CITATION: R. v. Taillefer, 2026 ONSC 2019

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-335

DATE: 2026-04-07

— and —

Before Justice P.J. Moore

Trial heard: May 20, 21, 22, 26, June 3, 2025

Sentencing Submissions heard on January 16, 2026

Mr. Vincenzo Mazza……………………….….…… Counsel for the Federal Crown

Ms. James Dean……………………………………. Counsel for Mr. Taillefer

On October 16, 2025, I convicted Mr. Taillefer on 11 counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (the “CDSA”). The convictions arose from drugs seized in his apartment during the execution of a search warrant on January 26, 2023. The drugs included benzodiazepine, cocaine, codeine, fentanyl, diacetylmorphine (heroin), hydromorphone, amphetamines, methylphenidate, morphine, oxycodone and psilocybin. The search also yielded a handgun and ammunition, resulting in four additional charges under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. I acquitted Mr. Taillefer of the gun and ammunition counts.

The parties jointly propose a global sentence of 15 years imprisonment, less credit for 18 days of pre-sentence custody and credit or mitigation of sentence pursuant to R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321, for the almost three years that Mr. Taillefer spent on bail under strict conditions.

(i) Circumstances of the Offence

Mr. Taillefer rented a two-bedroom apartment at 609-650 Cheapside Street in London, Ontario. He sublet his second bedroom to Taymoor Pasha. Police were investigating Mr. Pasha for drug trafficking and executed a search warrant at the apartment on January 26, 2023. Mr. Taillefer was the only person present when the police executed the warrant.
Inside the apartment, the police found drugs in the living room, office area, dining room, Mr. Taillefer’s bedroom and the second bedroom rented to Mr. Pasha. The second bedroom functioned as a stash and production room. It had no bed, but it contained vast quantities of illegal drugs, drug production/packaging materials and equipment.
The only issue at trial was whether Mr. Taillefer was in possession of the drugs, firearms and ammunition found inside the apartment. It was a very focused trial with many issues dealt with by way of a comprehensive agreed statement of fact. The parties agreed that, if I found possession of the drugs, the issue of possession for the purpose of trafficking was not in dispute.
At trial, I found that Mr. Taillefer had knowledge and control of all the drugs found in plain view in the apartment and his bedroom, except for the cocaine and fentanyl located in an opaque reusable grocery bag in the dining room. These drugs included: 674 g of benzodiazepine, 20.40 g of MDMA, 82 pills that tested as heroin, 37 g of psilocybin and 200 codeine pills. I had a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Taillefer’s knowledge of the loaded firearm found under the living room couch and found that the Crown had not proven that any of the ammunition was prohibited. I acquitted Mr. Taillefer on those counts.
The trial focused primarily on whether Mr. Taillefer had constructive possession of the drugs found in the second bedroom. That room contained drugs worth a street value of approximately $3.2 million, including: over 15 kg of fentanyl, over 3.4 kg of cocaine, over 1.3 kg of MDMA, 2 g of MDA, 16 g of Eutylone and thousands of “pharmaceutical” pills. The drugs were in different forms: bricks, powders, pills and liquids. They were found alongside drug production and drug trafficking paraphernalia bearing residue. The room had a drug press, vacuum bags, packaging, scales, food colouring, frying pans, multiple blenders and 6.5 kg of various cutting agents. These items were not hidden and were found throughout the room on tabletops, in totes and on the floor. The nature and function of the room was obvious.
Based on the evidence of the search and the text messages found on Mr. Taillefer’s phone, I found that Mr. Taillefer had actual knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the fact that Mr. Pasha was using the second bedroom as a stash and production room. Mr. Taillefer exercised a measure of control over that bedroom, which was within his apartment and unlocked. Mr. Pasha was not on the lease nor was he ever known to the owners of the apartment.
I did not find that Mr. Taillefer was an active participant in Mr. Pasha’s drug trafficking operation, beyond providing a safe location for his stash and production room. However, Mr. Taillefer, himself, was also in possession of various drugs found throughout other parts of the apartment.

(ii) Impact on the Community

The Crown filed compelling evidence demonstrating the profound harm that illegal drugs, particularly fentanyl, have inflicted on our local community. The effect has been devastating. The Crown relied on a document entitled “Fentanyl: A few grains can be enough to kill you”, which traces the history of the fentanyl epidemic through public documents and government reports. It explains that fentanyl is significantly stronger than other opioids and a lethal dose often measures less than two milligrams – approximately the size of a grain of salt. One fact stood out to me: in 2022, opioid-related deaths caused life expectancy in Canada to stagnate for the first time in decades. Statistics Canada attributed this largely to drug-poisoning deaths among young men. The report documents the scale of opioid-related deaths, hospitalizations, and emergency room visits and makes clear that the consequences extend well beyond public health. The economic costs of the opioid crisis are severe and far-reaching.
The evidence shows that the City of London has borne a disproportionate share of this crisis. A second document, entitled “Fentanyl in London”, sets out hospital visits, hospitalizations and deaths from 2021-2023 and demonstrates that London consistently exceeded provincial averages. During those years, death rates in London ranged from 16.7%-37.3% above the provincial average, with the majority of those deaths involving fentanyl. At one point, London Police Service records reflected a fentanyl-related overdose death every 2.7 days. Between 2014-2021, police time spent responding to fentanyl deaths increased by 396%.
Statistics only tell part of the story. The effects of the opioid crisis are neither abstract nor distant. One only needs to spend a day in the London courthouse, or drive down Dundas Street, to witness the raw and devastating human cost of the opioid epidemic. The harm to our community is pervasive, immediate and ongoing.

(iii) Circumstances of the Offender

Mr. Taillefer is 31 years old and has no previous criminal record.
A probation officer prepared his pre-sentence report. I heard submissions from his counsel and also reviewed an additional report completed by his counsellor, Angela Westgate.
The pre-sentence report indicates that Mr. Taillefer was born in Quebec, but moved to Georgetown, Ontario when he was seven. He and his family members report that he grew up in a close and supportive home with his parents, two biological sisters and four step-siblings. His parents divorced when he was twelve, which had a significant impact on him. His parents both re-partnered, and he enjoys a positive relationship with their new partners. While on bail, Mr. Taillefer lived with his mother and her partner. He also lived with his father for a period and maintains a close relationship with him. He has also maintained relatively close relationships with at least two of his siblings.
Mr. Taillefer attended a French Catholic School for elementary school and most of high school. He was suspended once for bringing marijuana paraphernalia to school and eventually had to complete his diploma at a different high school. Following his parents’ divorce, he became a disinterested and mediocre student. He later enrolled in college for an Electrical Engineering program in London but discontinued partway into the first semester. While on bail, he completed an online college course in business mathematics and has an interest in bookkeeping and stock trading.
Since his arrest, Mr. Taillefer obtained full-time employment working from home as a Customer Service Representative providing technical support, and he now works in a supervisory role. His employment history includes work with a moving company, drywalling, construction and customer service. He reports, and his parents confirm, that he has never struggled to obtain or maintain employment.
Mr. Taillefer reports that he first consumed alcohol at age 14, but that it has never been a problem for him. He began using marijuana at the same age, with his use increasing to daily consumption around the time he left for college. While at college, he experimented with other drugs including cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy) and psilocybin mushrooms. He reported that he began using Xanax in 2021 following the death of his roommate to cope with grief. He used both Xanax and marijuana daily until his arrest. His parents were only aware of his marijuana use and attempted to discourage it, with his mother suggesting treatment. His father also encouraged him to seek support for his grief. He currently uses marijuana, though not at a level that concerns his family.
When asked about the offence, Mr. Taillefer told the probation officer that he understood he had a role to play. He acknowledged that he ignored red flags and suspected his roommate was “up to no good.”
He describes himself as a “friendly, laid-back” individual with a generally positive disposition. He reports that he is not always a good judge of character and often gives others the benefit of the doubt. Most of his social interaction occurs online, though he maintains one close friendship formed during college. His family comments on his patience, easy-going nature and ability to assist customers with their technical issues by remaining composed and listening. They describe him as more engaged and less introverted since his arrest.
Mr. Taillefer has no formal mental health diagnosis. However, he struggled with grief and anxiety following the death of his roommate in 2021. With the encouragement of his parents, he sought counseling with a psychotherapist, Angela Westgate, in October 2022, shortly before his arrest in January 2023. In total, he completed 31.5 hours of psychotherapy, most of which occurred between October 2022 and December 2023. He completed one session in 2025 and had another appointment scheduled in January 2026. The counselling initially focused on anxiety, daily functioning and grief, but then expanded to the use of substances as a coping mechanism, as well as symptoms consistent with ADHD and depression. His parents helped arrange his counselling and reported no current concerns with their son’s mental health.
Ms. Westgate’s report indicates Mr. Taillefer was open and honest during their therapy sessions. They worked on substance use reduction, life skills and executive functioning, self-esteem and identity development, occupational stability and growth, social and family support and insight and risk awareness. Although Ms. Westgate expressed opinions concerning risk, criminal intent and the circumstances leading to Mr. Taillefer’s arrest, the parties did not agree that she was qualified to offer those opinions, and some of the information on which she relied appears to be inaccurate. The defence did not ask the court to rely on those opinions, and I have not done so.
Mr. Taillefer apologized to the court and expressed that the last three years have been extremely stressful and anxiety-producing. He expressed an intention to do more with his life once these proceedings conclude.

CROWN AND DEFENCE POSITIONS

The parties jointly submit that a global sentence of 15 years in jail, less enhanced pre-sentence custody (1.5:1) and whatever additional credit or mitigation the court determines is appropriate pursuant to Downes, is fit and appropriate in the circumstances, having regard to Mr. Taillefer’s personal circumstances and the gravity of the offences.
The Crown acknowledges that custodians and couriers are at the lower end of the drug hierarchy, with importers and producers at the higher end. However, the Crown submits that despite Mr. Taillefer’s somewhat reduced moral culpability, the gravity of the offence and the extraordinary quantities of drugs involved require a substantial penitentiary sentence.
The Crown emphasizes that without Mr. Taillefer’s provision of a stash house, none of Mr. Pasha’s activities would have been possible. The Crown submits that London has been disproportionately harmed by fentanyl traffickers and those who assist them. The Crown argues that, but for the mitigating factors and joint proposal in this case, it would have sought a sentence in the range of 18-20 years in custody.
The Crown also seeks a weapons prohibition order and a DNA order. I have signed the requested consent forfeiture order.
The defence acknowledges the extreme harm that drugs, particularly fentanyl, have brought to this community. The defence submits that Mr. Taillefer was not motivated by profit. Rather, he sublet a spare bedroom to help cover his rent on the apartment.
The defence argues that Mr. Taillefer is a young man with no prior criminal record who accepts that he made poor decisions that led to this outcome. Further, Mr. Taillefer’s own use of drugs impaired his appreciation of what occurred in his residence and contributed to his reluctance to confront Mr. Pasha, as doing so would have required him to confront his own behaviour.
The defence submits that Mr. Taillefer’s decision to seek counselling before and after his arrest, his ability to obtain and maintain employment following his arrest, and the continued support of his family demonstrate his capacity for rehabilitation. These factors show that Mr. Taillefer can move forward in a productive manner after serving his sentence and has genuine promise for the future.

THE FIT AND PROPORTIONATE SENTENCE

(i) Guiding Sentencing Principles

The offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking a Schedule I or II substance carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Where the substance falls under Schedule III or V and the Crown proceeds by indictment, the maximum penalty is ten years imprisonment.
Section 10(1) of the CDSA sets out that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society, while encouraging rehabilitation and treatment in appropriate cases and acknowledging the harm caused to victims and the community. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility. A just sentence balances deterrence, denunciation, retribution, and rehabilitation.
In coming to a just sentence, the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors unique to each case. Sentencing is a highly individualized process that turns on the specific facts before the court. Individualization is central to the assessment of proportionality as it requires a focus on the individual circumstances of the offender: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 12; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 58. In Lacasse, at para. 12, the Court observed that “[t]he more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be.”
Sentencing judges enjoy wide discretion when imposing sentences: R. v. Kerr (2001), 2001 21142 (ON CA), 153 O.A.C. 159 (C.A.), at para. 15.
In this case, denunciation and deterrence are the key principles. The quantities and nature of the substances in this case, particularly the kilograms of fentanyl, cocaine and MDMA require a sentence that clearly denounces the conduct and deters others. One way society expresses denunciation is through sentencing. Appellate courts have consistently recognized that “moral culpability rises with the risk of serious harm the trafficker is prepared to expose others to”: R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, 160 O.R. (3d) 241, para. 16, citing Parranto, at para. 70. Although I did not find that Mr. Taillefer actively participated in the trafficking operation, his role as custodian of the drugs in the stash room still attracts significant moral culpability.
That said, I must consider all the goals of sentencing, including rehabilitation and restraint. Restraint requires the court to impose the least intrusive sentence that will achieve the overall purpose of an appropriate and just sanction: R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 96. Restraint is of particular importance when sentencing a first-time and youthful offender: R. v. Priest (1996), 1996 1381 (ON CA), 30 O.R. (3d) 538 (C.A.) at pp. 543-544; R. v. Borde (2003), 2003 4187 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), at para. .36.

(ii) Parity in Sentencing

The principle of parity holds that similar offences committed in similar circumstances should result in similar sentences for similar offenders. Parity forms part of the broader concept of proportionality. Of course, no two cases are exactly alike, and sentencing remains an individualized process.
The Crown provided ten authorities to illustrate the appropriate sentencing range in this case. I reviewed them, but do not intend to canvass each decision here. I note that most of these cases were also before Carnegie J. in Mr. Pasha’s sentencing, and he summarized them in his decision in that matter. I will refer to only a few decisions that I found particularly helpful in assessing the fitness of the joint submission before this court.

(a) R. v. Pasha, [2025 ONSC 3481](https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2025/3481)

I will start with the co-accused in this matter, Mr. Pasha. Mr. Pasha pled guilty to one count of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking in relation to the drugs found in the stash room at the Cheapside apartment. Significant evidence on his cell phone established his ongoing involvement in drug trafficking activities. At the time of sentencing, he was 25 years old and was 23 years old at the time of the offence. He advised his pre-sentence report writer that he grew up around drugs and sold drugs to support himself and his mother. He experienced bullying and racial slurs in relation to his skin colour and religion. He had a prior criminal record, including a 2021 conviction for possession of a Schedule I substance for which he received probation and a 2024 resisting arrest conviction, for which he received 15 days pre-sentence custody. Although he was initially released on the charges before Carnegie J., police arrested and detained him after approximately one year on bail. While incarcerated, he completed his high school education and participated in all rehabilitative programming made available to him.
The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of 17 years, less credit for pre-sentence custody pursuant to R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, and a further reduction to account for time spent in overcrowded or harsh pre-trial detention, sometimes known as credit pursuant to R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344. Carnegie J. found that the scope of Mr. Pasha’s commercial-level trafficking placed his conduct within a sentence range from the mid-teens to early-twenties. He identified Mr. Pasha’s guilty plea as the most significant mitigating factor, noting that it reflected remorse and materially benefited the administration of justice. After considering the mitigating factors, including the harsh pre-trial conditions, Carnegie J. concluded that a sentence of 16.5 years, while on the low end, nevertheless fell within the appropriate range. Mr. Pasha also received 753 days of Summers credit.
While the co-accused’s sentence provides a useful point of comparison, important distinctions remain between Mr. Pasha and Mr. Taillefer. Most notably, they played materially different roles in relation to the drugs found. They also differ in background and life circumstances, were of different ages at the time of the offences and Mr. Pasha resolved his case by way of a guilty plea.

(b) R. v. Olvedi, [2021 ONCA 518](https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2021/518), 157 O.R. (3d) 583, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 39854

In Olvedi, our Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 15 years for importation and a concurrent sentence of 12 years for possession following a trial. The offender, whom the trial judge found to be willfully blind, imported and couriered approximately 500 grams of fentanyl nitrate, worth approximately $19 million dollars if sold on the street after being mixed with cutting agents. The drugs had been shipped from China and addressed to the appellant but were intercepted. The RCMP replaced most of the substances and conducted a controlled delivery. Upon arrest, the appellant told the police that he had agreed act as a courier for his cocaine dealer in exchange for $3,000 to accept a package at his home. He said he did not know what the package contained, told his dealer that he did not want to know, and did not ask where it came from. He stated that he later tried to withdraw from the arrangement but that his dealer threatened to kill him and sent an associate to assault him, prompting the appellant to arm himself.
At trial, the appellant offered a different account of events. He claimed that he had never used cocaine and believed the package contained refurbished iPhones or acrylic paint. The trial judge rejected this testimony but accepted the version initially given to the police, finding that it mitigated his involvement but established willful blindness.
The appellant was 33 years old and treated as a first-time offender. He cooperated with police, expressed genuine remorse, and demonstrated strong rehabilitative prospects. The trial judge also found that threats from the dealer reduced his moral blameworthiness. The Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the sentence, holding that denunciation and deterrence properly drove the length of the sentence and that the trial judge’s assessment of the fentanyl’s extreme harmfulness rested on a solid evidentiary foundation. At para. 59, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the sentence was fit, even for a first-time offender, because “the toll on human life could have been devastating had this staggering amount of fentanyl found its way onto the streets of Peel Region, and beyond.”

(c) R. v. Ali (11 February 2022), Oshawa, 21-15513 (Ont. S.C.)

In Ali, police found the offender in possession of 26.5 kg of a carfentanil mixed with caffeine, with an estimated street value of between $4 million and $16 million, along with multiple firearms. He pled guilty to 34 counts, including possession of carfentanil for the purpose of trafficking and 33 firearms offences. After extensive negotiations and pre-trials, the parties advanced a joint submission of 23 years imprisonment and a $1 million fine. The sentencing judge noted that carfentanil is a synthetic opioid approximately 10,000 times stronger than morphine. After accounting for Duncan and Downes mitigation, as well as Summers credit, the offender received a net custodial sentence of 18 years.

(d) R. v. Ansari, (29 May 2023), Oshawa, 21-15512 (Ont. S.C.)

In Ansari, Mr. Ansari was a co-accused of Mr. Ali in the carfentanil seizure described above. He had no prior criminal record, though he was not a youthful offender. The Crown sought a sentence of 30 years imprisonment, while the defence argued for no more than 16 years. The sentencing judge emphasized the extreme potency of carfentanil, describing it as approximately 10,000 times stronger than morphine and 100 times stronger than fentanyl, with the potential for a single gram of powder to yield 100 doses capable of causing death in non-tolerant individuals.
The Crown characterized Mr. Ansari’s role as that of a “chief security officer”. It submitted that he knowingly provided access to his residence for the cutting and processing of lethal drugs and for the storage of duffel bags of firearms. The trial judge found that Mr. Ansari’s involvement went beyond merely providing space and security. He also provided cover stories and knowingly, and recklessly, exposed a family with children living in the upper unit of the residence to serious risk. The trial judge found that Mr. Ansari had either actual knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the criminal activity occurring in his basement.
The defence submitted that Mr. Ansari’s role was unclear and that Mr. Ali operated as the primary actor. Counsel also pointed to the relatively short trial and the extensive agreed statement of fact. While the trial judge accepted that Mr. Ansari was not Mr. Ali’s right-hand man, he nevertheless found that Mr. Ansari acted as a ready facilitator. Although O’Connell J. could not conclude that Mr. Ansari knew of the operation from the outset, he found that Mr. Ansari became aware of it by at least mid-August. The court sentenced Mr. Ansari to 20 years imprisonment on the drug offences, with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

(e) R. v. Deol, [2024 MBCA 84](https://www.canlii.org/en/mb/mbca/doc/2024/2024mbca84/2024mbca84.html)

In Deol, the appellant was convicted after a trial of two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking, involving fentanyl and methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA). The trial judge imposed a sentence of 14 years imprisonment for the fentanyl offence and a concurrent sentence of eight years for the MDA. The Crown appealed, arguing that the sentence was unfit.
The appellant was 44 years old and had no prior criminal record. Police stopped him for speeding and discovered 26 kg of fentanyl (16 kg of which was mixed with benzodiazepines) and 50 kg of MDA. At the time, this seizure represented the largest fentanyl seizure in Manitoba and one of the largest in Canada.
The central issue before the Court of Appeal for Manitoba was the appropriate sentencing range for drug couriers with no decision-making authority within a high-level fentanyl trafficking organization. The Court of Appeal set the applicable range at 12 to 18 years imprisonment and increased the fentanyl sentence from 14 to 18 years. In doing so, the Court of Appeal emphasized that “significant sentences are necessary for individuals who participate in commercial, high-level trafficking offences to meet the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing given the insidious nature of fentanyl.”

(iii) Mitigating Factors

In crafting an individualized sentence, I must consider the presence of any mitigating circumstances. In this case, those include:

(a) Mr. Taillefer has no prior criminal record.

(b) Although he did not plead guilty, he proceeded by way of a significantly shortened and tightly focused trial, which provided a tangible benefit to the administration of justice.

(c) Mr. Taillefer is still a relatively young man. He enjoys strong family support and has strengthened his bond with his family members.

(d) Mr. Taillefer actively engaged in counselling to address some of his mental health issues, notably commencing counselling prior to his arrest for these offences.

(e) While on bail, he obtained and maintained employment, performed well in that position, and even earned a promotion to a supervisory role. He also completed an online course.

(f) Mr. Taillefer spent a significant period on strict house arrest, which I address in greater detail below.

(g) He has expressed his remorse for his involvement in these offences.

It does not appear to me that Mr. Taillefer has the same cultural, familial and socioeconomic circumstances as those faced by Mr. Pasha. However, I accept that his parents’ divorce had a meaningful impact on him and that the death of his roommate while he was living away from his family affected him deeply. I also accept that he attempted to cope with his resulting anxiety and grief through substance abuse.

(iv) Aggravating Factors

I must also consider the presence of aggravating factors. In this case, those include:

(a) The nature of the substances found in Mr. Taillefer’s residence, which rank among some of the most dangerous drugs circulating in Canada. They included fentanyl, cocaine, MDA, MDMA, heroin and many other opioids. As I have already emphasized, the established lethality of fentanyl, where a fatal dose is measured in milligrams, constitutes a significant aggravating factor.

(b) The extraordinary quantities involved in this seizure elevate this offence to a commercial level enterprise. Police measured the fentanyl, cocaine and MDMA in kilograms. At 15.038 kg, this was the largest local fentanyl seizure at the time, although, sadly, it has since been surpassed.

(c) This was not an isolated incident or a transient arrangement. The evidence demonstrates that the stash and production room operated over a sustained period, for at least several weeks but likely longer.

(d) The contents of the stash room indicate that it served purposes beyond mere storage. The presence of blenders, cookers, presses and substantial quantities of cutting agents demonstrated that individuals used the room not merely to store drugs, but also to prepare them for distribution.

(e) This room was located within an occupied apartment building within the City of London. This placed other residents in close proximity to highly dangerous substances and the risks that inevitably accompany large-scale drug trafficking.

(f) The local conditions in London give particular weight to these offences. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Parranto, at para. 20, that “a just and appropriate sentence may take into consideration ‘the needs and current conditions of and in the community.’” Sentencing may therefore respond to the specific harm a crime inflicts on a community. The evidence before me demonstrates that London has been disproportionately affected by the opioid crisis, and that this harm remains acute and ongoing.

(v) The Appropriate Sentence

As I have already indicated, the parties agree (and the case law confirms) that deterrence and denunciation are the primary sentencing objectives for these offences.
The parties present a joint position advanced by experienced counsel. I am mindful of the Court’s recent decision in R. v. Wesley, 2025 ONCA 51, 175 O.R. (3d) 166, leave to appeal refused, [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 41727, that the strict framework in R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 204, governing joint submissions arising from plea negotiations does not apply to joint positions advanced after trial. The Court of Appeal explained that such rigidity is unnecessary for several reasons. First, the realistic likelihood is that trial judges will generally accept joint submissions of this nature because counsel are well placed to make them. Second, although the parties relinquish the right to seek a higher or lower sentence by advancing a joint position, procedural fairness requires the sentencing judge to notify counsel of any concerns and afford them an opportunity to make further submissions. Third, where a sentencing judge departs from a joint recommendation, the judge must provide clear and cogent reasons for doing so. As a result, the applicable question where a trial judge accepts a joint recommendation which is advanced after trial is whether the sentence is “unfit”: Wesley, at paras. 81-84, 90.
I find that the joint position proposing a sentence of 15 years imprisonment, subject to Summers credit and with Downes credit left for determination by the court, is a fit and appropriate sentence. It properly reflects the gravity of the offences, Mr. Taillefer’s moral culpability and his personal circumstances. I am also satisfied that the authorities provided by the Crown, while not factually identical, offer a meaningful comparative framework and demonstrate the proposed sentence falls within the appropriate range for offences of this nature.

(vi) Downes Credit

The sole sentencing issue not resolved by the parties concerns the appropriate mitigation for the time Mr. Taillefer spent on bail. In Downes, our Court of Appeal held that where an offender has been subject to house arrest, the sentencing judge should adopt a flexible approach. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the amount and manner of the credit lie within the discretion of the sentencing judge and represent one consideration among many aggravating and mitigating factors to inform a fit sentence: Downes, at paras. 36-37. The Court of Appeal identified several relevant considerations, including the length of time spent on house arrest, the stringency of the conditions, the impact on the offender’s liberty, and the offender’s ability to maintain normal relationships, employment and daily activities: Downes, at para. 37.
In Downes, the offender was subject to very strict conditions, including an inability to leave without a surety, which affected his relationship with his daughter. At the same time, the record lacked evidence demonstrating the full extent of the restriction on his mobility. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal determined that five months of mitigation was appropriate for the 18 months the offender spent on house arrest.
In this case, Mr. Taillefer remained subject to strict house arrest conditions for an extended period. He could leave his residence only in the company of his surety, stepmother, mother or sisters, or in the event of a medical emergency. He was also required, on demand, to provide his cellphone and all passwords to his surety.
The Crown submits that while no strict formula applies, mitigation for bail conditions is typically capped at approximately 25-30% of the total time spent on bail. The defence seeks credit in the range of nine to twelve months. The positions are not far apart. Mr. Taillefer was arrested on January 26, 2023, and released on bail after 18 days in custody on February 13, 2023, and by March 13, 2026, will have spent approximately 37 months on bail. Thus, 25-30% of that period yields a range of roughly 9.25 to 11.1 months.
The parties provided limited evidence concerning the precise extent to which the bail conditions constrained Mr. Taillefer’s mobility, particularly given that he could leave his residence with five identified individuals. He also continued counselling and maintained full-time employment from home. He deserves credit for his efforts during this period, and I have taken them into account as mitigating factors. Nevertheless, remaining unable to leave one’s residence unaccompanied for more than three years constitutes a significant restriction on liberty, particularly for an individual with no prior criminal record and anxiety issues. Having regard to all the circumstances, I conclude that a credit of ten months appropriately reflects the mitigation warranted for the 37 months Mr. Taillefer spent on house arrest.

(vii) Summers Credit

Section 719 of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing court to credit pre-sentence custody at a rate of up to 1.5 days for each day actually served. In Summers, at para. 22, the Supreme Court explained that enhanced credit recognizes that offenders do not earn parole eligibility for time spent in pre-sentence custody and often lack access to rehabilitative programs while held in remand facilities. In this case, Mr. Taillefer spent 18 actual days in pre-trial custody, for which I grant credit of 27 days.

(viii) Ancillary Orders

The parties jointly propose a DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code. Possession for the purpose of trafficking constitutes a secondary designated offence where it is prosecuted by indictment and carries a term of imprisonment of five years or longer, rendering the order discretionary. I am satisfied that ordering Mr. Taillefer to provide a sample of bodily substances reasonably required for forensic DNA analysis serves the best interests of the administration of justice. I therefore order that he comply with the DNA order and accompany a peace officer for that purpose, in accordance with the DNA Identification Act, S.C. 1998, c. 37.
I also impose a mandatory firearms order pursuant to s. 109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Mr. Taillefer shall not possess any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years following his release from imprisonment. He is further prohibited for life from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition.
The parties made no submissions respecting the victim fine surcharge. Pursuant to s. 737 of the Criminal Code and having regard to the length of the sentence that I am imposing, I am satisfied that the imposition of the surcharge should be waived.

CONCLUSION

I sincerely hope that Mr. Taillefer moves forward from this and makes better choices in the future. I believe that he can. I also believe that he now has some insight into the gravity of the harm posed by the drugs stored in the second bedroom of his apartment. That harm carried a real and foreseeable risk of serious injury or death to members of this community.
Significant sentences are warranted even for those who occupy lower positions in the drug hierarchy when dealing with large quantities of opioids, especially fentanyl. Their actions contribute to the ability of those higher in the hierarchy to avoid detection and continue to spread this poison to members of our community. Courts can only express their denunciation for this type of activity through our sentencing framework and in the hopes of making people think twice before involving themselves in such an enterprise knowing the penalty for their involvement will be severe.
As already indicated, I find that the sentence jointly proposed of 15 years is a fit and appropriate sentence and proportional to the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of Mr. Taillefer. I have considered the time Mr. Taillefer spent on strict bail as a mitigating factor and am reducing the time he must serve by 10 months, making the total sentence 14 years and 2 months. From that, I am also crediting him for his pre-sentence custody for 27 days.
The parties propose a global sentence on all counts. However, not all the counts are Schedule I offences, some are Schedule III (count 8, 11) and IV (count 1) which have different maximum penalties.
Subject to further submissions, I broke down the eleven possession for the purpose of trafficking counts as follows:

i. Count 4 – Fentanyl: 14 years, 2 months (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) for 5,113 days left to serve;

ii. Count 2 – Cocaine: 14 years, 2 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

iii. Count 3 – Codeine: 14 years, 2 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

iv. Count 5 – Heroin: 14 years, 2 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

v. Count 6 – Hydromorphone: 14 years, 2 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

vi. Count 7 - Amphetamines, their salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues: 14 years, 2 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

vii. Count 9 – Morphine: 14 years, 1 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

viii. Count 10 – Oxycodone: 14 years, 1 month (5,171 days) less credit for pre-sentence custody (18 days credited at 27 days) concurrent;

ix. Count 8 – Methylphenidate: 3 years, concurrent:

x. Count 11 – Psilocybin: 3 years, concurrent; and

xi. Count 1 - Benzodiazepines, their salts and derivatives: 2 years, concurrent

Please stand, Mr. Taillefer:
You are sentenced to a global sentence of 5,171 days with a further credit of 27 days deducted for pre-sentence custody, broken down as outlined above. This leaves you with 5,113 days or approximately 14 years, 1 month left to serve.
You are also ordered to provide a DNA sample and are being placed on a mandatory firearms order as outlined above.
I recognize that this is a daunting sentence, but I encourage you to participate in the programs that are offered and to maintain your support systems.

Justice P.J. Moore

Released: April 7, 2026

Note: this written decision is the formal decision of the court.

CITATION: R. v. Taillefer. 2026 ONSC 2019

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-335

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JUSTIN TAILLEFER

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Justice P.J. Moore

Released: April 7, 2026