CITATION: Barron v. Town of East Gwillimbury, 2026 ONSC 2384
COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00002052
DATE: 20260422
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Rusty Barron, Plaintiff
AND:
The Corporation of the Town of East Gwillimbury, Defendant
BEFORE: J. Di Luca J.
COUNSEL: Plaintiff – Self Represented
Douglas Smith and Robert Stefanelli, Counsel for the Defendant
HEARD: January 30, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Overview
[1] This is a motion by the defendant, The Corporation of the Town of East Gwillimbury, (“the Town”) seeking a dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the statement of claim discloses no cause of action. In the alternative, the defendant seeks an order dismissing the action or striking the pleadings as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process under Rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11.
[2] In accordance with the Orders of Charney J. dated February 29, 2024, January 17, 2025, and March 13, 2025, the parties have agreed to argue the motion on the basis of a draft Amended Statement of Claim, originally delivered to the defendant on May 29, 2024.
[3] The draft Amended Statement of Claim is 202 pages in length. It makes a number of allegations which can essentially be distilled into one key complaint. In short, Mr. Barron alleges that the Town failed to enforce a zoning by-law against a residential property that sits adjacent to his residential property. [^1] This key complaint forms a part of a long-standing neighbour dispute between Mr. Barron and his former neighbour, Cameron Brown. [^2]
[4] In his claim, Mr. Barron also alleges that the Town has failed to disclose investigative records in response to numerous Freedom of Information requests and also improperly disclosed his personal information. Lastly, he suggests that the Town has made false allegations against him to the York Regional Police Service and has also acted in bad faith towards him.
[5] Mr. Barron seeks damages in the amount of approximately $1.6 million based on the defendant’s alleged failure to properly investigate and prosecute the alleged by-law infractions committed by his then-neighbour. He also seeks certain declaratory relief including an order declaring the neighbouring property a “contractor yard.”
[6] At the hearing of the motion, Mr. Barron advised that he was narrowing his claim to focus only on the allegation that the Town failed to enforce its by-laws and, as a result, acted in a biased and prejudiced manner. As he explained, he simply wants the Town to enforce the by-law for his sake and the sake of the community.
[7] Mr. Barron also advised that he would pursue the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act requests and the alleged breach of privacy issue elsewhere, and not through this action. Lastly, he advised that this case was not about Charter rights nor was it about an alleged abuse of public office.
[8] In short, at the hearing of the motion, Mr. Barron clearly indicated that the action is only about the Town’s failure to investigate and enforce the by-law in relation to alleged transgressions committed by his neighbour.
[9] For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the claim, as framed in the draft Amended Statement of Claim, is dismissed without leave to amend.
The Legal Framework
[10] Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure grants authority to strike a claim where it is “plain and obvious” that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success, see R. v. Imperial Tobacco, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45, at para. 17; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980; and McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 483, 116 O.R. (3d) 429, at para. 39.
[11] On a motion to strike under this Rule, the claim is to be read generously with allowance for drafting deficiencies. No evidence is permissible on such a motion, and the Court generally assumes that the facts pleaded are capable of being proven. The issue is whether the pleading asserts a legally sufficient claim and not whether the plaintiff will likely be able to prove the material facts, see Brozmanova v. Tarshis, 2018 ONCA 523 at paras. 25‑26, Barbara Schlifer Commemorative Clinic v. HMQ Canada, 2012 ONSC 5271, and Abbasbayli v. Fiera Foods Company, 2021 ONCA 95, at para. 20.
[12] Rule 25.11 and Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure grant the Court authority to dismiss or strike claims that are considered “frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.” The analysis under these rules is somewhat different, though the focus remains on whether it is “plain and obvious” that the claim must fail because it is fundamentally defective, see Baradaran v. Alexanian, 2016 ONCA 533 at paras. 15-16 and Currie v. Halton (Region) Police Services Board, 2003 7815 at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.).
[13] A claim must only be struck or dismissed in the clearest of cases. A court must consider whether amendment may cure the noted deficiency. Leave to amend a pleading should only be denied in the clearest of cases particularly in cases where the deficiency may be cured by an appropriate amendment, see South Holly Holdings Limited v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2007 ONCA 456 at para. 6.
The Statement of Claim and Proposed Amended Statement of Claim
[14] The original claim was commenced on May 2, 2023. The Statement of Claim is approximately two pages in length and it advances two claims: (1) a claim for disclosure of all investigative material relating to the various by-law complaints made in relation to the neighbour’s property, and (2) an allegation that the Town is “deliberately turning a blind eye” to the by-law infractions committed by the neighbour, thereby ruining the enjoyment of the adjacent property owners.
[15] The claim alleges that the neighbour, Mr. Brown, is operating his business, CamBro Contracting, at the property, thereby using the property as a “contractor yard.” The claim alleges that the contracting activities at the property are disruptive to neighbours and cause traffic congestion on the nearby streets. Lastly, the claim alleges that the Town’s by-law investigation has concluded that the property is not being used as a “contractor yard” though the Town has refused to disclose the investigation details and/or techniques and procedures allegedly used to “catch the alleged individuals in the act.”
[16] On May 30, 2023, the Town made a request under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order dismissing the proceedings on the basis that they appear on their face to be frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. Notice was issued under Rule 2.2.01(3)(1) and the plaintiff filed written submissions.
[17] On December 1, 2023, Sutherland J. considered the Rule 2.1.01 request and held that the high threshold for dismissal under that rule had not been met and that there existed a possible claim in relation to the Town’s failure to enforce its by-laws. Sutherland J. also held that the request to dismiss the action was better suited for a “pleadings motion” as opposed to a Rule 2.1.01 request. That said, he noted that claims relating to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act were “not within the Court’s purview” as an alternate mechanism for review was available to the plaintiff.
[18] Sutherland J. urged the plaintiff to obtain legal advice and redraft his claim in compliance with the Rules.
[19] The proposed Amended Statement of Claim was delivered on May 29, 2024. As stated earlier, it is 202 pages in length. The first few pages are the same as the initial Statement of Claim that was reviewed by Sutherland J. The remaining pages are essentially a lengthy and detailed chronological narrative of events relating to Mr. Barron’s many complaints against his neighbour and the Town’s alleged failure to deal with these complaints to Mr. Barron’s satisfaction. The proposed amended claim includes copies, excerpts, and summaries of numerous email and letter communications between Mr. Barron and the Town’s staff and by-law officers. It also includes various photographs and links to some videos posted on YouTube and elsewhere.
[20] In essence, Mr. Barron alleges that Mr. Brown used the neighbouring property as a “staging area” for a construction business, making noise and causing excessive light in the morning hours, thereby disrupting the peaceful enjoyment of the neighbourhood by its residents. He also alleges that Mr. Brown installed a fence that exceeded permissible by-law height in response to Mr. Barron’s attempt to video record events on the property.[^3]
[21] In support of his claim, Mr. Barron catalogues various complaints to the Town and its by-law officers. He also catalogues his attempts to gain access to the Town’s investigative files through a multitude of Freedom of Information requests.
[22] The proposed amended claim ends with a summary of allegations detailing the many alleged by-law infractions that the Town failed to investigate and/or enforce. It also lists a number of other related failings by the Town.
[23] Lastly, the proposed amended claim also includes a summary of allegations against Cameron Brown, CamBro Contracting and Melnyk Custom Carpentry, though they are not actually named as defendants.
[24] The proposed amended claim seeks $1,646,419.68 in damages to be “divided appropriately between all defendants.”
Analysis and Findings
[25] In his responding oral submissions on the motion, Mr. Barron made it clear that this action is focused on the Town’s failure to enforce its by-laws.[^4] He explained that the draft Amended Statement of Claim on which this motion was argued was essentially a “work in progress” that was intended to apply to various motions and two other civil suits.
[26] As a result of his clarified position, I will focus on the central allegation that the Town failed to enforce its by-laws and that this failure resulted in damages of approximately $1,000 per day.[^5]
[27] In addressing this central allegation, the key issue is whether the Town owes a private law duty of care to the plaintiff to enforce its by-laws. In determining whether a private law duty of care is owed, the Court must apply the Anns/Cooper test, which, as discussed in Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 at para. 22 and Deloitte & Touche v. Livent (Receiver of), 2017 SCC 63 at para. 19, directs the Court to ask the following questions:
a. Whether a prima facie duty of care exists between the parties, and
b. If so, whether there are any residual policy considerations that should negate the existence of a prima facie duty?
[28] In terms of the first branch of the test, the issue of whether a municipality owes a private law duty of care to enforce a by-law in respect of the activities of a plaintiff’s neighbour has already been decided. In Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 2005 33780 (ON SCDC), the Divisional Court stated as follows:
[8] At a preliminary matter, a question of whether a ratepayer can compel a municipality to restrain a breach of it’s By-law or compel it to enforce compliance with its By-laws.
[9] The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations 2d ed. Toronto: Carswell, at p. 1361, Para. 246.6, indicates:
A municipal by-law passed in the public interest confers no right upon a property owner or ratepayer to have a breach or intended breach of its provisions restrained by the court.
[10] See also p. 1362:
Where a ratepayer has a statutory right of this nature, the municipality cannot be compelled by mandamus to take proceedings necessary for preventing its violation.
[11] At p. 1371:
The remedy will not be granted where the statutory power conferred is a discretionary one which the council may or may not exercise, unless the council has exercised it by enacting a by-law imposing a duty on its officers and servants.
[12] No such provision exists in the By-law in issue here. No direct personal or property interest is engaged here such as is the case with building permits, rezoning and so on.
[13] There appears to be no specific duty upon a Municipality to enforce a By-law which it has enacted in the exercise of a discretionary power. Brown v. Hamilton (1902), 4 O.L.R. 249; Montreal v. Mulcair, (1898), 1898 46 (SCC), 28 S.C.R. 458.
[14] There are valid policy reasons for the courts not interfering with the exercise of municipal discretion.
[15] Dealing with standard of review, Chief Justice McLachlin elucidated in Shell Canada Products v. Vancouver (City), 1994 115 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231:
Recent commentary suggests an emerging consensus that courts must respect the responsibility of elected municipal bodies to serve the people who elected them and exercise caution to avoid substituting their views of what is best for the citizens for those of municipal councils…Whatever rules of construction are applied, they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of municipal bodies as community representatives.
[29] In Suprun v. Bryla, 2007 56089 (ON SC), affirmed at 2008 ONCA 94, Quinn J. came to the same conclusion in a case where the applicant commenced an application seeking, inter alia, an order enforcing a municipal by-law relating to a fence. See also Eisenberg v. Toronto (City), 2019 ONSC 7312 at para. 106 and Donnell v. Joseph et al, 2011 ONSC 6307, affirmed at 2012 ONCA 240.
[30] These decisions are dispositive of the claim advanced by Mr. Barron. In short, the Town is under no private law duty to enforce its by-laws at the behest of Mr. Barron.
[31] Mr. Barron is in a similar position to an alleged victim of a criminal offence seeking to establish a private law duty of care against the police for failing to charge an alleged perpetrator. No such duty exists, see Project 360 Investments Limited (Sound Emporium Nightclub) v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 36380 (ON SC) at para. 19 and Wellington v. Ontario, 2011 ONCA 274 at para. 20.
[32] Turning to the second branch of the Anns/Cooper test, the Town argues that even if a private law duty of care exists, the availability of an administrative remedy would negate the private law duty of care on policy grounds, see Radil Bros. Fishing Co v Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) (2000), 2000 16458 (FC), reversed on other grounds at 2001 FCA 317, and Gligbe v. Canada, 2015 FC 1265 at paras. 22-24.
[33] The plaintiff could have resorted to s. 440 of the Municipal Act to bring an application to restrain the alleged contravention of the by-law by Mr. Brown, see Syrowik v. Wheeler, 2020 ONSC 7948, affirmed at 2021 ONCA 819. He did not do so. While this may undermine the availability of a public law duty of care on policy grounds in this case, I need not ultimately decide the issue as I am not satisfied that a prima facie duty exists.
[34] In view of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the proposed amended statement of claim should be dismissed under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as it is plain and obvious that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success.
[35] In view of this finding, I need not consider the alternative relief sought, though I note that in addition to the absence of a viable cause of action, the pleadings are also fundamentally flawed as they essentially consist of a prolix recitation of evidence without any attempt to address the elements of any specific cause of action against the defendant. The pleadings also include various claims against non-parties unrelated to the defendant.
[36] Lastly, I consider whether I should grant leave to amend the proposed Amended Statement of Claim. Given the nature and content of the claim advanced, this is not an instance where amendment can be expected to cure the deficiency noted, see Rebello v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2018 ONSC 7127 at para. 52. As a result, I do not grant leave to amend.
[37] The motion is granted. The action is dismissed.
[38] The defendant may file written costs submissions no longer than five pages in length, in addition to appropriate appendices, within 15 days of the date of the release of these reasons. The plaintiff shall have 30 days to file written costs submissions, also no longer than five pages in length. The submissions should be sent to my assistant at mary.galluzzo@ontario.ca.
J. Di Luca J.
Date: April 22, 2026
[^1]: Mr. Barron has commenced several actions against his former neighbour, companies owned/operated by his former neighbour as well as the Town of East Gwillimbury. It appears that these various actions are all essentially related to the Barron’s dispute with his neighbour and the Town’s response to his many complaints and Freedom of Information Act queries.
[^2]: Apart from this action, Mr. Brown has commenced a number of other actions against the Town, Mr. Brown and Mr. Brown’s companies. Of note, Mr. Barron is no longer the owner of the property in question, though it remains owned by his ex-spouse and he continues to have some degree of use of the property. The neighbouring residential property, once occupied or used by Cam Brown, has since been sold to a new owner.
[^3]: Mr. Barron notes that he was charged with criminal harassment in relation to Mr. Brown. It appears that this also resulted in an action being commenced against the York Regional Police Service.
[^4]: While his factum advances a Freedom of Expression argument under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, this argument was not pursued at the hearing of the motion. It also has no merit.
[^5]: I note that the claim as originally drafted did not include a claim for monetary damages. Mr. Barron has made it clear that this case is not about money. He simply wants the Town to properly enforce its bylaws.