Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: FS-23-35307
Date: 2025-05-14

Between:
Susannah Spencer Hutton, Applicant
and
Kenneth Wakely, Respondent

Applicant Counsel: Karen Ballantyne
Respondent Counsel: Self-represented

Heard: April 28–30, 2025

Reasons for Judgment
Carissima Mathen

Introduction

[1] This trial is about financial issues and parenting. The parties, Susannah and Kenneth (“Kent”), cohabited for several years before separating in 2012. They never married. Their seventeen-year-old son, K., lives with severe mental health challenges that have contributed to violent incidents against both of his parents.

[2] The Applicant, Susannah, commenced this Application in 2023. At trial, she sought:

a. Primary parenting of K., with parenting time for Kent as K. wishes;
b. Occupancy rent for the couple’s formerly shared home located at 778 Shaw Street in Toronto;
c. Table child support for two years while K. completes high school. Support is to be calculated on an imputed income to Kent of $70,000 per annum, and paid out in a lump sum;
d. Fines of approximately $20,000;
e. Costs.
f. Any amounts owing from Kent shall be deducted from the sale of the parties’ jointly owned property at 778 Shaw Street in Toronto.

[3] The Bank of Montreal (BMO) has obtained a writ of possession for 778 Shaw Street. It advised the parties just before this trial that it had forwarded the writ to the sheriff for enforcement. The house therefore is virtually certain to be sold.

[4] At an exit pre-trial conference held on April 14, 2025, the parties agreed to the following:

a. There will be no order regarding decision-making for K. The issue may be revisited if a medical professional determines that K. is incapable of making his own decisions.
b. K. will require extra time to finish high school and will therefore likely require child support beyond his 18th birthday.
c. Kent’s income is imputed at $70,000.

[5] Contrary to the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form completed on October 28, 2024, Kent had not filed any trial materials. Justice Horkins granted Kent leave to bring a trial motion to extend time to file his materials. She also granted Susannah leave to bring a motion to strike Kent’s pleadings.

[6] On the first day of trial Kent had still not filed any materials but sent counsel a document brief the previous evening. After hearing both motions, I granted Susannah’s motion in part, striking Kent’s pleadings on all issues except parenting. I dismissed Kent’s motion for additional time to file his pleadings.

[7] I suggested bifurcating the trial, but on request I permitted Ms. Ballantyne to examine Susannah on all issues. Kent cross-examined Susannah about parenting. Kent then gave his own evidence. At times, there was some overlap in how the issues were discussed, especially parenting and child support. I advised the parties that, in these reasons, I would only consider Kent’s submissions on the issue of parenting. In his closing and in his draft order, Kent sought an order for shared and equal parenting. He also sought an order that occupation rent not be paid. Given that I struck his financial pleadings, he did not have standing to ask for the latter relief.

Issues and Brief Conclusion

[8] The issues for trial are:

a. Who should have primary parenting of K.?
b. Is Susannah entitled to occupation rent?
c. What child support is owing, and how should it be paid?
d. What, if anything, does Kent owe Susannah in prior costs and fines?
e. Does either party owe costs?

[9] I have decided that Susannah shall have primary parenting of K. Kent may have parenting time with K. as K. wishes. Child support shall be payable in a lump sum based on Kent’s imputed income of $70,000, but the amount shall be held in trust to be paid out periodically. Susannah is entitled to occupation rent of $45,789.50. Kent owes Susannah a fine of $20,000; prior costs of $8,904.30; and costs for this trial of $52,300.68. All these amounts shall be paid out of the proceeds of sale of 778 Shaw Street. A review of child support shall occur after July 1, 2027. At the Applicant’s request, this review shall proceed on a de novo basis.

Motion Decisions

[10] As noted above, the trial began with two motions – one by Kent for an extension of time to file materials, and one by Susannah to strike Kent’s pleadings. I delivered my reasons orally.

[11] Briefly, I found Kent in breach of the following:

a. Three costs awards, which Kent admits he has not paid:
i. $6,904 awarded by Justice Vella on June 14, 2024;
ii. $1,500 awarded by Justice Kraft on September 26, 2024;
iii. $500 awarded by Justice Horkins on April 14, 2025
b. A daily penalty imposed by Justice Kraft on September 26, 2024, if Kent failed to produce financial disclosure within 14 days. I am satisfied that Kent did not provide all of the required disclosure and has not paid anything towards the resulting fine.
c. An Order by Justice Vella dated December 11, 2023, with regard to partition and sale of the matrimonial home. Kent appealed that decision to the Divisional Court which transferred the proceeding to the Court of Appeal on January 30, 2024. Kent never perfected the appeal, he says, because he was waiting to hear from the Court of Appeal. On October 10, 2024, he filed an amended notice of motion to the Court of Appeal. Based on an email from the Court of Appeal, which Kent did not dispute, I am persuaded that as of October 24, 2024, the Court had no record of any filing. At the time of this trial, which is seven months after Kent filed the amended notice, and fifteen months after the appeal was first transferred, there is no evidence that any appeal of the Vella order is ongoing. The home should have been sold long before this trial.

[12] I determined that it was not appropriate to exercise my discretion to avoid a sanction on Kent. I acknowledge that Kent deposes to severe mental health challenges following a series of physical assaults by his son. I acknowledge that Kent suffered depression in the past. At the same time, I found that Kent must take some responsibility for his chronic disregard of court orders and of the Family Law Rules.

[13] With respect to the appropriate remedy, I said the following:

I have decided that the only appropriate course is to strike Kent’s pleadings on all financial issues. We are literally in the trial process. No lesser sanction is available. I am not persuaded that it is consistent with the Family Law Rules’ primary objective – to treat cases justly – that Kent be permitted to participate fully in this trial. I note that the actual financial issues are narrow, limited to child support, occupation rent, fines and costs. Even if I thought that Kent deserves yet another chance, I am not persuaded that he would actually take advantage of it in a way that enabled this court to decide these issues. He served the documents upon which he intends to rely at 5 pm the evening before the first day of the trial. None of the materials have been provided to the court yet. It is unclear how this matter could proceed without further delay. That would not only be prejudicial and harmful to Susannah, it would be an intolerable result for the administration of justice.

I am not persuaded that Kent should be barred from some participation on the issue of parenting. Susannah argues that the issue is, essentially, moot because their son is not currently living with Kent and will decide his own visits. I disagree. The parties’ son appears to have severe mental health challenges. Both of his parents have been involved with and affected by these challenges. I am not persuaded that it would promote the son’s interests to completely exclude his father from participating in a trial on parenting.

[14] With respect to Kent’s motion, I decided as follows:

Moving to Kent’s request for an extension of time, I find that such an order is not appropriate. His failure to comply with the rules regarding filing materials is consistent with his ongoing pattern of diffident participation in this proceeding. I find it more likely than not that his late materials, offered to opposing counsel yesterday, are of limited relevance to the issues before the Court. He may give viva voce evidence, and cross examine Susannah to assist the court in arriving at a parenting decision that promotes the best interests of the parties’ son.

Analysis

Issue One: Who should have primary parenting of K.?

The Law

[16] Since the parties are not married, the applicable statute is the Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12. Section 24 of that Act states that, in making a parenting order, the court “shall only take into account the best interests of the child” considering “all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”.

[17] Factors relating to the circumstances of a child include:

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things ... the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, … and
(k) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child. 2020, c. 25, Sched. 1, s. 6.

[18] In determining what is in a child’s best interests, the court “shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child”: section 24(5).

[19] The court “shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child”: section 24(6).

[20] When determining a parenting schedule, there is no presumption in favour of the status quo: Gibbons v. Byrne, 2024 ONSC 3898, para 24, citing Gordon v. Goertz, para 44.

Findings and Conclusions

[21] The parties testified about their relationship prior to their separation a dozen years ago. This evidence included allegations of abuse against each other, which they both said had a negative impact on K.

[22] Given the historical nature of these allegations, the fact that neither parent seeks to bar the other from visits with K., and the short duration of any parenting order, I find that it is not necessary to make findings of fact about whether the parties’ prior relationship was marked by family violence. I am persuaded that the relationship was at times highly fraught. I note that the parties treated each other respectfully in the court proceedings. Neither appeared to fear the other.

[23] K. will turn 18 in November 2025. His parents agree that he can make his own decisions. As a result, any parenting order will only be in effect for 6 months.

[24] His parents do not dispute that K. suffers from numerous mental health challenges. This includes several periods of hospitalization. Given the sensitive nature of this information and the fact that K. is almost 18, it is not necessary to delve into it in detail.

[25] I find that the most important factors to consider are K.’s own views and preferences; and his parents’ ability to care for him.

[26] K.’s residence has shifted between his parents’ homes over the years. The parties have never had a court-ordered parenting schedule. I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that, due to a variety of factors, the parties have at times had shared parenting, and at times, respectively, primary parenting. The most significant recent factor affecting Kent’s parenting is K.’s serious physical aggression against him beginning in May 2024. I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that K. attacked his father multiple times, including on one occasion with a metal broom handle.

[27] As a result of those attacks, in November of 2024 K. went to live with Susannah. Since then, he has had occasional visits with Kent. Quite understandably, Kent insists that before returning to his home to stay, K. must follow a course of treatment and counselling, including regularly taking prescribed medication. At the time of trial, because K. was not doing those things, he was still living with Susannah.

[28] Kent earnestly believes that K. eventually will follow the conditions for return to his home. I acknowledge that K. may wish to return to Kent’s home. At present, however, K. resides with his mother. I accept Susannah’s testimony that she and K. have an open and honest relationship. For clarity, K. has also been physically aggressive towards her.

[29] Another relevant factor is Kent’s ability to care for K. BMO has a writ of possession against Kent’s current residence, 778 Shaw Street. On April 25, 2025, BMO advised the parties that it intends to sell the property soon. It asked Kent to vacate the property by May 30. At trial, Kent was hazy about his plans for the future. It is apparent that Kent has just started to process this news. I acknowledge that Kent finds the prospect of vacating 778 Shaw Street very painful because he regards it as a source of stability for K.

[30] On a practical level, I am persuaded that K. will continue to live with Susannah for the next six months. In his motion materials, Kent deposed to having a very poor credit rating. This makes it unclear what sort of alternate accommodations he can afford. I note that this is a primary reason why Kent resisted the sale of the home in the first place. It is not at all certain that Kent will be able to secure appropriate accommodations for himself and K. in the near term.

[31] I therefore find it appropriate to award primary parenting to Susannah. Kent shall have parenting time with K. as the parties and K. decide.

Issue Two: Does Kent owe occupation rent?

The Law

[32] An order for occupation rent is a discretionary remedy. In considering whether to make it, the court may consider the following factors:

a. the timing of the non-resident spouse’s claim for occupation rent;
b. the circumstances under which the non-resident spouse left the home;
c. the duration of the exclusive occupancy;
d. whether the non-occupying spouse moved for the sale of the home;
e. the inability of the non-resident spouse to realize on their equity in the property;
f. any financial hardship experienced by the non-resident spouse as a result of being deprived of their equity in the property;
g. any reasonable credits to be set off against occupation rent for expenses associated with the home;
h. the conduct of both spouses, including any failure to pay support;
i. whether children resided with the occupying spouse and, if so, whether the non-occupying spouse paid child support;
j. whether the occupying spouse has increased or decreased the selling value of the property; and
k. any other competing financial claims in the litigation.

See Higgins v. Higgins; Griffiths v. Zambosco.

[33] The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that while an order for occupation rent should be reasonable, it need not be exceptional: Non Chhom v. Green, 2023 ONCA 692, para 8. Such an award remains discretionary: Non Chhom, para 11.

Findings and Conclusions

[34] Here, Susannah claims occupation rent owing from February 1, 2024 – one day after the date by which Justice Vella ordered the parties to make efforts towards a sale. The parties did not begin that process because Kent appealed the order. However, after the Divisional Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeal on January 30, 2024, Kent did not perfect the appeal. Given that Kent did not pursue the appeal in a timely fashion, it is appropriate to assess occupation rent from February 1, 2024.

[35] The home at 778 Shaw Street includes a basement apartment. Susannah filed an expert report, by Jim Parthenis, that estimates the market rental value of both units. At the exit pre-trial conference on April 14, 2025, Kent accepted Mr. Parthenis’ credentials but wanted to cross-examine him. Because the issue of occupation rent proceeded on an uncontested basis, I decided that Mr. Parthenis did not need to testify. Having reviewed the report, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that it provides a reasonable analysis of market conditions and arrives at a fair estimation of the rents that could have been realized, namely:

a. Main unit (2024): $4,495 x 11 months = $49,445
b. Main unit (2025): $4,607 x 4 months = $18,428
c. Basement unit (2024): $1,570 x 11 months = $17,270
d. Basement unit (2025): $1,609 x 4 months = $6,436

[36] Given that Susannah’s claim only dates to February 1, 2024, I am satisfied that there was no undue delay in bringing the claim. Furthermore, Susannah gave notice to Kent that she wanted the property sold as early as June 14, 2023.

[37] There is no evidence that, during the period for which occupation rent is being sought, Kent incurred any carrying costs for the home:

a. The home has a $150,000 line of credit with BMO. In July 2024, BMO obtained a writ of possession because the parties failed to maintain payments. I am satisfied that Susannah made efforts, on various occasions, to make payments as she was able. There is no evidence that Kent did. There is no other mortgage.
b. I find it more likely than not that Kent did not pay property taxes during this period.

[38] Therefore, I find on a balance of probabilities that there were no amounts paid by Kent that should be offset against the occupation rent.

[39] I am satisfied that Kent’s refusal to participate in the sale of the home led to BMO obtaining a writ of possession. Kent did not fulfil his obligations as a joint owner. The fact that BMO now enjoys a power of sale has injured Susannah’s interest in the home.

[40] The final factor I will consider is whether any children of the relationship lived with the occupying spouse, and whether any child support was paid by the non-occupying spouse. During part of the relevant period, K. was living in the home with Kent. However, from November 2024, K. lived with Susannah. It appears that neither party paid child support. Susannah is not seeking child support arrears and Kent’s pleadings on financial issues have been struck. Therefore, there is no evidence about what child support might have been owing. However, given that I am satisfied that K. lived with both parents during this period, I do not find the issue of child support to be relevant.

[41] In conclusion, I find that Susannah is owed occupation rent of $45,789.50, which is half of the total appraised rental value of the property between February 1, 2024, and April 30, 2025.

Issue Three: Does either party owe child support and how should that be paid?

[42] Susannah’s claim for ongoing child support raises the following questions:

a. What child support, if any, should be ordered?
b. What section 7 expenses, if any, should be ordered?
c. Is it appropriate to order any support as a lump sum payment?

What child support, if any, should be ordered?

[43] At the exit pre-trial conference on April 14, 2025, the parties agreed that K.’s “mental health challenges have delayed his completion of high school, and he is not expected to graduate until spring of 2027. It is agreed that child support is a live issue going forward. The issue is - who should pay child support and whether a lump sum should be ordered.”

[44] The parties also agreed to impute an income to Kent of $70,000. That is the income shown on Kent's latest tax returns which are from 2022.

[45] As I have ordered that K.’s primary residence shall remain with Susannah, I find that Kent owes table child support for so long as that is the case. There is no evidence to warrant a departure from the principle that child support should be allocated according to the Child Support Guidelines, O Reg 391/97.

[46] Susannah acknowledges that she receives a tax benefit because of K.’s disability. However, she also testified that K. has more expensive needs than other children. For example, he wears only natural fabric clothing and follows a restrictive diet consisting of significant amounts of meat and butter. In addition, Kent failed to provide financial disclosure or an updated sworn financial statement in time for trial. I note that the materials he sought to admit do not include his 2023 tax return. Accordingly, the court cannot determine whether an adjustment to monthly child support is appropriate.

[47] Therefore, Kent will pay table child support of $654 a month.

[48] The parties agree that K. is very unlikely to finish high school before 2027, and that he continues to have significant mental challenges. I am persuaded on a balance of probabilities that K. will be unable to withdraw from his parent’s support for some time after he turns 18 on November 3, 2025. In making this finding, I rely on section 31(1)(b) and (c) of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3:

“(1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who… (b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or (c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.”

[49] I am satisfied that, at least until June 30, 2027, K. meets the definition of a child entitled to support.

[50] Susannah has asked that child support be reviewed on or after July 1, 2027. Since Kent’s pleadings on financial issues have been struck, he would have no standing to participate in such a review. Susannah therefore asks that the review proceed de novo. I agree that this is appropriate. It will be important for the court to have up to date information from Kent, if possible. For clarity, Kent’s ability to participate in any such review does not include the ability to seek retroactive adjustments to this Order.

What section 7 expenses, if any, should be ordered?

[51] Under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court may provide for an amount to cover certain expenses, taking into account the following: the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the parents and those of the child and to the spending pattern of the parents in respect of the child during cohabitation.

[52] Section 7 expenses are those additional costs of raising a child that are not incorporated into table child support: Ostapchuk v. Ostapchuk, para 13.

[53] The expense categories under section 7(1) include:

a. childcare expenses incurred as a result of employment, illness, or disability;
b. medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to a child;
c. uninsured health-related expenses that exceed $100;
d. extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or other educational programs;
e. post-secondary education; and
f. extraordinary expenses for extra-curricular activities.

[54] For the purposes of clauses (d) and (f), above, whether an expense is “extraordinary” is determined, inter alia, by considering the following: the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the requesting parent; the nature and number of educational programs and extracurricular activities; any special needs and talents of the child; the overall cost; and any other similar factors that the court considers relevant: Child Support Guidelines, s. 7(1.1).

[55] Susannah gave evidence that she expects K. to have the following special expenses:

a. Behaviour therapy @ $200 per session, 1-2 sessions per week. 6 sessions x $200 = $1,200 per month. Susannah states that the first few months of therapy are covered.
b. Tutoring @ $50 per session, 1 session per week. 4 sessions x $50 = $200 per month.
c. Piano lessons @ $75 per session, 1 session per week. 4 sessions x $75 = $300 per month.
d. Dentist @ $300 per annum. $300/12 = $25 per month.
e. Eyecare @ $200-$300 per annum. $250/12 = $21 per month.

[56] I am satisfied that: behaviour therapy is a necessary expense incurred because of disability; tutoring is eligible both as an incidence of K.’s disability as well as for secondary school education; and dental and vision care are uninsured health expenses that exceed $100. While the piano lessons are somewhat of a closer call, I am persuaded that they count as a special and extraordinary extra-curricular expense. Piano is a long-standing activity, and I am satisfied from Susannah’s sworn financial statement that she incurs very great expenses caring for K. overall. There is no persuasive evidence that Kent has contributed in a meaningful way to the majority of K.’s expenses. In the circumstances, therefore, I find that Susannah’s listed expenses are all eligible under section 7.

[57] Together, the eligible section 7 expenses amount to $1,746 per month, or $20,952 per annum. Susannah has provided evidence that her income is $120,000 per year. Weighed against Kent’s annual imputed income of $70,000, Susannah’s share of section 7 expenses would be $1,100 (63%) and Kent’s share would be $646 (37%). Susannah acknowledges that “some of these expenses are speculative, she may obtain some health insurance coverage through her employer in future and she is receiving a disability benefit.” She therefore suggests reducing the amount payable by Kent to $500, which is a reduction of 23%.

[58] While the amount of section 7 expenses is high compared to Kent’s monthly child support, I find that the total amount of child support is warranted. K. has significant challenges and correspondingly higher expenses. Kent’s income is uncertain at the present time. There is a possibility that his actual income was higher in 2023.

[59] In addition, the order only sets section 7 expenses until June 30, 2027, after which support must be reviewed.

[60] Having regard to the evidence led and the history of this case, I am persuaded on a balance of probabilities that Susannah has established reasonable section 7 expenses, and Kent’s contribution to them should be $500 per month.

How should the support be paid?

[61] Susannah asks for child support in a lump sum payment of $30,004, as permitted under section 34 of the Family Law Act.

[62] Lump sum support is appropriate where there is a real risk that a payor will not comply with an order for ongoing support: Cirota v. Cirota, 2024 ONSC 4117; K. v. B., 2022 ONSC 7181; Makeeva v. Makeev, 2021 ONCA 232, para 11; Milutinovic v. Milutinovic, 2018 ONSC 4310, para 102.

[63] Unfortunately, Kent does not comply with court orders. He was first ordered to provide financial disclosure at a case conference on November 20, 2023. He received several court-ordered extensions for this basic obligation. Finally, on September 26, 2024, Justice Kraft said Kent would have to pay a daily fine of $100 if he did not complete disclosure within 14 days. He did not. In addition, Kent filed no materials for this trial until his motion to extend time on April 22, 2025. He served but did not file a document brief on April 27, 2025. Kent also engaged in protracted litigation of Justice Vella’s December 2023 order to sell the home but failed to perfect an appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

[64] During this time, I am satisfied, Kent also failed to maintain 778 Shaw Street in good standing with its creditor, BMO.

[65] Susannah is asking for any financial award, including support, to be paid out of the proceeds of sale of 778 Shaw Street. This will ensure that she gets the money owing to her. In the circumstances of the case, I find this request justified and therefore will order child support as a lump sum.

[66] However, because the child support award is entirely prospective, I am not prepared to assume that K. will live primarily with Susannah over the next two years. The evidence shows that K. has had a somewhat peripatetic residence. Should K. return to live with Kent, the child support amount might no longer be appropriate.

[67] Therefore, I find that appropriately balancing predictability for Susannah and K., and fairness for Kent, requires that $30,004 from the proceeds of sale of 778 Shaw Street be held in trust by Susannah’s solicitor of record. The amount held in trust shall be dispensed to her on a monthly or quarterly basis on account of child support.

Issue Four: Does Kent owe fines and prior costs?

[68] I am satisfied that Kent owes both fines and prior cost awards.

[69] First, on account of Kent’s prior failure to comply with financial disclosure orders, Justice Kraft made an order on September 26, 2024, that, should Kent fail to provide complete financial disclosure within 14 days, he would be subject to a $100 daily fine. While Kent did provide some disclosure, I am satisfied that he did not include his 2023 tax return. During his motion at the beginning of trial, Kent stated that he was advised by CRA that it would not provide an assessment until he had submitted prior outstanding tax returns. There is no independent evidence of this information. It was Kent’s responsibility to either comply with the past orders or provide grounds to assess his failure to do so. He did neither. Therefore, I accept that he not only owes the daily penalty set by Justice Kraft, but he has failed to pay it. There are two hundred days between October 10, 2024, and the first day of trial, April 28, 2025. Kent therefore owes Susannah $20,000.

[70] Second, Kent is in breach of three cost awards:

a. Justice Vella ($6,904.30 on June 14, 2024)
b. Justice Kraft ($1,500 on September 26, 2024)
c. Justice Horkins ($500 on April 14, 2025)

[71] Kent has made no efforts towards paying these awards. Kent is liable to pay all of the outstanding fines and cost awards. They shall be paid out of the proceeds of sale of 778 Shaw Street.

Issue Five: Does either party owe costs?

[72] Susannah was almost entirely successful at this trial. Kent’s pleadings on financial issues were struck and his participation on the questioning of parenting, while sincere, did not affect the outcome. This trial was unnecessary. I therefore award Susannah her full costs of $52,300.68.

Order

[73] In conclusion, I make the following order:

a. The Respondent’s pleadings, save for parenting, are struck.
b. The Respondent’s motion for an extension of time to file his materials is dismissed.
c. The parties’ son, K.H.W., born [redacted] (“K.”), shall have his primary residence with the Applicant. The Respondent shall have parenting time with K. as agreed by the parties and K. from time to time.
d. The Respondent shall pay lump sum prospective child support of $30,004 for K., calculated as follows:
i. Table child support of $654 for the period from May 1, 2025, to June 30, 2027 ($654 x 24 months = $17,004), based on an imputed income of $70,000.
ii. $500 per month x 26 months = $13,000, which represents the Respondent’s share of K.’s estimated special expenses (inclusive of therapy, tutoring and medical/dental expenses not covered under insurance) for the period from May 1, 2025, to June 30, 2027.
iii. Child support for K. shall be reviewed as of July 1, 2027. The review shall proceed de novo so that the Respondent may participate. The Respondent’s participation does not include a right to seek retroactive adjustments of this order.
iv. The lump sum child support shall be paid in trust to the Applicant’s solicitor to be dispensed on a monthly or quarterly basis, as determined by the solicitor.
e. The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant a fine fixed at $20,000, which is $100 x 200 days for the period from October 10, 2024, to April 28, 2025, pursuant to Justice Kraft’s order of September 26, 2024.
f. The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant occupancy rent of $45,790 for the period from February 1, 2024, to April 30, 2025.
g. The net proceeds of sale of 778 Shaw Street, Toronto shall be divided and paid equally between the parties, subject to the following adjustments:
i. The Applicant shall receive half the net proceeds plus $156,998.98, calculated as follows:
1. $30,004 in lump sum child support, pursuant to subparagraph d), above.
2. $20,000 in fines, pursuant to subparagraph e) above.
3. $45,790 in occupancy rent, pursuant to subparagraph (f) above.
4. $6,904.30 for outstanding costs, ordered by Justice Vella on June 14, 2024.
5. $1,500 for outstanding costs, ordered by Justice Kraft on September 26, 2024.
6. $500 for outstanding costs, ordered by Justice Horkins on April 14, 2025.
7. $52,300.64 on account of costs for this trial.
ii. The Respondent shall receive half the net proceeds less $156,998.98.
h. Either party may submit a draft order containing the above provisions for my signature within 14 days.

Carissima Mathen
Released: May 14, 2025