SCJ 2025

The court considered motions by both parties regarding the sale of jointly owned property, occupation rent, and the return of personal possessions following the breakdown of a cohabitation relationship.

The applicant sought the sale of the property, occupation rent, and the return of his possessions, while the respondent sought financial disclosure and opposed the sale.

The court ordered the sale of the property, declined to award occupation rent, and directed the return of personal possessions, with certain proceeds to be held in trust pending resolution of outstanding claims.

The decision addresses a motion by Pamela Adderley for standing in an application brought by Bridgepoint Financial Services Limited Partnership I against Rudolf Steinberg.

The application concerns entitlement to settlement funds arising from accident benefits and the priority of claims to those funds.

The court considers whether Adderley should be joined as a party under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure or permitted to participate under section 67 of the Personal Property Security Act.

The court concludes that while Adderley is not a necessary party for joinder, her interests are engaged under the PPSA and she is permitted to participate in the application, subject to limits on her evidence and submissions.

The court dismissed a motion by the defendants, a real estate agent and her brokerage, to strike the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

The defendants argued the claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB), was statute-barred, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court found the LTB did not have jurisdiction over claims of real estate agent negligence, the limitation period had not clearly expired, and the statement of claim disclosed all elements of negligence.

The action was allowed to proceed.

The court considered whether a complainant can consent to bodily harm in the context of BDSM sexual activity.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault with a weapon.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent, vitiation of consent by abuse of authority, or intentional infliction of bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The decision also discusses the social value of BDSM and questions whether the law should be re-examined to reflect contemporary social norms.

This decision concerns the conviction of Stephen William Koritar on eight charges, including possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, assault of a police officer with intent to prevent arrest, attempt to take a weapon from a police officer, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found that Mr. Koritar had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the master bedroom and kitchen of a Toronto condominium, and rejected his evidence as not credible.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of constructive and joint possession, circumstantial evidence, and the application of the W.D. framework for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed Douglas LaFramboise’s action against Robert Kostyniuk as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The claim arose from a prior action in which Kostyniuk, as counsel for Sylvia Zwaan, obtained judgment against LaFramboise for unlawful conversion.

The court found that LaFramboise’s new action was a collateral attack on prior decisions, was barred by absolute privilege, and that Kostyniuk owed no duty of care to LaFramboise.

The court emphasized the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent frivolous or vexatious litigation.

The court considered whether a person intending to make a claim against an estate for unjust enrichment, based on services rendered to the deceased, has standing to file a Notice of Objection to the granting of a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee under Rule 75.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to seek removal of the Estate Trustee named in the will.

The court held that such a potential creditor does not have standing to file a Notice of Objection, as the category of persons with standing is limited to those whose claims turn on the outcome of a challenge to the will or the issuance of a certificate of appointment.

The Notice of Objection was ordered removed.

The applicant, Jerzy Szot, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents, Peter B. Cozzi and his professional corporation, to be vexatious litigants.

The application arose from a lengthy and complex litigation history involving Mr. Cozzi’s repeated attempts to access insurance proceeds and fees in relation to a former client, Mr. Nguyen, a party under disability.

The court found that Mr. Cozzi’s conduct, including relitigating settled issues, failing to pay costs orders, and acting against a vulnerable party, was vexatious and an abuse of process.

The court granted the order, prohibiting the respondents from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

This sentencing decision concerns two co-accused, Tafari Bezabeh and Justin Harker, convicted by a jury of attempt murder and first degree murder arising from two closely connected shootings in Toronto on June 19, 2022.

The court reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the applicable case law, ultimately imposing life imprisonment for both offences, with no parole eligibility for 25 years on the murder count and a concurrent life sentence for attempt murder.

The decision emphasizes the need for denunciation and deterrence in the context of planned, public gun violence.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code to permit a witness, T.A., to testify by video at trial due to her lack of stable housing and inability to travel.

The court found the hardship to the witness, the limited scope of her evidence, and the arrangements for secure testimony justified granting the application, despite late notice.

The judge noted that while in-person testimony is preferred, the circumstances warranted an exception, and the application was granted.

This costs decision follows the trial judgment in a motor vehicle insurance dispute.

The court addresses the adjustment of the judgment for a Pierringer Agreement, calculation of prejudgment interest, and the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court finds that the net damages to be paid by Economical are $13,008.86, with prejudgment interest of $1,292.14, and costs awarded on the Small Claims Court scale, totaling $7,909.26.

The decision discusses the application of Rule 49 offers, proportionality, and the policy behind limiting costs where the claim could have been brought in Small Claims Court.

The reasons for judgment in this case are not available at this time.

The respondent, Yitzhak Lewin, brought a motion to set aside a final order made in his absence in a family law proceeding.

The court considered whether there was proper service of the application, whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible excuse for the default, whether there was an arguable defence, and the comparative prejudice to the parties.

The court found that service was proper, the motion was brought promptly, and the respondent had a plausible excuse and an arguable defence.

The prejudice to the respondent if the default judgment was maintained outweighed the prejudice to the applicant if it was set aside.

The order of Bordin J. was set aside, and the respondent was permitted to file responding materials.

The applicants, Steven Bulut and 1091369 Ontario Inc., sought leave to appeal an arbitral award granting Marko N. Bulut a 50% constructive trust interest in real property.

The court declined to grant leave, finding no error of law in the arbitrator’s application of the law of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, limitation periods, or issue estoppel/abuse of process.

The court also declined to recognize the award under s. 50 of the Arbitration Act at this time, as no application for such relief was before the court and certain matters remained outstanding before the arbitrator.

The applicant, Junhua Wang, sought the appointment of a receiver and manager over real property owned by the respondents, Hong Jing and Lihan Jing, under a matured and unpaid mortgage.

The respondents objected, arguing the mortgage was part of a broader financing arrangement involving third parties and ongoing litigation.

The court found the appointment of a receiver just and convenient, given the default, the risk to the applicant’s security, and the lack of evidence that the applicant was party to the broader arrangements.

The court also addressed evidentiary objections regarding the applicant’s affidavits and settled the process for finalizing the receivership order.

The court dismissed motions by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis of absolute privilege.

The case concerns whether statements made in an affidavit in another proceeding, about a non-party, are protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that absolute privilege is subject to exceptions and applies only to statements made “with reference to the inquiry.” Without the full context of the affidavit and related documents, the court could not determine that the claim was bound to fail.

The court also addressed the application of absolute privilege to counsel and found no basis to treat counsel differently in this context.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The court sentenced Ryan Turgeon, a former high school teacher, to three years’ imprisonment for making sexually explicit materials available to a child and for child luring, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The decision reviews the facts, the positions of the parties, the impact on the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. M.V. to situate the sentence within the evolving range for such offences, emphasizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court considers a second discreditable conduct application by the Crown in a sexual offences prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused’s prior conviction for sexual interference and the circumstances of the prior complainant’s presentation, to undermine the accused’s claim of honest but mistaken belief in age and to show recklessness.

The court finds both groupings of evidence inadmissible, concluding that their probative value is limited and outweighed by the risk of distraction and prejudice, especially given the factual dissimilarities between the prior and current complainants.

The application is dismissed.