COURT FILE NO.: FC-21-57041
DATE: 2022-09-13
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Michael Paul Denomme, Applicant
AND:
Faune Marie Denomme, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice D. Piccoli
COUNSEL: Steven Lubczuk/Kaitlin Jagersky for the Applicant
Lorrie Stojni-Kassik, for the Respondent
HEARD: September 8, 2022
ENDORSEMENT
Brief Background
[1] The parties began dating in the spring of 2017. They started living together in November of 2017. They married on September 4, 2019 and separated on September 2, 2021.
[2] There are two children of the marriage: Nash James Denomme, born on May 22, 2018, and Violet Marie Denomme, born on October 13, 2021. Nash is 4 years of age and Violet will turn 2 in October. They are collectively referred to as “the children”.
[3] The respondent (the “mother”) has two children from a previous marriage: Karsten, aged 14, and Kennedy, aged 12.
[4] The applicant (the “father”) does not have any children from previous relationships.
[5] The parties resided together with the four children in the matrimonial home until September 7, 2021 when the mother physically left the home with them. The father did not see the children for 5 or 6 weeks thereafter.
[6] The father is the sole registered owner of the matrimonial home.
[7] The father commenced this litigation on September 28, 2021.
[8] On November 25, 2021, Justice Broad heard an urgent motion in advance of a case conference dealing with parenting time and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. On November 30, 2021, he made an order on an interim without prejudice basis that, among other things, the children be in the care of their parents on a 2-2-3 parenting schedule.
[9] On March 14, 2022, the matter proceeded to a case conference. No substantive order was made on that day. The matter is scheduled for a settlement conference on October 24, 2022.
[10] At the commencement of the motion there were four issues before the court, namely:
What school should the child, Nash, attend?
Should the parenting schedule be varied from 2-2-3 to 2-2-5-5?
Can the father enroll the child, Victoria, in a day care of her choosing? and
Costs.
[11] The court was provided with and read the following documents:
a) Notice of Motion of mother dated June 1, 2022;
b) Affidavits of mother dated June 1, 2022, and July 28, 2022;
c) Notice of Motion of father dated June 9, 2022;
d) Affidavits of father dated June 9, 2022, July 11, 2022 (which attached the Family & Children Services of Waterloo records received on or about June 24, 2022), and August 3, 2022; and
e) Factums of each party.
[12] The evidence led by the parties is conflicting, and neither party was cross-examined on their affidavits. The father has filed and relies upon the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) report dated May 12, 2022. The mother does not accept the OCL report and filed a dispute dated June 24, 2022. Neither party sought to cross-examine the OCL clinician in advance of the motion.
[13] During argument of the motion, the mother indicated that she had no objection to the father registering Violet in a daycare of his choosing on the days that Violet was in his care at his expense. She wished to know where the child was being registered. This order was made on consent and I provided both counsel with my endorsement regarding same.
Position of the parties
[14] The father seeks that the children be in the parties’ care on a 2-2-5-5 rotation. He asserts this is a minor change to the current schedule, but it is the change recommended by OCL. He argues that this schedule would reduce the number of exchanges between the parties and therefore reduce conflict. It would allow the children to be in each parents’ care on the same days each week with the weekends alternating.
[15] The father wants Nash to commence schooling in the jurisdiction where he resides, namely at Westmount Public School for the 2022/2023 academic year and that, for that purpose only, he be granted primary residence.
[16] The mother’s position is that the schedule should remain as set out in the order of Broad J. It is what the children are now accustomed to and it is working well. She has arranged her work schedule around this order and would be devastated to not see the children for long stretches of time. The current schedule allows her to “check in” with the children.
[17] The mother wants Nash to commence his schooling with Baden Public School.
[18] For the reasons that follow, I order that Nash attend school in the jurisdiction where his father resides and that the schedule be 2-2-5-5.
Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) Report
(a) Appointment
[19] The Office of the Children’s lawyer was appointed at the request of the mother and by the order of Justice Broad, dated November 25, 2021. Ms. Barbara Dyszuk, a clinical investigator, was appointed as the OCL investigator under section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act. She held a disclosure meeting on April 11, 2022 and released a 65-page report on May 24, 2022.
[20] The father relies on the report. The mother disputes the report and filed a dispute on June 24, 2022. OCL responded to that dispute on July 20, 2022. The parties made submissions as to whether the court, on an interim motion, should be able to rely on the recommendations of the OCL and, if so, to what extent.
[21] The court is concerned about two submissions made by counsel on behalf of the mother as they relate to the OCL: 1) That father was aware of the outcome of the OCL recommendations before the disclosure meeting alluding to some sort of collusion between the father and the clinician. 2) That the OCL created “this mess” between the parties by making the recommendations it did. These submissions are concerning given that the OCL is considered an independent, neutral third-party and because these serious accusations are not at all substantiated by the evidence. These submissions give the court reason to be concerned that mother fails to understand the impact of her actions.
(b) The Law
[22] Courts are generally cautious about implementing assessment reports or OCL recommendations on an interim basis. It is usually preferable for the status quo to continue until trial, unless there is a “compelling reason” to change the arrangement in the best interests of the child: Benko v. Torok, 2012 ONCJ 401. See also, Grant v. Turgeon, 2000 CanLII 22565 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 970 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para 15 and Daniel v. Henlon, 2018 ONCJ 122.
[23] In general, interim implementation of OCL reports and assessments should be discouraged. There is usually no opportunity at the motions stage to undertake a full analysis and evaluation of all aspects of the report. It is preferable for disputed facts to be resolved in a trial setting with the benefit of cross-examination: Batsinda v. Batsinda 2013 ONSC 7869, per Chappel J., at para. 32 and JLM v. PDAB, 2012 ONSC 4696 per Pazaratz J.
[24] However, there are cases in which a parent has been found to be engaging in potentially alienating behaviour and parenting arrangements have been varied on an interim basis: See, for example, WDC v. JLM, 2012 ONCJ 700 per Tobin J. See also O’Connor v O’Connor, 2017 ONCJ 48 in which the court implemented recommendations of the OCL pending trial.
[25] While many cases refer to the requirement that there be “compelling circumstances” or “exceptional circumstances” to change the status quo pending trial, in Bos v. Bos, 2012 ONSC 3425, at para 26, Mitrow J. listed the following factors for consideration when a court is asked to change temporary parenting arrangements, based on an assessment report, without a finding of “exceptional circumstances:”
(a) How significant is the change that is being proposed as compared to the interim status quo?
(b) What other evidence is before the court to support the change?
(c) Is the court being asked to consider the entire report and recommendations, or only some parts, including statements made by children, or observations made by the assessor?
(d) Are the portions of the report sought to be relied on contentious and if so has either party requested the opportunity to cross-examine the assessor?
[26] There should not be an “inflexible blanket prohibition” against considering any aspect of an assessment report on an interim motion, especially when that is the only independent evidence before the court. Taylor v Clarke, 2017 ONSC 1270, 2017 CarswellOnt 3586.
c) Analysis
[27] In this case,
a) Broad J. in his decision stated: “The disposition of the court will therefore be made on an “interim without prejudice” basis and are not intended to remain in force until trial, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or determined by the court. A request will be made for the scheduling of an early Case Conference on an urgent basis.”;
b) This is to be Nash’s first year of school and, as such, there is no status quo;
c) The change requested to the parenting schedule is not significant; the children will remain in each parents’ care on an equal basis;
d) There is other evidence before the court to support the change which includes the voluminous CAS records;
e) The court has been asked to read and consider the entire report but to implement 2 of the 41 recommendations;
f) Other than in argument, neither party sought to cross-examine the OCL in advance of this motion;
g) There are portions of the OCL report that are contentious, but to the extent they are relied upon, they are supported by other evidence included in the CAS records.
[28] I agree with counsel for the mother that, in general terms, OCL reports cannot be heavily relied upon at the interim motion stage. She has a right to question the clinician at trial. In this case, the observations of the clinician relevant to the issues are supported by the CAS notes ordered to be produced and which have been produced for this motion.
[29] In the case at bar, although I have considered the OCL report, I have not given it the weight requested by the father. I have relied upon the material before me, the statutory framework and the caselaw in making my decision.
Statutory Framework
[30] Subsections 16.1(1) and (2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) provide that the court may make an order providing for the exercise of parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of any child of the marriage on application by either or both spouses and may make an interim parenting order in respect of the child, pending the determination of the application.
[31] Pursuant to subsection 16.1(4), the court may, in the order:
(a) allocate parenting time in accordance with section 16.2;
(b) allocate decision-making responsibility in accordance with section 16.3; and
(c) provide for any other matter that the court considers appropriate.
[32] Section 16 sets out the considerations and factors which shall guide the court in making a parenting order, which is deemed by subsection (7) to include an interim parenting order, as follows:
16 (1) Best interests of child
The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.
16 (2) Primary consideration
When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
16 (3) Factors to be considered
In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including
(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each spouse, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;
(c) each spouse's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child's care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
16(4) Factors relating to family violence
In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
16(5) Past conduct
In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.
16(6) Maximum parenting time
In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
16(7) Parenting order and contact order
In this section, a parenting order includes an interim parenting order and a variation order in respect of a parenting order, and a contact order includes an interim contact order and a variation order in respect of a contact order.
What should the parenting schedule be?
[33] Both parties agree that I need not find there has been a material change in circumstances in order to vary the parenting order made by Justice Broad.
[34] Both parents agree that an equal parenting schedule is in the best interests of the children.
[35] The mother wants the current order (2-2-3) to continue as the children have become used to this schedule, are doing well, and there is no reason to change it. She would be “devastated” if the schedule is changed as she cannot bear to be away from the children for more than three days. She asserts that she has altered her work from full-time to part-time to accommodate this schedule but is not forthcoming about where she works or what her schedule is.
[36] The father wants the order to be that the children are in each parties’ care on 2-2-5-5 schedule. He states that this is what the OCL recommended. He points out that this schedule would require less transitions for the children in this high conflict situation: 8 transitions in 28 days instead of 12 transitions in 28 days.
[37] The schedule proposed by the father is in the children’s best interests as it is more stable and consistent, and, with fewer exchanges, will hopefully reduce conflict.
Where should Nash go to school?
(a) Position of the parties
[38] It is the mother’s position that Nash should attend Baden Public School. She states this is because:
a) That is the catchment area of the matrimonial home where she and the children reside; 500 m from the matrimonial home and a 6-minute walk.
b) Nash’s older half-sister Kennedy attends that school and just started grade 7.
c) Nash will share the teachers his older siblings had.
d) This is what the parties discussed before the separation.
e) Nash knows the school because two of his half siblings attended the school.
f) Nash’s medical professionals are all in Baden.
g) The children have family in Baden.
h) The mother has traditionally made the decisions about where Nash attends school.
i) She plans to remain in Baden regardless of whether she can retain the matrimonial home.
j) The school is a great school academically and the staff go above and beyond for their students.
k) Attending school where the father resides will likely disrupt mother’s work schedule.
l) The father will likely move, and this may mean another change in school for
Nash.
m) Baden Public School goes to grade 8 and Westmount Public School to Grade 6.
n) She will be required to take 3 different children to three different schools and, as such, Violet will be in the car for a longer period of time.
[39] It is the father’s position that Nash should attend school in his catchment area, namely Westmount Public School in Kitchener, and that he should be noted as the primary resident parent for school purposes only. He states this is because:
a) That is what the OCL recommended.
b) He has family and support in Kitchener.
c) He plans to make his long-term home in Kitchener, Waterloo where he grew up and where he has his support system.
d) The mother has poisoned the atmosphere at Baden Public School and the community of Baden in general against him because of the accusations she has made against him.
e) The mother registered the child at Baden Public School without his consent which is further indication of her unilateral actions and confirmation that she will continue to marginalize him as a parent.
f) The court needs to implement a schedule and choose a school that provides the children with stability until trial.
g) The court should not condone the mother’s continued unilateral behaviour.
h) Although the parents’ convenience is not important, the mother may still be employed at Manulife which is located in Waterloo and the school is on her way to work.
[40] Both parents agree that in making a determination with respect to the child’s school, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. I have considered both parent’s plans and submissions in reaching my decision.
[41] For the reasons that follow, this court orders that Nash attend school in his father’s catchment area, namely Westmount Public School.
(b) The law
[42] Broad J., in the recent decision of Dauber v. Dauber, 2021 ONSC 5489, summarized the law with respect to the guiding principles on the choice of school. In that decision, at paras. 14 and 15, he quoted from Piper v. Hare, 2021 ONSC 2139, which quoted Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712, as follows:
[15] The general principles guiding the court in deciding where a child shall attend school when the parties disagree were very usefully set out by Audet, J. in Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712 (S.C.J.) at para. 37 as follows:
The decision as to the choice of school that a child should attend, when the parents disagree, is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion. However, a number of general principles have emerged from the caselaw to assist the decision-maker in making the decision in the child's best interests. They can be summarized as follows:
a. Sub-section 28(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act specifically empowers the court to determine any matter incidental to custody rights. The issue of a child's enrollment in a school program must be considered as being incidental to or ancillary to the rights of custody (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.));
b. It is implicit that a parent's plan for the child's education, and his or her capacity and commitment to carry out the plan are important elements affecting a child's best interests. In developing a child's educational plan, the unique needs, circumstances, aptitudes and attributes of the child, must be taken into account (Bandas v. Demirdache, 2013 ONCJ 679 (Ont. C.J.));
c. When considering school placement, one factor to be considered is the ability of the parent to assist the child with homework and the degree to which the parent can participate in the child's educational program (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.));
d. The emphasis must be placed on the interests of the child, and not on the interests or rights of the parents (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] S.C.J. No. 52 (S.C.C.);
e. The importance of a school placement or educational program will promote and maintain a child's cultural and linguistic heritage (Perron v. Perron, 2012 ONCA 811 (Ont. C.A.);
f. Factors which may be taken into account by the court in determining the best interests of the child include assessing any impact on the stability of the child. This may include examining whether there is any prospect of one of the parties moving in the near future; where the child was born and raised; whether a move will mean new childcare providers or other unsettling features (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);
g. The court will also look to any decisions that were made by the parents prior to the separation or at the time of separation with respect to schooling (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);
h. Any problems with the proposed schools will be considered (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);
i. A decision as to the choice of school should be made on its own merits and based, in part, on the resources that each school offered in relation to a child's needs, rather than on their proximity to the residence of one parent or the other, or the convenience that his attendance at the nearest school would entail (Wilson v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 479 (Ont. S.C.J.));
j. Third-party ranking systems, such as the Fraser Institute's, should not factor into a Court's decision. These systems of ranking do not take into consideration the best interest of the particular child in a family law context (Wilson v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 479 (Ont. S.C.J.));
k. If an aspect of a child's life, such as school placement, is to be disrupted by an order of the court, there must be good reason for the court to do so. Thus, before a court will order a child to transfer schools, there must be convincing evidence that a change of schools is in the child's best interests (Perron v. Perron, 2012 ONCA 811 (Ont. C.A.);
l. Custodial parents should be entrusted with making the decision as to which school children should attend. When a sole custodial parent has always acted in the best interest of a child, there should be no reason to doubt that this parent will act in the best interest of the child when deciding on a school (Adams v. Adams, 2016 ONCJ 431 (Ont. C.J.));
m. Those cases are very fact-driven. The courts are not pronouncing on what is best for all children in a general sense but rather deciding what is in the best interests of this child before the court (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.)).
[43] In addition, Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746, set out other factors, namely assessing any impact on the stability of the child and examining how many years the child has attended his or her current school.
c) Analysis
[44] At this time, neither parent is in a particularly stable situation. These are early stages in this intense litigation. The relationship and marriage were short. The parties, even when they were a family, experienced significant changes in a short period of time which likely had an impact in the demise of the relationship and may, in part, explain some of the behaviour. It is hoped that with this decision, there will be more stability for the children, and that the parties will be able to set aside their differences, focus on the children and the final resolution of this matter.
[45] Although Nash’s older half-sister attends the same school and that is a factor to consider (See Deschenes v. Medwayosh) in this case, there is a significant age gap between the children, and Kennedy will only be at the school for two more years and it is unlikely there would be interaction between these siblings at school. Both parents live close to the school he and she is proposing.
[46] The parties have family in both cities, making this is a neutral factor.
[47] Regardless of whether the parties discussed whether Nash would be attending Baden Public School before the separation, that is not relevant now as he is four years of age and this is his first year in school. The parties are separated and the situation has changed. Regardless of the outcome of this motion, Nash will have to commute to one of the schools.
[48] In arriving at my decision, I have not had regard to the convenience of the parents as that is not a factor to be considered.
[49] The mother made much of the close-knit community of Baden in her material and in her submissions. In this case, because of the mother’s actions, this is not a factor that weighs in favor of her argument. I accept the father’s evidence that the mother has engaged in a course of conduct to marginalize the father which included creating a sense in the community that he is someone “to watch out for”. It is difficult to imagine how the attitude of the small, close-knit community towards the father will not impact the children. I agree with the comments of the OCL that when a parent denigrates the other parent to the community and involves police and child protection services, the community receives the message that the parent is bad or dangerous (which, in this case, on the evidence before me, is untrue) and if the community accepts this view, then it will seem more accurate in the children’s minds. This court is concerned that the mother’s marginalization of the father continues and, given her own evidence about how closely connected she is to the school, that the father will not be treated as an equal parent.
[50] Father asks that I find mother has engaged in a pattern of conduct with her three former spouses (police intervention, unfounded allegations) and that she has been planning “this” for over one year. (CAS notes at page 28). I am not prepared to make this finding at this stage on the evidence before me. I am concerned about actions that have been taken by the mother. These actions cause the court to be concerned about her ability to foster a proper relationship between the father and the children. Her continued insistence that she has always made the decisions about the children and she has always been their primary caregiver ignores the order of Broad J.
[51] Some of the mother’s concerning conduct includes the following:
(a) On August 21, 2021, the mother called the police to allege concerns about the father. The police spoke with both parties and left the home. No one was charged.
(b) Three days later, on August 24, 2021, the mother “formed” the father under the Mental Health Act resulting in his involuntarily admittance to Grand River Hospital for psychiatric observation. The father was detained in the hospital for three days of observation and released. On release, he was informed by the doctors that they had no concerns with his mental health.
(c) On September 7, 2021, the mother called the police to allege concerns about the father. The police spoke with both parties, left the home, and no one was charged. While the father was speaking with the police officer, the mother suddenly removed the children from the home without notice or consent and did not disclose their location to the father.
(d) On September 8, 2021, the mother again had the father involuntarily admitted to Grand River Hospital for psychiatric observation and again the father was released without any concerns.
(e) Following the party’s separation, the mother moved – she did not tell the father where she and the children resided. It was only at the OCL disclosure meeting that the father discovered that she and the children were residing on the same street. I accept father’s evidence that mother has had the neighbours watching him and telling people that the children could be in harms way, and that the father is dangerous. This behaviour is consistent with the mother’s unfounded allegations about alcohol in the father’s car, and her untruthful statements in her affidavit of July 8 (paragraph 20, 2022) to CAS about what the police told her to do (page 76 of the CAS notes).
(f) Mr. Day, principal of Baden Public School, advised the father that mother told him she was concerned for the safety of the children and was getting a restraining order. She then gave Mr. Day the father’s picture which remained at the school for three months.
(g) The continuation of her unilateral actions. She enrolled Nash in Baden Public School without father’s consent. Her assertion that she understood that he had provided consent is not plausible in this high conflict case. The father had to involve his lawyers to de-register Nash in the school. Despite father’s request to discuss the schooling issue, she did not.
(h) There are numerous references in the CAS notes to the third parties involved with this family being concerned about the mother’s mental health but there is nothing in the evidence to indicate she has done anything about these concerns (see pages 31, 67, 75 and 82 of the CAS records as just some examples of third-party concerns).
[52] As I have made an order regarding where Nash is to attend school, I see no reason to make an order for primary residence. Should the school require such an order, the parties will return before me at the earliest possible date.
On a temporary basis:
On consent, the Applicant is permitted to enrol the child, Violet Marie Denomme, born October 13, 2020, in the daycare of his choice during his parenting time and at his cost. He shall notify the Respondent of the name of the daycare.
The children, Nash James Denomme, born May 22, 2018, and Violet Marie Denomme, born October 13, 2020, be in the care of the parents on a 2-2-5-5 schedule as follows:
a) In week one, the children shall be with the Applicant, Michael Denomme, from Monday after school/daycare until Wednesday after school/daycare, with the Respondent, Faune Denomme, from Wednesday after school/day care until Monday after school/day care;
b) In week two, the children shall be with the Applicant, Michael Denomme, from Monday after school/daycare until Wednesday after school/daycare, with the Respondent, Faune Denomme, from Wednesday after school/day care until Friday after school/day care, and with the Applicant, Michael Denomme, from Friday after school/day care until Monday after school/daycare;
c) During week two, if Monday is a school holiday the children shall be with the Respondent, Faune Denomme, until Tuesday morning at school. If Friday is a school holiday, the children shall be with the Applicant, Michael Denomme, from Thursday after school/daycare;
Nash shall attend school in the catchment area where father resides, namely Westmount Public School in Kitchener, Waterloo.
I strongly encourage the parties to resolve the cost issue. If the parties are unable to resolve costs, the father may file written submissions on costs within 14 days. The mother may file responding written submissions within 10 days thereafter. The father may provide brief reply 4 days thereafter. Submissions are not to exceed four pages, plus a detailed bill of costs and copies of any offers to settle. There shall be no extension of these timelines. If a party does not submit submissions respecting costs in accordance with these deadlines, there shall be no costs payable to that party, although costs may still be awarded against that party. Cost submissions shall be sent to Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca
Justice D. Piccoli
Date: September 13, 2022