R. v. Rajaratnam #2, 2025 ONSC 3640
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
SATHISKUMAR RAJARATNAM
Defendant
R. Fried and B. Ververs, for the Crown
L. Shamesh, for the Defendant
HEARD: March 19, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Period of Parole Ineligibility)
A. INTRODUCTION
1Sathiskumar Rajaratnam was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for stabbing Leon Tyrell on August 20, 2022 and causing his death. At trial, Mr. Rajaratnam acknowledged stabbing Mr. Tyrell and causing his death. However, he pleaded not guilty to the charge of second degree murder, but guilty to the included offence of manslaughter. The Crown did not accept that plea and the trial proceeded on the second degree murder charge. In addition to the possible verdict of guilty of second degree murder, it would have been open to the jury to find the accused guilty of manslaughter, either because the Crown had failed to prove the requisite level of intent required for murder, or because the jury was satisfied that the requirements for provocation had been met, thereby reducing the offence to manslaughter.
2The trial commenced on January 13, 2025 with preliminary motions.1 The jury was selected on January 20 and the trial proceeded from there. Mr. Rajaratnam testified in his own defence. The jury started its deliberations on January 30, 2025 and returned with its verdict at 4:22 p.m. on January 31, 2025.
3After receiving the verdict, I instructed the jury on whether they wished to make any recommendations on the period of parole ineligibility that I should impose on Mr. Rajaratnam’s life sentence. They retired again to consider that issue. After deliberating for approximately 10 minutes, the jury returned with all 12 jurors recommending the minimum parole ineligibility period of 10 years.
4The matter returned before me on March 19, 2025 for the sentencing hearing. The evidence consisted of victim impact statements from the family members of the deceased, the criminal record of the accused, and information with respect to the conditions in the institutions in which he has been incarcerated since his arrest on August 24, 2022. I reserved my decision. Having considered the evidence on the sentencing hearing, the evidence at trial, the submissions of counsel, and the relevant case law, I have concluded that 10 years is the appropriate parole ineligibility period. My reasons for that decision follow.
B. POSITION OF THE PARTIES
5Mr. Rajaratnam has been in custody since August 24, 2022 when he surrendered himself to police. The Crown position is that Mr. Rajaratnam should not be eligible to apply for parole until 13 years from the date of his arrest. In support of that position, the Crown relies primarily on the poor character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the severe impact this tragedy has had on the family of Leon Tyrell.
6The defence submits that I should impose the minimum 10-year period. The defence also emphasizes the circumstances of the offence, although with a significantly different perspective on the evidence than the factual underpinnings relied upon by the Crown. The defence also submits that I should take into account the harsh conditions under which Mr. Rajaratnam served his pre-trial custody as a mitigating factor and the positive steps Mr. Rajaratnam has taken to turn his life around.
C. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
7The Criminal Code stipulates that a person convicted of second degree murder must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life, without eligibility for parole until that person has served at least 10 years of the sentence.2 The sentence begins to run from the date of incarceration, in this case, August 24, 2022.
8The Criminal Code also provides that I have a discretion with respect to the parole ineligibility period and may increase it to anything between 10 and 25 years as I “deem fit in the circumstances”. In exercising that discretion, I am required to consider: (1) the character of the offender; (2) the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission; and (3) the recommendations, if any, of the jury.3
9In R. v. Shropshire, the Supreme Court of Canada held that although 10 years is the general rule, the language of the section does not require “special circumstances” in order to impose a period longer than 10 years, nor is it correct to say that the discretion should only be issued sparingly. The Court held:
If the objective of [what was then] s. 744 is to give the trial judge an element of discretion in sentencing to reflect the fact that within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability, then it is incorrect to start from the proposition that the sentence must be the statutory minimum unless there are unusual circumstances. As discussed supra, a preferable approach would be to view the 10-year period as a minimum contingent on what the "judge deems fit in the circumstances", the content of this "fitness" being informed by the criteria listed in s. 744. As held in other Canadian jurisdictions, the power to extend the period of parole ineligibility need not be sparingly used.4
10In addition to the specific considerations listed in the Criminal Code, it is relevant to take into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Typically, these will be subsumed within the character of the offender and nature and circumstances of the offence criteria. However, it is also appropriate to take into account the harshness of any conditions of any pre-trial custody as a mitigating factor in determining the ineligibility period, although this cannot take the period below the mandatory 10-year limit. As stated by Favreau J.A. in R. v. Lamba:
. . . as this court directed in Marshall, pre-sentence conditions are one of many mitigating factors that may affect a fit sentence. There are no principled reasons why this mitigating factor should not also apply to determining the appropriate period of parole ineligibility, as long as the statutory mandatory minimum sentence is maintained and the sentencing court also considers the factors in s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code when determining an appropriate period of parole ineligibility.5
11I will deal with each of the three factors specified in s. 745.4, but in reverse order. I will then consider the pre-sentence custody conditions and the extent to which they are mitigating in this case.
D. ANALYSIS: JURY RECOMMENDATIONS
12I am mandated by the statute to take into account any recommendations made by the jury, but I am not bound by them. In this case, I gave brief instructions to the jury about making parole ineligibility recommendations. I emphasized that there was no requirement to make a recommendation and that they did not have to be unanimous. My instructions included the following:
The punishment imposed when a person is convicted of second degree murder is imprisonment for life. That is the sentence that I must and will impose in this case. Part of that sentence is a period of parole ineligibility. The period of parole ineligibility, which begins to run from the date on which Mr. Rajaratnam was arrested (August 24, 2022), must be between a minimum of ten (10) years and a maximum of twenty-five (25) years. It is my job to decide what the period of parole ineligibility will be.
In making my decision about the period of parole ineligibility, our law requires me to take several factors into account. One of those factors is any recommendation the jurors who tried the case may wish to make about parole ineligibility. As representatives of this community, you have the right and now the opportunity to make a recommendation about the number of years of his sentence of life imprisonment Mr. Rajaratnam should serve before he is eligible for consideration for release on parole. You do not pass sentence. I do. Any recommendation you make about parole ineligibility is a factor I will consider in making my decision.
In deciding what recommendation about parole ineligibility you may make, you should consider three (3) factors:
the character of Mr. Rajaratnam;
the nature of the offence; and
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence.
13The jury left the courtroom at 4:30 p.m. to consider this issue. At 4:45 they returned to the courtroom and delivered the completed sheet indicating that all 12 jurors recommended the minimum period of 10 years. Those 15 minutes that the jury was out of the courtroom included going to the jury room, completing the form, notifying staff they were ready, and then returning to the courtroom. The length of the deliberations themselves must only have been about 10 minutes.
14In determining the weight to give to the jury recommendations, I must be mindful that the instructions given to the jury are abbreviated. The jury would not have a full appreciation of the principles of sentencing or how the parole system works. Also, the jury did not have as full an appreciation of the relevant evidence as I do now, particularly with respect to the criminal record of the offender and the impact of this offence on the family of Mr. Tyrell. However, Mr. Rajaratnam testified at trial, so the jury did have considerable information about his circumstances and, obviously, a full appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the offence.
15Ms. Shamesh, for the defence, submits that in these circumstances I should give particular weight to the recommendation of the jury. Ms. Shamesh referred to the fact that the jury was visibly moved upon learning that Mr. Rajaratnam would receive a life sentence and to the speed with which the jury returned its unanimous recommendation for the minimum period.
16For what it is worth, I agree with Ms. Shamesh’s characterization of the jury’s reaction to being told that Mr. Rajaratnam would be sentenced to imprisonment for life. They looked disconcerted, perhaps even shocked. However, juries are always instructed that the sentence to be imposed for an offence has nothing to do with their deliberations or decision as to the accused’s innocence or guilt of an offence. That is a correct principle of law and one they are required to apply. Although the jury might have been surprised, or even upset, to learn the implications of the verdict they rendered, it would have been irrelevant for them to take that into account in the course of their deliberations, even if they had known about it. Therefore, if this was the source of their reaction, it plays no part in my analysis.
17The jury deliberated for over a day before reaching its verdict as to guilt on second degree murder. I do not think it can be said that the speed with which the jury returned its recommendation on the parole ineligibility is any indication that they were not being mindful of their responsibilities as jurors. That would be inconsistent with their attitude and degree of attention throughout the trial. Rather, I consider that the speed of this particular decision underscores their unanimous view that on the scale of seriousness in the various factors they had to consider in reaching their verdict, their findings of fact were likely towards the lower end of the scale, although it is difficult to be certain about that.
18However, I do consider it to be significant that the entire jury recommended the lowest possible period of parole ineligibility. In my experience, juries are rarely unanimous on parole ineligibility recommendations, and it is particularly unusual that everyone would have recommended the minimum. Frequently, one or more jurors will abstain from making any recommendation at all. I have never seen a unanimous jury recommendation, nor had counsel before me. Of the cases cited at sentencing, the closest to a unanimous minimum recommendation was in R. v. Cromwell,6 a decision of Gabriel J. in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. In that case, nine jurors recommended 10 years, two abstained, and one recommended 15 years. The trial judge noted that, “These recommendations have significance.” He then quoted with approval from the decision of R. v. Shevalev, 2018 BCSC 1612 at para. 30 as follows:
This jury, after hearing all of the facts, determined that Mr. Shevalev had the requisite intent, but the majority has expressed the view as to the number of years this young man must spend in custody before he has a chance of resuming his life. In my view, the jury's recommendation is entitled to serious consideration. The community has spoken. If we did not want their opinion, we should not have asked for it.
[Emphasis added by Gabriel J.]
19Relying substantially on the jury recommendations, Gabriel imposed a parole ineligibility period of 11 years.
20On a limited search conducted on , I was able to find three cases in which there were unanimous jury recommendations for 10 years – one each in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Alberta. The New Brunswick case is the notorious and brutal murder of wealthy businessman Richard Oland by his financially destitute son, seemingly in a fit of rage. After a three-month trial, the jury convicted the son of second degree murder, but unanimously recommended the 10-year minimum period of parole ineligibility. The offender had no criminal record, excellent character references, and good prospects of rehabilitation. The case is not similar to the one before me on its facts. However, in determining to impose the minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period, the trial judge held:
In the end, the tipping point for the Court has been the unanimous jury recommendation. They too saw the brutality. They too saw the dysfunction. And it was they, the chosen representatives of the community, who expressed their individual and collective opinions as to the level of seriousness of the offence. It is a strong recommendation that, for the reasons I have given, I intend to respect; for in my opinion it does not do injustice to the “proportionality principle” or the “parity principle”.7
21The Ontario case, R. v. Salific,8 is also an example of a son brutally killing a parent (in this case his mother) in a fit of rage. The accused pleaded not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder, but was convicted of second degree murder by the jury. The facts are not similar to the case before me. The killing itself was particularly gruesome and brutal, but the accused was a youthful first offender who expressed extreme remorse almost immediately after the murder. The trial judge, Harris J., found that the offender’s mental illness was a significant contributing factor causing the son to kill his mother, although falling short of the requirements of the “not criminally responsible” defence. The jury unanimously recommended a 10-year period of parole ineligibility. The trial judge imposed that minimum period of ineligibility, stating that he was placing “significant reliance on the unanimous jury recommendation.”9
22In the Alberta decision, R. v. Ledesma,10 the jury unanimously recommended 10 years, but the trial judge imposed an ineligibility period of 12 years. Although imposing a higher period than was recommended by the jury, the trial judge held that the circumstances of the offence required higher than the minimum (the victim was shot in the back in the course of an armed robbery and the offender had an extensive criminal record including two prior weapons prohibition orders which he was in breach of at the time of the murder). However, the trial judge noted:
I place substantial weight on the jury recommendation that the period of parole ineligibility be set at the minimum ten year period. The jury was unanimous in making this recommendation. They had the benefit of hearing extensive evidence during the course of the trial relating not only to the details surrounding the undercover operation, but also regarding the Accused’s history and personal circumstances. Their unanimous recommendation reflects their view of the seriousness of the crime, a recommendation that warrants serious consideration under all of the circumstances.11
23I am also guided by the decision of MacDonell J. in Pandurevic. In that case, there was not a unanimous jury recommendation, but the trial judge noted that only one juror recommended more than the minimum. That juror recommended 12 years, eight recommended 10 years, and three made no recommendation. MacDonnell J. held:
Recommendations of the jury are simply that: recommendations. However, seeking the input of the jury is not a mere exercise in public relations. As the 12 members of the community selected to sit in judgment in this case, their opinions are a valuable insight into the degree of Mr. Pandurevic’s moral culpability and I am statutorily bound to take those opinions into account.12
24In the case before me, the jury did not know the full extent of Mr. Rajaratnam’s criminal record, but apart from that had considerable information about his circumstances and character. They also had a full picture with respect to the nature and circumstances of the offence itself. In that context, they were overwhelmingly of the view that the minimum period of parole ineligibility was appropriate. In my view, their unanimous recommendation, delivered in such a definitive manner, is deserving of considerable weight.
E. NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE
Legal Principles
25The consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offence is highly fact specific. As a starting point, I must accept as proven all facts, express and implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty of second degree murder.13 While I have heard all the same trial evidence as the jury did, I do not have reasons from the jury explaining the basis for the verdict they reached – which is simply the natural consequence of it being a jury trial. However, that leaves me at somewhat of a disadvantage, as I do not know the specific findings of fact the jury made on particular issues. Therefore, where the existence of certain facts is relevant to the factors I must consider in making my decision, it is necessary for me to make my own determinations of fact.
26In doing so, I must make findings that are consistent with the verdict reached by the jury. However, my role is not to try to discern the likely basis for the jury’s decision. Rather, I must make my own findings, provided they are consistent with the jury’s verdict. Where a relevant fact alleged would be an aggravating factor, I must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt before taking it into account. For facts that would be mitigating, and therefore helpful to the defence, I need only be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.14
27Leon Tyrell died of a single stab wound to the side of his chest. Self defence was not raised. It was admitted that Mr. Rajaratnam inflicted that stab wound and that his unlawful act caused Mr. Tyrell’s death. I also instructed the jury that a reasonable person would realize that this unlawful act would likely put Mr. Tyrell at risk of bodily harm that was something more than brief or trivial. Therefore, the constituent elements of manslaughter were established. Those being established facts, there were two issues for the jury to determine: (1) whether Mr. Rajaratnam possessed the level of intent required for second degree murder; and, if so, (2) whether the Crown had disproven an element required to reduce this offence to manslaughter, rather than second degree murder.
28It is an express implication of the jury verdict that they found Mr. Rajaratnam to have the intent required for second degree murder, and also ruled out the availability of provocation as a partial defence reducing the offence to manslaughter. I am bound by those findings, regardless of whether I would have reached the same conclusions.
29There are two facts relied on by the Crown that would be aggravating if established, but which I do not believe to be essential to the jury’s finding on intent. First, the Crown alleged that upon seeing Mr. Tyrell, Mr. Rajaratnam deliberately went back to his vehicle to get a knife, which he then used to kill Mr. Tyrell. Second, the Crown alleged that comments made by Mr. Rajaratnam at the picnic table referring to a funeral were confirmation of his intent to kill. In my view, for the reasons I will set out below, neither of these aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
30There are also a number of facts which, if established would have a mitigating impact on sentencing. Those are: (1) the history between the deceased and Mr. Rajaratnam; and (2) threats allegedly made by Mr. Tyrell in relation to Mr. Rajaratnam’s daughter just before the altercation between these two men. Again, for the reasons set out below, I find these mitigating factors to have been established.
31There was evidence at trial that Mr. Tyrell had a history of mental health issues. Psychiatric records were filed establishing that he was a diagnosed schizophrenic with a history of transient episodes of behavioural outbursts and disinhibition. His medical history shows there was a correlation between these behavioural outbursts and his use of cannabis. At the time of his death, the toxicology analysis showed the presence of the operative component of cannabis in his system. On August 2, 2022, Mr. Tyrell had an altercation with the mother of his child. She was sufficiently concerned about his mental state that she called the police. The officers who attended were also concerned and they apprehended him under the Mental Health Act, and took him to the Humber River Hospital. The notes of the nursing staff at the hospital show that Mr. Tyrell was acting in a hypersexualized manner. This included exposing his pubic area to nursing staff, presenting as sexually disinhibited, and using sexually explicit and vulgar language about penis, vagina, and having sex with women. This conduct was close in proximity to two incidents that brought Mr. Tyrell into conflict with Mr. Rajaratnam and his family and was also close in time to the stabbing in this case, which occurred on August 20, 2022.
32Mr. Rajaratnam testified that a few weeks before the stabbing, Anisa Mohamed (the mother of Mr. Rajaratnam’s 15-month-old daughter) told him that she had been in the courtyard area with their daughter and the child was making noise. She said that Mr. Tyrell told her, “Tell your kid to shut the fuck up before I kick her in the face.” Mr. Rajaratnam did nothing about it at the time, but when he encountered Mr. Tyrell in the parking lot some days later, he accused him of threatening to kick his kid. He testified that Mr. Tyrell responded by telling him that he knew people, and could have him “picked off” any time. According to Mr. Rajaratnam, he did nothing further and did not really take Mr. Tyrell’s threat seriously.
33Subsequent to that event, Ms. Mohamed told Mr. Rajaratnam about another incident that happened when she was with her daughter and a friend in the courtyard of the apartment complex. She said that Mr. Tyrell approached them, pulled up his shirt, and was putting his hands down his pants in front of her daughter. At Mr. Rajaratnam’s insistence, she reported that incident to the apartment’s security officer. A report was taken on August 1, 2022, and the security officer spoke to Mr. Tyrell about it, telling him to stay away from Ms. Mohammed. The officer noted that Mr. Tyrell appeared to be “in crisis.” This is consistent with the hospital records that began the very next day.
34Whether or not the reported threat to kick the child in the head and/or the attempted exhibitionism in front of the child are true, is not a necessary fact. However, it is an uncontroverted fact that Mr. Rajaratnam had information to this effect and that he believed these incidents occurred (as they likely did, based on the evidence I heard at trial). The Crown did not dispute, but rather relied upon, the history of tension between these two men over these two incidents. According to the Crown, this history was what prompted Mr. Rajaratnam to kill Mr. Tyrell in an act of revenge. The Crown challenged Mr. Rajaratnam’s evidence that Mr. Tyrell made additional threats on August 20, 2022. The source of the motive was alleged to be these two prior incidents, although the Crown acknowledged that if the jury found that the threats at the scene were made, this would simply add to the existing motive.
35The Crown is not required to prove motive to establish its case, and in my view, it failed to prove an overt motive on the evidence in this case. Mr. Rajaratnam was perhaps a resident, and at the very least a frequent visitor to, the same housing complex where Mr. Tyrell lived. The stabbing on August 20, 2022 was in a public area, in front of multiple witnesses, and captured on security cameras. Those witnesses knew Mr. Rajaratnam. If Mr. Rajaratnam intended to kill Mr. Tyrell as a result of the two earlier incidents, he would have had ample opportunity to locate Mr. Tyrell and attack him in a place where he could himself escape detection. There would be no reason to do so in a situation where he would inevitably be identified and arrested. He had a strong motivation not to go to jail because of his attachment to his young daughter, for whom he was the primary parent. However, it was possible for the jury to reach a finding of second degree murder without being satisfied it was done for revenge.
36Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied that these incidents with Mr. Tyrell were in Mr. Rajaratnam’s mind as the events on August 20, 2022 were unfolding. This does not constitute justification for murder, but it does provide context.
Threats Made by the Deceased on August 20, 2022
37I am also satisfied that Mr. Tyrell made further threats to Mr. Rajaratnam and his daughter on August 20, 2022, just prior to the altercation between the two men.
38That morning, Mr. Rajaratnam was beside his car in the parking lot smoking a cigarette and Ms. Mohammed and their daughter were in the nearby “courtyard.” Their plan was leave soon to buy a birthday present at a nearby mall and then go to a birthday party. The “courtyard” was a small park-like area with trees, grass, and some picnic tables. There were also a number of other people in the courtyard who knew Mr. Rajaratnam. As Mr. Rajaratnam was standing by the front of his car, Mr. Tyrell walked by, heading in the general direction of the courtyard area, but towards the precise area where Mr. Rajaratnam’s daughter was playing. This is captured on security video. However, Mr. Rajaratnam testified that Mr. Tyrell, without moving his head, moved his eyes sideways, looked at him, and called him a “pussy,” said he was going to kill him, and then said that after that he would get his daughter and “fuck out her hole.” The Crown argued that Mr. Tyrell did not even look Mr. Rajaratnam’s way, and that Mr. Rajaratnam’s evidence about this threat should be rejected. However, it is absolutely clear that Mr. Tyrell was talking as he walked past Mr. Rajaratnam. On the video, you can see that his lips are moving, although the position of his eyes cannot be seen one way or the other. He must have been saying something, and there was nobody he could have been talking to other than Mr. Rajaratnam. I found Mr. Rajaratnam’s evidence on this to be compelling and to be consistent with the video. I believe him. I note as well that this kind of sexual threat is consistent with Mr. Tyrell’s conduct on previous occasions, including while in hospital. It is not clear to me whether this would be an aggravating factor (as contributing to the motive for revenge) or a mitigating factor (as supporting the state of rage Mr. Rajaratnam must have been in). However, the standard of proof does not matter, as I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these words were spoken.
Mr. Rajaratnam Did Not Bring the Knife or Seriously Threaten Death
39It appears from the video that Mr. Rajaratnam seems more amused than angered when he hears these words. After Mr. Tyrell passed by, Mr. Rajaratnam returned to the car and opens the driver’s door. He appears to be doing something in the area on the inside of that door.
40Mr. Rajaratnam testified that his initial reaction was to laugh it off as being ridiculous. He said that he then started getting ready to leave and put a bag of weed in the pocket on the inside of the driver’s door. He was heading to pick up his daughter when he heard Ms. Mohamed call. He said he looked up and realized that Mr. Tyrell had now changed direction and was heading straight to the area where Mr. Rajaratnam’s daughter was playing beside the picnic table.
41That evidence is completely consistent with the video. Mr. Tyrell had been heading towards one part of the courtyard more to his left, and then made a sharp turn, heading straight for the little girl. Mr. Rajaratnam started walking toward the courtyard, but then began to run when Mr. Tyrell changed direction.
42The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Rajaratnam picked up a knife from the pocket in the driver’s door and went after Mr. Tyrell with it. It is not impossible that this happened, but I find it unlikely. The knife is never visible in Mr. Rajaratnam’s hand as he is heading towards the courtyard area. Also, he did not immediately hurry towards Mr. Tyrell, which might be more likely if he had picked up the knife for that purpose. He only started to hurry when Mr. Tyrell changed direction. This change of pace seemed to me to signal a change in Mr. Rajaratnam’s intent and level of concern.
43None of the people there saw a knife in Mr. Rajaratnam’s hand when he reached the courtyard, nor did they see it in the initial skirmish between Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Tyrell.
44When Mr. Tyrell reached the courtyard, he sat on the bench of the picnic table near where Mr. Rajaratnam’s daughter was playing. Mr. Rajaratnam ran and leapt to the tabletop. He testified that he said “Hello” at that point, but not in a friendly way, and that Mr. Tyrell again threatened to kill him in patois saying, “You gonna go dead.” In response Mr. Rajaratnam scooped up some flower petals and tossed them in the air, some of which fell on Mr. Tyrell and said, “I’m gonna be the one bringing these to your funeral.”
45Mr. Tyrell then started swinging at Mr. Rajaratnam, which Mr. Rajaratnam dodged. Mr. Tyrell started backing away and Mr. Rajaratnam went after him. Mr. Tyrell stumbled and fell twice as Mr. Rajaratnam advanced towards him. Then Mr. Tyrell ran towards an area away from the courtyard. At this point, Mr. Rajaratnam turned around and went back to the picnic table. The altercation appeared to be over. According to Mr. Rajaratnam, he never actually hit Mr. Tyrell. That cannot be confirmed completely on the video, but it is, at least, consistent with the video. It is also apparent from the video that if Mr. Rajaratnam wanted to connect with Mr. Tyrell during this initial skirmish, he certainly could have, whether with a fist or a knife. Nobody saw the knife at that time, nor can it be seen on the video.
46The words spoken by Mr. Rajaratnam about bringing flowers to Mr. Tyrell’s funeral are capable of being interpreted as a threat to kill. However, I did not take this as a serious threat to kill, and I certainly would not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of that. Several witnesses saw the flower tossing incident. None of them interpreted it as a threat. Some of them laughed, thinking it was in jest.
47If Mr. Rajaratnam had taken the knife from the car before heading over to the courtyard, that would be an aggravating factor on sentencing. I cannot be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he did so. Indeed, the evidence strongly points towards the contrary. I believe Mr. Rajaratnam’s evidence that he found the knife on the ground by the picnic table, near where Mr. Tyrell had been sitting. There is a point in the video where he can be seen bending down in the spot where he claimed to have found it, upon returning from the initial altercation between the two men.
Level of Intent
48Mr. Rajaratnam testified that he was enraged when he saw the knife, which he believed must have been dropped by Mr. Tyrell, and which Mr. Tyrell therefore had in close proximity to his daughter. At this point, Mr. Tyrell was coming back towards the courtyard and, according to Mr. Rajaratnam, repeated the threat to kill him and rape his daughter. Mr. Tyrell testified that at this point he completely lost control and went after Mr. Tyrell. He chased him out of the courtyard and when he caught up with him stabbed him. He was not sure where he stabbed him.
49After being stabbed, Mr. Tyrell stood up and walked calmly back through the parking lot and entered the apartment building. He did not appear to be injured at all. It was only when he reached the inside of the building that he suddenly collapsed. He died from his injury not long after. The single knife wound had penetrated his heart from the side.
50Meanwhile, Mr. Rajaratnam can be seen on the video pacing around in the parking lot. He testified that he was trying to calm himself down from the intense rage that caused him to stab Mr. Tyrell. He also said he feared Mr. Tyrell may have gone into the apartment to get a gun and would be coming back after him. Some spectators also thought Mr. Tyrell would come back armed.
51Having reached the verdict they did, the jury must have determined that Mr. Rajaratnam either intended to kill Mr. Tyrell when he stabbed him in the side, or that he meant to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to result in death and was reckless as to whether or not he died. I confess great difficulty in understanding that verdict. Mr. Tyrell got up and walked calmly away after the initial stab wound. If Mr. Rajaratnam truly intended to kill him, one would expect he would stab him again when he appeared to be completely uninjured. However, Mr. Rajaratnam merely walked away. Nevertheless, the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Rajaratnam had the level of intent to commit second degree murder, and for purposes of determining the appropriate parole ineligibility period, I must, and so, accept that finding.
52It follows that the jury must have also concluded that at least one of the essential elements required to establish provocation had been negated by the Crown. I explained to the jury in my charge that there were four questions they must answer affirmatively before finding there was provocation, and that if the answer to any question was “No”, then their verdict must be second degree murder. Those questions were:
(1) Did Mr. Tyrell commit a serious criminal offence?
(2) Was the serious criminal offence sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control?
(3) Was Mr. Tyrell’s conduct at that time sudden for Mr. Rajaratnam?
(4) Did Mr. Rajaratnam act suddenly before regaining self-control?
53Again, it is difficult for me to determine the basis for the jury’s rejection of these factors. However, clearly each jury member rejected at least one of these four factors, and not necessarily the same factor for each of them.
54Notwithstanding that, it would be mitigating for Mr. Rajaratnam if this killing was a sudden impulse, driven by rage over Mr. Tyrell threatening to rape his 15-month-old daughter. This is in the context of Mr. Tyrell’s prior conduct including threatening to kick her in the head, and appearing to be in the process of exposing his genitalia to her. Also, this was particularly triggering for Mr. Rajaratnam who had himself been sexually abused as a child. I only need to be satisfied of these factors on a balance of probabilities. I would have been satisfied of it beyond a reasonable doubt. The question, however, is whether such a finding would be inconsistent with the jury verdict. I do not think so. It is possible the jurors were of the view that although these things occurred, they were not sufficient to cause a person to lose control sufficiently to stab another person to death. Or perhaps, they were of the view that Mr. Rajaratnam had sufficient time to regain his self-control before stabbing Mr. Tyrell.
F. CHARACTER OF THE OFFENDER
55Sathiskumar Rajaratnam is now 37. He was born in India, but came to Canada with his parents when he was three years old. He has an older brother and three younger siblings.
56Mr. Rajaratnam testified that he was sexually abused by an uncle as a young child but never told anyone about it until he was about 20 years old, first disclosing it to his brother, who then told his mother. He said his mother then called him and they spoke about it, which resulted in his mother no longer permitting his youngest sister (then aged nine) to spend time alone with that uncle. As I discussed earlier, credibility findings are difficult but are often aided by small details that ring true. These details of the discussion with his mother and her decision to take steps to protect his sister have that ring of truth that support my finding that Mr. Rajaratnam was honestly reporting that he had been sexually assaulted as a child. I also accept Mr. Rajaratnam’s testimony that he was subjected to physical beatings by his father, which he described as bordering on torture.
57Unsurprisingly, Mr. Rajaratnam was a troubled child, acting out and getting into trouble at school. His father responded to this behaviour by throwing him out of the house when he was 15 years old. Mr. Rajaratnam testified at trial that in retrospect he recognizes that he was a bad role model for his younger siblings (another example of an honest assessment, in my view). However, he had a difficult time living on his own and being homeless at that age. He dropped out of school at Grade 10. For a while he lived in his friends’ houses, and in backyards. He said he would sometimes sneak into the houses during the day. Then a friend told him about a shelter for homeless youth, and he lived there for two and a half years. He started a plumbing apprenticeship and eventually got work in a factory. In his twenties, he started gradually to reconnect with members of his family, but found it awkward, particularly at the beginning. Also in his early twenties, he completed high school.
58Mr. Rajaratnam has a lengthy criminal record, including for crimes of violence. It starts with a conviction for assault and failure to comply with a “disposition” in Youth Court from March 2005, when he would have been approximately 17 years old. He was sentenced to time served of 72 days and probation for one year and six months. Thereafter, as an adult, there are two separate entries on his record in 2006, two in 2007, two in 2008, one in 2010, one in 2014, one in 2015 and, and one in 2017. In some cases, these entries included multiple related charges. The last entry is a sentencing on June 14, 2017 for two counts of assault causing bodily harm (in addition to two counts of mischief, disobeying a court order, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with a probation order). On one of the assault causing bodily harm charges, he was sentenced to a fine of $10.00 and probation for two years, on top of the equivalent of 18 months served in pre-sentencing custody. He was then sentenced to an additional $10.00 on each of the other charges.
59Mr. Rajaratnam’s criminal record was the subject of a Corbett application at trial. I ruled that crimes of violence were more like evidence of bad character than evidence going to credibility and as such would be excluded. There were no crimes of actual dishonesty such as fraud, forgery, perjury, obstruct justice, or other offences related to deceit. However, I held that failing to comply with court orders could be relevant to credibility and that some of those convictions could be put before the jury so that they did not have a distorted view of him. I held as follows:
I am required to balance the respective interests of the jury not having a skewed picture of the accused in assessing his credibility while at the same time avoiding undue prejudice to the accused by permitting evidence of violent offences similar to that which he is alleged to have committed in this case. In my view, this balance is best struck by permitting the following convictions to be put before the jury:
2008 FTC (which was failing to report as required)
2010 FTC (which was a breach of the no-weapons clause of the probation order)
2015 FTC (breach non-contact term)
2017 disobey court order (non-contact order in family proceedings)
I have added the qualifiers just so counsel know which FTC I am referencing. I am not suggesting that a full description of the offence should be put to the witness.
This ruling is a flexible one. It may be subject to change depending on the nature and content of defence counsel’s cross-examination of the Crown’s witnesses and anything that might emerge during the examination in chief of the accused, if he testifies. It may be raised again by counsel at the close of the Crown’s case.
60Crown counsel did raise the issue again following the testimony in chief of Mr. Rajaratnam and sought again to put in the entire criminal record, which I denied. Therefore, the only evidence before the jury with respect to Mr. Rajaratnam’s criminal record was that he had four convictions (in 2008, 2010, 2015, and 2017) related to failing to comply with court orders, and that the jury could take that into account in assessing credibility.
61While the character of the accused was not a relevant factor for the jury in its determination of guilt or evidence, it is directly relevant to the determination of the appropriate parole ineligibility period. Further, the full criminal record is directly relevant to the character of the offender. I have the benefit of knowing the full record, albeit not the full details of the offences. However, none of this was known to the jury, which must be recognized in determining how much weight to give to their recommendations on this issue now before me.
62Mr. Rajaratnam’s criminal record is serious and lengthy. It is a factor that I would consider aggravating in terms of assessing the appropriate period of parole ineligibility. However, it has to assessed in light of the troubled circumstances of his youth. I also note that the last entry on the criminal record is for a sentencing on June 14, 2017, at which time he was given credit for the equivalent of 18 months pre-sentence custody. Thus, this was for offences which likely occurred in 2016. Therefore, he had been free from any trouble for at least six years prior to stabbing Mr. Tyrell.
63Also relevant to his Mr. Rajaratnam’s character is his clear devotion to his daughter. Ms. Mohammed was not a particularly stable individual and struggled with her role as a mother. When the couple split up for a while, it was Mr. Rajaratnam who took custody of their daughter, moving in with his mother. He put the child in daycare during the day while he was working, and his mother also helped out with her care. Later, he returned to live with Ms. Mohamed and their daughter, but described their relationship as more like co-parenting than being in a relationship with Ms. Mohammed. Other witnesses commented on his care for his child. I have no hesitation in finding that he had a deep love for his child and was devoted to being a father.
G. CONDITIONS OF PRE-SENTENCING INCARCERATION
64In R. v. Lamba, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that in determining the period of parole ineligibility, it is appropriate to take into account the harshness of the conditions under which the offender served any period of pre-sentence custody.15 This is a principle that has application here.
65After his arrest, Mr. Rajaratnam was held at the Toronto South Detention Centre for 29 days. During that time, there were two days when the institution was under full lockdown and three days when Mr. Rajaratnam was held in isolation due to medical reasons. In addition, there were nine days of partial lockdowns affecting Mr. Rajaratnam. This means there were extra restrictions imposed on Mr. Rajaratnam for 50% of the days he was there.
66Mr. Rajaratnam was then transferred to the Toronto East Detention Centre. As of March 1, 2025, he had been in custody there for 891 nights. For 170 of those days, he was triple bunked. There were full lockdowns for five days and partial lockdowns for 82 days.
67These conditions were onerous and it is appropriate to take them into account in determining the period of parole ineligibility.
68I also note that since Mr. Rajaratnam has been in custody he has completed 12 courses of self-improvement, including goal-setting, substance abuse, changing habits, anger management, understanding feelings, and recognizing healthy relationships. I agree with the submissions of defence counsel that this evidence shows a willingness by Mr. Rajaratnam to turn his life around.
H. IMPACT ON THE VICTIMS
69Mr. Tyrell was 38 years old at the time of his death. He was clearly a troubled individual, and he behaved very inappropriately towards Mr. Rajaratnam’s child. However, he certainly did not deserve to die and I recognize what a tragedy this was for those who loved him. His mother and other family members are heartbroken. Mr. Tyrell had a son (now 10 years old), and a stepdaughter (now 16) who described him as the only father she had ever known. These losses are profound. However, virtually every murder case carries with it this kind of toll.
I. CONCLUSIONS
70The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 13 years and submitted the range is from 11 to 15 years. I disagree with that range. The bottom end of the range is clearly 10 years, particularly when there is a unanimous and decisive jury recommendation for 10 years.
71The Crown argues that I should discount the jury recommendation because they were not familiar with Mr. Rajaratnam’s full criminal record and history of violence. I agree that the jury did not know the full extent of Mr. Rajaratnam’s criminal record. However, for at least the six years prior to this offence, Mr. Rajaratnam appears to have made a considerable effort to change. This preceded the birth of his daughter, but was reinforced by his commitment to being a good father. I also note the courses Mr. Rajaratnam has taken in jail as a continuing commitment to change his circumstances.
72Also, the Crown’s position is predicated on the rejection of the threats Mr. Rajaratnam alleged were made by Mr. Tyrell. I believed Mr. Rajaratnam’s evidence about those threats. In my view, those threats and Mr. Rajaratnam’s childhood trauma provide a context that makes this less of an unprovoked savage attack on an innocent man. Rather, it is more like conduct approaching what would be considered provocation, but falling just short of it.
73In addition, I find some credit is due for the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, although this is not a substantial factor in my decision.
74I have reviewed the case law submitted by both parties. Nothing is on all fours. Having considered that case law and the circumstances of this case, in my view the appropriate period of parole ineligibility is 10 years. I emphasize that this is only the point at which Mr. Rajaratnam becomes eligible to be considered. Whether it is appropriate for him to be released at that point will be determined by the Parole Board.
75There will also be a DNA Order and a s. 109 order for life.
____________________________
MOLLOY J.
Released: June 20, 2025
Footnotes
- For my rulings on those motions see: R. v. Rajaratnam #1, 2025 ONSC 358.
- Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 745(c).
- Criminal Code, s. 455.4.
- R. v. Shropshire, 1995 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 at para. 27.
- R. v. Lamba, 2024 ONCA 778 at para. 25.
- R. v. Cromwell, 2019 NSSC 144, at paras. 28-29.
- R. v. Oland, 2016 NBQB 43 at para. 35.
- R. v. Salifu, 2019 ONSC 483.
- Ibid at para. 57.
- R. v. Ledesma, 2019 ABQB 204.
- Ibid at para. 108.
- R. v. Pandurevic, 2013 ONSC 3323 at para. 24.
- Criminal Code, s. 724(2)
- R. v. Gardiner (1982), 1982 30 (SCC), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 477.
- R. v. Lamba, 2024 ONCA 778 at paras. 32-34. See also, R. v. Chang, 2021 ONSC 7954 at paras.43-49.