R. v. M.T., 2026 ONSC 2263

CITATION: R. v. M.T., 2026 ONSC 2263

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-40000588-0000 DATE: 20260417

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

M.T.

V. Gallegos, for the Crown

M. Worsoff, amicus curiae

HEARD: March 27, 2026

SCHRECK J.:

1M.T. immigrated to Canada with his nine-year-old daughter, R.S., in 2018. They initially lived with R.S.’s step-mother and half-brothers, and then alone after M.T.’s relationship with the step-mother ended. Throughout this period, M.T. worked very long hours as a food delivery driver so that he could provide R.S. with everything she needed and pay for tuition at a private school. He also sexually abused her repeatedly until she left the home in 2023.

2Following a judge-alone trial, M.T. was convicted of sexual assault, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code (Count 1), sexual interference, contrary to s. 171 (Count 2), and invitation to sexual touching, contrary to s. 172 (Count 3). A sentencing hearing took place on March 27, 2026 at which M.T. was not present because he had absconded. The Crown takes the position that a sentence of imprisonment for eight to 10 years is appropriate. Amicus curiae (a role M.T.’s former counsel has agreed to fill) suggests that five years is appropriate.

3I have concluded that a total sentence of eight years is appropriate. The following reasons explain why.

I. FACTS

A. The Offences

4The facts are set out in detail in my reasons for judgment, reported as R. v. M.T., 2025 ONSC 4944. Between 2018 and 2023, when R.S. was between the ages of nine and 14, M.T. repeatedly committed a number of sexual offences in relation to her, including touching her breast area, making her caress his penis, touching the outside of her vagina with his penis and shaving her pubic hair with a razor. He also showed her pornographic videos. On one occasion, he forced her to perform fellatio on him. He once attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis, but stopped when she told him that it was hurting her.

5R.S. was inconsistent about the frequency of the sexual contact in her statement to the police and her testimony at trial and the preliminary inquiry. For the purposes of sentencing, I find that it occurred at least once a month and sometimes up to four times a month.

B. The Offender

(i) Background

6M.T. was born in Eritrea in 1970. He grew up there and eventually had nine children. He had a successful business in Eritrea, but at some point became the victim of political persecution by the government and was forced to flee the country. He went to Uganda with his family, and then came to Canada in 2018 as a refugee with his then wife and four of his children, including R.S.

(ii) Employment

7In Canada, M.T. worked a food delivery driver for businesses such as Uber Eats and Skip the Dishes. While I found at trial that he exaggerated the number of hours that he worked, it is clear that he worked very long hours each day, usually seven days a week. It appears that he lived very modestly and that most of earnings went towards supporting R.S.

(iii) Failure to Attend the Sentencing Hearing

8M.T. did not attend court on the date initially scheduled for his sentencing hearing. After hearing evidence from the officer in charge of the investigation, I am satisfied that he has left Canada for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of his conviction and has absconded within the meaning of s. 475 of the Criminal Code.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sentencing Principles

(i) General

9 Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the “fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society….” This is to be accomplished through the imposition of just sanctions that have one or more of several objectives enumerated in s. 718(a) to (f), including denunciation, general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation. As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 58, the various objectives “will not necessarily point toward the same sentencing disposition” and the court must “prioritize and blend the different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender.”

10While there will rarely be only one possible fit sentence, s. 718.1 of the Code provides that any sentence that is ultimately imposed “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 30.

(ii) Sexual Offences Involving Children

11 Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code provides that in cases involving the abuse of a person under the age of 18, a sentencing court “shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.” The application of sentencing principles in such cases was the subject of considerable guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen, the main points of which may be summarized as follows:

Protecting children from exploitation is the overarching objective of sentencing in such cases, along with holding those who commit such crimes accountable and communicating the wrongfulness of such conduct: Friesen, at paras. 42, 45, 74-75.
A proper application of sentencing principles in cases of sexual violence against children requires an understanding of the harm caused by such offences to the personal autonomy, bodily and sexual integrity, dignity and equality of children, as well as to their relationships with family members and caregivers. These offences have long-term and often permanent psychological, emotional and physical effects: Friesen, at paras. 51-61, 79-84.
Offences of this nature can have ripple effects that go beyond the immediate victim and extend to other family members, communities and society as a whole: Friesen, at paras. 62-64.
Sentences must reflect the inherent wrongfulness of the offender’s conduct and its highly morally blameworthy character, which arises because the offences necessarily involve the intentional exploitation of highly vulnerable victims. This requires that the objectives of denunciation and deterrence be prioritized: Friesen, at paras 77-78, 101-105.
At the same time, as with all sentencing, courts must consider and give appropriate weight to mitigating factors that may arise from the offender’s personal circumstances and any acceptance of responsibility and expressions of remorse: Friesen, at paras. 81.
Significant factors to consider in determining an appropriate sentence include a likelihood of reoffence, an abuse of a position of trust or authority, the duration and frequency of the sexual violence, the age of the victim, and the degree of physical interference: Friesen, at paras. 122-147.

B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

(i) Aggravating Factors

(a) Likelihood of Reoffence

12R.S. has not had any contact with M.T. since 2023. He is no longer in Canada and if he returns, he will likely be apprehended and will have to serve the sentence I am imposing. There is no evidence respecting his relationship, if any, with any other children. In these circumstances, I am not able to make a finding that he is likely to reoffend.

(b) Harm

13R.S. declined to provide a victim impact statement, as she is entitled to do. As a result, there is no direct evidence of the harm caused to her by the commission of the offences. However, I have no doubt that she has suffered significant psychological and emotional harm: Friesen, at paras. 83-86.

(c) Breach of Trust

14Not only was M.T. R.S.’s father, he was her only parent and someone on whom she was entirely dependent. It is difficult to imagine a more egregious breach of trust.

(d) Number and Frequency of Incidents

15This is not a case involving a single incident or only a few incidents. Rather, the offences took place on multiple occasions over the course of five years.

(e) Age of the Victim

16The offences began when R.S. was only nine years old and continued until she was 14.

(f) Degree of Physical Interference

17Aside from a single incident of fellatio and one instance of attempted vaginal intercourse, the offence did not involve physical penetration of the victim. While I take this into account, I do so having regard to the caution in Friesen, at para. 144, against “downgrading the wrongfulness of the offence or the harm to the victim where the sexually violent conduct does not involve penetration….” As noted in that case, “harm to the victim is not dependent on the type of physical activity involved”: Friesen, at para. 143.

(g) Abscondment and Lack of Remorse

18While the fact that M.T. absconded prior to sentencing does not bode well for his prospects for rehabilitation, it is not an aggravating factor: R. v. Singh, 2015 ONSC 904, at para. 19; R. v. Tully, 2022 ONSC 3515, at paras. 41-43; R. v. P.M., 2022 ONCA 408, at para. 22. More generally, the fact that M.T. pleaded not guilty, gave evidence at his trial which I found to be untrue, and has expressed no remorse are not aggravating factors, but simply the absence of what would have been mitigating factors: R. v. Ellacott, 2017 ONCA 681, at para. 22; R. v. Kozy (1990), 1990 2625 (ON CA), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 500 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 506; R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, at para. 8-9; R. v. Valentini (1999), 1999 1885 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 178 (C.A.), at paras. 81-85.

(ii) Mitigating Factors

19M.T. has no prior criminal record. Prior to his conviction, he was a very hard-working individual.

C. Sentences Imposed in Similar Cases

20Crown counsel and amicus curiae have helpfully provided me with a number of sentencing cases involving ongoing and repeated sexual violence committed on a child by a parent or step-parent: R. v. A.B., 2023 ONCA 254, at paras. 53-57; R. v. B.O., 2025 ONSC 3507; R. v. C.B., 2021 ONSC 187; R. v. C.N.B., 2024 ONSC 5850; R. v. S.S., 2024 ONSC 3568; R. v. R.L., 2025 ONSC 2317; R. v. D.D., 2025 ONSC 239; R. v. R.S., 2022 ONSC 4604, aff’d 2025 ONCA 585. Each of these cases is similar to this case in some respects but dissimilar in others, but they are useful in determining a “discerned” range, that is, a range based on what other courts have historically imposed, which is to be distinguished from a “formal” range that is created by an appellate court: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 19. The sentences in these cases range from five to 11 years.

21The sentences at the lower end of the range (A.B., B.O., C.B. and C.N.B.) involve sexual violence that was less physically invasive than in this case and there was more evidence of mitigating factors relating to the offender’s character or background. The sentences at the higher end of the range (R.L. and D.D.) had aggravating factors absent in this case, such as more physically invasive conduct, offences committed with greater frequency, or a prior related record.

D. The Appropriate Sentence

22Having carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case and applying the principles set out in Friesen, I have concluded that the appropriate total sentence is imprisonment for a period of eight years.

III. DISPOSITION

23For the foregoing reasons, M.T. is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight years on each count, to be served concurrently.

24Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, there will be an order that M.T. be prohibited from possessing any of the items enumerated in s. 109(2)(a) for a period of 10 years and the items enumerated in s. 109(2)(b) for life.

25Pursuant to s. 161(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, there will be an order that M.T. be prohibited from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years for a period of five years following his release from custody.

26Sexual assault is a “primary designated offence” enumerated in s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code. There will accordingly be an order pursuant to s. 487.051(2) requiring M.T. to provide a sample of his DNA for inclusion in the national databank.

27Pursuant to ss. 490.012(1) and 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, an order is made requiring M.T. to comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Information Registry Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”) for a period of 20 years.

28I am indebted to both counsel for their assistance, and in particular to Mr. Worsoff for agreeing to continue on this case as amicus curiae.

Justice A. Schreck

Released: April 17, 2026