COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00724766-0000
DATE: 20241218
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Uko Abara
Appellant
– and –
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
Self-represented
Andrew Jin, for the Respondent
HEARD: October 8, 2024
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT
Merritt J.
OVERVIEW
[1] This is an appeal pursuant to ss. 50(3) and (4) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) of a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “LAT” or the “Tribunal”) suspending the Appellant’s driver’s licence.
DECISION
[2] The appeal is dismissed for reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[3] The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) suspended the Appellant’s driver’s licence for medical reasons on December 8, 2023 (the “Registrar’s Decision”). The letter advised the Appellant that the suspension was the result of a report indicating that the Appellant had a condition that affected his ability to drive safely, namely “seizure”.
[4] The Registrar’s Decision was based on the receipt of a medical condition report (the “MCR”) from neurologist Dr. Maurice Levitan (the “Neurologist”) pursuant to section 203(2) of the HTA.
[5] The reason listed on the MCR was “other” and “syncope versus seizure”. In the MCR, the Neurologist advised that the reason for the report was:
[P]rolonged attack of loss of consciousness took a very deep breath getting up in the morning has been sleep deprived, sleep study results pending referring physician respirologist was concerned about a possible seizure because unconsciousness lasted 30-40 minutes awaits MRI brain and EEG told to stop driving for now.
[6] The Appellant appealed the Registrar’s Decision to the LAT. Before the LAT, the Appellant testified that this issue all started when he told his respirologist that he “passed out”, meaning that he fell asleep. He said that his respirologist incorrectly understood the Appellant to mean that he lost consciousness. The respirologist referred him for a sleep study, which he did, and referred him to the Neurologist who submitted the MCR relying on the statement of the respirologist. The Neurologist also referred the Appellant for MRI and EEG testing and referred him to a cardiologist. The Appellant stated that he did not suffer from seizures, had never been diagnosed with seizures, there were no test results indicating he suffered from seizures, and he had never had treatment for seizures. The Appellant filed a letter he had written to the Neurologist stating that he had obtained the results of his sleep study, EEG, MRI and cardiology assessments and that they were “unremarkable”. However, the Appellant did not file the actual test results with the LAT.
[7] On March 18, 2024, the LAT denied the Appellant’s appeal of the Registrar’s Decision (the “LAT Appeal”). The Tribunal rejected the Appellant’s version of events, finding his testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable. The Tribunal found that the appellant suffered an episode of significance given that three specialists had been involved in investigating it. The LAT held that the Appellant “suffers from a medical condition, namely prolonged unconsciousness, possible seizure, and that this is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.” Accordingly, the Tribunal declined to reinstate the appellant’s licence “at this time”. The Tribunal noted that the Appellant filed no medical reports or test results and that the only medical evidence it had was the MCR.
[8] On June 17, 2024, the LAT denied the Appellant’s request for a reconsideration of its decision (the “Reconsideration Decision”).
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[9] The Appellant says that his licence has been suspended with no evidence of seizures, no evidence that he has any medical condition, and no medical diagnosis.
[10] The Appellant submits that there was insufficient evidence to support the Registrar’s decision and that the decisions of the Tribunal to uphold the suspension were based on errors of fact and errors of law. The alleged errors include: 1) failing to properly apply the Canadian Council of Motor Transportation Administrators (the “CCMTA”) National Medical Standards; 2) contravening the relevant provisions of the HTA and the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3. Sched. A (“PHIPA”) by publishing and failing to redact the Appellant’s personal health information (the “PHI”) and by allowing the Registrar to disclose the PHI; and 3) conducting its proceedings contrary to the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”) and in a manner that breached procedural fairness. The Appellant also submits that the Tribunal’s proceedings and decisions raise a reasonable apprehension of bias and were made in bad faith.
[11] The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s privacy issues are irrelevant to the outcome of the LAT Appeal, the LAT did not misapprehend the evidence or misapply the law, the proceedings were fair, and the LAT did not err in its Reconsideration Decision.
[12] The Respondent submits that the proceedings below turned on a straightforward factual dispute. The Registrar suspended the Appellant’s driver’s licence after receiving the MCR. At the LAT Appeal, the Appellant gave evidence that this was all a misunderstanding based on his unfortunate choice of words (“passing out”). However, the Appellant did not call any evidence to corroborate his testimony. He did not file any medical evidence, despite filing the letter to the Neurologist claiming that he had such evidence. The Tribunal did not accept the Appellant’s evidence. The Tribunal held: “We find that it is more likely than not that the appellant experienced an episode which required further investigation”.
THE ISSUES
[13] There are five issues as follows:
Did the LAT breach the Appellant’s privacy rights?
Did the LAT make errors of fact or law?
Did the LAT err in its Application of the CCMTA Standards?
Did the LAT breach the provisions of the SPPA or the rules of natural justice?
Did the LAT err in its Reconsideration Decision?
ANALYSIS
Legislative Provisions and Standard of Review
[14] Section 31(a) of the HTA provides:
The purpose of this Part is to protect the public by ensuring that,
(a) the privilege of driving on a highway is granted to, and retained by, only those persons who demonstrate that they are likely to drive safely
[15] Section 14(1) of Regulation 340/94 (the “Regulation”) provides:
(a) An applicant for or a holder of a driver’s licence must not, suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely …
[16] Section 203(2) of the HTA provides:
A [physician] may report to the Registrar a person who is at least 16 years old who, in the opinion of the [physician], has or appears to have a medical condition, functional impairment or visual impairment that may make it dangerous for the person to operate a motor vehicle.
[17] Section 47(1)(b) of the HTA provides that the Registrar may, by order, suspend or cancel a driver’s licence on various grounds or for “any other sufficient reason”.
[18] Section 50(1) of the HTA provides that a person aggrieved by a decision to suspend a driver’s licence may appeal that decision to the Tribunal.
[19] Where the appeal involves a question of medical condition or fitness, section 4(4) of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G requires the appeal panel to include a legally qualified medical practitioner.
[20] Section 50 of the HTA provides as follows:
(3) Every person aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal with respect to a decision of the Minister under subsection 32 (5) for which there is a right of appeal pursuant to a regulation made under clause 32 (14) (n) or an order of the Registrar under clause 47 (1) (b) may, within 30 days after a notice of the decision is sent to the person’s latest address as recorded with the Tribunal, appeal the decision of the Tribunal to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
(4) The judge may confirm, modify or set aside the decision of the Tribunal.
[21] Section 50(3) of the HTA provides for an express statutory appeal and it requires the appellate court to apply appellate standards of review to the administrative decision. For questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation and the scope of the decision maker’s authority, the standard of review is correctness. For questions of fact, the standard of review is palpable and overriding error. For mixed questions of fact and law with no readily extricable legal principle, the standard of review is palpable and overriding error: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at paras. 36-37.
[22] On an appeal, the reasons of the decision maker below are not measured on a standard of perfection, and administrative decision makers are not required to respond to every argument and make and justify explicit findings on all issues: Vavilov, at para. 128; Kucyi v. Kucyi, 2007 ONCA 758, 45 R.F.L. (6th) 1, at para. 22.
Issue 1: Privacy
[23] At the LAT Appeal hearing, the Appellant brought a motion for a confidentiality order (the “Confidentiality Motion”). The Appellant sought to keep the record of the LAT Appeal confidential, an order anonymizing the LAT’s decision, a publication ban and redaction of the Respondent’s submissions. The Respondent took no position on this motion other than opposing the redaction of its submissions. The LAT dismissed the motion with reasons when also dismissing the LAT Appeal.
[24] At the hearing of this appeal, the Respondent again took no position, other than submitting that the dismissal of the Confidentiality Motion is irrelevant to the issue of driving eligibility.
[25] The Appellant submits that Section 204(3) of the HTA prohibits disclosure of his MCR. Section 204(3) provides:
A report made under section 203 or made to the Registrar in good faith with the intention of reporting under that section, is privileged for the information of the Registrar only and shall not be open to public inspection.
[26] There is no evidence that the Registrar allowed the MCR to be made available to the public. Rather, once the Appellant appealed the Registrar’s decision, the MCR and other documents became part of the record before the LAT.
[27] The LAT denied the Appellant’s Confidentiality Motion because it found that the Appellant’s desire for privacy did not outweigh the public interest in openness in the case before it. The LAT also found that even if the Applicant’s personal health information is sensitive, limiting public access to the information was not in the public interest.
[28] The LAT correctly stated that its adjudicative records are generally open to the public and cited Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, 2018 ONSC 2586, 142 O.R. (3d) 266. The LAT also correctly identified that ss. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 60 (the “TARA”) provides that the LAT’s adjudicative records be made available to the public. The LAT’s adjudicative records include the evidence and submissions in the proceeding: TARA, s. 1(2).
[29] The LAT correctly identified the legal test under s. 2(2) of the TARA which provides that the LAT may order that part or all of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if intimate financial or personal matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be publicly available.
[30] The LAT correctly stated that r. 13.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”) is consistent with TARA and allows the LAT to restrict public access to the adjudicative record on the same grounds.
[31] The LAT correctly identified the proper legal test under Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 75, and that the test is discretionary.
[32] The LAT was correct and made no legal errors in identifying and applying the law on the Confidentiality Motion.
[33] The LAT found that the Appellant’s human dignity was not at risk because the Appellant led no evidence that the appeal involved intimate personal matters of such a nature that his interest in avoiding disclosure outweighed the openness principle. The LAT found that there was nothing sensitive about the Appellant or who he is as a person, other than the episode about which his doctors were concerned and the doctor’s concern that he should not drive at that time. There was no evidence before the LAT of stigmatization or subjection to harassment. The LAT found that the information was not sufficiently sensitive to strike at the Appellant’s biographical core.
[34] The Appellant relied on Khan v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 848. I find that Kahn is distinguishable. There, the doctor appealed from the findings and penalty of a discipline tribunal. The exhibits before the tribunal contained personal health information regarding the doctor’s patients. The medical condition of the patients was not directly in issue. Sealing orders regarding confidential patient medical records are routine in cases involving discipline of health professionals: Khan, at para. 13, citing Dr Kadri v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, 2020 ONSC 5296, para. 7.
[35] The LAT made no palpable and overriding errors in its findings of fact or in applying the law to the facts on the Confidentiality Motion.
[36] There is no basis to interfere with the LAT’s exercise of discretion on the Confidentiality Motion.
Issue 2: Errors of Fact and Law
[37] As set out above, the standard of review for errors of fact (or mixed fact and law for which there is no extricable legal principle) is palpable and overriding error, meaning plain to see or obvious: Hydro-Québec v. Matta, 2020 SCC 37, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 595, at para. 33.
[38] The Appellant submits that the LAT misapprehended the evidence in the following ways:
The LAT erred in relying entirely on the MCR and ignoring or discarding his version of events because it was inconsistent with the MCR.
The LAT erred in finding he had a medical condition in the absence of a diagnosis and clinical evidence.
The LAT erred in imputing motives to the Appellant.
The LAT erred in failing to assess whether the MCR was submitted in good faith.
The LAT misapprehended the relevant caselaw.
[39] I find that the LAT did not rely entirely on the MCR. The LAT also considered the Appellant’s testimony that was critical of the Neurologist’s report because it did not specify the date of the episode and did not give a definitive diagnosis. The LAT also considered the admissions made by the Appellant in his testimony and reasonable inferences from the admissions, including that he had undergone testing and had the results but had not provided them (at paras. 45, 48-49 of the LAT Appeal).
[40] The LAT said that “Dr. Levitan’s report, when considered together with the admissions made by the Appellant in his testimony, establishes on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant suffers from prolonged unconsciousness, possible seizure” (at para. 45 of the LAT Appeal).
[41] The LAT found that the Appellant “suffers from a medical condition, namely prolonged unconsciousness, possible seizure” after considering both the medical information filed by the Registrar and the Appellant’s own admissions (at para. 49 of the LAT appeal).
[42] The LAT did not reject the Appellant’s evidence simply because it was inconsistent with the MCR as the Appellant suggests. Rather, the LAT rejected the Appellant’s evidence because it was inconsistent with the admissions which he made concerning all the medical appointments and testing which was recommended by the specialist and done by the Appellant following his initial report to the respirologist. The LAT concluded that, more likely than not, the Appellant experienced an episode that required further investigation (at paras. 43-44 of the LAT Appeal).
[43] It is not the function of this court to “finely parse” reasons regarding credibility findings as they are sometimes difficult to precisely articulate: R. v. Meli, 2024 ONCA 270, at para. 9. The LAT did not make any palpable and overriding error in rejecting the Appellant’s evidence.
[44] The LAT did not err in finding that a conclusive diagnosis is not always required. The LAT did not err in finding the Appellant had a medical condition in the absence of a diagnosis and clinical evidence. The LAT found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant suffers from “prolonged unconsciousness, possible seizure” and specifically referenced the differential diagnosis of syncope or seizure in the MCR. The LAT said: “While what has caused this medical condition remains uncertain, the fact that he suffers it has been established on a balance of probabilities at this time” (at para. 45 of the LAT Appeal).
[45] The Tribunal did not err in rejecting the assertion that a diagnosis was necessary to find the appellant suffered from a “condition” under section 14(1)(a) of the Regulation, particularly considering the circumstances of the case, where there was no firm diagnosis and further testing was needed to understand the medical cause of the loss of consciousness.
[46] The LAT did not err in finding that it is the medical condition itself (prolonged period of unconsciousness), rather than its cause, that presents the risk (at para. 47 of the LAT Appeal). The Regulation refers to the requirement to be free of any “condition” and does not require a “diagnosis”.
[47] The Appellant submits that the LAT erred in imputing motives to him because he reported the episode to his doctor, went to specialists and underwent medical testing. The LAT also made inferences concerning the conduct of the doctors. The LAT noted that the respirologist was sufficiently concerned to order a sleep study and refer the Appellant to a Neurologist, and the Neurologist was sufficiently concerned to order further testing and refer the Appellant to a cardiologist.
[48] The LAT’s inference that the actions taken by the medical specialists pointed to an episode of medical significance was reasonable. To the extent that the LAT inferred that the Appellant’s conduct also suggested that something more than a nap had occurred, that was also a reasonable inference. The LAT did not err in inferring that doctors do not order tests or make referrals without a basis to do so, and in inferring that patients do not generally attend medical appointments and undergo tests for no reason (at para. 44 of the LAT Appeal).
[49] The Appellant also submits that the Respondent had an obligation to request information from the Neurologist but did not provide any authority, either statutory or caselaw, to support this proposition. It is doubtful that the Respondent could obtain medical information without the Appellant’s consent.
[50] The LAT did not make any palpable and overriding errors in its findings of fact based on these inferences. It was entitled to rely on reason, common sense, life experience, and acquired knowledge about human behaviour and logic. The LAT was entitled to consider how people generally behave and how things tend to happen: R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 72-73.
[51] The Appellant submits that the LAT failed to properly assess whether the MCR was submitted in good faith and that s. 204(3) of the HTA required it to do so.
[52] Section 204 of the HTA provides as follows:
(2) No action or other proceeding shall be brought against a prescribed person required or authorized to make a report under section 203 for making such a report or for reporting to the Registrar in good faith with the intention of reporting under that section.
(3) A report made under section 203 or made to the Registrar in good faith with the intention of reporting under that section, is privileged for the information of the Registrar only and shall not be open to public inspection.
[53] These sections do not impose a requirement that the LAT consider whether the MCR was made in good faith. Rather, they protect the person making the report from personal liability and preserve the report’s privileged status.
[54] In any event, the Tribunal considered but rejected the Appellant’s submission that the MCR was made in bad faith, which was based on hearsay evidence in the form of information from various unknown persons on the internet criticizing the Neurologist. The LAT was entitled to reject this evidence as unreliable and irrelevant and made no legal error in doing so.
[55] The Appellant submits that the LAT misapprehended the caselaw which he submitted. The application of caselaw to facts is a question of mixed fact and law: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Restoule, 2024 SCC 27, 494 D.L.R. (4th) 383, at para. 90.
[56] I agree with the Appellant’s submission that administrative tribunals should seek consistency among their decisions; however, in this case, the LAT found that the decisions which the Appellant relied upon were confined to their own facts (Reconsideration Decision at para. 29). The Appellant has not suggested that the LAT made any error in so finding.
[57] I have reviewed the cases the Appellant relied upon and cannot find that the LAT made any error in finding that they are distinguishable. In most, if not all of the caselaw, the drivers submitted medical evidence to support their own evidence that they did not have a medical condition that may make it dangerous for them to operate a motor vehicle.
[58] In his oral submission, the Appellant referred to 8199 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2013 CanLII 51160 (Ont. LAT). In that case, the licence was removed for alcohol dependence. The driver submitted medical evidence that blood alcohol tests were negative, other tests were negative, and the doctor who submitted the report did not witness the seizures and admitted that he erred in the original diagnosis of alcohol dependence. The driver’s “initial seizures” may have been caused by an infection which was diagnosed by a neurologist. The LAT found that the licence removal based on alcohol dependence could not stand.
[59] The Appellant also referred to 10134 v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2016 CanLII 36678 (Ont. LAT) where the reason for suspension was “possible seizure”. The driver submitted medical evidence of investigation of the possibility of seizure and negative test results.
[60] In both of these cases, the driver submitted medical evidence which the LAT accepted.
[61] Unlike the cases relied upon by the Appellant, in this case, the only medical evidence before the LAT was the MCR. The Appellant filed the letter he wrote to the neurologist in which he said he had the results of the sleep study, the MRI, the EEG and cardiology assessment, that the results were “unremarkable… and provided no evidence of a seizure or any other condition”. However, the Appellant failed to file any medical records, including the test results which he said that he had. On this basis alone, the caselaw relied upon by the Appellant was distinguishable.
Issue 3: CCMTA Standards
[62] The Appellant submits that the LAT failed to properly apply the CCMTA Standards. These standards offer detailed information for physicians and licensing authorities to help provide a fair and consistent approach to decision-making.
[63] The Appellants submits that the LAT made no reference to the CCMTA Standards and could not have applied them without the date of his episode.
[64] The MCR indicated that the Appellant had suffered a loss of consciousness for reasons that were unexplained, but the neurologist suspected either syncope or seizure. Until that differential diagnosis was narrowed down, there was no applicable CCMTA Standard for LAT to consider and apply.
[65] At the LAT Appeal, the Appellant did not argue that either the CCMTA Standard for syncope or seizure applied. Rather, he denied that the loss of consciousness occurred at all; he said he merely took a nap. He did not provide the results of the testing he had undergone which may have shed light on which CCMTA Standard might apply.
[66] The LAT did not err in failing to apply the CCMTA Standards because it was not known which standard might apply and, in any event, the CCMTA Standards are not binding. Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation provides that the Registrar may take them into consideration when determining eligibility to drive.
Issue 4: SPPA and Fairness
[67] The Appellant submits that the proceedings were unfair because: 1) the LAT improperly expanded the scope of his appeal; 2) the LAT improperly limited his cross-examination; and 3) the LAT was biased.
[68] The LAT considered all of these arguments in the Reconsideration Decision, and I find that it did not make any reversable errors for the reasons set out under Issue 5 below.
Issue 5: Reconsideration decision
[69] On April 8, 2024, the Appellant asked the Tribunal to reconsider its decision. Vice-Chair Avril A. Farlam dismissed the Appellant’s request for reconsideration. The Appellant’s grounds for reconsideration fall into three main categories: 1) error of law in deciding the Confidentiality Motion; 2) breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness; and 3) failure to consider and respond to the Appellant’s evidence and submissions.
[70] The criteria for granting reconsideration are set out in r. 18.2 of the Rules which provides:
The Tribunal shall not make an order under 18.4(b) unless satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a. The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b. The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c. There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
[71] In its reconsideration of the Confidentiality Motion, the LAT said that the outcome of the motion would not have affected the outcome of appeal. While that may be true, the issue is whether, if legal errors were made, they affected the outcome of the Confidentiality Motion.
[72] Given that in the Reconsideration Decision the LAT found that it did not make any legal or factual errors in the Confidentiality Motion (at para. 21 of the Reconsideration Decision), a finding with which I agree as set out above under Issue 1, it does not matter that the LAT focused on the outcome of the appeal rather than the outcome of the Confidentiality Motion.
[73] The Appellant argued that the Tribunal had unfairly limited his cross-examination, unfairly expanded the scope of the appeal beyond “seizure” per the letter of suspension, and that its conduct demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Tribunal made no errors in rejecting these arguments.
[74] The Appellant submits that the LAT limited his cross-examination of the Respondent’s lawyer on the CCMTA Standards and the Ministry’s internal policies. The Tribunal found that it had simply reminded the Appellant of the time allotted, allowed him to continue and that the Appellant did not request more time. The Tribunal was satisfied that the cross-examination had touched on all relevant points (at paras. 11-12 of Reconsideration Decision).
[75] The Appellant has not pointed to any matters upon which he was prevented from cross-examining the Respondent’s lawyer.
[76] I find that the LAT did not breach the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness with respect to the Appellant’s cross-examination.
[77] With respect to expanding the scope of the appeal beyond “seizure”, at an initial case conference, the Respondent clarified that the condition underpinning the appellant’s suspension was not simply “seizure”, but a “prolonged loss of consciousness and possible seizure but more information is needed”.
[78] This clarification was consistent with the differential diagnosis set out in Dr. Levitan’s MCR. The appellant in turn advised that he had medical evidence that would support his position on the appeal but had not yet decided whether he would provide it.
[79] The Tribunal held that at the initial case conference it clarified that the scope of the appeal included “prolonged unconsciousness” and that this was clearly set out in the order made at the case conference, so that the Appellant had notice of the issue to be argued and the evidence.
[80] The Appellant did not challenge the scope of the appeal at the case conference or at the LAT Appeal. He did not seek an adjournment.
[81] It was the Appellant’s position throughout that he merely took a nap and did not suffer from any seizure, syncope or loss of unconsciousness. The Appellant has not shown that the clarification regarding the scope of the appeal impacted his position, strategy or rights.
[82] In clarifying the scope of the appeal, the Tribunal did not breach the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness.
[83] With respect to the allegation of bias, the Tribunal found that the Appellant was out of time to raise that allegation having not raised it at the hearing and only raising it when requesting a reconsideration. The Tribunal also noted the high threshold for demonstrating adjudicative bias. It identified the correct legal test and made no error in this regard.
[84] The basis for the allegation of bias was a statement alleged to have been made by one member of the Tribunal panel indicating there was a personal relationship with Dr. Levitan. The Request for Reconsideration was decided by the other member of the panel, who clarified that this statement was not made.
[85] Administrative decision makers are strongly presumed to be impartial: Raba v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2015 ONSC 5893, at para. 10. There is a high threshold to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at para. 30.
[86] The Appellant has not filed an affidavit or other evidence to substantiate his claim of bias and has not met the high threshold to establish it.
[87] The Appellant also submits that the LAT refused his request to record its proceedings.
[88] There is no evidence that LAT refused a request to record its proceedings. The Tribunal’s general practice is not to record hearings, although a party may request a recording. However, in this case the Tribunal noted “neither party had requested permission from the Tribunal to record the hearing” (at para. 8 of the LAT Appeal).
[89] The Appellant argued the Tribunal had erred in failing to refer to any of the Tribunal caselaw which the Appellant submitted. The Tribunal made no error in rejecting this argument. The Tribunal was not required to refer to every submission or authority that was put to it: Vavilov, at para. 128. In any event, the Tribunal correctly stated that the cases were non-binding and confined to their own facts.
[90] The Tribunal made no error in declining to address the Appellant’s other arguments in its Reconsideration Decision. The Appellant was attempting to re-argue his case rather than pointing to errors of jurisdiction, law, fact or procedural fairness.
[91] I note that there is no requirement for the Appellant to admit that he suffers from seizures in order to provide medical evidence which he says he has to the Registrar to demonstrate that he does not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.
COSTS
[92] The Appellant submits that the LAT erred in failing to award him costs. There was no basis for an award of costs to the Appellant.
[93] I encourage the parties to agree on costs. If they cannot agree, I will consider brief written submissions. These costs submissions shall not exceed three pages in length (not including any bill of costs or offers to settle). Any party claiming costs shall file their written submissions within ten days of the date of these reasons. Any responding submissions shall be delivered within five days of receipt of the other party’s costs submissions. Any reply to submissions shall be delivered within three days of receipt of responding submissions and shall be no more than three pages long. Costs submissions shall be uploaded to CaseCenter and delivered to me by way of email to my Judicial Assistant.
Merritt J.
Released: December 18, 2024
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00724766-0000
DATE: 20241218
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Uko Abara
Appellant
– and –
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Merritt, J.
Released: December 18, 2024