His Majesty the King v. S. S., 2026 ONSC 2608

WARNING

The Court hearing this matter directs that the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:

486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences;

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22, 48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

CITATION: R. v. S. S., 2026 ONSC 2608

COURT FILE NO.: CR 2025-06

DATE: May 4, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

S. S.

Accused/Applicant

Joel Lefebvre, for the Crown/Respondent

Brett McGarry, for the Accused/Applicant

HEARD: April 30, 2026

HOLOWKA J.

reasons for decision

ADJOURNMENT APPLICATION

I. Overview

1Counsel for the accused applies to adjourn an upcoming trial concerning allegations of sexual offences involving a 13-year-old girl. The request for adjournment is made to permit defence counsel to participate in an in-custody murder trial in a neighbouring jurisdiction, which has been rescheduled to an earlier date to comply with Jordan timelines. Counsel for Mr. S.S. offers to waive his rights under section 11(b) of the Charter regarding the delay resulting from this adjournment.

2The Crown opposes this adjournment application due to its potential impact on the young complainant, the complainant's family, and society's right to a trial conducted within a reasonable timeframe.

3For the reasons set forth below, the adjournment request is denied.

II. Factual circumstances

4The applicant was arrested and charged with several sexual offences on January 10, 2024. The charges, all in relation to the same complainant, are:

a. Invitation to sexual touching (s. 152) between April 27 and 29, 2023;

b. Sexual assault (s. 271) between April 27 and 29, 2023;

c. Sexual interference (s. 151) between March 1, 2021, and September 1, 2022;

d. Sexual assault (s. 151) between March 1, 2021, and September 1, 2022; and

e. Child Luring (s. 172.1(1) between January 1, 2021, and December 29, 2023.

5The applicant elected to have a preliminary hearing followed by a trial in the Superior Court of Justice. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 7, 2025, but shortly before that date, the Crown preferred an indictment. A five-day judge-alone trial is scheduled for June 8 to 12, 2026. A section 278 application was also scheduled but was ultimately abandoned.

6The interval from the swearing of the Information on January 10, 2024, to the projected conclusion of the trial on June 12, 2026, spans 29 months and 2 days. This duration excludes any periods during which the defence was unavailable for the earlier preliminary inquiry or for other reasons.

7The information provided by the Crown, with the applicant's consent, demonstrates that the complainant and her mother are disappointed by the possibility of an adjournment. The complainant had previously requested permission to attend an end-of-year trip coinciding with the current June trial dates; however, the Crown informed her that her presence in court to testify was mandatory. Due to the timing of this application, it is no longer feasible for her to partake in this experience.

8Mr. McGarry is the counsel of record for the applicant; however, the defence intended for Mr. Biagio Del Greco to conduct the cross-examination of the complainant in French, the language in which the complainant will testify. Nonetheless, Mr. Del Greco has already agreed to conduct the murder trial in Ottawa before the hearing or decision of this application. The applicant prefers that Mr. Del Greco conduct the cross-examination; however, if this application is dismissed, Mr. McGarry has stated that he will conduct the cross-examination of the complainant in this matter with the assistance of a court interpreter.

9The rationale for the current application for adjournment is to enable Mr. McGarry and his partner, Mr. Del Greco, to participate collaboratively in the second-degree murder trial of R. v. Jacob Blanchard and Samuel Laurin-Gauvreau. Aside from the murder charge, there exists an additional allegation of assault causing bodily harm related to an individual with mental health issues.

10The offence date for the homicide was February 15, 2025. The matter was scheduled for a jury trial from November 22 to December 24, 2027, which were the earliest available dates. These dates would have positioned the commencement of the trial at over 33 months from the date the Information was sworn, with no delay attributable to the defence.

11The Ottawa Crown Attorney’s Office has consented to conducting R. v. Blanchard and Laurin-Gauvreau as a judge-alone trial, to allow the newly available dates from May 25 to June 12, 2026, to be used for the trial. The Ottawa Crown has agreed to adjourn several trials involving Brett McGarry, Biagio Del Greco, and Jenny McKnight (counsel for Mr. Laurin-Gauvreau), with section 11(b) waivers, to facilitate the homicide trial proceeding on the earlier scheduled dates.

12The new dates for the Ottawa trial were only recently made available. The process to secure a court date for the adjournment application in L’Orignal, coordinated by the Trial Coordinator, began on April 24, 2026.

13If granted, the applicant’s trial would proceed from January 4 to 8, 2027.

III. Position of the parties

14The applicant requests a postponement of the imminent trial in L’Orignal to facilitate the participation of Mr. McGarry and Mr. Del Greco in the in-custody murder trial scheduled in Ottawa. The applicant waives his rights under section 11(b) of the Charter with respect to any delay attributable to this adjournment, should it be granted. Counsel for the applicant recognizes that this request involves balancing competing interests.

15Mr. McGarry does not contend that the applicant’s right to a full answer and defence is compromised if the adjournment request is denied. He maintains that the defence prefers that Mr. Del Greco conduct the cross-examination of the complainant in this matter in French. Additionally, the adjournment will enable Mr. McGarry to participate in the trial in Ottawa. If denied, Mr. McGarry will not be available for the entire Ottawa trial.

16Mr. McGarry cites the consent adjournments of other trials in Ottawa to facilitate the trial in R. v. Blanchard and Laurin-Gauvreau, which would otherwise be at risk of a stay of proceedings due to a violation of the accused’s section 11(b) Charter rights. He further references an adjournment granted in the Ontario Court of Justice in L’Orignal to accommodate the Ottawa trial.

17The Crown opposes the adjournment, citing the following factors:

a. The age and vulnerability of the complainant and her right to have these proceedings concluded within a reasonable time;

b. The serious nature of the sexual offences alleged and the reality that the complainant and her family have long anticipated the June 2026 trial date;

c. The risk that delay poses to the reliability of memory, especially having regard to young complainants;

d. The accommodation already made by the complainant’s family to permit the trial to proceed on the scheduled dates;

e. The section 11(b) waiver offered by the applicant does not address the prejudice that the complainant would suffer.

IV. Analysis

18The decision to grant an adjournment necessitates the exercise of judicial discretion. Such discretion must be exercised judicially. It must respect the defendant’s right to make full answer and defence. In R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4548, Justice M.A. Code, at para. 6 described this requirement:

A long line of authority has held that the power to grant or refuse an adjournment is discretionary. However, the trial judge must exercise the discretion judicially, that is, in accordance with proper legal principles and after considering and weighing the relevant circumstances of the particular case. See: R. v. Darville (1956), 1956 463 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. 113 (S.C.C.) at 115; Barrette v. R. (1976), 1976 180 (SCC), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 (S.C.C.) at 193; R. v. Manhas (1980), 1980 172 (SCC), 17 C.R. (3d) 331 (S.C.C.), affirming (1978), 17 C.R. (3d) 331 at 332 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. Olbey (1977), 1977 2060 (ON CA), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Ont. C.A.) at 398, affirmed on other grounds, (1979), 1979 61 (SCC), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.); R. v. G. (J.C.) (2004), 2004 66281 (QC CA), 189 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (C.A. Que.) at paras. 8-9; R. v. White (2010), 2010 ABCA 66, 252 C.C.C. (3d) 248 (Alta. C.A.) at paras. 14-15.

19In deciding the issue of this adjournment, I have considered the following factors:

a. The reasons for the adjournment application;

b. The gravity of the charged offences;

c. The custody status of the accused;

d. The need to avoid unnecessary delay;

e. The consequences of the adjournment for the Crown, the complainant, and the accused, including whether the adjournment is required to make full answer and defence;

f. The parties' diligence and the timing of the application; and

g. The length of the adjournment.

20The request for an adjournment is well-founded. Rescheduling the second-degree murder trial in R. v. Blanchard and Laurin-Gauvreau to an earlier date to uphold the accused’s rights under section 11(b) of the Charter, especially given their custody status, is appropriate. The adjournment request is made in good faith and is reasonable considering its purpose.

21There exists a substantial public interest in the prompt adjudication of both the homicide case in Ottawa and the sexual offence trial involving a young complainant in L’Orignal. This situation does not involve a case in which the balancing of interests is affected by one trial being markedly less serious than the other.

22I acknowledge that the accused in R. v. Blanchard and Laurin-Gauvreau are currently in custody, and that this constitutes a significant factor in the balancing of interests.

23The application to adjourn the trial in R. v. S.S., scheduled for June 8 to 12, 2026, raises significant concerns about the need to prevent unnecessary delays. The trial at L’Orignal has already been scheduled for an extended period. An adjournment at this stage would result in an unwarranted delay. The allegations involving a young complainant span from 2021 to 2023. The Information was sworn on January 29, 2024, which, absent any further adjournment, results in a delay of 29 months and 2 days. If granted, the trial would not commence until January 4, 2027—35 months and 7 days from the laying of the Information—and an additional 6 months and 28 days following the currently scheduled trial date.

24The timing of the application in this matter is a crucial factor to consider. The request for an adjournment is made only shortly before the trial date. In a context where judicial resources and court time are limited, granting an adjournment at this stage will not allow for a full week of court time to be effectively reallocated.

25The consequences of granting or denying the adjournment request are fundamentally the primary consideration in this matter. Should the adjournment be refused, the trial in R. v. Blanchard and Laurin-Gauvreau will continue as scheduled, notwithstanding Mr. McGarry's absence for certain proceedings. There is no indication that the interests of a fair trial or the right to make full answer and defence would be compromised by the denial of the adjournment.

26Similarly, if the adjournment is denied, it is not suggested that Mr. Del Greco's unavailability to cross-examine the complainant in French in R. v. S.S. would compromise the fairness of the trial or infringe the defendant's right to make a full answer and defence. I acknowledge that it was anticipated Mr. Del Greco intended to cross-examine the complainant, and that it remains their preference to do so; however, he has now committed to another matter during the same timeframe. While there is no evidence on the feasibility of this request, I question whether it might be possible to request a one-day pause in the Ottawa trial to allow Mr. Del Greco to cross-examine the complainant. Nevertheless, Mr. McGarry is a highly experienced and respected defence counsel, fully capable of cross-examining the complainant with an interpreter.

27The consequences of an adjournment upon the young complainant, her family and the Crown’s case are, in my view, significant. While the applicant, who is out of custody, has offered to waive his section 11(b) Charter rights for the period resulting from the requested adjournment, it does not fully address the negative impact that would result from the adjournment. A waiver of section 11(b) does not account for the impact of delay on the young, vulnerable, sexual assault complainant who would be told shortly before trial that the commencement of the trial would be delayed almost seven months.

28The information presented to the court indicates that the complainant and her family are aware of the adjournment application and the possibility of a postponement. They are disheartened by the circumstances, particularly given that the complainant and her family have previously made sacrifices to accommodate the scheduled trial date in June 2026. The extended duration of the court proceedings has posed significant challenges for the complainant. She is eager to see the conclusion of the trial so that she can move forward. The potential impact of an adjournment on the complainant is a significant factor that weighs against granting such an application.

29Beyond the effect on the complainant, society also benefits from a reasonably prompt trial on the merits while respecting the fundamental principles of justice. As memories fade over time, the search for truth becomes more difficult. Additionally, the criminal justice system must consider how delays impact vulnerable and young complainants of sexual offences. Lengthy and avoidable delays could understandably dissuade victims from reporting such crimes.

30When I consider the foregoing factors, particularly the timing of this application and the consequences that would flow from granting or denying the adjournment, I am satisfied that the interests of justice require that the trial in the matter of R. v. S.S. proceed as scheduled.

V. Disposition

31The application to adjourn the trial scheduled for June 8 to 12, 2026, is dismissed.

Released: May 4, 2026

The Honourable Justice Brian Holowka

CITATION: R. v. S. S., 2026 ONSC 2608