. However, the list of relevant factors is not closed and the application judge must consider the "entirety of the child's situation": at para. 47. The child is the focus of the analysis and parental intention is only relevant as a tool to assess the child's connections to a given country: at para. 68.

Habitual Residence Stage One: Undisputed Date of Retention is September 4, 2025

105There is no dispute between the parties that the date of retention was September 4, 2025. That is the date of the return plane ticket. It was also the date that the Mother told the Father on a WhatsApp message that “I am not well and since the kids are having fun I will be delaying my flight”. She never rebooked that flight. The Father responded a number of hours later that he had “formally notified the authorities that this is a case of child abduction”.

Habitual Residence Stage Two: Positions of the Parties and the OCL

106The Father asserts that the evidence clearly shows that the Children were primarily resident in Wilmslow, UK immediately prior to their retention in Canada. The Children had primarily resided in that one location all of their lives. Their annual vacation visits to Canada did not change that state of affairs. Until the date of their retention, the Children attended only one school throughout their entire scholastic careers: Ryleys in Wilmslow. They had friends in Wilmslow and participated in many activities there. While the Mother was their primary caregiver, the Father was continuously involved in their lives, seeing them almost every day post-separation, driving them to and from school and activities as well as taking them on most Saturday overnights and even taking them on two trips without the Mother, post-separation.

107Further, the Children grew up in Wilmslow with members of their paternal family, consisting of their paternal first cousins, whom they saw numerous times each week, along with their paternal aunt and uncle. The Father’s uncontested evidence is that the cousins were akin to siblings.

108The Mother argues that Canada, along with the UK has always been one of the Children’s two habitual residences. She says this because the Children are Canadian as well as British and had visited Canada annually to stay with their grandparents.

109The Mother argues for a best interests approach to habitual residence in line with the Children’s new lives here. She argues that as the primary parent, her home is the Children’s home; or as I summarized and her counsel accepted, citing an old song, her position is that wherever the Mother hangs her hat is the Children’s home.

110The Mother points out that the Children are now enrolled in an Oakville public school, which they have told the OCL they like. They have made many friends in Oakville. They spend time with their relatives here. Y, who adores soccer, plays it with his maternal uncle and is enrolled in a soccer program. They have had regular outings in the community in the Oakville area. They tell the OCL that they are comfortable and prefer it here.

111The Mother also asserts, in regard to the issue of habitual residence, that the Father actually consented or at least acquiesced to the move. He was even present when she emptied her safety deposit box just before her departure to Canada. She further argues that she was forced to move because of the Father’s physical, emotional and financial abuse.

112The OCL echoes the Mother’s arguments but asserts that the habitual residence of the Children was the UK until they arrived in Canada on August 6, 2025. OCL counsel points out that there is no set period of time required to establish habitual residence. She cites the comment by Martin J. for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunmore v. Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20, 15 R.F.L. (9th) 241, a non-Hague case, at para. 65, that “permanence is not necessary for residence”.

113OCL counsel argues that between the Children’s arrival in Canada with what it characterizes as the consent of the Father, until September 4, 2025, when the Mother refused to board the plane back to the UK, the Children became habitually resident in Canada. The OCL states that the Children’s already existing ties to Canada strengthened during those 29 days.

114The OCL also points to the Mother’s refusal to return to the UK and the fact that the Children have told OCL social worker, Yemi Faderin, that they have witnessed shouting between their parents, which once made the Mother cry. The Children have spoken of their Father’s yelling at them. The OCL also accepts all of the Mother’s allegations of abuse and argues that they are relevant to the issue of habitual residence. Finally, the OCL refers to the views and preferences of the Children, who prefer to stay in Canada with their Mother. Five-year-old Y told the OCL social worker, Ms. Faderin, that he refuses to return to the UK. Eight-year-old Y told her Father that she wishes to stay in Canada.

Analysis of Habitual Residence

115Utilizing the hybrid approach and looking at the focal point of the Children’s lives prior to their September 4, 2025 retention, I do not accept that the Children are habitually resident in Canada. They have spent their entire lives in the UK with the exception of vacation trips to Canada, Pakistan, and Europe.

116In Dunmore, at para. 65, Martin J. wrote for the majority in regard to the issue of residence (as a non-Hague Convention case, the issue was not habitual residence): “[w]hat the concept of residence excludes are inherently transient situations, like vacationing (Aslanimehr,⁹ at paras. 36 and 39), appreciated in light of the full context of each individual case” (footnote added).

117When the Children travelled to Canada prior to 2025, they were only visiting. I have been provided with no evidence that in Canada prior to 2025 they were enrolled in a school, participated in programs, or made Canadian friends. Even the OCL concedes that prior to August 6, 2025, the Children were habitually resident in the UK.

118Much of what both the Mother and the OCL rely upon regarding habitual residence is related to the lives that the Mother created for them after she refused to return them to the UK. However, in determining a child's habitual residence for the purpose of the Hague Convention, facts arising after they have been wrongfully removed or retained are irrelevant to the analysis: Ellis v. Wentzell-Ellis, 2010 ONCA 347, 102 O.R. (3d) 298, at para. 23. While Wentzell-Ellis is a pre-Balev case, I do not see Balev as having overruled that statement.

119I find support for that position in three post-Balev cases. In Andegiorgis v. Giorgis, 2018 ONCJ 965, 19 R.F.L. (8th) 490, Pawagi J. concluded at paras. 42-43:

42 Thus, Balev has only really expanded what the court must consider in determining habitual residence in wrongful retention cases as the court may now consider connections the child forms in another jurisdiction during the agreed upon temporary stay.

43 Balev has not expanded the test to permit the court to consider connections formed after a wrongful removal (where the application was brought within one year).

120In Knight v. Gottesman, 2019 ONSC 4341, 147 O.R. (3d) 121, Shore J. wrote at para. 37, after a detailed consideration of both Balev and Giorgis:

37 In the case before me, I cannot consider the children's connections to Ontario created after their wrongful retention in Ontario. In using the hybrid approach set out in Balev, I can still only consider the relevant factors in place prior to the children's wrongful retention and not those formed since returning to Ontario.

[Emphasis in original.]

121More recently, in Pruitt v. Pruitt, 2025 ONSC 3405, at para. 25, McVey J. articulated an important reason, rooted in the purpose of the Hague Convention, to reject post-removal evidence as a ground for finding habitual residence in the new location, even for infants. She wrote:

25 I cannot accept the proposition that, when dealing with an infant, the location of the primary caregiver alone should determine habitual residence, without reference to the child's home environment immediately prior to their removal. Such an approach, in my view, conflicts with the objectives of the Convention. While I acknowledge that the Respondent's argument is more nuanced given the child's ties to Ottawa, the broader concern is that if an infant's habitual residence is driven almost exclusively by the primary caregiver's location, it would permit that caregiver to move the child at will, effectively transferring custody issues to another country that may not be best placed to resolve them. This creates significant unfairness for the left-behind parent and is contrary to the aims of the Convention and the child's best interests.

[Emphasis added.]

122This comment directly responds to the “wherever I lay my hat, that is my children’s home” argument. That point is even stronger given the fact that the Children are no longer infants, and thus less tied to their Mother for basic necessities than they were in their younger years.

123Here, I have no evidence that the Children had established a habitual residence in Canada prior to September 4, 2025, whether through summer holidays or even the 29 days prior to their retention on September 4, 2025.

124To the contrary, the evidence shows the Children’s close ties to Wilmslow prior to their retention: their permanent home in Wilmslow, their (only) school – Ryleys, their friends, their activities in Wilmslow, and particularly as well, their relationship with their paternal uncle, aunt, and cousins. All of this evidence adds up to the nexus of the Children’s lives being in Wilmslow prior to their retention in Canada.

125While I am aware of and consider the Children’s views and preferences, particularly regarding the third exception found in Article 13, they are not determinative of the Children’s habitual residence. I will have more to say about that below.

126Accordingly, I find that the Children are habitually resident in the UK for the purposes of this proceeding.

Issue No. 2: Did the Father consent or acquiesce to the Mother’s retention of the Children in Canada?

127The Mother’s first Article 13 defence to this application is her contention that the Father either consented to her retention of the Children in Canada or passively acquiesced to it. The OCL agrees with the Mother, although it offers no additional evidence on that point. The Father states that he briefly considered such a move for a short period in early May 2025 but soon openly changed his mind. Thereafter, he was clear with the Mother that he was not consenting to a move.

128For the reasons which follow, I find that the Father neither consented nor acquiesced to the Mother’s retention of the Children in Canada.

Applicable Law re Consent and Acquiescence

129In Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis (2001), 2001 24075 (ON CA), 203 D.L.R. (4th) 386, (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the meaning of “consent” and “acquiescence” as used in Article 13(a) of the Hague Convention. They are related words. As Osborne A.C.J.O. wrote for the court at para. 47:

…"To consent" is to agree to something, such as the removal of children from their habitual residence. "To acquiesce" is to agree tacitly, silently, or passively to something such as the children remaining in a jurisdiction which is not their habitual residence. Thus, acquiescence implies unstated consent.

130The question of acquiescence is determined from the actual subjective intention of the left behind parent, not the perception of the outside world. Subjective consent is “determined by words and conduct, including silence, which establishes the acceptance of, or acquiescence in, a child's removal or retention”: Katsigiannis, at para. 48, citing In re H. and others (Minors), [1997] 2 All E.R. 225 (H.L.).

131The issue of consent or acquiescence under Article 13(a) must be determined at the time of the abduction or retention. Even a consent to a future relocation is not sufficient to meet the test of Article 13(a): Ahmed v. Abdelmoaein, 2025 ONCA 618, 20 R.F.L. (9th) 44, at para. 19.

132In Katsigiannis, at para. 49, Osborne A.C.J.O., wrote that to establish acquiescence, “the mother must show some conduct of the father which is inconsistent with the summary return of the children to their habitual residence. In my view, to trigger the application of the Article 13(a) defence there must be clear and cogent evidence of unequivocal consent or acquiescence.”

133“Summary return” is defined as: “the relatively immediate, as opposed to the eventual, return of the child”: Katsigiannis, at para. 36.

134These points were confirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Thomas v. Thomas, 2024 ONCA 646, 9 R.F.L. (9th) 263. There, Nordheimer J.A., writing for the court,¹⁰ reviewed and summarized the applicable principles under Article 13(a) as follows, at para. 15:

i. The object of the Hague Convention is to deter abductions of children and to secure the prompt return of children where abductions occur;

ii. "[C]onsent" and "acquiescence" as used in Article 13(a) should be given their ordinary meaning;

iii. Acquiescence is a question of the actual subjective intention of the wronged parent;

iv. The onus rests on the abducting parent to establish acquiescence by the objecting parent;

v. Acquiescence must be established on clear and cogent evidence;

vi. To be established, it must be shown that the acquiescence was unequivocal;

vii. The standard for finding acquiescence is high.

135At para. 23 of Thomas, Nordheimer J.A. added that “[c]lear and cogent evidence does not require a balancing of evidence of the type envisaged in the balance of probabilities standard. The clear and cogent evidence standard is also not established by a finding that the appellant ‘implicitly consented’".

136In Raposo v. Raposo, 2023 ONSC 346, 84 R.F.L. (8th) 169, McDermot J. emphasized the high standard required for evidence of consent or acquiescence, writing at para. 49:

There must be some formal indication of consent or acquiescence or alternatively actions or statements which unequivocally indicate the subjective intention of the wronged party to permit the child to remain in the location to which she was removed.

137In U.K. v. N.A., 2021 ONCJ 73, Finlayson J., then of the Ontario Court of Justice, highlighted the need for clear and cogent evidence of consent or acquiescence in order to prove its existence. He wrote at para. 107 of the need to “prove words or conduct on the part of the [left behind parent], that are inconsistent with the child's summary return.”¹¹

The Mother’s Evidence and Arguments of Consent and Acquiescence to her Retention of the Children in Canada

138The Mother stated in her affidavit of October 17, 2025 that in May 2025, the Father “initially encouraged relocation to Canada and even sent links to Oakville rentals, telling me to give notice to our landlord and the school”. She adds that “[o]nce preparations were made, he retracted consent as a form of control. Nevertheless, I relocated to Canada.” She then continued: “[u]pon arrival, I informed the children we would stay permanently”.

139Later in that affidavit, the Mother referred to the following statement, allegedly made by the Father as proof of his consent: “[t]his kid shit is not for me. I need to work”. She did not say where and when he made that statement. She did refer to an exhibit in her affidavit which presumably included that communication. But the exhibit she cited, Exhibit 9, did not contain any text or WhatsApp communication between the Parents. She may have been referring to his October 2, 2024 text statement, cited above, regarding “kids nonsense…[s]tupid shit like [that]”. That statement was made about eleven months prior to her retention of the Children in Canada.

140On May 2, 2025, the Mother gave notice to her landlord that she would be leaving. She wrote:

I have had to make a hard decision to leave the country and move back to Asia permanently. I leave the property 7th of August and can pay the rent up till then therefore I would urge you to please market the property to have it rented for 8th August 2025 onwards.

141She was never asked at trial why she untruthfully stated that she was moving to Asia when she was contemplating a move to Canada.

142In her November 5, 2025 affidavit, the Mother justified her claim to the Father’s acquiescence to the relocation by deposing:

I gave up the tenancy to our home and told the school the kids were leaving only for the [Father] to keep the children in school for the time being. However, he did not give me the impression that we could not move to Canada, only that we could not leave immediately. He knew that the children and I did not have anywhere to live after August 2025. I believed he would let us stay in Canada on the basis that we had no home to which we could return.

143The Mother further relies on her email to the head of Ryleys, Ms. Langford, which she made an exhibit to her October 17, 2025 affidavit. In the email, dated May 7, 2025, the Mother told Ms. Langford:

I wanted to share something personal with you. Rubaid and I are currently going through a divorce, and it's been a very difficult time for us and the children. The kids and I may also be relocating to Canada in September, although plans are still being finalised. Please take this email as a notice of them leaving after this term.

144The Mother also requested the placement of L and Y on a full bursary for the remainder of the school year as she was “facing significant financial hardship at the moment”.

145The Mother did not mention that the Father soon asked her to retract the request and that she complied. On May 11, 2025, four days after her initial withdrawal request, the Mother retracted it, writing to Ms. Langford: “Rubaid’s being quite difficult so I don’t think we are leaving for now. Please let me know about the bursary so I can work out our finances”.

146On May 12, 2025, the Father sent the Mother a WhatsApp message stating: “Please email Mrs. Langford. And let her know kids are staying + still get back to you on 100% bursary”. He added, with regard to enrolling L for an activity: “can u sign up [L] to this and just use my [credit] card. I can’t do it as [I’m] working but I don’t want her to miss it”. The Mother replied “[o]k” to the latter request. In response to the first request, the Mother replied: “I did that yest[erday]”.

147Also on May 12, the Mother wrote to Ms. Langford, requesting that she “please send across the paperwork for next year”.

148The Mother nonetheless contends that, even in the face of these exchanges, the Father orally agreed to her move to Canada with the Children. In her testimony, she insisted that the Father kept changing his mind about letting her go and that he communicated his consent to her relocation with the Children orally. While she offers no written evidence of that oral consent, the Mother relies on three other factors:

1. The Father signed a travel consent on August 5, 2025, the day before she and the Children boarded a plane to Canada. As the Mother points out, the travel consent had no explicit return date. The operative terms of the travel consent read as follows:

I hereby give my full consent for the mother, Sarina Khalid Zia …to travel with our children from the United Kingdom to Canada, where they will temporarily reside at the following address:

This permission is granted for the purpose of international travel and temporary stay, including travel thorough airports and immigration control. I confirm that I have no objections to this travel and give full permission for the above journey and stay.

2. The Father was present when the Mother cleaned out her safety deposit box, shortly before leaving for Canada. She left the key with her sister-in-law, Sidra. When testifying about this event, the Mother added that the Father was “complicit” in her leaving the UK, in that he did not adequately help her to obtain adequate living arrangements; and

3. Uzair and Sidra, along with their children, accompanied the Mother and the Children to the airport when she left, which she claimed that they never did before. She contends that they did so to offer a final goodbye to her and the Children. When Uzair was cross-examined about this claim, he denied that the airport goodbye represented a final goodbye. But he also stated that he could not recall whether he had ever accompanied them to their airport before (which the Father claimed he had done).

The Father’s Evidence and Arguments of Lack of Consent or Acquiescence to the Mother’s Retention of the Children in Canada

149In his affidavit of October 15, 2025, the Father deposed that “[f]or a brief period following our separation and prior to our divorce being finalized, the Mother and I had discussions about the Mother’s desire to move to Canada, with or without the children.” He continued that he “ultimately did not agree that it was in the children’s best interests to move away from Wilmslow” and offered his reasons, primarily regarding his unwillingness to “agree to uprooting the children and moving them away from their home”.

150In addition to the text exchanges in May 2025 cited above, the Father relies on a WhatsApp message exchange between himself and the Mother on June 3, 2025, in which he expresses his refusal to consent to the Children moving to Canada. I recount relevant excerpts of that conversation below. The exchange begins after a one-minute voice call, with the Father writing to the Mother:

Sarina, I know things have been really tough and I can see you're hurting. I'm not ignoring that – I know you've been feeling lonely and missing your family.

But I just need to be honest with you. The UK is home for the kids. They were born here, raised here, they've got school, friends, and family around them. Uprooting them now just wouldn't be right.

I really think you should speak to your family and ask them to come here and spend some time with you. You need to get this thought of leaving out of your head. The UK is a perfectly normal place to live – and you've got your art, your independence, and a whole community here to build something around.

If you need help – whether that's with the kids, or just having more support around you – I'll do my best. But taking the kids away from their life, here is not something I can agree to.

151The Mother plaintively responds, implicitly referring to her annual trip to Canada with the Children:

I can't live here anymore. You underestimate my wellbeing rubaid. Trust me when I say this. I am not ok.

You want to keep the kids here. Go ahead and see if they can live without me.

I will bring the kids back and fly back after some time.

You should look for a bigger place to accommodate the kids.

Ive been dragging my feet through the mud.

But I don't have the strength to anymore.

Please know it's so bad I'm telling you you can keep the kids here if you wont let them go with me.

I need to go home now.

I'm sorry for everything.

152The Father responded in a manner which evinces sympathy for the Mother’s plight but not consent to her request. He wrote:

I’m really sorry you’re feeling like this, Sarina. I can see you’re overwhelmed, and I genuinely think it would help if you spoke to a counsellor to guide you through this. I suggest taking professional advice. I’m not the right person to guide you here.

Right now, it feels like you’re making very sudden and emotional decisions, and I don’t think they reflect what’s truly best for the kids. They need stability, routine, and both of us in their lives.

Please don’t make any major decisions in this state. These messages show you’re not in the right frame of mind, and that’s okay – but it also means it’s even more important to pause and get support before doing anything that could affect the children’s future.

I’m here to support you where I can, but I can’t agree to anything that risks, their well-being.

153In her response to this message, the Mother stated that she will see how she is feeling over the next month and “[i]f it doesn’t feel better I will take the necessary steps for my wellbeing”. She told him that her “kids are my entire world… I am nothing without them but [I] can’t be a good mother to them if i am in this frame of mind”.

154The Mother then berated the Father for liking to be in control, preferring her “stay[ing] miserable and be[ing] a half ass mother to them”, and his failure to understand her. She continued: “I just know its best for me to be in my familiar environment and receive love from my family when im going through the hardest time of my life.”

155The Father’s response to this post was to express sympathy, suggest counselling, compliment her parenting and respond to her comments about their marriage by saying that he tried to save it. He ended as follows:

Take time for yourself. Get the support you need. I’m here to help where I can, but I can’t agree to things that may damage the kids in the long run – I know deep down, you don’t want that either.

156The Father asserts that despite his definitive assertions regarding his refusal to consent to a relocation of the Children to Canada, the Mother was telling the Children that they were moving to Canada. He wrote by WhatsApp message to her on July 1, 2025: “I’d appreciate it if you could stop saying that infront of the kids about them moving to canada. It will really confuse them. So please stop doing that.”

157The Mother responded that the Children “cant [live] without me...I beg you to let them go with me and trial it for a year.” She then attempted to convince him to agree, whether by “sit[ting] at your feet”, money or anything he can tell her to allow her to convince him to agree. She even mentioned suicide, saying that “I need to go but if something happened to my kids in my absence I will end up committing suicide”.

158The Mother then attempted to convince the Father of the virtues of her plan but made clear: “I dont want to take the kids anywhere without your permission but you and i know both know they cannot live without their mom”. She offers to allow them to “come every summer and winter to you”.

159The Father replied “I just cant do this serena. I need my kids around me. They are my life and they need their father”. The exchange continued with the Mother stating that she is “emotionally demolished” and “drowning”. She begged him not to “take advantage of me anymore”. He then responded quizzically about how he is taking advantage of her. He offered that she could “always go and spend time with your family there [i.e., Canada]. Taking my kids is just so extreme”.

160The Mother’s response was that she did not simply wish to spend time with her parents, “I need them”. She added “I don’t want to live away from them while theyre turning old”.

161The exchange then devolved into recrimination, with the Mother calling the Father a “selfish prick” and stating that she “will never forgive you and you will never accelerate in your life.” The Father replied that the Mother is the one being selfish and that she is “only focused on yourself. Not concerned about the kids”. The Mother answered that the Children need her more than him at their age and that she cannot stay and be miserable.

162When cross-examined about the July 1, 2025 text exchange, the Mother stated that she was upset because the Father was seeking to control her; that is, by refusing the consent to the move. But she was unable to point to any time after May 2025, that he gave her consent to move with the Children to Canada.

163The Parents then engaged in another WhatsApp exchange on July 3, 2025. The Father began by stating that he would like the Mother to clarify her intentions regarding a move to Canada:

Are you planning to remain in the UK with them, or are you leaving them in my care here? Also, I must stress the importance of how we communicate with the children during this time. They are still very young, and any mention of relocating to Canada is highly inappropriate and confusing for them. I've been told they've been hearing things like, "Dada is saying you can't move to Canada," which is deeply concerning. Please ensure that the topic of moving abroad is not discussed with them at all. It is not a decision that has been agreed upon or is even being considered at this stage. Talking to them about such matters prematurely is likely to cause unnecessary anxiety and emotional distress. Let's both focus on protecting their well-being and giving them a sense of stability.

164The Mother responded that she would not be leaving the Children with the Father as he is incapable of raising them alone. She stated: “[a]s soon as you let us, [I'd] like to take them with me”.

165In her response, the Mother was both unrepentant and clear regarding her discussions with the Children about her desire to move to Canada. She had clearly spoken to them regarding her plans. She justified this by saying:

I am transparent with the kids. When [I] initially wanted to leave the kids said they wanted to come with me and [I] told them the truth which was that you wont let them. My kids well-being is my number one priority. Which is why I have left you.

The Mother then accused the Father of first sending her and the Children away and then changing his mind.

166The Father’s response was sharp:

Let me be absolutely clear: the children will continue to live in the UK. Their home, where they've been born, raised, and have all their support systems in place. I do not believe it's in their best interests to be taken abroad, nor do I believe you are in a position to raise them alone. They need stability, and they need both of us in their lives.

167The Father, then criticized the Mother’s comments to the Children that he would not allow them to go to Canada as "inappropriate and unfair…[and] emotionally damaging”. He stated that instead, she should reassure them that both parents love them. He ended by stating that the Parents should focus on the Children, to which the Mother replied that “[k]ids get off at 3:30”.

168In his affidavit of October 15, 2025, the Father deposed that the Mother was looking for new rentals in Wilmslow in July and August 2025. He added that once her lease expired in August 2025, she placed her belongings in his brother’s garage in Wilmslow, including the keys to her safety deposit box.

169The Father further deposed that he drove the Mother and the Children to the airport on August 6, 2025 with “2-3 pieces of luggage total”.

170The Father agreed that he had signed the travel consent, but that it stipulated that the permission granted was for a “temporary stay”. He pointed out that when he signed the consent, the trip had been pre-booked as a round trip, returning September 4, 2025, in order to allow the Children to return to school in the UK. He stated that he never agreed to the Children relocating to Canada.

171While in Canada, the parties exchanged further WhatsApp messages. As set out above, on August 25, 2025, the Father wrote to the Mother:

Need to sort out your house. Why don't you narrow down 2/3 and uzair will [do] the viewing? Otherwise you are planning to stay in airbnb? Let me know what you are thinking, dont want it to be overwhelming for the kids and you.

172The Mother’s response set out that she did not intend to look for a home in the UK or return there. Blaming the Father, she wrote:

Since you cannot provide food and shelter for the kids and I. There's no place for us to come back to. We have a roof over our head here and the kids can go to a good public school nearby till I have an income and can get an apartment.

I can't afford school fees anymore either. Stop expecting me and my parents to pay for everything. It's not going to happen anymore.

As you are aware none of my properties are on rent hence I have no income. I dont understand how you expect me to get a house and a car. Please consult your family. I am not willing to live in the UK anymore and you are not capable of raising the kids on your own. They can't live without me and you know that.

Please do not call me to harass me, I am not your wife, you cant keep giving me orders anymore. I only communicate through messages.

173The Father replied that he always provided for the Children and that he only wanted to put their wellbeing first. He asked her not to make a decision which would unnecessarily disrupt the Children. He repeated that he was expecting them to return to the UK on September 4, 2025.

174The Mother’s response of August 25, 2025 referred primarily to financial reasons to refuse to return to the UK, as follows:

I cannot afford a house nor a car. It's very simple rubaid. I highly doubt you can either. If you can let me know. I'm not willing to live in an environment where I am secluded from my support system. I do not wish to live in the UK. As far as I am aware, like you keep saying, you cannot afford to keep me or the kids there. Your accounts to my lawyer display the same. Are we supposed to live on the streets? I'm over spent and now dry of funds. I have spent everything I could and I am unable to now.

175The Father continued to insist that the Children return, writing:

Sarina, I hear your concerns, but the children's stability and wellbeing come first. As we agreed, I expect them to return to the UK on 4th September 2025.

I will continue to support them and provide for them as I always have. If you have specific concerns about living arrangements, let's discuss them calmly and sensibly, but this cannot change the children's agreed return.

176The Mother’s reply was that she was “doing this for [the Children’s] stability. Not to be a financially struggling parent under constant pressure.” She continued, responding to his statement that he would provide for the Children as he had by stating: “[a]s before you mean you will pay half? I have just told you I cannot afford anything. I am not residing in the UK anymore…”

177The Mother continued, derisively and again focusing on finances as follows:

I think you need help.

And you have agreed to let us temporarily leave the UK. We have not agreed on any date. You signed the paper yourself.

Are you trying to say you will be solo parenting the kids? Because as I said, let me repeat it for you again, I'm not living in England anymore sorry and yes, this is about the kids. Not you or me. I am trying to do whats best for them. I am not able to pay for anything. You can not force me to stay there and make my parents pay. You have done 10 years [of] that nonsense already. Not getting a penny out of me now. Enough is enough.

178The Father answered that he never consented to a permanent relocation, writing:

Just to be clear, I never gave consent for a permanent relocation. The children's habitual residence remains the UK.

The return tickets for 4th September 2025, together with the consent letter I signed, show that this trip was always agreed as temporary.

I expect the children to be on that return flight as planned. Their stability and well-being must come first, and continuity in the UK remains essential for them.

179On August 27, 2025, the Father wrote to the Mother that “I know things got tense the other day, but I just want to keep things constructive for all of us”. He offered:

I’m happy to help you with renting out your properties if that makes things easier.

You and the kids can stay in my apartment for now until you find a new place. I’ll help and support you in that process. You’re welcome to use my car during that time too. I’ll make my own temporary arrangements elsewhere. Once you do find a place, I’ll cover the rent until you’re back on your feet and earning again. We can work out what feels fair and comfortable for everyone at that point.

I’ll also cover the school fees for this year, so that’s one less thing to worry about, and hopefully enough time for me to strengthen things financially so the kids can stay there long term.

180The Father continued that the proposal was “me offering goodwill” and proposed talking things through personally. He ended by saying that “I’ll be there to receive you and the kids at the airport”.

181The Mother’s response to this message restated her refusal to return to the UK. She again referred to finances and her need to “heal”. She stated that she cannot rely on her three Properties as “they will be sold” and that her “family is under financial strain”. It is “unfair and unsustainable” for her to keep asking her father for money. She stated that she “cannot afford housing or a car in the foreseeable future”. She stated that she has “made the decision to live in Canada, and that is a decision you cannot change”. She stated that she would enroll the Children in free public school in Canada. She stated that she can change her return tickets to December, implying that the Children could return to visit him then. The Mother continued: “I need time to recover and heal. I am not in a good place right now, and I need my family’s support.” She urged him to resolve the matter amicably, saying that she lacked “the strength to keep fighting and arguing”.

182On August 29, 2025, the Father again wrote to the Mother to reiterate his position. He wrote:

I want to be absolutely clear – I am approaching this amicably, but the children's home is in the UK and you cannot unilaterally decide to keep them in Canada.

Telling the kids that they are now staying in Canada is absolutely ludicrous and deeply irresponsible. It is causing them unnecessary confusion and shows a lack of emotional stability. This sort of behaviour will be extremely frowned upon by the authorities and the court.

Their schooling is super important. Their education is everything. They have their friends, their teachers, their cousins, and their wider support network all here in the UK. Uprooting them is reckless and damaging.

Please don't think I am bluffing. If you do not return the children, it will be considered kidnapping and brainwashing – simply because you want to live in Canada. I urge you to think straight and take advice from McAlister [the Mother’s British law firm]; they will confirm that you are making a grave mistake that will directly impact the children’s wellbeing and mental health. If you continue down this path, only you will be held responsible.

I have already committed to paying for a rented house, a car, and the children's school fees. There's no financial pressure – I've ensured everything is provided for.

Please do not put our kids through this. Think about their wellbeing and stability.

I do not want to discuss this any further. I expect confirmation on the 4th that you and the children have boarded the flight, and I will also be asking the children directly. The expectation is clear: the children must arrive back in the UK as planned, at Manchester Airport on 5th September at 11:40am.

If you refuse, I will have no choice but to begin legal proceedings, notify the authorities, and take action under international child abduction laws. I want to avoid this route, but I will not hesitate if you continue on this course.

183That same day, the Mother applied to the Manchester Family Court, “seeking child arrangement orders”. In her testimony, the Mother stated that she only filled out the form, but never acted on it. The Father says that the drafting and filing of this UK application is further proof of the Mother’s knowledge of his lack of consent or acquiescence to the relocation.

184On September 4, 2025, as stated above, the Mother wrote to the Father: “I am not well and since the kids are having fun I will be delaying my flight”.

185That same day, the Mother’s lawyer wrote on her behalf to the Halton Regional Police Services, the RCMP and to authorities in the UK, claiming that the Father had abused the Mother and stating:

Our client says that Mr. Zaidi should be charged for his offences against our client. Our client further mentions that she should not be misunderstood as she does not want to go back to United Kingdom because of threat to her life. If the law enforcement authorities want to contact her at any time, they can contact through our law firm.

186At some point thereafter, the Mother also sent texts to the parents of the Children’s fellow Ryleys students, stating that: “[t]he kids and I have decided to stay in Canada”.

Analysis of Consent or Acquiescence Defence

187The parties offer diametrically opposed narratives regarding consent and acquiescence. The Mother is adamant that the Father consented to her move or at the very least acquiesced to it. As set out above, the onus is on her to prove that consent or acquiescence. That onus is high. She must provide clear and cogent evidence. Any acquiescence must be unequivocal. That is not the case here.

188The text messages set out above demonstrate that when the Mother and Children boarded the flight to Canada on August 6, 2025, she knew that the Father was not consenting to her desired relocation. It would be difficult for him to be more clear than he was. Even if that were not the case, the Father was, if anything, even more explicit as the time for the Children’s return approached.

189Responding to the Mother’s evidence and arguments:

1. Her evidence that the Father orally consented to the proposed relocation, particularly after May 2025, is simply not credible in the face of the text and WhatsApp exchanges set out above. The Father said over and over again that he was not consenting to the Children’s relocation and that the Mother should not be discussing it with the Children. Moreover, the Mother’s responses demonstrate her knowledge of the Father’s disapproval of her plan. On July 3, 2025, she wrote that she is “begging” him to consent and that “[a]s soon as you let us, [I'd] like to take them with me.”

2. Nowhere in any of the text and WhatsApp exchanges set out above does the Father indicate his consent to the move nor does the Mother claim that he did consent. The one exception came on August 25, 2025 when she wrote to the Father to remind him of his temporary travel consent. But even then, she conceded that the consent was for a temporary stay.

3. The Mother places great weight on that temporary consent and the fact that the Father signed it before she left. But that consent form has to be considered within the full context of its execution. Each Parent had an annual monthly visit with their parents: the Father’s parents usually came to the UK for a month in July and then the Children would go to Canada to visit with the Mother’s parents for a month in August. The fact that such a visit to Canada was the ostensible plan is demonstrated by the return tickets with which the Mother and Children travelled. In cross-examination, the Mother attempted to discount the fact that the tickets were return by pointing out that her parents had purchased the tickets. But that clarification is of no moment. She did not deny knowing that the tickets called for the return of herself and the Children on September 4, 2025.

4. The Father was clearly aware of the return nature of the tickets as well. He was able to tell the Mother exactly where and when he expected her return flight to land. I add that in driving the Mother and the Children to the airport, he would have been aware that she had brought only two or three pieces of luggage along for the three of them. He was also aware that the Mother had left most of her belongings other than the contents of her safety deposit box in Wilmslow.

5. In addition, the Children were still enrolled in Ryleys when the Mother and Children boarded the plane for Canada. The return date would have allowed them to return to school on time.

6. Thus, the fact that the travel consent did not have a return date does not demonstrate consent or even acquiescence to the relocation, certainly not from the point of view of the Father.

7. The fact that the Father was present when the Mother cleaned out her safety deposit box is of little moment in considering whether he consented or acquiesced to the Children’s relocation. Since the Mother does not say what she took from the safety deposit box, the removal of those unknown contents cannot prove anything. The court cannot speculate on the contents’ value or significance. I add that the Mother did not return the safety deposit box key to the bank. She gave it to Sidra. For those reasons, the emptying of the safety deposit box proves little to nothing.

8. The Mother points to the fact that the Father’s family accompanied her and the Children to the airport as proof that they knew that she and the Children were relocating to Canada. From that, she asks the court to infer that the Father knew and consented or at least acquiesced to the move. She added that this was the first time that Uzair, Sidra and their children accompanied her and the Children to the airport for a trip to Canada. The Father vaguely contended that this occurred a number of times, although he was unable to cite any previous occasions. The Father’s brother, Uzair, was unable to recall any other times that he and his family had accompanied the Mother and the Children to the airport. Even if I accept that Uzair and his family never before accompanied the Mother to the airport, that fact is a thin reed upon which to perch a clear and cogent claim of consent or acquiescence.

190Relying on the best evidence available, the contemporaneous exchanges between the Parents, the evidence is clear that the Father never consented or acquiesced to the Children’s relocation to Canada. I reject the Mother’s evidence to the contrary.

191Any consent which the Father may have expressed or at least been open to in early May 2025 was extremely short-term. It seems to have lasted less than a week. The Mother was aware of that fact, as demonstrated by her second email to Ryleys, on May 11, 2025, four days after first announcing the withdrawal of the Children at the end of the school year. That second email stated that the Mother wished instead to enroll the Children for the following school year. From that point onward, the Father was clear and consistent that he was not consenting to any relocation to Canada.

192Further, the Mother’s responses to the Father’s refusal to consent to her relocation, sometimes angry, others pleading, demonstrate her knowledge of his position. In the face of that evidence, it is simply not credible to assert that the Father offered some oral consent to the relocation, which was not cited in the frequent, detailed and often acrimonious correspondence between the Parents. Nor is it credible that the Father somehow orally acquiesced to the relocation.

193For those reasons, I dismiss the claim that the Father consented or acquiesced to the Mother’s relocation to Canada with the Children.

Issue No. 3: Is there a grave risk that the Children’s return to the UK would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation?

Applicable Authorities

194The test for the determination of grave risk/intolerable situation was recently reiterated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 601, 178 O.R. (3d) 180. At paras. 49-50, Madsen J.A., writing for the court, stated:

49 The governing case on the meaning of grave risk of harm within the Hague Convention is Thomson. In that case, the Supreme Court held that to constitute grave risk, the risk must be weighty and substantial, and must place the child in an intolerable situation: at p. 597. The word "grave" modifies the "risk" and not the "harm": Thomson, at p. 596. The assessment must be undertaken from a child-centred perspective: Thomson, at p. 597. Stated otherwise, this defence to return will only be met in "situations that an individual child should not be expected to tolerate": F. v. N., at para. 73, as cited in Osaloni v. Osaloni, 2023 ABCA 116, at para. 12. This is a high threshold: Ellis v. Wentzell-Ellis, 2010 ONCA 347, 102 O.R. (3d) 298, at paras. 37, 40. Consistent with the objectives of the Hague Convention, the threshold does not require that children be "pushed beyond the limits of endurance": Landman v. Daviau, 2012 ONSC 547, 17 R.F.L. (7th) 332, at para. 103, aff'd Husid v. Daviau, 2012 ONCA 655, 298 O.A.C. 182, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 485.

50 The grave risk threshold may be met by the actions or pattern of behaviour of a parent, with or without physical violence against a child. In Pollastro v. Pollastro (1999), 1999 3702 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 485 (C.A.), this court held that a continued pattern of escalating abuse, combined with threats against the mother and her family were sufficient to create an intolerable situation for the child, where the child had not, himself, been physically abused by the father: see also Husid.

195The relevant time frame for the grave risk of harm is between the time of the child’s return and the custody hearing in the location where the child is habitually resident: Ceballos v. Casanova, 2024 ONSC 6865, 13 R.F.L. (9th) 431, at paras. 85-86, Paschel v. Paschel, 2017 ONSC 6952, 1 R.F.L. (8th) 379, at para. 84, M.J.W. v. P.S.G. (2007), 2007 13522 (ON SC), 38 R.F.L. (6th) 60 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 89-90, aff'd 2007 ONCA 521, 38 R.F.L. (6th) 91, all citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (U.S. C.A., 6th Cir. 1996), a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeal in the 6th Circuit.

196As Trimble J. pointed out in Paschel, at para. 84, the American appeal court in Friedrich accepted the restrictive reading of the grave risk of harm exception found in Thomson.

197To meet the test of Article 13(b), the evidence presented must be credible and meet the high threshold of grave risk set out in Thomson: Pollastro v. Pollastro (1999), 1999 3702 (ON CA), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 32 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 30-31.

198An allegation of domestic violence may, in itself, not be a sufficient reason to refuse a return of the subject child. That is because of the presumption that the court of the return state can and will provide sufficient protection to the abused parent: Finizio v. Scoppio-Finizio (1999), 1999 1722 (ON CA), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 15 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 34-35, citing Medhurst v. Markle (1995), 1995 9273 (ON CTGD), 17 R.F.L. (4th) 428 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 432 and C. v. C. (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A.), at p. 664. However, in some exceptional cases, the danger presented by the domestic violence is so great that the presumption is not applied: see C. v. C.

199Regarding the risk of psychological harm that a child may face upon return to their habitual residence, La Forest J. stated at p. 596 of Thomson that “the physical or psychological harm contemplated by the first clause of Article 13(b) is harm to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable situation”. La Forest J. then adopted this statement by Nourse L.J. of the UK Court of Appeal in Re A. (A Minor) (Abduction), [1988] 1 F.L.R. 365, at p. 372 (“Re A”):

. . . the risk has to be more than an ordinary risk, or something greater than would normally be expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing him to another. I agree . . . that not only must the risk be a weighty one, but that it must be one of substantial, and not trivial, psychological harm. That, as it seems to me, is the effect of the words 'or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation'.

200That statement was reaffirmed by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 616, at para. 79, albeit in a non-Hague case.

201In Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372, 8 R.F.L. (8th) 253, at para. 59, Laskin J.A. compared the "intolerable situation" standard of art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention to the less onerous “serious harm” standard which applies to non-Hague child abduction/retention cases under s. 23 of the CLRA. He found that the "intolerable situation" standard imports a more stringent standard than simply "serious harm" under s. 23 of the CLRA. At para. 60, Laskin J.A. described the Hague Convention standard as “exacting”.

202In F. v. N., the majority of the Supreme Court further adopted the statement of Harvison Young J. (as she then was) in Bolla v. Swart, 2017 ONSC 1488, 92 R.F.L. (7th) 362, at para. 137. There, Harvison Young J. stated that: “while the best interests of children is a relevant consideration in the question of whether serious harm has been established, it is clear that the ‘harm’ must be more than just the risk of harm resulting from being taken away from their primary caregiver.” In saying this, Harvison Young J. cited Thomson’s finding “that the removal of a child (despite leading to psychological harm) from the primary caregiver parent does not usually result in harm sufficient to reach the required threshold.”

203In F. v. N., a non-Hague Convention case whose facts bear similarities to this one, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a claim of psychological harm arising from a return to the country of origin of the parties’ six and three-year-old children without their primary caregiver/mother. In upholding the order for the return of the children, Kasirer J. adopted the comments of La Forest J. in Thomson and Laskin J.A. in Ojeikere, cited above. In addition, he stated:

77 Separating an infant from their primary caregiver is a circumstance that most certainly can cause psychological harm to the child. It should never be considered lightly, given "the particular role and emotional bonding the child enjoys" with their primary caregiver (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at para. 121, per L'Heureux-Dubé J.). I accept, as well, that a child's loss of contact with a primary caregiver who cannot return to the home jurisdiction, for reasons beyond their control, can be the source of serious harm for an infant.

78 But I reject the argument that such a separation, in and of itself and without regard to the individualized circumstances, will always rise to the level required under s. 23. As Hourigan J.A. wrote [in the decision below], this could ultimately defeat the legislative objective of discouraging child abductions of very young children (paras. 93-94; see also Jamali v. Gillani, 2021 BCSC 2134, at para. 101 ()). In order to deter and remedy child abductions effectively, courts should be prepared, in some circumstances, to order the return of the children despite a risk of separation from their primary caregiver. Deciding otherwise could allow abducting parents, in some situations, to rely on their status as primary caregivers to circumvent the due process for custody determination and remove the children from the authority of the courts that would normally have jurisdiction. This could ultimately risk making Ontario a haven for child abductions.

[Emphasis added.]

204Kasirer J. continued at para. 80, stating that the analysis of harm must be “individualized and based on evidence specific to the child involved (Ojeikere, at para. 92).” He added:

[I]f a child is separated from their primary caregiver, but is nevertheless returned to their capable left-behind parent and other known caregivers, in a safe and familiar environment, the high threshold of harm may not be met (for the Hague Convention, see Guide, at paras. 64-65). Conversely, if the evidence demonstrates that the child would be returned to an environment where they will be left without care or that they feel unsafe with their alternate caregiver, it is very possible that the serious harm threshold will be met (see, e.g., Aldush, at para. 158)¹².

[Footnote added.]

205The party claiming grave risk of physical or psychological harm faces a high threshold. Any interpretation of this exception, short of a rigorous one, would rapidly compromise the efficacy of the Hague Convention: Stefanska v. Chyzynski, 2020 ONSC 3048, at para. 62, citing Wentzell-Ellis, at paras. 38-40 and F.(R.) v. G.(M.), 2002 41087 (QC CA), [2002] R.D.F. 785 (Q.C.C.A.), at para. 30.

206In Hassan v. Garib, 2017 ONSC 7227, at para. 10, Engelking J. asked the three following questions to determine whether the “grave risk of harm” defence had been made out:

a. Has the alleged past violence been severe and is it likely to recur?

b. Has it been life-threatening?

c. Does the record show that the left-behind parent is not amenable to control by the justice system?

207That test was recently adopted in Pruitt as well as Habimana v. Mukundwa, 2019 ONSC 1781, 22 R.F.L. (8th) 98, at para. 42 and Stefanska, at para. 69.¹³

208In Ireland v. Ireland, 2011 ONCA 623, 11 R.F.L. (7th) 278, Juriansz J.A. wrote for the Ontario Court of Appeal at para. 48:

In assessing whether a situation is intolerable, it must be presumed that the court with jurisdiction to determine what is in the best interests of the children is equipped to make, and will make, suitable arrangements for the children's welfare…

[Citation omitted.]

209In support of his decision in Ireland, Juriansz J.A. cited the statement of MacPherson J.A. in Finizio at para. 35, who in turn cited the decision of the UK Court of Appeal in C. v. C. (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [1987] 1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A.), at p. 664. There, Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. wrote:

It will be the concern of the court of the State to which the child is to be returned to minimize or eliminate this harm and, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary or evidence that it is beyond the powers of those courts in the circumstances of the case, the courts of this country should assume that this will be done. Save in an exceptional case, our concern, i.e., the concern of these courts, should be limited to giving the child the maximum possible protection until the courts of the other country -- Australia in this case -- can resume their normal role in relation to the child.

210In Ojeikere, at para. 60, Laskin J.A. pointed out that “[i]n Hague Convention cases Ontario courts can have confidence that whatever jurisdiction decides on a child's custody it will do so on the basis of the child's best interests. Ontario courts cannot always have the same confidence in CLRA s. 23 cases” [i.e. in cases involving non-Hague Convention jurisdictions]. That statement was cited with approval by the majority of the Supreme Court in F. v. N., at para. 53.

The Mother’s Evidence and Arguments Regarding Grave Risk

211The Mother asserts that the grave risk of harm defence applies to the facts of this case. She relies on her allegations of the Father’s abuse of her, which she argues affects the Children. In her closing argument, her counsel stated:

The Respondent testified that she endured years of abuse: that he would denigrate her, belittle her, control her actions and responses, told her what to do and how to spend her days, demanded respect and compliance. She reported that her cultural beliefs and the shame and stigma around divorce prevented her from breaking free sooner. The Respondent also did not want to hurt the Applicant or his career, recognizing that he was instrumental to her own support and that of the children and more importantly, the threats of harm to her person and her father prevented her from seeking police intervention.

212The Mother cited the Father’s use of profanity towards her during texts which have been placed in evidence, which she describes as verbal abuse. She cites the following abusive texts and offers the following references to Father’s trial responses to them:

a. “I’ve married a fucking cry baby and ungrateful pig”. The Father indicated in his testimony that “I don’t say that to her, this is a one off, basically what’s happened here, I don’t speak to her like this”.

b. “Shut the fuck up bitch” – the Father blamed the Mother for starting the conversation and then again said that it is a “one off conversation” and that he was allegedly “sick and tired of her disrespecting” him. The Mother described this particular conversation as “egregious” because, she said, the Father continued to denigrate her notwithstanding her apology.

c. The Mother cites a text exchange of December 28, 2021 in which the Father calls her a “dumb fuck”, claims that she is “PMSing”, that she is a “lazy shit”, “[f]ull of excuses and lazy u are”, ungrateful” and that he admonishes her to “[s]top crying [you] make me sick”.

d. The Mother refers to the Father’s testimony when confronted with those text insults. He speaks of them as a “one of” conversation, although there were a number of conversations in which such insults were made.

e. The Mother also claimed that the Father threatened, in Urdu, to break her face, which, because of the language, she took to be a threat. There is no reference to such threats in the texts or other evidence.

f. The Mother also cited texts from the Father in which he tells the Mother on January 3, 2022: “[f]ucking bitch! Fuck off” and “fucking go fuck urself”.

g. I note that the Mother’s counsel includes in her written submissions what she says are translations of presumably Urdu statements by the Father to the Mother in texts. Since those translations were not placed into evidence, I cannot rely on them.

213Each of those insults and more are contained in dozens of pages of texts exchanged by the parties which have been placed in evidence. However, as set out below, I cannot ignore the fact that the Mother could be equally vulgar and insulting to the Father (including her references to his family) in her text messages to him. They are included in many of the texts to which she refers. Some of those text insults are set out below.

214The Mother further states that the Father physically harmed her during their ten years of marriage. She blames him for two accidents she incurred when they were vacationing. She had one accident on a motorbike in Sardinia, Italy and another snowboarding in Turkey. While she does not say that he caused or contributed to the accidents, she claims that he insisted that she participate in the activities while they were on vacation. She says regarding the snowboarding accident, that the Father said, “here we are, let’s go”. She claims that they are examples of his coercive control.

215The Mother also claims that the Father threw a heavy pillow at her when she was pregnant with Y, that he kneed her in the back in 2024 when he claimed to be play wrestling with her (she did not see it that way), that he kneed her in the back and that he once pinned her against a wall. She further claims that after the divorce, he sexually abused her by propositioning her and then exposing himself to her. He denies these allegations as false or overblown.

216The Mother further alleges that the Father engaged in coercive control of her, referring in large measure to what she describes as his financial abuse of her. When her counsel attempted to review the Father’s financial circumstances in her cross-examination of him, his counsel objected that they were irrelevant. Despite that objection and my own scepticism regarding relevance, I allowed some leeway. Little conclusive evidence was offered.

217The Mother relies on the following factors to buttress her claim of coercive financial control:

1. The Mother was unemployed throughout the marriage and post-separation.

2. The Father managed her three investment Properties and had access to the rental funds (although she does not say that he misappropriated the funds).

3. There have been no proceeds from the Properties since November 2024 (for one property) and early 2025 (for the other two properties).

4. The Father gave her only approximately £2,700 per month towards the rent on her home and expenses (which works out to approximately CAD$4,994/mo., based on the Bank of Canada’s currency converter¹⁴). The Mother claims that this amount is insufficient and proof of the Father’s financial coercive control. She asks the court to infer that part of the Father’s payments to her went towards his share of her rent because his name was on the lease, even though he was not living in the home. That meant that the Mother had to pay the other half.

5. The Father refused to co-sign a new lease for the Mother.

6. After May 2025, the Father refused to allow the Mother to drive his car, which restricted her mobility and she says, “isolated her and created further dependence upon him so that he could continue to control her movements”.

7. While the Father says that he transferred his share of the three jointly owned Properties back to the Mother, there is no evidence before the court that he did so.

8. The Father instructed the handyman for the three Properties not to return the keys to them to the Mother until these proceedings are over.

9. The Father terminated the Mother’s use of his credit card in September 2025 after she refused to return to the UK.

10. The Father filled out a form in the consent British divorce application in which the Mother sought only parenting relief. The Mother claims that the Father underreported his income and assets in that form.

11. The Mother also says that it is untrue that what the Father described as “joint decisions” were in fact joint. She points to giving the car gifted to her by her parents to his brother during the pandemic and deciding that her rent was too expensive.

218In her closing argument, the Mother asserts that the court “should be deeply concerned with the Applicant’s outright denial of any abusive conduct” towards her. She took issue with the fact that the Father denied abusing her and referred to certain physical interactions as “play fighting”. The Mother also states that by denying her abuse claims, the Father shows that he lacks insight into his conduct. Rather, the Mother contends, the Father “resorted to gaslighting by shifting the focus onto [her]” and denting or minimizing her claims.

219The Mother continues that it is not just physical harm that risks placing the Children in intolerable conditions, but psychological harm as well. She relies on her claims of the Father’s coercive control. In her closing argument, she asserts that the Father’s “every move was aimed at ensuring that [she] remained complicit and dependent. She had no autonomy; the Respondent was compelled to do as she was told with no choice or ability to respond.”

220In that regard, the Mother cites a working definition of coercive control offered by a 2021 House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, which has not made its way into legislation. It speaks of coercive control as:

…a pattern of behaviour that is low-level, repetitive, often doesn’t involve physical violence and takes away a person’s sense of personal agency. They no longer make decisions based on what their own best interests are or what their driving motivators are, but they make decisions based on fear of what the other person in the relationship is going to do to them if they don’t make a decision in a certain way.¹⁵

221The Mother argues as well that the Father’s conduct towards her is indicative of patriarchy rooted in the Parents’ Pakistani Muslim culture. She points to his statements that he is the man of the house and that he should be respected. She asks the court to infer that that means that she is not to question him and needs to do as she is told.

222While the Mother refers to the Khula as further evidence of the Father’s coercive control of her, I have dealt with the Khula in detail above.

223The Mother further argues that harm to her, as the primary parent, is harm to the Children. She states that the Father never really cared for the Children and that even when they were with him, they were also with their paternal uncle and aunt, Uzair and Sidra. She also refers to the Father’s text statements about his need to work and not be at home 24/7. She asserts that work, not the Children or family, are his priority. Accordingly, the Children would be harmed if they were taken away from her and the home she now shares with her parents in Canada.

224The Mother relies on statements made by the Children to the OCL about their lives in Oakville being “calm”. She argues that the court should take this to imply that things in the UK were not calm, and to draw the inference that the blame for that state of affairs lies at the feet of the Father and his family violence alone.

225The Mother places great weight on an event which occurred on November 9, 2019, when L was two years old, and the Mother was pregnant with Y. The Parents, and the Father’s brother and sister-in-law were staying at a club with a restaurant. L had a tantrum in the restaurant. The Father wanted the child to stop crying and for the Mother to take her upstairs. The Mother says that he grabbed the child by the collar, a claim he denied. But he agreed that he grabbed the child in the arm because of her misbehavior.

226The Mother claims that their text exchange, which is cited above and below, shows that the Father admitted that he “hit” the child, although I do not see such an admission in the text exchanges.

227One further argument which the Mother makes regarding grave risk of harm is that she bears no onus to prove that the British courts would be unable to protect her and the Children from the Father’s abuse.

OCL Evidence and Arguments Regarding Grave Risk of Harm

228The OCL supports the Mother’s claims regarding a grave risk of harm to the Children if they are returned to the UK. The OCL’s arguments regarding grave risk of harm closely echo those of the Mother, particularly regarding her allegations about the nature of the Father’s alleged abuse. The OCL also agrees with the Mother that the conduct of the parties must be viewed within both a cultural and child-centred lens.

229In addition to the evidence of the Mother, which it fully supports, the OCL relies on the evidence it has obtained from the Children through their interviews with its social worker, Yemi Faderin.

230Ms. Faderin interviewed the Children twice each and the Parents once each before swearing an affidavit dated October 16, 2025. She later interviewed the Children two further times. While the court granted the OCL permission to provide an updated affidavit of Ms. Faderin, the OCL failed to do so. Rather, it offered updating evidence through Ms. Faderin’s testimony-in-chief. While the Father’s counsel asked to see the notes of Ms. Faderin’s interviews with the Children, the request was refused by counsel prior to the commencement of trial on the basis of privilege.

231Ms. Faderin’s affidavit reports the following evidence from the Children:

a. Eight-year-old L reported to Ms. Faderin as follows:

i. When the parties lived together “it was a fun time”, with visits to the mosque and close relationships with her cousins, who “[have] the same blood as me”.

ii. L stated that her Parents “were always fighting. I don’t know what they were fighting about”.

iii. The Father would sometimes yell at her when she did not listen to him and sometimes for no reason. She described being yelled at as being “like he slapped her, but he did not”.

iv. L described this yelling by role playing in which she “widened her eyes, placed her left hand on her waist, and spoke in a stern voice while waving her right index finger in the air”.

v. L stated that her Father would come “too close” to her while yelling and “appeared angry”. She stated that he “really gets mad”. She felt “too scared to tell him as he will yell at me more”.

vi. She feels “calm” in Canada. She finds it to be “calm” and she feels “cozy” with her Mother.

vii. She “loved” living in the UK but likes it in Canada better.

b. Five-year-old Y reported to Ms. Faderin as follows:

i. He has fond memories of family holidays to places like Spain, Greece, and Canada.

ii. Y “spoke warmly” about spending time with his paternal uncle and aunt, enjoying meals prepared by his aunt.

iii. Y spoke of witnessing family arguments, including his Father yelling at both him and his mother. Both yelled, although Y said that “my dad yells more, my mum yells little”. When asked to elaborate, Y covered his ears with both hands, lowered his gaze and softly whispered “scream”. Ms. Faderin does not appear to have probed any further.

iv. Y stated that he missed his Father. This statement came before the Father came to Canada for this trial.

232Ms. Faderin interviewed the Children a third time on October 22, 2025, at their school. She met them separately. The Father had come to Canada for the trial and seen the Children a number of times by then. The Children had just seen their Father the night before the October 22, 2025 interview. Y told her that he was “excited” that his dad was here. He also described his Father as excited and emotional to see him. He stated that they had gone to a restaurant and had a wonderful time. L had also mentioned having a wonderful time with her Father. She said that she told her Father that she wishes to stay in Canada. He replied that it was a matter for the family.

233Ms. Faderin also asked L about a photo which the Mother placed in evidence in her first affidavit, showing Y crying while holding a Canadian ten-dollar bill and L holding her hands over her eyes (the “Photo”). L said that the Photo was taken after a call with the Father. He said that her Father had said that they would go back to the UK. Again, there is no evidence that Ms. Faderin probed further.

234Ms. Faderin met a fourth time with the Children, separately, at their school. Y mentioned to Ms. Faderin that his Father was still in Canada and that he was having a good time with his Father. He mentioned his Father buying him lots of toys. He stated that he wants to stay in Canada.

235L talked of having lots of fun in her visits with her Father – they had gone to Niagara Falls, been on rides, attended a water park, ate dinner and had a fun time. She stated that she sees him every weekend.

236L told Ms. Faderin that she experiences nightmares, which she used to have when she was young. Part of her nightmares included her parents telling her that they do not like her anymore. L stated that she discussed those nightmares with her Mother, who consoled her and told her that her parents love her. L did not tell her Father about her nightmares because she was having fun with him.

237As stated above, Ms. Faderin interviewed the Parents once each. She interviewed the Mother first and then the Father. She did so before the Father came to Canada and before this trial was adjourned for about a month. She did not interview either of the Parents again, whether after meeting the Children or after the one meeting with each Parent. In particular, Ms. Faderin did not ask the Father to respond to what the Mother had told her about his alleged abuse.

238The Mother described the Father to Ms. Faderin as controlling and authoritative. She said that he told her that she is not allowed to speak when he speaks. She stated that he treated her “like a ‘punching bag’, emotionally and psychologically abusing her by using her as an outlet for his anger and frustration”. The Mother told Ms. Faderin that the Father’s physical abuse increased when the Children were born, and that it was fueled by alcohol. She stated that he drank whiskey every night. She stated that after drinking, he behaved aggressively, including physical intimidation, door slamming and yelling.

239I note that the Mother only mentioned the Father’s alcohol consumption once in any of her affidavit or testimonial evidence. In her first affidavit, she briefly spoke of the Father drinking with his Father, who resides in Pakistan.

240The Mother admitted to Ms. Faderin that after arriving in Canada, she “explained to the children that she could not go back to the UK. She told them that she needed her family, their help and their love. She indicated that the children understood and that they feel loved as well, so they’re comfortable.” From her evidence, Ms. Faderin does not appear to have questioned the Mother about the propriety of this discussion or whether the Mother was attempting to influence the views of the Children. I will have more to say about that below.

241The Mother also told Ms. Faderin that while she is open to the Father having a relationship with the Children, she “insists that his contact must be supervised due to concerns about his behaviour and past abuse”. She added that she felt that the Father was attempting to “brainwash” the Children to return to the UK. Ms. Faderin does not appear to have questioned the Mother any further about her insistence that the Father’s parenting time be supervised. That is the case even though the Father had enjoyed consensual, regular, unsupervised parenting time with the Children in the UK. Nor did Ms. Faderin seek to question the Mother further after she agreed to the Father’s frequent, unsupervised visits with the Children after he came to Canada

242In Ms. Faderin’s interview of the Father, she did not ask him to respond to the Mother’s allegations. In his discussions with Ms. Faderin, the Father described himself as “the disciplinary parent”, which he said was “not by shouting but making sure they’re doing things the right way”. He stated that the Mother is more passive and hence the Children “walk all over the mom”. His descriptions of his discipline involved withholding an activity or a toy.

243The Father ascribed the breakdown of his relationship with the Mother to his “controlling” father-in-law, Khalid. While the Father described a “bitter” and “poisonous” relationship, he claimed that arguments occurred only “once in a blue moon”. He added that part of the problem with the Mother was that she was not doing anything at the time, even managing her Properties; a situation made worse by Covid. He described the Mother, after their separation as being very lonely and begging him “non-stop” to allow her to come to Canada. He also stated that at one point in May 2025, he explored what a move to Canada would look like for the Children. But he changed his mind as he did not wish to be separated from them.

244The Father described himself to Ms. Faderin as “like, the alpha male, the strong character kind of person”. He said that he would basically tell the Mother not to use abusive language. He also would say things like “you don’t know nothing, don’t bring your dad into things like this …tell him to worry about his own family, stop looking inside my family”.

The Father’s Evidence and Arguments Regarding Grave Risk of Harm/Intolerable Situation

245The Father denies the existence of a grave risk of harm from either his violence or from the Children’s potential separation from the Mother. He argues that the Mother has failed to meet the very high standard of both grave and intolerable. He asserts that the Mother’s claims of abuse are not believable and even if believed to any extent, are exaggerated. He adds that the Mother cannot simply refuse to return to the UK, the place of the Children’s habitual residence, and then rely on her own refusal to create a grave risk of harm. He adds that there is no “tender years doctrine” in the Hague Convention.

Allegations of Abuse

246While the Father denies the Mother’s abuse allegations, he asserts that even if accepted, they fail to meet the high standard of grave risk/intolerable harm. The Father also points out that with one exception, each of the Mother’s allegations pre-date their separation. The post-separation allegation, that the Father propositioned and exposed himself to her, is denied. There is no corroborating evidence.

247Furthermore, the Mother made no police reports (at least before the Father threatened these proceedings), sought no restraining order, and allowed unsupervised parenting time in the UK for the nine months between their separation and her attempted relocation. In the year before her that attempted relocation, she left the Children with the Father on three lengthy occasions: for five days in September 2024 when she travelled to Austin Texas, for two weeks commencing February 2025 (when she travelled to Ontario) and for one week in July 2025 when the Father took the Children to Spain.

248Regarding the allegations of abuse, the Father argues that the Mother’s claims cannot be reconciled with her actions. They include her spending significant time with him after their separation, whether in driving the Children to and from school daily, dinners and family occasions together, attending a charity gala together and even viewing a property together. For example:

1. In December 2024, the Parents attended a charity gala together, along with Uzair and Sidra. The Father includes a photo of the four of them in his October 15, 2025 affidavit.

2. On March 28, 2025, the Mother invited the Father by WhatsApp message to join her for breakfast with “Lisa and Joe”, who were apparently friends.

3. Later that day, the Mother sent a WhatsApp message to the Father, asking him to pick her up before he picked up the Children after school and before they attended at the home of Uzair and Sidra. The Parent’s exchanges that day included friendly banter about soccer as well as the Father’s views of Y’s prospect as a player.

4. On April 9, 2025, the Mother invited the Father over to her home for lunch with the Children.

5. The parents attended a children’s birthday party together in June 2025.

249While the Mother stated that the Parents’ attendance at the charity gala preceded the alleged sexual proposition and exposure, other events cited above came after the alleged sexual proposition.

250In addition, the Parents successfully and peaceably co-parented following their separation. They did so without the need for a court order. The Mother first sought a British family court order regarding parenting only after she and the Children were in Canada and was told by the Father that he would bring these proceedings if the Children did not return.

251The Father adds that the Mother has failed to prove that he is not amenable to British family law justice.

252Regarding his statement to Ms. Faderin that he regards himself as an “alpha male”, the Father testified that his use of the expression was a mistake he made because he was nervous in speaking to the OCL social worker over Zoom from the UK when these proceedings began. He meant that he is a leader, who protects his family, leads his family and instills confidence in them. But he added that this did not mean that he is “entirely” the head of the household. His word is not the last one. Respect for a man is not more important than respect for a woman. There should be mutual respect for each spouse.

253The Father points to a number of statements that the Mother has made, which are either inconsistent or irreconcilable with her evidence of abuse or coercive control. Many of those statements are set out above, regarding her credibility. They also include:

1. The Mother’s request in her August 29, 2025 British family court application to require the Father’s parenting time to be supervised, in light of his actual parenting time. The Mother admitted in cross-examination that her statement was not true.

2. The lack of text/WhatsApp or other correspondence to the Father raising issues with his post-separation parenting time. This contradicts the statement in her October 17, 2025 affidavit that the “[t]he children frequently returned from visits crying and distressed”.

3. Despite the Mother’s purported fear of the Father, she drove with him in his car every school day (being alone with him in the car after dropping off the Children), socialized with him as set out above, and went alone with him to view a potential rental in Wilmslow in August 2025, shortly before leaving for Canada.

4. Despite the Mother’s claims of the Father’s financial coercive control of her:

a. He paid her a total of £2,700 per month to support herself and the Children.

b. Furthermore, he never stated that he refused to support her and the Children after August 2025 even though he would not co-sign a new lease for her.

c. He was assisting her to find a new home after her former lease expired.

d. He has agreed to return his share of the three Properties to her, despite the fact that he was a co-mortgagor.

e. The Mother was the only party in the divorce proceeding with a lawyer. In the divorce application, the Mother pleaded that she did not wish to claim any financial relief from the Father. She also pleaded that he is transferring his interest in the three Properties to her and that “[e]ach party will work and make their own income”.

5. The Mother’s desire to have the Father co-sign a lease demonstrates that, despite her claims of abuse, she had been willing, even before boarding a plane for Canada, to return to the UK with the Children.

6. The Mother’s claims that the Father attempted to isolate her from her family are false and should not be believed. She admitted in her testimony that she spoke to her parents every other day, that she visited them regularly, including every summer with the Children and received visits from each of them in the UK. Both maternal grandparents also testified to the regular contact they had with the Mother and Children.

7. The Mother’s other claims of coercive control are simply not credible. They include the Mother’s claims that her accidents while on holidays in Turkey (skiing) and Italy (a scooter) were caused by coercive control, rather than her own misadventures. Her claim that the Father’s text of August 29, 2025, threatening simply to commence these proceedings if she improperly retains them in Canada, is another example of coercive control, is not credible. Rather, his text was a reasonable response to her retention of the Children.

254The Father also points to the Mother’s own demeaning comments to him, which are as abusive as those he offered to her. Among the invective which the Mother directed to the Father during their various text and WhatsApp exchanges are the following:

1. On November 9, 2019, the Mother called the Father a “loser with no self esteem”. She added that “no one respects you, even your bother”. She continued that “[t]his world will shit on you”. She described him as “twisted”, someone who would “die alone” and a “dirty man”. She continued: “[f]uck your family. No morals in life. Table manners my ass”. During this exchange, each Parent told the other to “fuck off” multiple times.

2. On December 28, 2021, the Mother called the Father “a bad mouthed piece of shit”.

3. On January 3, 2022, before the Father insulted the Mother, she called his brother and sister “motherfuckers”, who do “jack all”.

4. In a July 1, 2025 exchange, the Mother called the Father a “selfish prick”, who “will never accelerate in your life”.

5. In cross-examination, the Mother referred to the Father as a “narcissist”, with whom she cannot make joint parenting decisions.

255When cross-examined about her own vilification of the Father and how it matches up with her claims of fearing him, the Mother described her vituperative correspondence as “moments of courage”, which she could muster in writing but not in person. She asserted that those messages do not detract from her fear of the Father. The Father disagrees and argues that they actually evince a lack of fear. The Father further argues that both parties were disrespectful of the other at times because they were ill-suited. That is why they separated. But it is not evidence of abuse.

256Furthermore, even after the Mother repeatedly lied to the Father and tried to trick him regarding the grounds for her Khula application, he did not retaliate, threaten or harm her in any way. He consented. Despite her claim that she feared that he would withdraw his consent to the civil divorce, he did no such thing.

257The Father submits that the evidence of the Children elicited by the OCL offers no proof of abuse, let alone grave risk of harm. All that the Children were able to offer is that the Parents argued in Urdu, they did not understand the nature of the arguments, that the Father shouted more than the Mother and that when he did, he was louder and that they did not like it.

258The Father pointed to the Mother’s text of August 27, 2025 and testimony to the effect that it is her decision to make as to where the Children live and that the Father cannot change it. The Mother also stated in cross examination that she could not make decisions with the Father, because he is “a narcissist”. The Father argues that it is the belief that she can choose the Children’s residence, rather than the fear of him, which motivates the Mother’s relocation attempt.

259The Father adds that even if a grave risk of harm were proven, the Court must presume that British courts are able to deal with the issue. In saying this, he cites a number of cases cited above, including Ireland and Ojeikere.

Allegation of Psychological Harm due to the Mother’s Refusal to Return to the UK

260The Mother’s second argument under Article 13(b) is that she is the Children’s primary caretaker. Her refusal to return to the UK, even if the Father’s application is granted, creates a grave risk of harm to the Children. Her position is supported by the OCL.

261The Mother cites the following cases which speak to the close association between children and their primary caregiver:

1. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Service) v. G.(J.), 1999 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, Lamer C.J. stated at para. 76, in the context of child protection proceedings, where the parent(s) stand in opposition to a state child protection agency:

76 The interests at stake in the custody hearing are unquestionably of the highest order. Few state actions can have a more profound effect on the lives of both parent and child. Not only is the parent's right to security of the person at stake, the child's is as well. Since the best interests of the child are presumed to lie with the parent, the child's psychological integrity and well-being may be seriously affected by the interference with the parent-child relationship.

2. In Ojeikere, at para. 55, Laskin J.A. adopted this quote from Thomson, at p. 597:

I hasten to add, however, that I do not accept Twaddle J.A.'s assessment that the risk contemplated by the Convention must come from a cause related to the return of the child to the other parent and not merely from the removal of the child from his present caregiver.¹⁶ As this Court stated in Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, from a child centred perspective, harm is harm. If the harm were severe enough to meet the stringent test of the Convention, it would be irrelevant from whence it came.

3. In Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, L’Heureux-Dube J. relied on her comments in Young v. Young, discussing the importance to a child of maintaining a relationship with their psychological parent, writing as follows at para. 121:

121 The assessment of the child’s best interests also involves a consideration of the particular role and emotional bonding the child enjoys with his or her primary caregiver. The importance of preserving the child’s relationship with his or her psychological parent has long been recognized by this Court on a number of occasions (Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M. (C.), 1994 83 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165, at p. 202; Racine v. Woods, supra, at p. 188; King v. Low, 1985 59 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87, at p. 101). There is a growing body of evidence that this relationship may well be the most determinative factor on the child’s long-term welfare. As I mentioned in Young, supra, at p. 66, the vital link between continuity in the emotional bonding of the child with his or her psychological parent and the best interest of the child finds ample support in the literature:

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, supra, while perhaps lacking in empirical data, remains an influential analysis of the psychological needs of children following divorce. The authors emphasize, among other factors, the importance of continuity in the child's relationships and conclude that the major focus of custody decisions should be to preserve and protect the relationship between the child and his or her psychological parent.

[Emphasis in original.]

262The Father argues that the Mother’s position implies the grafting of a “tender years doctrine” to Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. He cites this statement by Hood J. in Usmani v. Hassan, 2016 ONSC 6453, at para. 42:

42 The RM [Respondent Mother] argues that due to Ismael's young age and the fact she has been his primary caregiver, any removal from her would result in psychological harm amounting to an intolerable situation. There is no evidence in support of this and even if there was, it would go to the merits of a custody hearing: Thomson, at para. 82. Moreover, to recognize an argument based on a child of tender years would effectively carve out an exception to the Convention, which would be inappropriate.

263The Father cites other Hague Convention cases in which children as young as or younger than the Children in this case were ordered to be returned to the country of their habitual residence, even without their primary caregiver, including:

1. Thomson, where a seven-month-old child was ordered returned to Scotland;

2. Usmani v. Hassan, where a child who was under a year old was ordered returned to California;

3. Singh v. Ramotar, 2018 ONSC 2964 where a one-year-old child was ordered returned to Pennsylvania;

4. Vantriet v. Ogutu, 2019 ONSC 5784, 32 R.F.L. (8th) 348, where two children, ages one and two, were ordered returned to Nevada; and

5. Pruitt, where a nearly three-year-old child was ordered returned to Michigan.

264The Father concludes on this point by stating that nothing prevents the Mother from returning to the UK, other than her own desire and knowledge that the Children do not wish to return without her. To allow her to rely on her own refusal to return to create a basis for risk to harm “would allow a child abductor to both create and rely upon the same harm to prevent the children’s return home”.

Analysis of Grave Risk of Harm/Intolerable Situation Defence

265As stated above, the onus which rests on the party alleging a grave risk of harm defence is a high one. The test is stringent: F. v. N., at para. 73. To meet the Article 13(b) threshold, the situation must be one which an individual child should not be expected to tolerate: F. v. N., at para. 73. That high standard refers to both physical and psychological harm: Thomson, at p. 596. In Thomson, La Forest J. cites with approval the dictum of Nourse L.J. in Re A, at p. 372, regarding the risk of psychological harm to a child: that the risk must be a weighty one and that the harm must be one of substantial, not trivial psychological harm.

266Those standards have not been met here. I say this for a number of reasons, which follow.

267First, while I have concerns with both parties’ evidence, as stated above, I have more concerns with the credibility of the evidence of the Mother than the Father. I set out in great detail above the problems I see with the Mother’s credibility. In addition to the credibility issues which I have raised above, I find that the Father’s arguments set out above regarding the Mother’s statements which are inconsistent or irreconcilable with her evidence on this issue, are valid. Altogether, they point to a pattern of dissemblance when the Mother sees it in her interest to tell less than the truth.

268I recognize in saying this that the court must be careful to avoid assuming that there is but one way in which a victim of domestic abuse (including coercive control) will react to it. A court must not rely on myths or stereotypes regarding the manner in which a victim of any form of abuse will be expected to respond to their abuse. But that fact must not mean that a court must ignore concerns with the evidence of a person claiming to be a victim of abuse, including coercive control: that approach is unfair to the person facing the allegation, to the system of justice and in parenting cases, to the children involved.

269Here, my concerns with the Mother’s evidence are not based on myth or stereotypes of what a victim should be expected to do or not do. Rather, I look to all of the evidence offered by the Mother, including its many contradictions, exaggerations and outright falsehoods in making my determination.

270I recognize the problems with the Father’s evidence as well, which are also set out above. But as I have already stated, he does not have the same credibility issues that the Mother faces.

271For those reasons, I do not simply accept everything that the Father says when it contradicts that of the Mother. But if there is not independent evidence to support the Mother’s allegations, I cannot accept them.

272Here, I find:

1. The relationship between the parties was a highly conflictual one, particularly following the birth of the Children;

2. The Mother was not the Father’s passive victim. She had her own agency. As her correspondence indicates, she was able to stand up for herself against the Father. While he was certainly verbally abusive to the Mother, she was quite willing and capable of doing the same to him.

3. The Mother asserts that her vulgar insults are different than those of the Father because she used them “as a manner of speaking” while the Father directed his insults at her. She claimed in her evidence that, while she was afraid of him hurting her if she spoke to him directly, she had the courage to confront him in writing. That was the case even if the two were in close proximity or even in the same building. However, in reviewing the many texts, I do not see the distinction in texts to which the Mother refers. Her insults land with the same ferocity as those of the Father. Many of them were proffered when the Parents were in very close physical proximity.

4. The threats which the Mother claims that the Father made are not borne out in the voluminous electronic communications between them. I give two examples of where she took steps that were highly contrary to his interests, and no threats of harm were made by the Father to support this finding:

a. Even when the Father became aware of the Mother’s deception regarding the Khula, and even after he went so far as to oppose the grounds she alleged, he still consented to the Khula. While the Mother claims that she made a financial sacrifice to obtain the Khula, that claim is a gross exaggeration. She gave up CAD$50.

b. A review of the correspondence between the parties after the Mother came to Canada this past summer shows that, even in the face of her unilateral actions and strong language, the Father maintained a measured, non-threatening and at times, sympathetic tone with her. He attempted to reason with her and attempted to respond to the Mother’s financial concerns. The Mother rejected his entreaties, making clear that she alone would decide where the Children would live.

5. The Mother’s claims of coercive control, are again, either untrue or exaggerated. For example:

a. There is no objective evidence that would cause me to find that the Mother’s accidents on vacations in exotic locations like Sardinia and Turkey are anything but simple accidents. Yet she attempts to claim a lack of agency and blame her misadventures on the Father. She has provided no evidence that would support her claims.

b. Even though he was aware of the Mother’s desire to relocate to Canada and even in the face of his opposition to such a move, the Father consented to her temporary visit to her parents this past summer.

c. The Father’s threat to commence these proceedings if the Mother refused to return the Children to the UK was not, as the Mother claims, an abusive form of coercive control. It was a rational response to her announcement of her intent to retain the Children in Canada, against his wishes. The mere commencement of these proceedings is not a form of coercive control.

d. Despite the Mother’s claims that the Father kept her from her family, the opposite is true. She visited her family every summer but one (for Covid) during the marriage, and spoke to them every other day. Her Mother visited her in England more than once (the evidence was not clear on the number of visits) and even her Father did so, albeit briefly.

6. Regarding the Mother’s claims of coercive financial control, even assuming without deciding that financial coercive control can meet the test of Article 13(b), I do not accept that the Mother’s allegations reach the level of grave risk of harm/intolerable situation. While I offered the Mother’s counsel some latitude in cross-examining the Father regarding finances, this is not the venue to determine whether the support he paid was in line with his income and assets.

7. More importantly, post-separation, even absent a court order, the Father voluntarily paid the Mother the British equivalent of close to CAD$5,000 per month in various forms of support. If she felt that this level of support was inadequate, the Mother could have requested more from the British family court. Unlike the Father, she had a lawyer to assist her. However, in her divorce application she told that court that she was seeking no financial relief from the Father. I add that in her WhatsApp message to the Father of August 25, 2025, the Mother conceded that the Father was not well off, writing: “I cannot afford a house nor a car. It’s very simple rubaid. I highly doubt that you can either. If you can let me know”.

8. Furthermore, as the Mother acknowledged in her UK divorce application, the Father agreed to return his share of the Properties to her even though he remained a co-mortgagor and thus liable for the mortgage debt.

9. The fact that, following their separation and civil divorce application, the Father did not wish to sign a new lease for the Mother or let her drive his car may well have been a factor in her decision to relocate to Canada. But they are not proof of coercive financial control. The relationship and arrangements between spouses inevitably change following separation and divorce. In my experience, it is rare for a divorced ex-spouse to, for example, sign financial documents on behalf of an ex-spouse. But he tried to help her find a new home and in his August 27, 2025 text promised her various financial assistance. There is no reason to believe that the Father was unwilling to support the Mother and Children, and there is much evidence to the contrary. While the Father may not have wanted the Mother to drive his car at some point after they separated, he drove her on school and other days.

10. I add that I do not have sufficient evidence to determine exactly what happened when a car paid for in part by the Mother’s family was given to Uzair during the pandemic. The Father’s evidence that they could not afford the car payments on a second car during Covid went unchallenged.

11. In none of her correspondence with the Father explaining her reasons for desiring a relocation did the Mother mention the claims she relies upon in this proceeding, including the various forms of alleged abuse. Instead, she cited two factors: lack of finances, as set out above and her emotional need to be with her family. The point is made in correspondence cited above. It is summarized in the August 25, 2025 WhatsApp message partially cited above. In that exchange, the Mother writes that:

I am not willing to live in an environment where I am secluded from my support system. I do not wish to live in the UK. As far as I am aware, like you keep saying, you cannot afford to keep me or the kids there. Your accounts to my lawyer display the same…

Yes I am doing this for [the Children’s] stability. Not to be a financially struggling parent under constant pressure.

12. There is no independent evidence to confirm the Mother’s allegations of physical abuse. She has offered one photograph of her wrist. In a text exchange, the Father asks why she was showing the photo to him. She answered “[y]ou pushed me freak”. The Father denied the claim. The photocopied photo in the Mother’s materials is too indistinct to demonstrate any bruise or other injury.

13. As stated above, the Mother has exaggerated or even fabricated other claims against the Father. He has offered responses to the Mother’s abuse allegations which point to far more anodyne events occurring than the Mother has alleged. I am inclined, for the reasons cited above, to accept his narrative over hers.

14. However, even if I were to accept the Mother’s narrative regarding those events, there is no evidence that they resulted in anything but transient effects. Further, they would be isolated incidents over ten years of marriage. They fail to meet the standard of grave risk of harm and intolerable conditions.

15. While not determinative and not a prime reason for my decision, I cannot ignore the fact that the Mother never contacted any British authorities to report the Father’s alleged abuse until after he threatened to bring these proceedings.

16. While the Mother relies on Pollastro to say that abuse to her was effectively abuse to the Children and is sufficient to meet the test of Article 13(b), the facts of this case, as I have found them (and even as alleged), are far from the horrific and frightening facts of Pollastro. Further and equally relevant, there was medical evidence in Pollastro regarding the adverse psychological effect of the father’s violence on the child: at para. 10. At para. 36, Abella J.A. (as she then was) found that if the child were “forced to return to California … the potential for violence is overwhelming. This exposes the child to the serious possibility of substantial psychological and/or physical harm and, in addition, creates a grave risk that he would be placed in an intolerable situation.” Again, that description is far from the circumstances in this case.

273Regarding any physical abuse of the Children, the only two events cited on behalf of the Mother are the contested event six years ago when the Father allegedly grabbed a crying L by the collar and the undated event recounted by Khalid Zia, the paternal grandfather, where the Father threw Y on a couch. There is no evidence that either child was harmed in any way. I add that the Father denied grabbing L by the collar but admitted to some physical contact with her arm. He said that he was a relatively new parent and was responding to a child who was throwing a tantrum. While L spoke of yelling feeling like a slap, it was not one.

274There is no evidence that the Children have been psychologically harmed by the Father’s conduct. L’s nightmares, for instance, are about both parents not liking her. Regarding the Father’s yelling, the OCL social worker did not probe more deeply and she was dealing with relatively young children.

275Regarding the Mother’s argument that the Children are at grave risk of psychological harm should they be ordered to return to the UK without her, that argument is insufficient in this case to prove that the test of Article 13(b) has been met. I say this because:

1. No expert evidence has been adduced to support that claim. Ms. Faderin is not qualified as an expert and is not in a position to offer such an opinion.

2. The Father has had many terms of unsupervised parenting time with the Children since separation. More to the point, he has had extensive unsupervised parenting time after the Parents separated, both in the UK and in Canada. All of that parenting time was on consent. It included the two weeks that the Mother visited her parents earlier this year and one week in Spain. It also includes the time that the Father has parented the Children without supervision in Ontario since this proceeding began. Despite the contentious nature of this proceeding, neither the Mother nor the OCL has offered any evidence or even correspondence challenging the Father’s treatment of the Children when alone with them. Nor has she demonstrated that the Children are averse to spending unsupervised time with the Father.

3. The Mother’s response to those facts is to state that the Father may be able to care for the Children for short periods of time, but he cannot parent them alone. That creates a grave risk of harm if they are returned to the UK in the face of her expressed refusal to follow. Other than the Mother’s obvious interest in the Children remaining in Canada, there are three problems with that assertion:

a. First, that may be the Mother’s opinion, but it has not been borne out in the evidence. That is the case even though the Father deferred to the Mother’s parenting while they were together. I acknowledge the Father’s previous statements, while the parties were together, regarding his need to work and his feeling that he had to carry both childcare and financial responsibilities, as well as the Mother’s statement that she did all of the parenting while they were together. Even if I were to accept the Mother’s claim at face value, the Father would not be the first parent who was a better parent after separation than before it. After the parties separated, more than a year ago, he was able to combine the two roles; bringing the Children to and from school daily and having them overnight on weekends, despite working. With the Mother’s consent, he has also been able to care for the Children alone since separation. The Children indicated to the OCL that they enjoy their time with their Father. They have not told her that he shouts at them or harms them in any way during that time.

b. Second, the Mother claims that the Father’s care alone with the Children was actually always in the presence of his brother, Uzair, and sister-in law, Sidra. Both the Father and Uzair deny that claim and I accept that denial. But even if true, that does not raise a grave risk of harm. The Mother herself quoted the aphorism that it takes a village to raise a child. She currently resides with her parents and receives parenting assistance from them and her siblings. If the Father utilizes his brother and sister-in-law to assist him in parenting, and the Children are safe and well cared for, they are far from being at grave risk of harm. The court must be careful not to stereotype the ideal parenting arrangement, so long as it works. If there are any parenting concerns short of a grave risk of harm, they can be addressed in a British family court proceeding.

c. Third, the caselaw cited above demonstrates that more is needed to be proven than the Mother has offered to meet the test of Article 13(b). Undoubtedly the Children have, as will be discussed below, expressed a preference to remain in Canada and not to return without the Mother. But as also set out below, I question the age and maturity of the Children and the independence of those views.

276The Father has offered alternate plans should the Children be ordered to return to the UK. If they return with the Mother, the Father has set out, in his August 27, 2025 WhatsApp communication, terms he is willing to accept, which I take as undertakings. Those terms involve the provision to her and the Children of his apartment until they find one of their own, use of his car, and payment of both rent and school fees at Ryleys (which is still holding open spaces for the Children), as set out above. I am able to rely on those undertakings as the court did in F. v. N. I point out that if the Mother is unsatisfied with the proposed financial arrangements, she can apply to the local British Family Court.

277The Father also offers a plan should the Mother choose not to return to the UK. The Father states that he has a flexible job in real estate development and management. He can tailor his hours around his childcare responsibilities. The Children would resume their studies at Ryleys. In the short term, the Children would share a bedroom in his two-bedroom apartment, close to Ryleys, until he obtains larger three or four-bedroom accommodations. Such a residence will be available shortly as the Father’s lease expires in February 2026. He will use any front and back yard of his new home to keep the Children busy and active. He will buy them a puppy as well. The Father will have the assistance of Uzair and Sidra, who live within minutes of his apartment and as Uzair has deposed and testified, remain willing to assist. They can operate as one big family, sharing meals assisting each other with childcare and spending evenings together. The Children will resume their sibling-like relationship with their cousins. The Father will also connect with a network of friends, most of them parents of other children at Ryleys, for additional support for the Children. The paternal grandmother is also willing to come to the UK to assist for a few months.

278Based on the evidence before me, I find that, paraphrasing Kasirer J. in F. v. N., at para. 80, while the Children may be separated from the Mother if she refuses to return following an order for their return to the UK, they will be placed with a proven “capable left-behind parent and other known caregivers, in a safe and familiar environment.” They will not be left without care or made to feel unsafe with the Father, even if they miss their Mother. She will undoubtedly have the opportunity to see them as regularly as she wishes. Furthermore, she may avail herself of the U.K. courts to determine exactly what parenting and support arrangements should follow the Children’s return to Britain.

279I add that I agree with the Father’s argument that this court must presume that the courts of the UK, a common law jurisdiction with deep concerns for women’s, children and human rights as well as a signatory to the Hague Convention would, in the words of Juriansz J.A. at para. 48 of Ireland: “determine what is in the best interests of the children … and will make, suitable arrangements for the children's welfare…”. Whether or not the Mother is obliged to prove that the courts of the UK are unable to protect her rights and the best interests of the Children, I am entitled to presume that the UK courts would do so.

280Further, the Mother has already commenced an application in the UK regarding parenting issues. If the Father breaks his undertakings or otherwise acts contrary to the best interests of the Children, or if she finds the undertakings to be inadequate, the Mother has recourse to those courts.

281Thus, in sum, considering Engelking J.’s three questions in Hassan v. Garib:

1. I do not find that any past violence by the Father towards the Mother or Children has been severe and is likely to recur.

2. There has been no life-threatening violence by the Father.

3. There is no reason to question the Father being amenable to control by the justice system.

282For all of the reasons cited above, I find that the Article 13(b) defence is not made out.

Issue No. 4: Do the Children object to being returned and have they attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views?

283This issue deals with what Madsen J.A. described in Woods as “a defence for the child against return, separate and apart from any defence of the parent”: at para. 106. The second paragraph of Article 13 of the Hague Convention grants the “judicial or administrative authority” the discretion to refuse to order the return of the child if the child objects to the return and the child has reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity at which his or her views can be taken into account: see also Balev, at para. 77.

284In Balev, McLachlin C.J. wrote at para. 76 that Article 13(2) “should not be read so broadly that it erodes the general rule [of the Hague Convention]”. However, that reading does not preclude “a fact-based, common-sense approach to determining whether the elements of Article 13(2) are established”.

285The determination of the sufficiency of a child’s age and maturity will, in most cases, simply be “a matter of inference from the child's demeanor, testimony, and circumstances”. In some cases, expert evidence may be required, provided that it does not delay the proceedings: Balev, at para. 79.

286The court should assess a child's objection “in a straight-forward fashion – without the imposition of formal conditions or requirements not set out in the text of the Hague Convention”: Balev, at para. 80.

287In Woods, a trial decision to return a 13-year-old child to her country of origin was reversed on appeal, in part because the trial judge failed to give appropriate weight to the “mature” child’s objection to return. Rather, the trial judge relied on too narrow an evidentiary basis for her finding that the child’s objection was not an independent one. Madsen J.A. wrote for the court at para 110:

110 Giving appropriate weight to the objections of a sufficiently mature child is consistent with the policy objectives of the Hague Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, and the role of children’s views and preferences under the CLRA. As this court noted in A.M.R.I., “art. 12(1) of the CRC stipulates that the views of a child are to be given due weight according to the child’s age and maturity and that a child has the right ‘to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child’”: at para. 111. Referring to s. 64(1) of the CLRA, which provides that the court shall, where possible, take into consideration the views and preferences of the child, as well as s. 64(2), which authorizes the court to interview the child, this court noted that, “recognition of the child’s right to be heard on the Hague application conforms with the spirit and intent of s. 64 of the CLRA”: A.M.R.I.,¹⁷ at para. 110.

[Footnote added.]

288In Balev, at para. 81, McLachlin J. set out the manner in which the court should consider a child’s objection and exercise its discretion in regard to that objection as follows:

81 If the elements of (1) age and maturity and (2) objection are established, the application judge has a discretion as to whether to order the child returned, having regard to the "nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are 'authentically her own' or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considerations which are relevant to her welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations": In re M., at para. 46.

289There is no doubt that the Children would prefer to stay with the Mother in Canada, where they now reside with their maternal grandparents. They also appear to wish that the Father would move to Canada, so that they could be with him as well. Knowing those facts, the court must consider the Children’s age, maturity and the independence of their views.

290The Children are young, eight and five years old. There is no question that the Mother openly discussed her desire to move to Canada with them, both before and after they came to Canada in August 2025. There is also no question that she did so contrary to the requests of the Father that she avoid doing so.

Arguments of the OCL

291The OCL argues for what it describes as “a stand-alone defence for the child against return, separate and apart from any defence of the parent”. It argues that the Children refuse to return to the UK and now consider Canada their home. They have told their Father that they wish to remain in Canada. They associate Canada with comfort and coziness. While the OCL says that they also prefer Canada on the grounds of safety, neither of the Children actually said that.

292When L was asked whether she had a message for the judge, she stated that she wants to stay in Canada, that her Father fed her at the wrong time. Nobody told her to say this.

293The OCL argues that the Children “are of an age and maturity where their views are sufficient to ground an independent defence to return.” It asserts that those views are grounded in the Children’s experiences of parental conflict, and feelings of comfort and safety in Canada, as well as their strong bond with their maternal family. It states that the views of the Children are independent, relying on the consistency of their expression of views over their four interviews with Ms. Faderin.

294The OCL relies on the following cases in which the court considered the objections of a child to return, as follows:

1. In Borisovs v. Kubiles, 2013 ONCJ 85, 31 R.F.L. (7th) 470, the court considered the views of an eight-year-old child, but its decision to dismiss a Hague Convention application was not based on that child’s objection. Rather the court relied on the mother and child’s refugee status and a finding of grave risk of harm.

2. In Gulyas v. Messa, 2022 ONSC 6198 (unreported decision despite citation), McLaren J. considered the objections of eight and nine-and-a-half-year-old children to a return to their habitual residence. Both the OCL social worker and lawyer offered the court their “impressions”, which were found not to be opinions, regarding the maturity of the children. Those children were bright and did well at school. The older child had seen a psychiatrist regarding her fear of return, which was described as suicidal ideation, after being referred to a hospital emergency ward. The court accepted that the children’s views were independent, and not at odds with other considerations related to the children’s welfare.

3. In X.L. v. C.B., 2024 ONSC 3895, the father had wrongfully retained the child, who was habitually resident in China, in Canada. The father unsuccessfully argued that by virtue of his wrongful retention, the child had established ties to the new place such that this court should assume jurisdiction. The court rejected this argument. It found that there was no grave risk of harm if the child were to be returned to China. While the court considered the views of the child, she did not object to her return to China.

4. In M.L.L.C. v. J.L.R.R. Droit de la famille – 2785, 1997 10219 (QC CA), [1998] R.J.Q. 10, a non-Hague Convention case, the Court of Appeal for Quebec interviewed an almost nine-year old child who had been in Quebec for approximately five years and opposed a return to his previous home in Spain. The court found him to be well-settled and happy in his present environment. As this was not a Hague Convention case, the court considered the child’s best interests and relied on the child’s integration in Quebec over the five previous years.

Arguments of the Mother

295The Mother fully supports the position of the OCL regarding the ability of the Children to express their views, the basis of those views and their independence.

296The Mother relies on a statement by the Father during his cross-examination that the Children fear returning to the UK without her. She argues that their fear should be determinative, stating in her final submissions:

The Court should infer that the Applicant is well aware of the children’s connection to their mother and the psychological impact of being separated from her is significant and cannot be ignored. We submit that this also aligns with the views and preferences of the children which have been a consistent expression of remaining with their mother in Ontario.

Arguments of the Father

297The Father argues that the Children have not attained an age and degree of maturity which would allow them to appreciate the magnitude of what is asked of them. He points to certain statements made by the Children to Ms. Faderin as set out in her affidavit. Y stated that he wishes to live with his Mother rather than his Father, and that even if she returned to the UK he would want to stay in Canada because “I feel comfy here”. The Father pointed to the rationale offered by Y to Ms. Faderin, as set out in her affidavit, that “he loves his pillow and enjoys having lots of space to sleep on the bed. He also mentioned that he and his sister do not have to share a small bed like at their dad’s apartment.”

298L told Ms. Faderin that she also wishes to stay in Canada because “[t]here is no shouting and [she feels] cozy with my mum”. She added that she prefers wearing her own clothes to school in Canada rather than a school uniform in the UK. She also stated in her message to the judge that her ground for wanting to remain in Canada is that “[d]ad feeds me on the wrong time in the UK”.

299The Father further argues that the Children’s views and objections are not independent. He asserts that the Mother has improperly influenced the Children. He cites the Mother’s willingness to be, in her word, “transparent” with the Children regarding her desire to relocate to Canada. In his October 17, 2025 affidavit the Father recounts a discussion with L, who told him that the Mother told her that she will not return to the UK. He attaches a recording of that conversation to his affidavit. He also refers to two other recorded conversations with the Children. In one, L tells him that the Mother told her that the Father could not take care of her. In another, Y says that he wished to see the Father “right now” but L whispers to him that he should stop. A few minutes later, L tells the Father that “Mommy says that you cannot take care of me, honey”. The Father did not respond. No party objected to those recordings.

300The father also cites a more indulgent lifestyle for the Children here in Canada, where they have more amenities available to them at their grandparent’s home than they had in the UK. Y now has a Play Station in his room. He did not have one in the UK. L attends at the makeup store, Sephora. Both of the Children are given cash and enjoy far more treats than they did in the UK. The Photo includes Y inexplicably holding a $10 bill.

301The Father adds that the Mother was always present during his early calls with the Children until his lawyer intervened with the Mother’s lawyer.

302The Father asserts that the WhatsApp exchanges above and his conversation with the Children on October 16, 2025 demonstrate that the Mother has been candid in sharing her feelings about a return to the UK with the Children. Her discussions with the Children about her desire for relocation began before they came to Canda in August 2025.

303The Father argues that “[u]ndoubtedly, the Mother telling the children that she would not return with them would place a heavy burden on these young children, as they understand their Mother would not come back with them if they go back to England. So instead they hope that their father will move to Canada to be with them.” Here, the Father refers to a statement by L to Ms. Faderin that the Father “wants us to live there (UK), but I want them both to live here."

304The Father is critical of the OCL’s failure to explore any of his concerns regarding the independence of the Children’s views. While Ms. Faderin discussed the Photo with the Children, she never discussed the recordings in his affidavit, where the Children repeat things they heard from the Mother regarding her desire to relocate. When cross-examined on this point, Ms. Faderin’s answer was that the Photo was more recent. But that is not accurate. Both the Photo, which was contained in the Mother’s first affidavit and the recordings of the Children in the Father’s affidavit were exhibits to affidavits of the same date: October 17, 2025. While the OCL felt that it was relevant to investigate the Photo, it chose not to investigate the recordings which point to the Mother’s attempts to influence the views of the Children.

305The Father adds that when his counsel cross-examined Ms. Faderin about the reason she felt that the Children’s views were independent, she only pointed to the consistency of those views. The Father argues that consistency does not establish independence.

306The Father points out that Ms. Faderin also provided evidence that L told her that she “loves dad too much”, that she “loved living in the UK” and that Y missed the Father. This was before the Father came to Canada in early October. Since then, Ms. Faderin offered testimony that the Children have enjoyed their time with their Father.

307The Father cites a number of cases in which the views and objections of younger children are not sufficient to avoid a return to their habitual residence. In particular:

1. In M.L.E. v. J.C.E., 2005 ONCJ 89, a pre-Balev case, the court ordered the return of children ages ten, seven and five. Glenn J. wrote at para.12:

12 Given that the Hague convention applies to children up to the age of 16 years, I am doubtful that many ten-year-olds would achieve the age and the maturity to trigger the considerations of Article 13. The convention provides no guidelines on how to assess maturity levels in children and it contains little direction as to the age requirement. It is possible for a child to have very strong views and to articulate them clearly. But that alone does not mean the child is sufficiently mature. The fact that L. is clever is of assistance, but maturity is more than that. It would seem to me that, if one were to even consider the views of a child who was as young as age ten in the context of an Article 13 argument, the level of maturity would have to be quite extraordinary.

Glenn J. also stated at para. 6: “even if the court determines that a child has achieved the requisite age and maturity, his or her wishes do not represent an automatic veto on the question of the return to his or her home state.”

2. In Takenaka v. Kaleta (2006), 2006 4908 (ON SC), 28 R.F.L. (6th) 119 (Ont. S.C.), Croll J. found that a six-year-old was “still too young to ascertain any meaningful views or preferences of her own.”

3. In Nichilo v. Edge, 2024 ONSC 4966 (unreported decision despite citation), Trimble J. chose not to rely on the objection of a “thoughtful mature 12-year-old child who expressed her views clearly.” The child’s views were a factor but not determinative, as Trimble J. ordered the return of the child. At para. 88, Trimble J. wrote: “Against Kaitlyn’s maturity for her age and are clearly expressed views, I must consider other things. First, she is 12 years old, which is at the lower end of the age range at which point children’s views begin to weigh in the application of a judge’s discretion.” Trimble J. also had serious doubts about the independence of the child’s views.

4. In Diaz Garcia v. Reyna Cruz, 2023 ONSC 3306, Sah J. found that a seven-year-old child lacked sufficient maturity to give weight to his views. He was not mature enough to understand the intricacies of his situation. She found no evidence that he reasonably weighed the benefits and disadvantages of the two jurisdictions. She had doubts about the independence of his views. He had not expressed fears about returning to his home country, Mexico. The child’s objections were not linked to a fear of domestic violence but rather to keep his mother happy and because of “his newfound stepfamily, friends, his new home, school, and plentiful internet access.”

Analysis of the Children’s Objections to a Return to the UK

308The starting point in my analysis is that in judicial and administrative proceedings affecting children, they have the right to have their voices heard and their views given due weight according to their age and maturity. A child has the right “to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child”: A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R., 2011 ONCA 417, 106 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 111, citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, Article 12.

309I acknowledge that In Ojeikere, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the objection of a younger or less mature sibling can be bolstered by an older or more mature sibling who shares the same objections. However, the oldest of the two Children in this case is eight years old.

310Both Children have expressed a desire to remain in Canada with their Mother. Even at their ages, five and eight, those views must be considered. But ordinarily, in non-Hague cases where parenting decisions are made on the sole basis of the individual child’s best interests, children of that age may have a voice but not a veto as to parenting arrangements.

311In the Hague Convention context, the child’s objections must be substantial in order to be determinative: Cormier v. Borsk, 2019 ONCJ 889, at para. 25, citing Garelli v. Rhama 2006 13555 (ON SC), 2006 CarswellOnt 2582 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para 36. In Rhama, Mackinnon J. further stated: “the objection must be to returning to the country of habitual residence, and not merely an expression of a preference as to custodial parent and, the court ought to consider the reasons provided by the child.”

312At para. 40 of Borsk, Pawagi J, cited a number of cases where children older than the ones in this case (between the ages of ten and fifteen) were ordered returned to their country of origin when their objections were not sees as substantial.

313In a Hague Convention case such as this, knowing of the Children’s objections to a return to the UK, I must consider whether they have reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity that their views can be taken into account. Even so, I have the discretion as to whether I should act contrary to their views, looking at a number of factors, as set out above. Here, the key factors, in addition to the ages and maturity of the Children, are their independence, as well as the nature and strength of their objections.

314The Children are undoubtedly bright for their ages. They do well in school. But that, in itself is not proof of maturity, especially for children of their ages. I have no evidence that they are particularly mature beyond their young ages.

315The Children have expressed reasons for their views, some serious and some frivolous. The most serious is their observation of parental conflict. But the OCL did not inquire as to whether the conflict and the raised voices, particularly that of the Father, have ameliorated with the Parents’ separation. That is particularly relevant in light of the fact that the Father has spent about three months in Canada, seeing the Children regularly, with their approbation and without any reports of any concerns.

316The Children like living in Canada, with their grandparents and new friends, as well as the amenities that arrangement affords them. But they also want the Father to remain Canada so that they can see him here; which is presumably the best of all worlds from their perspective.

317The Children’s frivolous reasons for staying in Canada, as expressed to Ms. Faderin include Y’s love for his Canadian pillow, the enjoyment of the space in his bed, his love of snow and playing in the snow. It also includes L’s preference for wearing ordinary clothes rather than a uniform to school and the Father’s feeding her “at the wrong time”.

318The Hague Convention does not offer a guideline, let alone a rubric for the determination of when a child’s age and level of maturity is sufficient to tip the balance, particularly when the other defences are not proven. The cases cited above by the OCL and the Father show the potential range of circumstances and judicial views regarding that issue. But I find that it would have to be the exceptional five and eight-year-old or an exceptional set of circumstances that would make the views and objections of that five- and eight-year-old child determinative in a Hague Convention case when the other defences fail. I do not see that exceptionality here.

319I do not find that the Children fully appreciate the future consequences of a decision regarding their relocation. They are simply happy with their new living arrangements and wish that their father could join them in Canada. Nor do I find that the Children’s objections are substantial, as described in Borsk or the cases which Pawagi J. cites in that decision.

320I add that if I am wrong in that regard, I do not find that the views and objections of the Children are independent. There is no doubt that the Mother has been the Children’s primary caregiver, both before and after separation. That is the case, even though the Father saw them almost daily following separation. The Children are closely aligned with the Mother.

321That being the case, the Mother has clearly attempted to influence the Children in favour of relocation to Canada from well before they boarded a plane on August 6, 2025.

322From the correspondence between the parties, it is apparent that the Mother was unhappy in the UK and wanted to leave so that she could return to Canada to be with her family. The Children, despite their young ages, would have been aware of that fact. The Mother admitted that she shared those feelings with them.

323In a July 1, 2025 WhatsApp message to the Mother, the Father raised the issue of her involving the Children in their relocation dispute. He asked her to stop doing that. Rather than deny attempting to influence the Children, she begged him to agree to allow her to relocate to Canada with them.

324Then on July 3, 2025, the Father wrote to the Mother, stating that he had been hearing the Children say that he would not allow her to move to Canada. He again asked her to avoid the topic with them. Again, the Mother did not deny the Father’s allegation. Rather she admitted to discussing the issue without him and letting them know her feelings. She wrote: ““I am transparent with the kids. When [I] initially wanted to leave the kids said they wanted to come with me and [I] told them the truth which was that you wont let them.” Clearly the Mother had drawn the Children into the relocation conflict.

325In her testimony, the Mother stated that when she and the Children arrived in Canada she informed them that they are staying and that she would not return.

326In her October 16, 2025 conversation with the Father, L told him that her Mother told her that the Father cannot take care of them, a view which the Mother has shared with the court.

327It is hard to see how Children of their ages could not be influenced by their Mother when she is having the type of discussions with them set out above.

328The Children also appear to have a materially better lifestyle in Canada than they enjoyed in the UK. They are living in a home where their maternal grandparents, although clearly good people, also have strong adverse feelings regarding the Father.

329Despite all that, the OCL social worker seems to have been remarkably incurious regarding the independence of the Children’s views. That is the case even though, as set out above, the Father raised the issue front and centre in his October 17, 2025 affidavit.

330Ms. Faderin’s only justification for her opinion that the Children’s views are independent is their consistency. But consistent repetition of a view which is the subject of parental influence is not proof of its independence. In light of the issues reasonably raised by the Father regarding the independence of the Children’s views, it behooved the OCL to investigate further.

331Ms. Faderin met with the Children four times. She could have spoken to them in greater detail in order to form a fully reasoned opinion regarding the independence of their views. She could also have spoken to both Parents again. She had the time to do all of that since I adjourned the trial of this application for a month, between October 24 and November 24, 2025, at the request of the Mother.

332I do not find that Ms. Faderin’s evidence regarding the independence of the Children is persuasive in the face of the evidence of the Mother’s blatant attempts to influence the Children. I do not find that the Children’s views and objections regarding a return to the UK are independent.

333In light of my findings regarding the Children’s age, maturity and the independence of their views, I need go no further to deal with the Children’s objection defence. But I add that since the Father has been in Canada and seeing the Children regularly and without supervision, they have greatly enjoyed their time with him. They clearly love him. No concerns have been raised regarding his parenting here. If returned to the UK, the Children will be able to reunite with their paternal family there: their uncle, aunt and cousins, of whom they spoke well.

334While the Children’s preference may be with their Mother, it is her choice as to whether to return to the UK. Should the Mother return to the UK, I have every reason to believe, based on the evidence cited above, that the Father will support her and the Children, as he has previously done. If she is unsatisfied with the arrangements proposed by the Father, she can avail herself of the remedies that are available through the well-respected British system of justice, as she could have done before retaining the Children in Canada. Should the Mother refuse to return to the UK, the Father will be able to care for them, with the assistance of his extended family, as set out above.

335Thus, and in sum, while I have considered the Children’s views and objection to a return to the UK, for the reasons cited above, I dismiss this defence.

Conclusion

336I find that the Children should be returned to the country of their habitual residence, the UK. I grant paras. 1-5 of the Father’s application. I further find and order that the undertakings by the Father, cited at para. 276 above, are binding on him, should the Mother choose to return to the UK.

337I do not order police enforcement because I assume that it is not necessary. I also hope that the parties can arrange the orderly return of the Children to the UK. However, if the parties require any further direction regarding the terms and enforcement of my order, they may arrange to appear before me.

338This issue of costs regarding the aborted commencement of the trial has already been adjourned to determined at a date to be set before me.

339With regard to the costs of the balance of this proceeding, including any claim to necessary expenses under Article 26 of the Hague Convention, the Father was the successful party and thus presumptively entitled to his costs under r. 24(1).

340The parties should attempt to resolve the issue of costs on their own. If they are unable to do so, the Father may submit his costs submissions of up to five pages, double spaced, one-inch margins, plus a bill of costs/costs outline and offers to settle, within 21 days of release of this endorsement. He need not include the authorities upon which he relies so long as they are found in the commonly referenced reporting services (i.e. .org, LexisNexis Quicklaw, or WestlawNext) and the relevant paragraph references are included. The Mother may respond in kind within a further 14 days. The OCL is not seeking costs and I assume that no party will seek costs from it. No reply submission will be accepted unless I request it. If I have not received any submissions within the time frames set out above, I will assume that the parties have resolved the issue and will make no costs order.

M. Kurz J.

Footnotes

1. 1I note that I have not been asked to initialize the names of the parties or randomize them, as they were in Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 601, 178 O.R. (3d) 180.
2. 2For example, the OCL concurs with the Mother that the Father consented or acquiesced to the Children’s retention in Canada, despite the fact that the Children offered no views or evidence on the subject.
3. 3The parties do not agree on the subject. I have no independent evidence which would allow me to make a determination.
4. 4The Mother’s supplemental affidavit of November 5, 2025 unnecessarily offers derogatory commentary about the reputation of the Father while he was in high school.
5. 5The main contention between the majority and the dissent is whether the parental intention or hybrid approach should be used for determining habitual residence: see paras. 109-111.
6. 6On consent, the parties were limited to three hours for each other’s cross-examinations. I extended that time by an extra half hour for each, at the request of the Mother’s counsel.
7. 7In this endorsement I include a number of text and WhatsApp exchanges between the Parents. In doing so, I include their original spelling and syntax, as set out in their messages to each other, with any adaptations noted in square brackets.
8. 8Paragraph numbers and syntax in the original unless otherwise indicated by square brackets.
9. 9Aslanimehr v. Hashemi, 2022 BCCA 248, 76 R.F.L. (8th) 269.
10. 10Citing Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis (2001), 2001 24075 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 456 and Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 130
11. 12Aldush v. Alani, 2022 ONSC 1536, 74 R.F.L. (8th) 113.
12. 13In Stefanska, Horkins J. adopted the test from Habimana v. Mukundwa, which in turn adopted the test in Hassan v. Garib.
13. 14https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/currency-converter
14. 15Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, “The Shadow Pandemic: Stopping Coercive and Controlling Behaviour in Intimate Relationships”, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 150, No. 089 (27 April 2021) at 6215.
15. 16LaForest J. was referring to the comments of Twaddle J.A. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the Thomson decision below, (1993), 1993 3396 (MB CA), 88 Man. R. (2d) 204
16. 17A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R., 2011 ONCA 417, 106 O.R. (3d) 1.