R. v. J. R., 2026 ONSC 2898

WARNING

The Court hearing this matter directs that the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:

486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences;

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22, 48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

CITATION: R. v. J. R., 2026 ONSC 2898

COURT FILE NO.: CR-2024-19

DATE: July 3, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

J. R.

Accused

Marc-André Lavigne, for the Crown

James Coulter, for the Accused

HEARD: April 8, 2026

Holowka, J.

reasons for sentence

Overview

1J.R. was found guilty, after trial, of sexually abusing his domestic partner’s daughter between September 1, 2022, and July 14, 2023.¹ He was found guilty of one count of sexual interference, one count of sexual assault and one count of invitation to sexual touching.

2The Crown submitted that the sexual assault count should be conditionally stayed in accordance with the legal principle prohibiting multiple convictions for the same delict. Counsel for J.R. concurred that the sexual assault count should be conditionally stayed. This principle prevents an individual from being convicted of multiple offences arising from the same conduct when the elements of those offences are substantially identical. In such cases, the individual should be convicted only of the most serious offence, and the findings of guilt on the other similar offences should be stayed: R. v. Kienapple, 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729, at pp. 744-754; R. v. Prince, 1986 CanLII 40 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480, at pp. 491-503. Consequently, I hereby conditionally stay count 2, and J.R. shall be sentenced for sexual interference.

3The Crown requests a custodial sentence of nine years. The defence submits that a five-year jail sentence would be appropriate.

4Both Crown and defence counsel submit that the sentences to be imposed should be served concurrently. I agree.

5The Crown also requests additional orders: a DNA order, a s. 109 weapons prohibition for 10 years, a s. 161 order for life, a s. 743.21 order restricting contact with victim A.M., a lifetime SOIRA order, and a s. 743.2 order requiring the Court’s reasons, recommendations, and pre-sentence report to be sent to the Correctional Service of Canada. J.R.'s counsel agrees that most of the Crown's requested orders should be granted, with some exceptions to the s. 161 order. The defence argues that the Victim Fine Surcharge should be waived in light of the circumstances of this case. I will discuss the ancillary orders at the conclusion of these reasons.

The circumstances of the offences

6At the time of the alleged offences, the victim, A.M., was living with her mother, her younger brother, and J.R. The three of them lived as a family unit, and J.R. was a father figure to the victim. In many ways, he was the only father she had ever known.

7J.R. repeatedly engaged in sexual touching of the victim, usually when the victim’s mother was outside the family home. The sexual abuse included J.R. digitally penetrating the vagina of the victim to the point of causing pain. He also caused A.M. to engage in masturbation upon him. During these acts, J.R. would digitally penetrate her or rub her chest. These repeated incidents occurred when the victim was between the ages of seven and eight. Although J.R. engaged in this conduct multiple times over the course of approximately one year, an exact number of occurrences was not determined.

8In the summer of 2023, the victim disclosed J.R.'s sexual abuse to her mother. Despite not fully believing the victim's disclosure, the mother reported the matter to the Children’s Aid Society, which then involved the police. The victim was eight years old when she provided a statement to the police as part of their investigation.

9Since the disclosure, the victim has not resided with her mother, who continues to maintain a relationship and resides with J.R.

J. R.’s background

10J.R. is 31 years old. He was between 27 and 28 during the period of the offences.

11The court had the benefit of a pre-sentence report.

12J.R. had a difficult childhood characterized as dysfunctional, given frequent disputes and disagreements between his parents. Despite the prevailing negative atmosphere in his childhood household, he did not experience any abuse or neglect.

13According to J.R.’s mother, he has been diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder. Although no official medical documentation was submitted to the court regarding this condition, J.R.’s mother described it in the presentence report as a mental disorder within the autism spectrum.

14J.R. completed high school with some difficulty. Subsequently, he briefly enrolled in college but withdrew after a few months, intending to pursue a trade program; however, he ultimately did not follow through.

15Regarding employment, J.R. has been employed to varying degrees since the age of 13. From 2020 to December 2025, J.R. was employed seasonally by a roofing company. It remains uncertain whether he will be able to resume this employment, as the roofing company's owner became aware of the criminal proceedings. In February 2026, J.R. secured employment with a construction company, working approximately forty-four hours a week. A letter was provided from Dale Coleman Construction Ltd.

16J.R. has maintained a stable and supportive relationship with the victim’s mother since 2017. They have had no contact with her children since the victim disclosed the sexual abuse allegations. It is anticipated that the victim's mother will initiate family court proceedings following the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.

17Counsel for J.R. submitted to the court letters of reference from Mario Agozzino, who is J.R.’s uncle by marriage; Rebecca Sigouin-Ethier, an individual known to J.R. for ten years; and Erica Gyldenbjerg, the maternal grandmother of the victim. The letters support J.R., affirming his good character and highlighting the victim’s mother’s significant financial dependence on him, as well as the financial consequences of a custodial sentence.

The impact on the victim

18The impact of J.R.’s crimes on A.M. has been profound.

19She is currently on a waiting list for therapeutic services at the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario. As an interim measure, A.M. has access to a support person at school to assist with the management of her emotions and overall well-being.

20The victim has expressed fear and anxiety about returning to the location of the offences and, on occasion, has intentionally avoided passing in front of the house where the offences occurred.

21Her father reports that his daughter now appears distracted, falling behind in her schoolwork and activities, and has become confrontational with her peers. A.M.’s stepmother detailed the challenges of supporting the victim amidst the profound and ongoing effects of the offences committed by J.R.

22These are the impacts that have been realized. But, as the Supreme Court of Canada noted in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, the long-term harm to child victims of sexual abuse is substantial and foreseeable. There is no doubt that the effects of J.R.’s crime on A.M. will be experienced by her, in varying ways, in the long term.

The positions of the Crown and the defence

23The Crown relies on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Friesen, along with subsequent decisions made since Friesen was adjudicated, to support its position that a sentence of nine years is appropriate. The Crown observes that this case involved multiple instances of highly invasive sexual abuse of a young child by an individual in a position of trust, whose offences caused considerable harm to the child and demonstrated profound moral culpability.

24The defence acknowledges that Friesen articulates the principles governing this case. It is submitted that a sentence of five years would appropriately balance the aggravating and mitigating factors, considering that J.R. is a relatively young first offender and that his partner will be substantially affected by the sentence imposed on J.R.

25The defence submits that sentencing is a highly individualized process and that the principle of parity must be applied. Counsel for J.R. notes that the significantly aggravating factors cited in R. v. D.G., 2019 ONSC 930 and R. v. D.D., 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 1061 (ONCA), where the court determined the sentencing range to be in the upper single digits to low double digits, were not present in the current case. Those factors included other acts of physical violence, threats of violence, and various forms of extortion wherein the child is told not to tell anyone. Defence counsel fairly notes that these cases predate the Friesen decision.

The principles of sentencing

26The primary objective of sentencing is to uphold respect for the law and to maintain a just, peaceful, and secure society. Accordingly, sanctions for criminal conduct serve multiple purposes, including denouncing criminal behaviour, deterring both the individual offender and others from engaging in similar conduct, separating offenders from society when necessary, fostering rehabilitation, and encouraging a sense of responsibility among offenders: Criminal Code, s. 718.

27The paramount principle that governs sentencing is that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility in the unique circumstances of each case: Criminal Code, s. 718.1; Friesen, at para. 30. “The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction”: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at paras. 10, 12.

28The principles of parity and individualized sentencing also govern the imposition of a fit sentence. Still, they are secondary to the principle that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility. The parity principle, which is codified in s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires that similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances should receive similar sentences. The parity principle helps courts to impose a proportionate sentence. Individualized sentencing also furthers the search for a proportionate sentence: Parranto, at paras. 11-12.

29Offences against children are particularly grave. Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code states that when dealing with offences against children, a court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code specifies that the following factors elevate the gravity of an offence:

(i) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years,

(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,

(iii) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation.

30The offence of which J.R. has been convicted has a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment.

31The Supreme Court of Canada has examined the sentencing of offenders convicted of sexual offences against children in the case of Friesen. In Friesen, the unanimous Supreme Court, at paragraph 5, clarified that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase:

[W]e send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children's vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament's sentencing initiatives and by society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

32I am guided, as I determine an appropriate sentence for J.R., by the following directives provided by the Supreme Court in Friesen.

a. Sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm caused by sexual offences against children and the fundamental wrongness of sexual violence. They must fully convey the “life-altering consequences” that often result from such acts. It's essential to consider the harm to A.M. and her community in a way that aligns with society’s growing understanding of that harm. Additionally, the sentence should recognize the inherent wrongfulness of J.R.’s actions, which influences both the severity of the offence and J.R.’s level of responsibility, as discussed in Friesen, paras. 74-75.

b. It is necessary to properly understand the wrongful nature of sexual offences against children and the significant harm they inflict. This understanding will align sentencing law with society’s current view of the severity and importance of addressing sexual violence against children. In particular, the sentencing must acknowledge and reflect both the actual and potential harm to A.M.: Friesen, at para. 50.

c. I must consider forms of potential harm that have not yet materialized but are reasonably foreseeable as consequences of the offences against A.M., and may indeed manifest later as she matures into adulthood. To do otherwise would falsely suggest that these children will merely outgrow the harm associated with sexual violence: Friesen, at para. 84.

d. Sexual violence against children can inflict serious emotional and psychological damage, often more widespread and lasting than physical injury, as noted by Friesen, at para. 56.

e. Any physical contact of a sexual nature with a child invariably constitutes a wrongful act of physical and psychological violence, even in the absence of supplementary physical violence and when it does not cause physical injury: Friesen, at para. 77.

f. When a family member commits sexual violence against a child, violating a trust relationship, such a breach can harm the child’s relationships with their family members, caregivers, and other social connections: Friesen, at paras. 60-61.

g. The ripple effects of sexual violence against children can render parents, caregivers, and family members secondary victims who endure significant harm due to the offence. Sexual violence has the potential to undermine the trust that parents and caregivers place in friends, family, and social institutions, often leaving them feeling powerless and guilty. Additionally, parents and caregivers may incur financial, personal, and emotional costs as they assist their children in recovering and coping with their trauma: Friesen, at para. 63.

h. Sexual violence against children also adversely affects the communities in which children reside and society at large. The repercussions are significant: Friesen, at para. 64.

33Sexual assault through digital penetration constitutes a grave violation of the victim’s bodily integrity. In Friesen, at para. 146, the Supreme Court affirmed that “physical acts such as digital penetration … can be just as serious a violation of the victim’s bodily integrity as penile penetration”. See also: R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, at para. 77; R. v. Morgan, 2024 ONCA 937, at para. 11.

34Sentencing ranges, which summarize previously imposed sentences, serve as guidelines rather than strict rules.

35The sentencing range for sexual offences against children was specifically discussed in Friesen, at para. 114: mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal, and upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should not be considered unusual or reserved solely for rare or exceptional circumstances.

36Counsel has provided me with cases decided after the Supreme Court of Canada’s Friesen ruling. These cases involve different degrees of similarity to this situation. Naturally, no two cases are identical, and sentencing remains an individualized process. I have considered the following cases: R. v. De Flores Bermudez, 2024 ONCA, R. v. Parks, 2025 ONSC 4675, R. v. A.M., 2024 ONSC 7143, R. v. K.F., 2024 ONSC 5581, R. v. R.V., 2022 ONSC 2332, R. v. G.S., 2022 ONSC 120, aff’d 2023 ONCA 712, R. v. Audet, 2020 ONSC 5039, R. v. J.B., 2023 ONSC 1275, R. v. B.M., 2023 ONCA 224, R. v. E.H., 2024 ONCA 74, R. v. G.R., 2020 ONSC 7411, R. v. I.-B.(W.), 2026 ONCJ 66, R. v. D.D., 2025 ONSC 239, and R. v. D.S., 2026 ONCJ 47. These precedents help guide my application of the parity principle to ensure the sentence reflects the harm caused by J.R. and the seriousness of his conduct.

Analysis

37There are many aggravating factors in this case:

a. J.R. abused a position of significant trust. He was in the position of a stepfather to the victim and took advantage of his time alone with her when she was in his care. He breached his duty to protect and care for A.M., enhancing his moral blameworthiness.

b. The sexual violence against A.M. happened multiple times. Although the evidence does not allow me to determine the exact number of incidents, I find that it occurred on several occasions. This amplifies the seriousness of the offense, as J.R.'s actions were not isolated but demonstrated a pattern of conduct and repeated violations of A.M.

c. In this case, the level of physical interference is substantial. J.R. greatly violated A.M.'s bodily integrity by digitally penetrating her.

d. The offences occurred in A.M.’s home. Sexual violence against children in their own home environment is especially harmful, as it undermines the child’s sense of security within their domicile. In this instance, A.M. has experienced fear and anxiety about returning to the location of the offences—her former residence.

e. Harm has been inflicted upon A.M.’s father and stepmother, who are presently endeavouring to assist A.M. in coping with the aftermath of the offences.

f. J.R. knew or ought to have known of the potential harm caused by his wrongful exploitation of a young child. Consequently, his moral culpability is significant.

38There are also some mitigating factors:

a. J.R. has the support in the community from his common law spouse and his extended family. This increases the prospects for his rehabilitation.

b. J.R. has no prior criminal record. This also increases the prospects for his rehabilitation and engages the principle of restraint.

c. J.R. is relatively young and healthy. He is motivated to seek employment to support his partner and has done so despite the ongoing criminal proceedings. This speaks well of his prospects for rehabilitation.

d. J.R. has overcome challenges at school to become a productive member of the community.

39I have also considered the collateral consequences of the sentence to be imposed on J.R.’s ability to support his common law spouse. That will make the sentence to be served more difficult for J.R. Still, collateral consequences cannot be used to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender: R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34; [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, at para. 56.

The sentence

40An appropriate sentence for J.R. must encompass the fundamental principles of denunciation and deterrence. Such a sentence should explicitly serve to deter J.R. and broadly discourage other adults from contemplating sexual abuse of a minor. Furthermore, the sentence must embody society's revulsion and unequivocal disapproval of J.R.’s conduct, which entailed multiple instances of sexual violence against a young girl under his care, who regarded him as a parental figure.

41In this case, a total sentence of six years imprisonment is necessary to adequately reflect the gravity of J.R.’s offences and the harm he has caused, and that is the sentence that I impose. In doing so, I have considered the modest pre-trial custody served by J.R. before his release.

42On count 1, section 151 of the Criminal Code, a sentence of six years' custody is imposed. On count 3, section 152 of the Criminal Code, a sentence of two years' custody is imposed concurrently to count 1. As previously stated, count 2 is conditionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

43In addition to the custodial sentence, the following ancillary orders are made:

a. J.R. is prohibited pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code from contacting A.M, directly or indirectly, while he is serving his sentence.

b. The offence of which J.R. has been convicted is a designated offence under s. 490.011(1) of the Code for the provisions dealing with sex offender information. Pursuant to s. 490.013(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, I order that J.R. shall be subject to the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for life.

c. The offence of which J.R. has been convicted is a primary designated offence under s. 487.04 of the Code for DNA collection and storage, and a DNA order is mandatory. Accordingly, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Code, I order that J.R. provide samples of his bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis.

d. J.R. is prohibited from possessing firearms and other weapons and devices specified in the order I am making pursuant to s. 109 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code for life.

e. Section 161 of the Criminal Code requires the court to consider prohibiting the offender from attending various locations where persons under 16 years of age can reasonably be expected to be present, obtaining or continuing employment that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under 16, or having any contact or communicating with persons under 16, or using the internet.

In R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598, leave to appeal denied 2020 CanLII 27703 (SCC), the Court of Appeal held that:

The overarching protective function of s. 161 of the Criminal Code is to shield children from sexual violence: R. v. J. (K.R.), 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.), at para. 44. An order under s. 161 constitutes punishment and is not available as a matter of course: there must be an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children; the specific terms of the order must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk; and the content of the order must respond carefully to an offender's specific circumstances: J. (K.R.), at paras. 48-49.

J.R. exploited a vulnerable 7 to 8-year-old girl in circumstances where she was entrusted to his care for his personal sexual satisfaction. I find that he poses a risk to children in such circumstances. Therefore, J.R. is prohibited pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code from participating in the following activities for a period of 10 years:

i. From attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre, except when he is there with his own children and in the direct company of an adult who is aware of the circumstances of his conviction and is aware of this order;

ii. From being within two kilometres of any place where A.M. ordinarily resides, attends school, attends a place of worship, or areas known by J.R. to frequent, or where J.R. knows her to be present;

iii. From seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in any capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years;

iv. From having any contact, including communicating by any means, with a person who is under the age of 16 years, except his biological children or when he is in the direct company of an adult who is aware of the circumstance of his conviction and is aware of this order.

44Having regard to the fact that J.R. will be in custody for some time, has struggled to find employment as a result of the outstanding charges, and has financial obligations towards his common law partner, the victim surcharge is waived because it would cause undue hardship if he were required to pay it.

45Finally, pursuant to s. 743.2 of the Criminal Code, I order that Court’s reasons, recommendations, and pre-sentence report be sent to the Correctional Service of Canada.

Mr. Justice Brian Holowka

Released: Orally: July 2, 2026

Written: July 3, 2026

CITATION: R. v. J. R., 2026 ONSC 2898

Footnotes

1. 1R. v. J.R., 2025 ONSC 6978.