COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-00023356-0000
DATE: 20221219
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ELEFTHERIA IRINE KOURTERIDIS
Applicant
– and –
ELEFTHERIOS BARAS
Respondent
Shelley Quinn & Venessa Sectakof, for the Applicant
No one in attendance
HEARD: November 17, 2022
Brownstone J.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Background
[1] This matter came before me as an uncontested trial. On August 11, 2022, Pollak, J. struck the respondent’s answer on the basis that “the respondent has engaged in a serious and consistent pattern of not complying with court orders” and ordered an uncontested trial. On October 4, 2022 Nakonechny, J. ordered the uncontested trial to proceed on an urgent basis on November 17, 2022. The respondent did not appeal the order of Pollak, J., nor did he seek to vary any of the support orders that were outstanding.
[2] The Applicant Eleftheria Irine "Freda" Kourteridis (“Freda”) and the Respondent Eleftherios "Terry" Baras (“Terry”) were married on May 30, 2010 and separated on May 9, 2021, when Terry was removed from the matrimonial home by police. They are the parents of two children, “D”, born January 19, 2013 and “C”, born May 20, 2016 (together, “the Children”). Freda and the Children have lived in the matrimonial home since the date of separation.
[3] When D was between two-and-a-half and three years old, he was diagnosed with moderate to severe autism. He is non-verbal and has significant special needs, requiring assistance with feeding, dressing, toileting and bathing. He attends the Shining Through Centre daily, where he receives education and therapy, and is engaged in a number of therapies to assist with his level of functioning.
[4] Freda seeks the following relief:
Terry’s income to be imputed at $100,000.00 per annum for support purposes;
Terry to pay Freda a lump sum award for prospective table child support for the Children in the amount of $260,000.00;
Terry to pay Freda a lump sum award for prospective special and extraordinary expenses for the Children in the amount of $300,000.00;
Terry to pay Freda a lump sum award for prospective spousal support in the amount of $174,000.00;
Terry to pay Freda arrears of child and spousal support for the months of September, October and November 2022 in the amount of $7,770.00;
Terry to pay Freda arrears of extraordinary expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $1,926.11;
Terry to pay Freda $28,500.00, which is the appraised value of a vehicle (1969 Chevrolet Camaro) that Terry was ordered to transfer to Freda in May 2022, and did not transfer; and
Terry to pay Freda an equalization payment in the amount of $555,508.71;
An Order vesting Terry’s interest in the property municipally described as 68 Parkview Hill Crescent, Toronto, Ontario, M4B 1P9 (the “Property” or the “Matrimonial Home”) in Freda’s name, and transferring it to Freda for the purpose of the sale of the Property;
The Land Registrar for Land Titles Division of Toronto (No. 64 and No. 66) to accept and register the transfer conveying title to the Property from Terry to Freda solely.
An order dispensing with the need for Terry’s signature on all transfer documents in relation to the Property, and providing Freda the authority to sign any such documents herself on behalf of Terry to reflect the transfer of the Property.
An order giving Freda full carriage of the sale of the Property once the Property has been transferred to Freda, so that she may accept any offer(s) to purchase the Property without the prior written consent of Terry. Freda shall be authorized to act at all stages of the sale of the Property, including but not limited to, listing the home for sale, accepting any offers of purchase of the home, and executing any documentation required to take effect the sale in addition to discharging any and all encumbrances on the home.
Freda to be reimbursed for one half of any costs she incurs for the purpose of preparing the Property for sale, including the cleaning, repair of the home as deemed necessary by Freda or the realtor, to be paid from Terry’s share of the proceeds of sale.
Upon the sale of the Property, the real estate solicitor handling the sale of the Property shall hold these proceeds in trust (after payment of real estate commission, legal fees associated with the sale, and any encumbrances, including the TD Line of Credit Account ending in*924[^1], sale adjustments, and expenses incurred by Freda to renovate and sell the property).
The retroactive and prospective lump sum support amounts shall be paid to Freda from the proceeds from the sale of the Property as noted below.
From the remaining sale proceeds the real estate solicitor shall pay to Freda the following amounts:
a) Lump sum child support $260,000.00
b) Lump sum extraordinary expenses $300,000.00
c) Lump sum spousal support $174,000.00
d) Retroactive child and spousal support and s. 7 expenses $9,696.11
e) Equalization payment $555,508.71
f) Funds for vehicle $28,500.00
g) Costs[^2] $42,148.99
$1,369,853.81
- After paying Freda the total listed above from the sale proceeds, the real estate solicitor will provide the remainder of the funds to the Respondent by certified cheque.
Issues
[5] The following issues must be determined:
What is Terry’s income for the purpose of calculating child support (and, if entitlement is found, spousal support)?
Is child support owing and if so, what is the quantum and duration of support?
What are the special and extraordinary expenses for the Children?
Is Freda entitled to spousal support? If so, what is the quantum and duration of support?
Should there be an order for lump sum payments to satisfy the child and spousal support obligations?
If so, what is the appropriate quantum of the lump sum payments?
Is there an equalization payment owing? If so, to whom is it owed and what is the quantum?
If payments are owing to Freda, should they be enforced by granting a vesting order in respect of title to the Matrimonial Home?
[6] For reasons that follow, I find that an annual income of $100,00.00 per annum should be imputed to Terry; that monthly child support in the amount of $1471.00 is owing from Terry to Freda for 16 years, prospectively; that there are significant special and extraordinary expenses for the Children, as set out below; that Freda has established a claim to compensatory support and is entitled to spousal support in the amount of $1441.00 monthly for a duration of 11 years; that these support orders should be satisfied by a lump sum payment; that Terry owes Freda $518,508.71 by way of equalization, and that the payments should be enforced by granting Freda a vesting order in respect of title to the Matrimonial Home so that it can be sold.
1. What is Terry’s Income for purposes of calculating child support (and, if entitlement is found, spousal support)
[7] Terry has worked for the Greater Toronto Airport Authority since 2014, as a seasonal full-time employee. His income according to the line 150/15000 income reported on his income tax returns and his notices of assessment has been as follows:
2018: $ 95,679.23
2019: $118,425.78
2020: $100,002.99
2021: $ 67,171.00
[8] There is no evidence of Terry’s 2022 income available to the Court. The only evidence before the Court is that Terry is strong and healthy and able to work. His income dropped significantly in the year of separation.
[9] The average of Terry’s last four years of income is $95,319.75. The average of his best three of the last four years, noting that his income dropped in the year of separation, is $104,702.33
[10] On July 5, 2021, Faeita, J. imputed an income to Terry of $100,000.00 and ordered him to pay child support in the table amount of $1471 per month and spousal support of $1,119.00 per month. Child support was paid until the Order of Pollak, J. was made in August 2022 striking Terry’s pleadings. He has made no support payments since that time.
[11] The Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, permit the Court to impute income in certain circumstances. The relevant provision in this case states as follows:
19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:
(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse.
[12] The objectives of the Guidelines are also relevant to this case. Section 1 provides in part as follows:
- The objectives of these Guidelines are
(a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation;…
[13] The evidence supports that, to the degree Terry is earning less than he was pre-separation, he is intentionally underemployed. The amount of income to be imputed cannot be arbitrary; it must have a rational basis: Drygala v Pauli, 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 at para. 44. Based on Terry’s T4 income prior to separation, his health and skill set and ability to earn that income, his having entered into the Consent Order of Faieta, J. regarding s. 7 expenses (discussed below) based on his estimated income of 100,000 in 2021, I find an annual income of $100,000 ought to be imputed to Terry.
2. Is child support owing and if so, what is the quantum and duration of support?
[14] There is no doubt that Terry must pay child support for the Children under the Guidelines. The Children reside with Freda. On the basis of an imputed annual income of $100,000.00, the table amount of child support owing to Freda from Terry for the two Children, in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, is $1471.00 per month. Freda seeks child support for 16 years, until D. is 25 and C. is 22. Given D.’s special needs, I find this to be a reasonable timeline for the provision of child support.
3. What are the special and extraordinary expenses for the Children?
[15] Given D.’s special needs, this is a case where the s. 7 expenses are significant. D. requires several therapies, as he did during the marriage. On September 15, 2021, Faeita, J. made an order on consent of the parties that, “based on his estimated income of $100,000.00”, Terry shall pay 80.6 per cent of the Children’s special and extraordinary expenses, including:
a. Occupational therapy for D.;
b. Speech therapy for D.;
c. Medically necessary appliances for D.;
d. Communication tools for D.:
e. Dental desensitization appointments for D.:
f. Psychotherapy for C.;
g. All other medical expenses for the Children which are not covered by the Respondent's workplace health benefits;
h. Swimming lessons for D. and C.; and
i. Soccer for C.
[16] The evidence before the Court demonstrates that Terry has not paid these expenses regularly or in a timely way. Without Terry’s payments, Freda could not pay for the speech therapy, which is particularly important to D. given his communication challenges. Unfortunately, this resulted in D.’s loss of his spot in the speech therapy program. It is hoped that he will be able to recommence this therapy when funds permit. Freda has used whatever funds she has available to her, including borrowing from her family, to continue to pay for D.’s therapies. However, she was unable to find the funds to pay for the speech therapy in the absence of Terry contributing his share. This is obviously not in D.’s best interests.
[17] The Section 7 expenses, while high, are all reasonable. They are, to a large extent, expenses incurred while the parties lived together. They are of enormous importance to D.’s development, and to C.’s as well, given the challenging circumstances he has faced. None of the expenses is extravagant. In accordance with s. 7, these expenses are necessary in the Children’s best interests and reasonable in relation to the means of the parties and the family’s spending prior to separation. Freda estimates that the actual costs of the section 7 expenses are close to $49,000.00 per year.
4. Is Freda entitled to spousal support? If so, what is the quantum and duration of support?
[18] Freda claims spousal support entitlement on both compensatory and needs-based bases and cites both the Divorce Act RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) and the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3. It is the Divorce Act that applies in this case. Freda claims spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines : The Revised Users Guide by Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada 2016) (“SSAG”) for 13 years, until D. is 22 years of age. While the marriage lasted only 11 years, Freda’s position is that her inability to work will continue until D. is 22, given his special needs and the reality that he will not be able to live independently.
[19] In considering a claim for spousal support, regard should be had to the objectives of a spousal support order. S. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act provides:
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
[20] Until D.’s diagnosis, Freda worked for the Royal Bank of Canada in a series of positions. Before she stopped working, she was earning about $60,000.00 per year. Since D.’s diagnoses at the age of 2.5 or 3 some 6 or 6.5 years ago, Freda has not worked outside the home. She has been responsible for looking after the house and the Children’s well-being.
[21] Freda drives D. to his school every day and picks him up. She is available if the school calls her and she needs to pick him up during the day. She takes him to his therapies and programs. All of this responsibility is on Freda; Terry has not seen the Children for some time. Freda has clearly suffered an economic disadvantage from the marriage and its breakdown due to the roles she played during the marriage with Terry’s agreement. The marriage clearly created a pattern of financial dependency. Since separation, Freda has had to borrow from friends, family, and on credit products to pay the bills.
[22] Economic self-sufficiency is one of the goals of spousal support orders (s. 15(6)(d) of the Divorce Act); however, it is not pre-eminent: Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813. Given D.’s significant needs and Freda’s sole responsibility in ensuring those needs are met, a return to work for Freda at this time, and in the near future, is not feasible.
[23] I agree with the applicant that the commentary in the case of Dupuis v. Desrosiers, 2012 ONCJ 261, [2012] W.D.F.L. 5386, is instructive. In that case, the parties were parents to a severely disabled five-year-old child. The mother had been out of the workforce since the child’s birth and provided extensive care to the child. The child would require care for the rest of her life. The court made the following comments at paras. 23-25:
The applicant has a strong compensatory claim. She has been out of the waged workforce as a stay at home mother for almost five years to care for the parties’ child. Sophie is a young child who has very special needs, requiring attendance at numerous medical and therapeutic appointments with doctors, occupational therapists, speech pathologists, physiotherapists, neurologists and other specialists.
The applicant has been economically disadvantaged by her child care and household responsibilities throughout the parties’ relationship. Further, since the separation, her continued responsibility as the primary caregiver of a young child with very special needs has limited her ability to obtain employment and become self-sufficient.
The applicant has also been financially disadvantaged by the breakdown of the relationship and has compelling need. She is currently living below the poverty line and receiving government assistance. The basis for her entitlement to spousal support is therefore both compensatory and non-compensatory.
[24] A temporary order for spousal support at the high end of the SSAG range was ordered. Given Freda’s strong compensatory claim to spousal support, I am persuaded that support at the high end of the SSAG range is appropriate. The economic consequences of the marriage and its breakdown on Freda and on her ability to support herself have been serious. If she receives spousal support at the high end of the range, she and the Children will have 55.6 per cent of the parties’ net disposable income. Given Freda’s responsibilities, this is a fair result. However, I do not believe the support should continue for longer than the length of the marriage. Accordingly, I find that she is entitled to spousal support of $1441.00/ month for 11 years.
5. Should there be an order for lump sum payments to satisfy the child and spousal support obligations?
Authority to grant lump sum Support
[25] The Court's jurisdiction to grant a lump sum of support for spousal support, is found in section 15.2(1) of the Divorce Act, which provides as follows:
15.2 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.
[26] In respect of child support, the Child Support Guidelines specifically provide:
- The court may require in a child support order that the amount payable under the order be paid in periodic payments, in a lump sum or in a lump sum and periodic payments.
[27] This does not permit an award to be made on top of what would otherwise be payable; it simply permits the court to order, in certain circumstances, that the amount payable be paid by lump sum: Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1998 CanLII 6157 (BC SC), 37 RFL (4th) 422(BC SC). The Court also has jurisdiction to order lump sum payments for section 7 expenses. See Jones v. Iqbal 2022 ONSC 6566 at para. 65.
[28] While most support payments are ordered to be periodically paid, the courts have held that lump sum spousal payments are not limited to very unusual circumstances (Davis v. Crawford 2011 ONCA 294, 332 D.L.R. (4th) 508 at para. 70). A lump sum award may be made to relieve against financial hardship (Davis at para. 61) This is different from a lump sum award being used for the purpose of redistributing assets, which is not permissible (Davis at para. 60). Providing capital to meet an immediate need on the part of a dependent spouse is a reason in favour of providing a lump sum award, as are the need for a clean break between the spouses, and the real prospect that periodic payments will not be made. (Davis, at para. 61; Bulman v. Bulman, 2009 CanLII 63126 (ON SC), 76 RFL (6th) 112 (ON SC) at para. 60). A significant risk of a lump-sum award is that the parties’ means and needs will change over time, which would lead to a variation of a periodic award. (Davis at para. 68)
[29] A lump sum is desirable in this case. Given Terry’s non-compliance with court orders, his arrears, his failure to follow through with the Camaro sale as ordered by the court, and his non-communication regarding financial matters, I have no doubt that Freda would have a very difficult time enforcing any award of periodic payments that may be made. Given D.’s needs, Freda’s situation is unlikely to change, and her needs can be fairly assessed now. The only evidence before the Court is that Terry has had regular employment with the same employer for several years, that he is healthy and able to work, and that at his age, working for the next 13 years will not take him past a normal retirement age.
[30] A lump sum award is also sought for the Children’s s. 7 payments. As counsel noted, were the expenses limited to C.’s soccer and swimming lessons, such a request would not be sought. It is the nature of the extraordinary expenses for D., agreed to by the father as reflected in the consent order of Faeita, J. that engenders the request for the lump sum in this case. Given the extent of the s. 7 expenses in this case and their central importance to the Children’s wellbeing, and Terry’s noncompliance with court orders and non-contact with the Children, this is an appropriate case in which to order a lump sum payment.
6. What is the appropriate quantum of lump sum payments?
[31] Child support of $1471.00 per month for the next 16 years would equal $282,432.00 in a straight calculation. Freda suggests discounting this to an estimated present-day value of $260,000.00. I note that a DivorceMate calculation of a lump sum spousal support, referred to in the paragraph below, applies a discount rate of 1.2%. Applying the same rate to the child support claim yields a payment of just under $257,000.00.
[32] Spousal support at the high end in this case is $1441.00 per month according to the SSAG. This support shall be paid for 11 years. The lump sum calculation for spousal support, using the midpoint of the after-tax cost to Terry and the after-tax benefit to Freda, and applying a discount rate of 1.2%, leads to a lump sum award of just under $149,000.00 for spousal support.
[33] For the purposes of the lump sum calculation, the section 7 expenses have been conservatively estimated at $30,000.00 per year, to last for 10 years, for a total of $300,000. Freda takes the position that her conservative figure for this amount means the sum is already discounted. (she estimates the actual expenses to be closer to $49,000.00 per year; $30,000.00 per year represents about 61% of this figure). Certainly, the expenses will not decrease in amount, and could well increase. I therefore would not apply a discount to this amount and will use the lump sum figure of $300,000.00.
7. Is there an equalization payment owing? If so, to whom is it owed and what is the quantum?
[34] Section 5(1) of the Family Law Act provides:
5 (1) When a divorce is granted or a marriage is declared a nullity, or when the spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them.
[35] The Court had evidence of the parties’ assets on the date of marriage and date of separation. The Court was provided with a comprehensive Net Family Property statement based on the disclosure Freda had received from Terry before his pleadings were struck. Underlying documentation was provided. Freda also obtained an independent appraisal of the Matrimonial Home.
[36] The value of the assets owned by Freda on the valuation date consisted of a rental property she owned, as well as a small LIRA, less some minor debts, for a total of $1,003,906.41. Freda’s liabilities on the valuation date included a mortgage on the rental property, a personal line of credit secured against the rental property, a contingent disposition cost on the rental property, contingent capital gains tax on the rental property, credit card debt, contingent disposition costs for the LIRA, legal fees owing for a human rights complaint made on behalf of her son, loan owing for legal fees for her family law case, for total debts and liabilities of $633,623.05. I have removed a portion of the legal fees for the human rights complaint from the debt, given the timing of that case. Freda’s date of marriage assets comprised a previous rental property, a pension account and some modest savings, for a total of $525,350.00. Debts on the date of marriage were largely mortgages or lines of credit on each party’s property; Freda’s total debt was $413,200.78. Therefore, Freda’s net date of marriage assets were $112,149.22.
[37] Terry’s valuation date assets comprised the matrimonial home, four vehicles, a bank account, and a defined benefit pension plan in the amount of just over $30,000.00 for a total of $1,765,863.68. Terry’s valuation date debts include disposition costs for the matrimonial home, a line of credit secured against the matrimonial home, credit card debt, and contingent disposition costs on his pension, for a total of $162,462.12[^3]. Terry’s date of marriage assets included the previous matrimonial home as well as vehicles and household items, for a total of $575,250.00. He had not provided information about his date of marriage bank accounts prior to his pleadings being struck. Like Freda, his debts on the date of marriage were largely mortgages or lines of credit on his property; his date of marriage debt was $300,000.00. Terry’s net date of marriage assets were $275,250.00. Exclusions were not claimed for either party.
[38] Freda’s net family property therefore is $291,134.14 ($1,003,906.41-$600,623.05-$112,149.22). Terry’s net family property is $1,328,151.56 ($1,765,863.68-$162,462.12-$275,250.00). Therefore, Terry owes Freda an equalization payment of $518,508.71
Other amounts claimed
[39] In addition to the equalization payment and the support claims, Freda seeks the following:
[40] Child support arrears for September, October and November 2022 for a total of $4,413.00; Section 7 expenses arrears in the amount of $1,926.11, and spousal support arrears in the amount of $3,357.00 for the same time period.
[41] She also seeks amounts relating to unpaid costs awards: there are $11,079.65 owing under the order of Pollak, J. dated August 11, 2022 and $3,601.86 owing from an order of Pinto, J. dated June 30, 2022.
[42] The total of these amounts is $24,377.62 and they are all amounts duly owing from Terry to Freda.
[43] Freda also seeks $28,500.00 in respect of Terry’s Camaro. By order dated May 24, 2022, Nakonechny, J. ordered on consent of the parties that Terry was to transfer all ownership of his 1969 Chevrolet Camaro to Freda no later than May 18, 2022. He was required to execute all necessary documentation to do so on a without tax basis. Freda was then free to sell the Camaro, which was valued at $28,500.00.
[44] Terry failed to execute the required documentation and the Camaro was unable to be transferred to Freda. The funds were therefore unavailable to Freda as they ought to have been pursuant to court order. I order them to be paid now.
[45] She also claims her costs of this trial in the amount of $27,467.48, which is supported by a bill of costs. I do not find Terry’s conduct meets the high threshold of bad faith required under Rule 24(8) to warrant a full recovery costs award. I therefore order Terry to pay partial indemnity costs in the amount of $16,500.00, inclusive of HST.
8. If payments are owing to Freda, should they be enforced by granting a vesting order in respect of title to the Matrimonial Home?
[46] The Matrimonial Home is in Terry’s name. It is mortgage-free. The home is the parties’ single largest asset. While Freda would like to stay in the house with the Children, she is aware that this is not feasible. It will have to be sold to fund the parties’ obligations. Currently, Freda has no way of knowing whether there is insurance for the home, or whether property taxes are being paid. She is unable to obtain information about this as she is not on title to the home.
[47] Freda seeks an order vesting the Matrimonial Home in her name, for the sole purpose of selling it to fund the equalization and support payments.
[48] The power of the Court to make a vesting Order is found in the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, and the Family Law Act, as follows:
- A court may by order vest in any person an interest in real or personal property that the court has authority to order be disposed of, encumbered or conveyed
9(1) In an application under section 7, the court may order,…
(d) that, if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order,
(i) property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in a spouse, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years…
34(1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,
(c) requiring that property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in the dependant, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years
[49] The Court has a broad discretion to make vesting orders; the onus is on the person seeking a vesting order to establish that it is appropriate (Lynch v. Segal 2006 CanLII 42240 (ON CA), 277 DLR (4th) 36(ON CA), at para. 32). The payment liability, as well as the amount of the liability, must be established before a vesting order can be made. The vesting order may be made if it is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the payment obligation. (Lynch, at para. 32). This can be established if “the previous conduct of the person obliged to pay, and his or her reasonably anticipated future behaviour, indicate that the payment order will not likely be complied with in the absence of more intrusive provisions” (Lynch, at para. 32). There should also be a reasonable relationship between the amount of the asset sought to be vested and the amount of the liability (Lynch at para. 33).
[50] I agree with Freda’s submissions that based on the facts and the jurisprudence a vesting order should be granted in this case. There is no realistic chance that Freda will receive the monies I have ordered Terry to pay Freda for support, equalization and costs. Terry has repeatedly failed to comply with court orders. He has ceased paying any funds to Freda for spousal or child support. There is no other way for her to obtain the amounts owing to her (Heydari v. Ahmadi, 2019 ONCA 346, at para. 7). Once vested and transferred, the Property shall be sold. Proceeds will be disbursed as set out below.
DISPOSITION
[51] A series of related orders is required in order to effectuate the vesting of the Matrimonial Home, and the sale of the home to fund the payments owing to Freda. Therefore,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 19 OF THE FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The Respondent’s, Eleftherios “Terry” Baras’ income is imputed at $100,000.00 per annum for support purposes.
PURSUANT TO SECTION 15.2(1) OF THE DIVORCE ACT, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant, Eleftheria Irine “Freda” Kourteridis, a lump sum award for prospective table child support in the amount of $257,000.00 for the children of the marriage, D. born January 19, 2013 and C., born May 20, 2016 (the “Children”).
(2) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant, a lump sum award for prospective special and extraordinary expenses in the amount of $300,000.00 for the Children.
(3) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant, a lump sum award for prospective spousal support in the amount of $149,000.00.
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 15.1 AND 15.2 OF THE DIVORCE ACT, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant child and spousal support arrears for the months September, October and November 2022 which totals $7,770.00.
(2) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant arrears of extraordinary expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $1,926.11.
PURSUANT TO SECTION 34(1)(c) OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT
Vehicle
(1) The Respondent, failed to transfer ownership of his 1969 Chevrolet Camaro to the Applicant as he was ordered to do pursuant to the order of Justice Nakonechny dated May 24, 2022. He shall therefore pay to the Applicant the sum of $28,500.00 which is the appraised value of the vehicle.
PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The Respondent owes to the Applicant, an equalization payment in the amount of $518,508.71
PURSUANT TO SECTION 100 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT AND SECTIONS 9(1)(d)(i) and 34(b) OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
Matrimonial Home
(1) The Respondent’s interest in the property municipally described as 68 Parkview Hill Crescent, Toronto, Ontario, M4B 1P9 (the “Property”) shall be vested in the name of the Applicant and shall be transferred to her for the purpose of the sale of the Property.
(2) The Land Registrar for Land Titled Division of Toronto (No. 64 and No. 66) shall accept and register the transfer conveying title to the Property municipality described as 68 Parkview Hill Crescent, Toronto, Ontario, M4B 1P9 from the Respondent to the Applicant solely.
(3) The Respondent’s signature on all transfer documents in relation to 68 Parkview Hill Crescent, Toronto, ON, M4B 1P9 shall be dispensed with and the Applicant shall be permitted to sign any such documents to effect the transfer of the Property.
(4) Once the Property has been transferred to the Applicant, the Applicant shall have full carriage of the sale of the Property, and she may accept any offer(s) to purchase the Property without the prior written consent of the Respondent. The Applicant shall be authorized to act at all stages of the sale of the matrimonial home, including but not limited to, listing the home for sale, accepting any offers of purchase of the home, and executing any documentation required to take effect the sale in addition to discharging any and all encumbrances on the home.
(5) The Applicant shall be reimbursed for one half of any costs she incurs for the purpose of preparing the Property for sale, including the cleaning, repair of the home as deemed necessary by the Applicant or the realtor, to be paid from the Respondent’s share of the proceeds of sale.
(6) Upon the sale of the Property, the real estate solicitor handling the sale of the property shall hold these proceeds in trust (after payment of real estate commission, legal fees associated with the sale, and any encumbrances, including the TD or CIBC Line of Credit Account *924, sale adjustments, and expenses incurred by the Applicant to renovate and sell the property).
(7) The retroactive and prospective lump sum support amounts shall be paid to the Applicant from the proceeds from the sale of the Property as noted below.
(8) From the remaining sale proceeds the real estate solicitor shall pay to the Applicant the following amounts:
Lump sum child support $257,000.00
Lump sum extraordinary expenses $300,000.00
Lump sum spousal support $149,000.00
Retro child and spousal support and s.7 expenses $9,696.11
Equalization payment $518,508.71
Funds for vehicle $28,500.00
Costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act $31,181.51
$1,293,886.33
(9) After paying the Applicant the total listed above from the sale proceeds, the real estate solicitor will provide the remainder of the funds to the Respondent by certified cheque.
(10) In order to ensure that maximum value is achieved for the Property, if a sale for less than the appraised value of the Property is contemplated, Freda shall seek court approval for the sale.
Brownstone J.
Released: December 19, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-00023356-0000
DATE: 20221219
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ELEFTHERIA IRINE FREDA KOURTERIDIS
Applicant
– and –
ELEFTHERIOS BARAS
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
Brownstone J.
Released: December 19, 2022
[^1]: Note the Net Family Property refers to this as a CIBC Line of Credit, secured against the house. As a result, I shall later refer to this as the TD or CIBC line of credit ending in *924. [^2]: These costs comprise $14,681.51 Terry owes to Freda for outstanding costs orders, and $27,467.48 in costs sought for this uncontested trial. [^3]: This figure is slightly lower than that shown on Exhibit 4. This is because, although the value of the matrimonial home on Vday was reduced in accordance with the expert evidence, the disposition costs were not recalculated as a percentage of the lower price. I have done that calculation, which resulted in a difference of $14,000.00 to Terry’s liabilities.