Court File and Parties

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-1310 DATE: 20240917 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – FAMILY COURT

RE: Nasir Aslam, Applicant AND: Marina Janakovic, Respondent

BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice D.A. Jarvis

COUNSEL: Ravital Khardas, Counsel for the Applicant Kamla Lewis, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: September 11, 2024

Ruling

[1] The applicant father (“the father”) brought an urgent motion on August 28, 2024, for the return of the parties’ child to this jurisdiction and for related parenting relief. On or about August 5, 2024, the respondent mother (“the mother”) left the matrimonial home with the child to live with her parents in the Kitchener/Waterloo area and enrolled him in school there without the father’s consent. After the father brought his motion, several endorsements were made for this matter to be heard on an urgent basis. Directions were given.

[2] For the reasons which follow, the father’s motion is granted.

Background

[3] The parties began cohabiting in July 2016, married on October 13, 2018, and separated either on July 14, 2024 (the mother’s date) or on July 16, 2024 (the father’s date), although they continued to live under the same roof until August 5, 2024. There is one child of the marriage, NA, born August 5, 2017. Both parties agree that although NA was diagnosed with autism, he doesn’t need any assistance with his daily activities (including dressing or feeding) nor requires medication. Since September 2022 NA has been a student at Glen Cedar Public School (“GCPS”) in the Newmarket area. He has an Educational Support Advisor at the school and, for Grade two (which he is entering), he has the same teacher as he had in Grade One. There is no suggestion in the parties’ evidence that NA had not been doing well at school.

[4] The parties dispute when they separated. The mother’s evidence is that the parties separated after the father sexually assaulted her, which he denies. He says that the parties separated after he wrote to her on July 16, 2024, that he wanted a divorce. What the parties do agree upon is that from and after July 16th the father began to live with his mother in a granny suite in the basement to the matrimonial home.

[5] The mother provided no details about the assault in her affidavit except that she was examined and assessed at a local hospital and that the police provided her with a safety plan (DVR). On July 15, 2024, she contacted her psychologist to speak to him about the assault.

[6] On July 16, 20 and 21, 2024 the parties exchanged a series of text messages, none of which referenced an assault. In the July 16th exchange the father told the mother that he wanted a divorce. In a July 20, 2024, text exchange, the mother wrote that she was at the gym and inquired whether the father needed her to pick up anything from Costco. He didn’t. The mother thanked him for updating her (with a smiling emoji) and that she was coming home soon to eat and then going out for a hike while her mother-in-law looked after the children and the father went to a medical appointment (the father had a child from another relationship who would regularly spend time with the parties and NA). In the July 21st exchange, the father told the mother that he was going to take NA to a nearby lake (she was at the gym). She inquired whether he wanted her to join them. There was reference to a claim being made (for what reason never made clear, but not related to these proceedings) with the mother then telling the father to “have a good time with the kids” (thumbs up emoji).

[7] On or around July 30, 2024, the basement flooded, forcing the father and his mother to move upstairs, which the father told the mother he intended to do on August 3, 2024. On August 5, 2024, the mother and her mother-in-law got into a dispute. The mother alleged, and the mother-in-law denied, that the mother was assaulted. The police attended the home on four occasions between 12:30 pm and 5:30 pm. The issues involved the living arrangements in the home. The mother and NA eventually left with the police. She went to her parent’s home in the Kitchener/Waterloo area. No criminal charges were laid.

[8] The father retained a lawyer (Galin) on August 6, 2024. Ms. Galin wrote a letter to the mother urging her to retain a lawyer and inviting her to enter into negotiations about the parties’ separation and emphasizing that parenting arrangements needed to be made urgently.

… we need to address the issues of parenting on an urgent basis. Mr. Aslam would like to have parenting time from Friday, August 16, 2024, to Sunday, August 18, 2024. The start and end time will depend on whether or not you and [NA] will return to the Matrimonial Home. If you are in the Matrimonial Home, then the exchanges will occur at 6PM on Friday and Sunday. If you are residing with your parents in Kitchener, then the exchanges will occur at a midpoint location in Orangeville at 8PM (to miss traffic)…

Regarding the Matrimonial Home, we understand that there has been extensive damage to the basement of the Matrimonial Home as a result of a storm, which will be repaired by the insurance company. However, the main and upper level of the Matrimonial Home are livable. It is our client's position that [NA] needs to return to the Matrimonial Home before the start of the new school year (the sooner the better). [NA] must be enrolled and must attend the same school as he did last year. My client is not agreeable to change [NA]'s school. (bolding added)

It is also important for [NA] to return to the Matrimonial Home to facilitate parenting time between [NA] and his father. Although the Matrimonial Home will need to be sold in the foreseeable future, pending the listing and sale of the Matrimonial Home, it should be occupied by you and [NA]. My client undertakes not to enter the Matrimonial Home while you reside there. (bolding added)

[9] The mother acknowledged receipt of Ms. Galin’s letter by email on August 9, 2024. She mentioned the August 5, 2024, incident and said that moving back to the matrimonial home didn’t “support my safety plan provided to me at the police station on Aug. 7.” She indicated that she was not agreeable to NA returning to his school or to the father’s parenting time requests.

[10] In a further letter dated August 14, 2024, Ms. Galin confirmed that the father was not agreeable to NA living in Kitchener and repeated that the mother could have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. If the mother wasn’t prepared to confirm that she would be returning with the child to Newmarket, she was informed that the father would start legal proceedings and bring an urgent motion.

[11] On August 16, 2024, Ms. Khardas, the lawyer who had taken over carriage of the father’s file from Ms. Galin, wrote to the mother and indicated that if the mother confirmed “that you will not change [NA]’s school, then we can wait another week to allow you time to seek legal advice and retain a lawyer.” The mother indicated that she was “…open to beginning the Mediation process…”

[12] On August 19, 2024, the mother confirmed that “I am planning to go back to Newmarket….” and that she would be retaining a lawyer the next day. The mother’s intention to return to Newmarket and have NA attend his school there was also confirmed by a text she sent later that day to the father “I confirmed with your lawyer that I am not changing [NA]’s school.” There is no mention of any sexual assault in the mother’s email. Rather she referred to a physical assault on her by the father’s mother that was witnessed by NA.

[13] Ms. Khardas confirmed with the mother in an August 20, 2024, email that NA would be returned to Newmarket and attending GCPS. To avoid an urgent motion the father agreed to a parenting time schedule proposed by the mother that would start on September 6, 2024.

[14] The mother retained a lawyer on August 26, 2024 (not Ms. Lewis). She did not return to Newmarket.

[15] On August 28, 2024, the father brought his urgent motion. It was served on the mother’s new lawyer.

[16] To this point in time there is nowhere any evidence about any sexual assault mentioned in any communication between the parties after July 14th, no reference in any communications between lawyers about any assault and no mention that, notwithstanding the police attending the matrimonial home on four occasions on August 5, 2024, and the mother attending the police station on August 7, 2024, that a sexual assault had occurred.

[17] Later in the evening of August 28, 2024, after the mother was served with the father’s urgent motion, he was charged with sexually assaulting her on July 14, 2024.

[18] On August 30, 2024, the mother’s lawyer (Jacob) wrote to Ms. Khardas,

We have not heard back from the judge yet regarding the urgent motion. I have not received any endorsements from you or from Newmarket Court. At this point, it is the Respondent's position that it is in the best interests of the child to be attending any school rather than no school at all, given that Newmarket is 2 hours away from Kitchener and there is a letter of undertaking involved.

My client has no choice but to register the child in Kitchener -the specific school being, St Boniface Catholic Elementary School.

I understand the court does not appreciate when parties utilize self-help measures but, in this matter, given the short timelines and the fact that the incident took place recently, my client had no choice.

[19] The “incident” to which the mother’s lawyer referred was not made clear.

[20] Pursuant to endorsements made on September 4 and 5, 2024 (by this court) and on September 6, 2024 (by Finlayson J.) the mother was ordered to return the child to this jurisdiction and to re-enroll him at his former school. When this matter was argued on September 11th, the parties confirmed that the mother had complied with the Orders and that NA was attending GCPS.

[21] In support of her decision to relocate to the Kitchener/Waterloo area, the mother provided a letter dated September 3, 2024, from a psychotherapist (Dr. Saugh). In a letter to (presumably) the mother’s family doctor, the psychotherapist wrote that the mother had been his “client” for a few months and that she had been “struggling with the current challenges in her marriage.” He recommended that she not return to the matrimonial home. No mention is made of any sexual assault.

Discussion and Analysis

[22] Several principles are engaged by the evidence in this matter. They involve NA’s best interests, family violence, and relocation.

Best Interests and Family Violence

[23] Section 16 of the Divorce Act (“the Act”) mandates the considerations required of the court when dealing with parenting disputes involving children. Subsections (1) to (4) are relevant:

16 (1) The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.

(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

[24] “Family violence” is defined in s 2 of the Act:

Family violence means any conduct, whether or not the conduct constitutes a criminal offence, by a family member towards another family member, that is violent or threatening or that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour or that causes that other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person — and in the case of a child, the direct or indirect exposure to such conduct — and includes

(a) physical abuse, including forced confinement but excluding the use of reasonable force to protect themselves or another person;

(b) sexual abuse;

(c) threats to kill or cause bodily harm to any person;

(d) harassment, including stalking;

(e) the failure to provide the necessaries of life;

(f) psychological abuse;

(g) financial abuse;

(h) threats to kill or harm an animal or damage property; and

(i) the killing or harming of an animal or the damaging of property.

[25] Allegations involving intimate partner violence (IPV) are serious. Study after study has confirmed that as a facet of family (or domestic) violence, IPV reached a crisis point years ago and impacts the physical, sexual and mental health of survivors and has far-reaching impacts on children who are exposed to the trauma of family violence. [2] But assessing IPV and family violence allegations at an interim stage of a court case is often fraught with evidentiary frailties, especially since credibility is so pivotal, and can be so elusive. The seriousness of the allegation must be balanced by appropriate caution at an early stage in a case. In De Rocchis v. De Rocchis, 2024 ONSC 3983, [3] a case in which the mother alleged, and the father denied, repeated physical abuse, Sharma J. highlighted the delicate balancing act faced by the court in an interim motion:

[27] This Court must regularly consider allegations of family violence on an interim motion when, like in this case, there are competing versions of facts. The Legislature has nonetheless directed this Court to consider family violence and its implications even when making parenting orders – temporary or final. The allegations cannot be ignored. This presents challenges when the Court is forced to make interim findings on a contested affidavit record.

[28] Regrettably, there are cases where one parent makes false allegations of abuse, in the hopes of securing an “upper hand” in the family litigation. This is a reprehensible tactic because it can wrongfully deny children time with a parent. Alleged abusers often respond by saying the allegation is false and a mere tactic. When criminal charges are laid against an alleged abuser, that party may be instructed by criminal cases to be careful in responding to abuse allegations in the family proceeding.

[26] In finding that at least some of the family violence alleged by the mother in De Rocchis had likely occurred, Sharma J. observed that “… in the context of a parenting motion, I have to assess the potential for this violence to re-occur and the impact on the children…” in crafting an order. [4]

[27] The father in this case submitted that the psychotherapist’s letter [5] should be approached with caution as it was not in affidavit form, its’ contents hearsay and it was devoid of helpful details such as the date when the mother began consulting him and her complaints (such as an assault, as opposed to marital unhappiness, depression). I agree with the father. In Lucreziano v Lucreziano, 2021 ONSC 4106, [6] Nakonechny J. reflected on the caution that the court must adopt when dealing with untested doctor letters:

[49] Rule 14(19) allows for hearsay only in restricted conditions. The case law identifies potential issues with the admissibility of the doctors’ letters attached to a party’s affidavit. In some cases, courts have rejected unsworn doctor’s letters as inadmissible because the letters contained no evidence as to the doctor’s qualifications and there was no opportunity to cross-examine the doctor. While a doctor’s letter or report will not be excluded solely because it is not in the form of an Affidavit, the Court must be satisfied of the truth of the facts contained in the letter or report. [Citations omitted].

[28] Assuming, without deciding, that Dr. Saugh’s letter is admissible, it leaves out critical information pertinent to, and impacting, the mother’s credibility. The letter provides no specifics about when he was first consulted and why, the history taken, the number of sessions held, diagnosis or prognosis, and is based (not surprisingly) solely on the mother’s self-reporting. The letter advocates for the relocation outcome that the mother is seeking.

[29] In my view, NA’s best interests are served by his continuing to live with his mother in the matrimonial home in Newmarket and continuing to attend GCPS for the foreseeable future. There are a number of reasons for this:

(a) Apart from the mother’s allegation and the fact that the father was charged with sexual assault, there is no evidence about where the assault occurred, what time of day or night or what, if anything, may have precipitated it. In fact, the only evidence with any details about assaultive behaviour involves the father’s mother, not the father, and that assault allegedly occurred on or about August 5, 2024. There is no evidence that the grandmother was charged.

(b) There is no mention in the parties’ text exchanges after July 14, 2024, to any assaultive behaviour involving the father and no reference to any such behaviour in the email exchanges between the mother and the father’s lawyers from and after August 6, 2024.

(c) In her affidavit sworn on September 6, 2024, the mother said (paragraph 11) that the police provided her with a safety plan (DVR). No date is mentioned when that plan was provided but that statement is made in the context of (and in that part of the mother’s affidavit dealing with) the father’s criminal charges. In the mother’s August 9, 2024, email to the father’s lawyer, the mother said that the police drafted a safety plan for her which was provided to her “at the police station on Aug.7.” So were there two such plans?

(d) While Dr. Saugh’s letter quite properly demonstrates his concern about the mother’s well-being and refers to the mother having a “recent traumatic experience” there is, surprisingly, no mention what that experience involved and who was involved in that experience, apart from a general reference to the father’s family. Equally surprising, there is no mention anywhere about the father in the doctor’s letter.

(e) In assessing the potential for violence to reoccur, the father is already subject to a non-contact Order and will not be residing at the matrimonial home. He has no history of involvement with the police. The parenting time arrangements to which the parties agreed in mid-August did not involve any contact between the mother and her mother-in-law and the relief sought by the father in his motion proposed that all exchanges of NA occur at his school.

[30] Without deciding the issue whether the father committed a sexual assault, the evidence in this case, admittedly at a very preliminary stage, is insufficient to conclude that the father was involved in any family violence and supports the view that NA should be living with his mother at the matrimonial home and attending GCPS.

Relocation

[31] Section 16.9(1) of the Act deals with relocation:

16.9 (1) A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to undertake a relocation shall notify, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation and in the form prescribed by the regulations, any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.

[32] Section 16.92 of the Act requires the court to take into account additional “best interests” factors:

16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16 ,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

(2) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider, if the child’s relocation was prohibited, whether the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.

[33] It is common ground that very little to no consideration was given to the relocation provisions of the Act by the mother. Her decision to exercise “self-help” was made without any notice to the father after consulting with her first lawyer and after she had already confirmed that she was returning with Newmarket and that NA would be attending GCPS. That is not the end of the matter though.

[34] There may well be evidence developed that NA’s best interests would be served by relocation, but not at this time. As noted by Laskin J. A. in Reeves v Brand, 2018 ONCA 263 [7] relocation or mobility cases “are among the most difficult cases in family law.” In this case there is a wholly insufficient evidentiary record to consider all the factors needed to determine whether NA should relocate outside of Newmarket and, just as importantly, to change schools particularly when there is no evidence that he was not doing well at CGPS. [8]

Disposition

[35] Accordingly, the following is ordered:

1. NA’s primary residence shall not be moved outside Newmarket without the prior written consent of the parties or court order.
2. NA shall continue to attend Glen Cedar Public School pending further agreement of the parties or court order.
3. The parties shall have equal parenting time with NA according to a 2:2:5:5 schedule to commence forthwith, as follows: a. NA will be in the mother’s care from pickup after school on Monday until Wednesday morning drop off at school; b. NA will be in the father’s care from pickup after school on Wednesday until Friday morning drop off at school; c. The parties shall alternate the weekends from Friday after school until Monday drop off at school with NA being in father’s care starting the weekend from Friday September 6th; and d. All exchanges shall occur at NA’s school.
4. For any exchanges which cannot be accomplished due to the school being closed, exchanges shall be done at a mutually convenient location in Newmarket. Until such time as the father’s release conditions are varied to so permit, a third party known to NA (not the father’s mother) shall attend NA’s exchange. The attending parties shall park their vehicles a few parking spaces apart in the parking lot. NA shall walk from one vehicle to the other. No parent shall approach the other attendees’ vehicle. The attendees shall not communicate. Each may have a third-party present for the exchange.
5. There shall be no video or audio recording of any exchange.
6. There shall be no posting on any social media of anything dealing with this case or which would identify NA.
7. The parties shall communicate with respect to NA using Our Family Wizard or other such comparable application, except in the case of an emergency. All such communications shall be polite, respectful, child focused, and without any abusive, insulting, sarcastic or profane language.
8. Neither party shall criticize or denigrate the other parent in NA’s presence when NA is in their care, nor will they allow third parties to do so. The parties will be held accountable for the conduct of third parties who engage in such behaviour in NA’s presence.
9. The parties are prohibited from discussing with NA, or with a third party in the presence of NA, any issues pertaining to this litigation.

[36] As the successful party, the father is presumptively entitled to costs. He seeks an award ranging between $14,625.02 (full indemnity) to $8,755.01 (partial indemnity at 60% of full indemnity). A detailed Bill of Costs was provided to the court which identified who worked on the file from and after August 14, 2024, the time spent, hourly rates and particulars of the work done. A statement of experience was also provided for Ms. Khardas and her law clerk. The hourly rate for Ms. Khardas was reasonable, that of her clerk (at $200 an hour) somewhat excessive.

[37] The mother also submitted a Bill of Costs. She requested costs ranging between $10,271.20 (full recovery) to partial recovery ($6,163.02, at 60% of full recovery). Like the father’s Bill, the mother’s Bill set out the same categories of information helpful to assessing the value of the legal services provided.

[38] The father made an Offer to Settle dated August 13, 2024. It complied with the formal requirements of Family Law Rule 18 and its terms mirrored the terms of the Order now made. The mother made no Offer.

[39] As is well known, the principles guiding the Court’s exercise of its discretion pursuant to the Rules are well-established. The primary objective, of course, is to enable the Court to deal with cases in a fair and timely manner. Four fundamental purposes are served: (1) to partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (2) to encourage settlement; (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants; [9] and (4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly. [10] Family law litigants must act in a reasonable and cost-effective way: they should, and will, be held accountable for the positions they take in their litigation. [11] As observed by the Court of Appeal in Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840 [12] reasonableness and proportionality frame the exercise of the Court’s discretion; the amount to be awarded is what the “court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful [party]”: Boucher et al v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario. [13]

[40] The mother made no Offer to Settle. She should have. In F. (H.) v H. (M.), 2014 ONCJ 526 [14] Sherr J. observed,

4. …it should be a fundamental step in any family law case to serve at least one offer to settle. Parties and their counsel now have a mandate under subrule 2(4) of the rules, to promote the primary objective of the rules; to deal with cases justly (subrule 2(2)). Dealing with a case justly includes taking steps to save time and expense (subrule 2(3)). Offers to settle play an important role in saving time and expense in a case. They are an important vehicle in promoting settlements, focus the parties and often narrow the issues in dispute.

5. There are consequences in the rules for not making or accepting reasonable offers to settle. Subrule 18 (14) sets out the costs consequences of not accepting an offer to settle that is as good as or better than the final result. When determining the reasonableness of a party’s behaviour in the case, clauses 24 (5) ( b ) and ( c ) of the rules direct the court to examine the reasonableness of any offer made, withdrawn or not accepted. This does not preclude the court from examining the failure of a party to make an offer to settle.

[41] The father’s Bill included no time for argument of the motion. Taking into account the overall time spent, the results obtained and the father’s Offer it is my view that a fair and reasonable award is $11,000 inclusive of HST, of which $5,500 shall be paid in thirty days and the balance payable, without interest, on final disposition of these proceedings.

[42] Two final notes.

[43] The parties should consider the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide to assist them in minimizing conflict between them so that NA can continue to have a meaningful relationship with both his parents and their extended families. A copy of the Guide accompanies the release of this ruling.

[44] The mother indicated in mid-August that she was “open” to mediation. While that could be problematic due to the father’s current criminal charge, the parties should consider a form of dispute resolution tailored to their needs and the circumstances of this case, and so as to avoid the high cost and inevitable delay that pursuing parenting relief through the court will entail.

Justice D.A. Jarvis

Date: September 17, 2024

[1] Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) as am.

[2] Intimate partner violence in Canada, 2018: An Overview (Adam Cotter, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Release date: April 26, 2021); also, Intimate Partner Violence in the Age of the Pandemic: Implications for Courts. National Judicial Institute, November 2020.

[3] 2024 ONSC 3983.

[4] De Rocchis, at para. 33.

[5] The mother used the term “psychologist.”

[6] 2021 ONSC 4106

[7] 2018 ONCA 263, at para. 263.

[8] See, for example the Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712 factors (at para. 37) dealing with school choice as noted in Denomme v. Denomme, 2022 ONSC 5205, at paras 42-43.

[9] Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395.

[10] Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 at para. 10.

[11] Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004 ONCJ 141, 2004 CarswellOnt 3317; Peers v. Poupore, ONCJ 615.

[12] 2018 ONCA 840, at para. 4.

[13] (2004), , 71 O.R. (3d) 291, 48 C.P.C. (5th) 56, 188 O.A.C. 2001, [2001] O.J. No. 2634, 2004 CarswellOnt 521 (Ont. C.A.).

[14] 2014 ONCJ 526.