ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANTHOULA MITSOPOULOU, deceased
BETWEEN:
ALICE CHRYSSANTHOPOULOS Applicant
– and –
ELEFTHERIA BETHANIS, VASILIKI MITSOPOULOS, ELENI TRENDES, and IOANNA PANTOPOULOS Respondents
Counsel: Margaret Pettipas, for the applicant Filipe Mendes, for the respondent Vasiliki Mitsopoulos No one appearing for the respondents Eleftheria Bethanis, Eleni Trendes, or Ioanna Pantopoulos
HEARD: March 9, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Honourable Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal
I. INTRODUCTION
1Anthoula Mitsopoulou died, with a will, in December 2021. She is survived by her five children: the applicant Alice Chryssanthopoulos, and the respondents Eleftheria Bethanis (Elsie), Vasiliki Mitsopoulos (Vicki), Eleni Trendes, and Ioanna Pantopoulos (Joanne). This litigation is about Vicki’s administration of Ms. Mitsopoulou’s estate.
2Alice applies for an order passing over Elsie and Vicki as the named estate trustees, and appointing Elikem Deley instead. She also asks for an order that Vicki repay $170,000 to the estate for breach of fiduciary duty, devastavit, and unjust enrichment. Vicki agrees with the appointment of Ms. Deley, but asserts that only Ms. Deley, as estate trustee, has standing to sue her. Alternatively, if Alice has standing, Vicki denies that she breached her duties to the beneficiaries or the estate.
3For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that:
(a) Ms. Deley be appointed as estate trustee; and
(b) Alice has standing to sue Vicki, but she’s failed to prove that Vicki breached her duties.
4As the parties’ success is divided, I endorse an order that there shall be no costs of these applications.
II. BACKGROUND
5The parties are equal beneficiaries of Ms. Mitsopoulou’s estate. After she died, Elsie and Vicki took some steps to administer the estate. But the estate was never probated because Elsie and Vicki couldn’t get along.
6Vicki lived with Ms. Mitsopoulou from 2012 until Ms. Mitsopoulou’s death. Just before Ms. Mitsopoulou passed away, Ms. Mitsopoulou sold her house. Vicki moved out after Ms. Mitsopoulou died but moved back in when the sale of the home didn’t close.
7Alice alleges that Vicki took no steps to administer the estate. In particular, she claims that Vicki delayed administering the estate so she could live “rent-free” in the house, which was the estate’s only substantial asset.
8In October 2024, Alice started this proceeding seeking to pass over Vicki and Elsie as named estate trustees, and appoint herself or a third party as the estate trustee. Vicki started a counter-application seeking to be appointed as the estate trustee or, in the alternative, to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between the parties.
9In mid-2025, Alice moved to appoint an estate trustee during litigation, and for an order that Vicki vacate the house. Vicki moved for an order enforcing the alleged settlement agreement. Petersen J granted Alice’s motion, and dismissed Vicki’s motion. In September 2025, the parties consented to an order appointing Ms. Deley at ETDL.
10Vicki moved out of the house that same month. The house was sold in January 2026. Ms. Deley is in the process of completing an accounting for the parties.
11After Ms. Deley was appointed as ETDL, Alice abandoned her request that she be appointed as the estate trustee. Instead, she now requests that Ms. Deley be appointed as the estate trustee. She also continues to press her damages claim. Vicki agrees that Ms. Deley should be appointed as the estate trustee but argues that Ms. Deley’s appointment means that Alice doesn’t have standing to sue Vicki. She pursues this argument through a motion to enforce a purported Rule 49 settlement agreement.
12For the purposes of this hearing, the parties relied on three affidavits from Alice, two paralegal affidavits, and affidavits from Vicki, Joanna, and Elsie. Further, Alice and Vicki were cross-examined on their affidavits.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION
13This case presents five issues:
(a) whether there’s a settlement agreement between the parties;
(b) whether Elsie and Vicki should be passed over as the named estate trustees;
(c) whether Alice has standing to sue Vicki;
(d) if so, whether Vicki committed breach of fiduciary duty, devastavit, or unjust enrichment, and the damages, if any; and
(e) whether Vicki should be compelled to pass the estate’s accounts.
A. Issue #1: whether there’s a settlement agreement between the parties?
14Vicki submits that the parties had a binding settlement agreement appointing Ms. Deley as the estate trustee. According to Vicki, the consequence of this agreement is that Alice’s claims are extinguished—only Ms. Deley, as the estate trustee, can sue Vicki.
15Alice responds that Vicki’s purported acceptance of Alice’s offer to settle is a counter-offer and, as a result, there’s no settlement agreement.
16For the reasons discussed below, I agree with Alice—Vicki’s acceptance of Alice’s offer was a counter-offer. As a result, there is no settlement agreement.
1. Legal Framework
17A party to a proceeding may serve on any other party an offer to settle any one or more of the claims in the proceeding on the terms specified in the offer to settle. An offer to settle may be accepted by serving an acceptance of offer on the party who made the offer, at any time before it is withdrawn or the court disposes of the claim about which it is made. See Rules of Civil Procedure, rr 49.02(1), 49.07(1).
18A settlement agreement is a contract and subject to the general rules regarding offer and acceptance. Thus, a concluded settlement requires both a mutual intention to create a legally binding contract, and agreement on all “essential terms” of the settlement. See Cook v Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49, at para 65.
19If there’s an acceptance of an offer to settle, it must be an unqualified and unconditional acceptance of the terms offered. A purported acceptance which contains any qualification or condition constitutes a counter-offer. See Desanto v Cretzman (1986), 53 OR (2d) 732 (Dist Ct), at 734.
2. Facts
20In October 2025, Alice served an offer to settle:
Vicki Mitsopoulos will be passed over as an Estate Trustee for the Estate of the late Anthoula Mitsopoulou (the “Estate”) with prejudice, and Elikem Deley of Sorbara Law in Waterloo, Ontario (“Elikem Deley”) will be appointed as Estate Trustee for the Estate;
Vicki Mitsopoulos will pay $120,000.00 in damages and occupation rent to the Estate, payable forthwith from Vicki Mitsopoulos personally;
Vicki Mitsopoulos will pay Alice Chryssanthopoulos’ costs of the Application and Vicki Misopoulos’ (sic) Cross-Application as agreed or assessed; and
Alice Chryssanthopoulos will be indemnified for her costs of the Application and Vicki Mitsopoulos’ Cross-Application as agreed or assessed.
This offer will remain open until 2 minutes after the start of the final hearing of this proceeding and the Cross-Application.
21Vicki served an acceptance of offer in February 2026 that only accepted paragraph 1.
3. Analysis and Disposition
22There was no binding agreement here. Alice’s offer contained two essential terms: (a) the appointment of Ms. Deley as estate trustee; and (b) payment by Vicki of damages and costs. Vicki purported to accept only the first term, which made her acceptance conditional and equivocal. That was a counter-offer, not an acceptance that created a binding agreement.
23Vicki argues that the terms were implicitly severable. She submits that the purpose of Rule 49 offers is to end the litigation, which is what her acceptance of paragraph 1 does.
24I reject that argument for two reasons. First, Vicki’s argument presumes that offers are severable unless they state otherwise. I wasn’t provided any authority to support that proposition. And this conclusion would expressly contradict Desanto, which has been repeatedly applied in the 40 years since it was decided. See Torres v MGL Properties Ltd., 2021 ONSC 6088, at para 14; 77 Charles Street Ltd. v Aspen Ridge Homes Ltd., 2021 ONSC 2732, at para 42; Krasuski v Zariczniak, 2015 ONSC 4553, at para 14.
25Second, Vicki’s submission amounts to a “gotcha” argument: either Alice intended for the offer to be severable, or her lawyer made a mistake.
26It doesn’t make sense for Alice to make a severable offer. If, as Vicki argues, it’s well-settled that only the estate trustee can sue her, then there would be no point in Alice offering the other terms. Why would Vicki accept the rest of the offer, and agree to pay damages to the estate and costs to Alice, when it’s undisputed that only the estate trustee can sue her?
27Or Alice was ill-advised: her lawyer didn’t realize that acceptance of paragraph 1 would end Alice’s claim against Vicki. But that argument assumes the offer is severable. It also undermines Vicki’s position that there was a meeting of the minds. The test to determine whether the parties reached a meeting of the minds is whether a reasonable person apprised of all the circumstances would believe the parties had reached an agreement. See UBS Securities Canada, Inc. v Sands Brothers Canada, Ltd., 2009 ONCA 328, at para 47; Herold Estate v Canada (AG), 2021 ONCA 579, at para 42, leave to appeal ref’d, 2022 28616 (SCC). Given that the offer wasn’t explicitly severable and Alice offered to compromise her damages claim, the only reasonable inference is that she intended to make a “global” offer.
28As a result, I conclude that there was no enforceable settlement agreement between Alice and Vicki. At best, Vicki’s acceptance of the offer signalled that she was conceding the appointment of Ms. Deley as estate trustee.
B. Issue #2: whether Elsie and Vicki should be passed over as the named estate trustees?
29The Trustee Act, RSO 1990, c T.23, ss 5, 37, and the court’s inherent jurisdiction give the court the authority to pass over a named executor. See Chambers (Estate) v Chambers, 2013 ONCA 511, at para 101.
30Alice, Elsie, Vicki, and Joanne agree that Ms. Deley should be appointed as the estate trustee. Eleni takes no position. As a result, I endorse an order passing over Vicki and Elsie, and appointing Ms. Deley as the estate trustee.
C. Issue #3: whether Alice has standing to sue Vicki?
31Vicki submits that only Ms. Deley, as estate trustee, has authority to sue her, in part because she was never formally appointed as estate trustee. Alice responds that she can sue Vicki as the named estate trustee because Vicki owed fiduciary duties to the estate’s beneficiaries. She further argues that Vicki’s position would create unnecessary delay, inefficiency, and expense because the litigation would have to be restarted by Ms. Deley.
32For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Alice has standing, as a beneficiary, to sue Vicki in her capacity as the named estate trustee.
33Vicki’s primary submission is that only an estate trustee may advance claims on behalf of the estate. Alice doesn’t dispute this legal principle. At common law, a deceased person’s tort or personal claim ends upon death. The Trustee Act creates a statutory exception, permitting the executor or administrator to continue that claim on behalf of the estate. In exercising this authority, an estate trustee “steps into the shoes of the deceased.” See Trustee Act, s 38(1); Re James Estate, 2024 ONCA 623, at para 29, leave to appeal ref’d, 2025 33157 (SCC); and Ryan v Moore, 2005 SCC 38, at para 18.
34But Alice isn’t suing on behalf of the estate. An executor’s authority flows from the will itself, and their interest in administering the estate vests immediately upon the testator’s death. Probate merely confirms title; it doesn’t create it. See Sustrik (Estate of) v Floyd, 2005 ABQB 880, at para 34; I Hull & S Popovic‑Montag, Feeney’s Canadian Law of Wills, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2020) (loose-leaf updated 2025), §8.6. Accordingly, named estate trustees owe fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries from the moment of the testator’s death, regardless of whether the estate has been probated. See Cowper‑Smith v Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, at para 41. Alice’s claim is that Vicki owed her duties as a beneficiary, and Vicki breached those duties.
35Vicki responds that allowing Alice’s claim would improperly “usurp” the estate trustee’s role. She cites Eisen v Altus Group, 2021 ONSC 1723. That case involved a syndicated mortgage in which a trustee sued an appraiser for negligence on behalf of the trust and the trust’s beneficiaries. The issue was whether the trustee had standing to assert a cause of action belonging to the trust. Vella J held, at para 35, that where a trust holds a cause of action and the trustee is authorized by the beneficiaries to sue, the trustee has standing. This principle has no application here. In the estate context, an estate trustee doesn’t require beneficiary authorization to sue on behalf of the estate.
36And, in any event, Alice isn’t purporting to exercise the estate trustee’s authority. Again, Alice isn’t seeking to sue on behalf of the estate. She’s alleging that Vicki owed obligations directly to her as a beneficiary and failed to meet them. As I discuss below, I conclude that Alice hasn’t proven these claims. But that doesn’t mean she doesn’t have standing to advance them.
37Finally, Vicki makes several arguments about the merits of the dispute, which I take are intended to show that the estate trustee is in the best position to advance these claims. I deal with these arguments in the next section since they’re not a defence to Alice’s standing.
D. Issue #4: whether Vicki committed breach of fiduciary duty, devastavit, or unjust enrichment, and the damages, if any?
38Alice asks for a declaration that Vicki is liable to the estate for $170,000, representing the lost value of the estate’s real property. She alleges breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and devastavit but, in her factum, she argues unjust enrichment instead of negligence.
39Vicki responds that she acted properly in administering the estate and, in any event, caused no loss.
40For the following reasons, I conclude that Alice has not proven breach of fiduciary duty, devastavit, or unjust enrichment.
1. Law
i. Fiduciary Duty
41An executor has several duties to the estate’s beneficiaries:
do act honestly and with the level of skill and prudence that would be expected of the reasonable person of business administering their own affairs
don’t delegate the office to another
don’t profit personally from their dealing with the trust property or with the beneficiaries of the trust
do preserve the assets of the deceased’s estate
See Valard Construction Ltd. v Bird Construction Co., 2018 SCC 8, at para 17; Fales v Canada Permanent Trust Co., [1977] 2 SCR 302, at 315.
ii. Devastavit
42An estate trustee is liable for devastavit, or wasting the estate’s assets, if they engage in “mismanagement of the estate” or the deceased’s assets, or where they dissipate and misapply the assets in breach of the standard of care imposed on estate trustees. See Commander Leasing Corp. Ltd. v Aiyede (1984), 4 DLR (4th) 107 (Ont CA), at 110. The standard of care required of an executor is “the standard of care of a person of ordinary care and diligence in managing their own affairs”. See Baran v Cranston, 2022 ONSC 6636, at para 14 (Div Ct); Fales, at p. 315.
43That said, the standard isn’t perfection—it’s “honesty, and reasonable skill and prudence”. See Valard, at para 26; Trustee Act, s 27, 35(1)
iii. Unjust Enrichment
44The elements of unjust enrichment are (a) that the respondent was enriched; (b) that the applicant suffered a corresponding deprivation; and (c) that the respondent’s enrichment and the applicant’s corresponding deprivation occurred in the absence of a juristic reason. See Moore v Sweet, 2018 SCC 52 at para 37.
2. Facts
45Again, in December 2021, just before Ms. Mitsopoulou died, she agreed to sell her house for $670,000. The buyer agreed to close the sale in June 2022, so that Vicki and Elsie could probate the estate. Vicki moved out of the house in February 2022.
46Vicki and Elsie made some progress in probating the estate. They engaged a lawyer in February 2022, but Vicki and Elsie’s relationship started devolving in June 2022, in part because Vicki was challenging the will:
Elsie missed appointments two bank appointments
on June 14, the lawyer withdrew because “it was suggested that [he] was attempting to prefer one sister over another”
then, Elsie accused Vicki of trying to leverage her role as estate trustee for “demands that benefit you personally and are outside the terms of the will itself”
Elsie also prohibited Vicki from moving into the house without the other parties’ permission
in July 2022, Vicki accused Elsie of using “abusive language and giving out misinformation” after Elsie implied that Vicki used Ms. Mitsopoulou’s CPP death benefit to pay the funeral expenses
later that month, Vicki accused Elsie of committing fraud when Elsie deposited a cheque for the estate in Elsie’s personal account
in November 2022, Vicki arranged a meeting with another estate lawyer, but Elsie threatened to cancel the meeting if Vicki didn’t disclose her “intentions” first
47Meanwhile, the buyer agreed to delay the closing even further. But, finally in November 2022, Elsie returned his deposit, which led to more acrimony among the sisters.
48As a result, no significant progress was made on the probate through the rest of 2022 and 2023. Vicki and Elsie continued sparring.
49Vicki moved back into the house sometime between November 2022 and January 2023. According to Joanne, all five parties agreed that Vicki could do so provided she paid the property’s expenses until it was sold. According to Elsie, Vicki moved in without permission, but agreed to pay the house expenses. Vicki herself says she “took it upon [herself] to move in” because she feared the city would sell the house for unpaid taxes.
50In late 2023 and early 2024, the parties tried to settle this dispute. As discussed above, Vicki contended that there was an enforceable settlement agreement, but Petersen J rejected that claim.
51In September 2024, Elsie renounced her right to be estate trustee.
52As discussed above, the litigation started in October 2024, which led to Ms. Deley being appointed as ETDL and Vicki vacating the house in September 2025.
53To sell the property, Ms. Deley received several valuations:
Bunker Realty told her that the home was worth between $450,000 and $480,000, and recommended it be listed for $425,000
Precise Real Estate Appraising Inc. appraised the house for $465,000
eXp Realty Brokerage appraised the house for $550,000
This evidence was adduced as exhibits to a paralegal’s affidavit.
54The house was listed for sale for $485,000 and sold for $500,000.
55Bunker Realty opined that the fair market value of the house in December 2021 was between $600,000 to $630,000. This evidence was also adduced as an exhibit to a paralegal’s affidavit.
56Since Ms. Mitsopoulou died, Vicki and Elsie, as named estate trustees, have provided some financial disclosure. They didn’t provide any disclosure before Alice started this case. Elsie blamed Vicki for not sharing information with her—she said that she couldn’t access the accounts without probate, but Vicki had the information because she was living at the house. In January 2025, Vicki produced bank statements, insurance policy, and utility and tax bills. In April 2025, she produced some more bank statements and bills, and some overdue collection notices.
57The only evidence for Alice’s occupation rent claim is an MLS listing for an allegedly comparable property, which was attached to Alice’s affidavit. It was being rented for $2650 monthly in 2021.
3. Analysis and Disposition
58On the admissible evidence filed in this proceeding, I’m not satisfied that Alice has proven that Vicki breached her fiduciary duties or mismanaged the estate.
59First, Vicki and Elsie are both the named estate trustees under Ms. Mitsopoulou’s will, and they share responsibility for the delays in administering this estate. The record before me shows that Elsie equally didn’t take steps to administer the estate, and her conflict with Vicki led to an impasse. Indeed, Alice’s first factum in this application lays the blame at both estate trustees’ feet. For example, Alice argues that Elsie “was not prepared to take legal action to resolve the near three-year delay caused by [her and Vicki’s] inability to cooperate.” Alice blames the collapse of the sale on Vicki’s failure to probate the estate. That failure must be shared by both Vicki and Elsie.
60Petersen J made the same observation:
The two individuals named as Estate Trustees in the 2012 Will have been incapable of cooperating. They have done nothing to administer the Estate. Neither will consent to the other acting as sole Estate Trustee. They have reached a stalemate. An ETDL needs to be appointed to preserve the value of the Estate’s main asset and to pay off the Estate’s debts before further interest charges and penalties accrue.
61Second, Alice asserts that Vicki preferred her interests over the other beneficiaries by living in the house “rent-free”. To begin, the house was empty from February 2022 to at least November 2022. Further, there’s Joanne’s evidence that all the parties agreed that Vicki should move in to maintain the house until it’s sold. Elsie doesn’t concede that there was an agreement, but she implies that the parties tacitly accepted this arrangement so long as Vicki paid the house expenses.
62Third, Alice’s argument is based, in part, on the fact that the house sold in 2026 for less than the 2022 sale price. There are several problems with this argument. To begin, Bunker Realty’s valuation is opinion evidence, and should’ve been adduced through a properly qualified expert not a paralegal’s affidavit.
63Further, there’s a lack of evidence about the two sales. Elsie says that, after the deal collapsed, the buyer was prepared to consider a fresh offer at a “purchase price reflective of the current real estate market.” But I haven’t been provided with any evidence about this buyer, the conditions on the sale, or about the negotiations with him after the deal collapsed.
64Next, there’s little evidence about the condition of the house. It was empty for almost a year. For all I know, Vicki’s maintenance of the house after she moved back in preserved its value.
65Also, I’m unwilling to blame Vicki alone for the aborted sale—Elsie’s conflict with Vicki is, in part, to blame for the delay in probating the estate, which led to the sale collapsing.
66Fourth, Alice’s evidence about the house’s value in 2026 is largely based on double hearsay or opinion evidence—again, these values should’ve been adduced through a properly qualified expert or, at least, non-hearsay affidavits.
67Alice leans heavily into Petersen J’s finding that Vicki mismanaged the estate. Some of this evidence was before Petersen J. But Petersen J was deciding a motion, where she can rely on hearsay evidence. On an application, hearsay evidence is only admissible “with respect to facts that are not contentious.” See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 39.01(5). The value of the house when Ms. Mitsopoulou died, its value now, and whether Vicki caused any depreciation are all contentious facts. Further, Petersen J was deciding a different issue: whether Vicki should be appointed as estate trustee, not whether Vicki breached her duties as executor.
68At bottom, it’s relevant that someone was willing to buy the house for $670,000 in 2021 and it sold for $500,000 in 2026. But without more, this evidence isn’t probative of whether Vicki’s actions caused a drop in the house’s value.
69There’s also no unjust enrichment here. The first two elements of unjust enrichment require an enrichment of the respondent and a corresponding deprivation of the applicant. To establish that Vicki was enriched and Alice was correspondingly deprived, it must be shown that something of value—a “tangible benefit”—passed from the latter to the former. See Moore, at para 41. The evidence on this application is unclear on Vicki’s benefit, since there’s no evidence of the value of her use of the house (other than the MLS listing, which is also hearsay evidence and unreliable). It’s also unclear on Alice’s deprivation, since there’s no evidence on the depreciation of the estate caused by Vicki living in the house.
E. Issue #5: whether Vicki should be compelled to pass the estate’s accounts?
70An executor shall not be required by any court to render an account of the property of the deceased, otherwise than by an inventory thereof, unless at the instance or on behalf of some person interested in such property. See Estates Act, RSO 1990, c E.21, s 50(1).
71An order for the passing of accounts may be required when an applicant raises a significant concern in respect of the estate trustee’s management of the estate, whether related to misfeasance, wrongdoing, or a significant erosion of estate. See Huang v Nie, 2024 ONSC 2398, at para 16.
72I’m not persuaded that Vicki should have to pass the estate’s accounts. I appreciate that Alice has raised a “significant concern” but that concern points to both Vicki and Elisie’s alleged mismanagement. I’ve been unable to conclude that there was any mismanagement here.
IV. COSTS
73Subject to the provisions of an act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 131(1).
74In exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act, s 131, to award costs, the court may consider, together with the result in the proceeding and any offer to settle or to contribute made in writing, the factors listed in the Rules of Civil Procedure, r 57.01.
75In the usual case, costs are awarded to the prevailing party after judgment has been given. The traditional purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party in respect of the expenses sustained either defending a claim that in the end proved unfounded (if the successful party was the respondent), or in pursuing a valid legal right (if the applicant prevailed). Costs awards are “in the nature of damages awarded to the successful litigant against the unsuccessful, and by way of compensation for the expense to which he has been put by the suit improperly brought”. See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 at paras 20-21.
76The main objective is to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case, rather than to fix an amount based on the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant. See Boucher v Public Accountants Council (Ontario) (Ont CA), at para 26.
77Both parties seek their costs if successful. My conclusion is that both parties were equally successful and unsuccessful. Alice asked for the appointment of herself or a neutral third party as estate trustee. Vicki asked for the same thing. Then, Alice focused on Ms. Deley, and Vicki agreed. Alice asked for a finding that Vicki mismanaged the estate. I dismissed that claim. Vicki asked for a finding that there was an enforceable settlement between the parties. I dismissed that motion. As a result, there was divided success, and the parties shall each bear their own costs.
V. CONCLUSION
78I am sorry that for five years after Ms. Mitsopoulou’s passing, her children have been embroiled in this litigation. The task of administering the estate was overwhelming for Vicki and Elsie, and their delay in probating it led to unforeseen consequences. I appreciate that Alice believes that Vicki took advantage of the situation, but that’s not borne out by the evidence.
79I hope that the appointment of Ms. Deley as estate trustee will finally bring some closure to the parties.
Agarwal J
Released: March 31, 2026