COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-21543-0000
DATE: 20240115
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ROUBA ZOUGHAIB
Applicant
– and –
HASSAN EL-MOKADEM
Respondent
Frank Philcox, for the Applicant
Robert Carnavale, for the Respondent
HEARD: December 1 and 14, 2023
RULING ON MOTION
Bezaire J.
Overview
[1] This motion was brought by the applicant, Rouba Zoughaib, for, amongst other relief, an order that the respondent, Hassan El-Mokadem, consent to a Religious Divorce and an order that the respondent’s application be dismissed, and his pleadings and affidavits be struck, for failing to remove all barriers which would allow the applicant to remarry within her faith per s. 2(6) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”) and s. 21.1(3) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) (“Divorce Act”), collectively the “Religious Divorce Issues”.
[2] The applicant also requested relief relating to decision-making responsibility, parenting time, s. 7 expenses, and child support.
[3] While evidence was presented on all issues, the parties agreed to restrict their initial oral arguments to the Religious Divorce issues. This decision therefore relates solely to the Religious Divorce issues. Following the release of this decision, the motion will be continued to address the remaining issues.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the respondent shall serve and file an affidavit indicating that all barriers to religious remarriage have been removed within 60 days of the Divorce Order dated January 3, 2024, failing which the respondent’s pleadings and affidavits shall be immediately struck and the respondent will no longer be able to participate in these proceedings. The applicant’s request for an order compelling the respondent to consent to a Religious Divorce is dismissed.
The Background
[5] The parties were married in Lebanon on August 17, 2011, by Fahed Munir Qasim (Mayor) under the religious authority of the Jaafari Shari’a Court of Baabda. This is the applicant’s first marriage and the respondent’s third marriage.
[6] The respondent moved to Canada in 2013. The applicant moved to Canada in 2014.
[7] There were two children of the marriage, Daniel and Samuel El-Mokadem, both born on January 11, 2016.
[8] By Order dated January 3, 2024, the parties were granted a civil divorce. The applicant also seeks a Religious Divorce, known as talaq within Islam.
[9] The applicant testified that she requires a Religious Divorce to remarry within her faith and to enable her and her children to travel to Lebanon where she was born, and her parents reside. Without a Religious Divorce, the applicant would be prevented from remarrying within her faith. Further, if the applicant travels to Lebanon without a Religious Divorce, the respondent may have her passport revoked and prevent her from leaving Lebanon.
[10] The applicant requested the respondent consent to a Religious Divorce as early as November 2022. The applicant also made written requests through a letter written by her counsel dated March 7, 2023, and her affidavit, sworn July 21, 2023.
[11] The parties agree that the applicant requires the respondent’s consent to obtain a Religious Divorce. The respondent testified that there are some circumstances, such as abuse, where a woman can obtain talaq without the husband’s consent, but none of those circumstances apply herein.
[12] The respondent submits that he cannot consent to a Religious Divorce because it would contravene his genuine religious beliefs. He submits that his objection to talaq in these circumstances is not borne out of any desire to be obstructive or controlling. Rather, it is coming from a place of deep religious conviction and the necessity to maintain the integrity of his faith.
The Law
[13] At the commencement of the motion, the respondent raised a potential constitutional question with respect to ss. 2(4) to (6) of the FLA because the FLA does not contain a subsection akin to ss. 21.1(4) of the Divorce Act. Subsection 21.1(4) of the Divorce Act allows the Court to consider the respondent’s reasons for refusing to remove the barriers and if there are genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature, allows the Court to refuse to exercise its discretion to dismiss or strike out a spouse’s pleadings.
[14] To avoid a constitutional challenge, and because the respondent did not comply with the requisite procedure for such a challenge, the parties agreed that this motion would proceed under s. 21.1 of the Divorce Act only and that any relief granted would apply to all pleadings and affidavits, even if made under the FLA.
[15] Pursuant to s. 21.1 of the Divorce Act, the Court has discretion to refuse to hear a party who fails to eliminate barriers to the remarriage of a spouse entitled to a divorce in Canada. The process for exercising that discretion is as follows:
Affidavit re removal of barriers to religious remarriage
(2) In any proceedings under this Act, a spouse (in this section referred to as the “deponent”) may serve on the other spouse and file with the court an affidavit indicating
(a) that the other spouse is the spouse of the deponent;
(b) the date and place of the marriage, and the official character of the person who solemnized the marriage;
(c) the nature of any barriers to the remarriage of the deponent within the deponent’s religion the removal of which is within the other spouse’s control;
(d) where there are any barriers to the remarriage of the other spouse within the other spouse’s religion the removal of which is within the deponent’s control, that the deponent
(i) has removed those barriers, and the date and circumstances of that removal, or
(ii) has signified a willingness to remove those barriers, and the date and circumstances of that signification;
(e) that the deponent has, in writing, requested the other spouse to remove all of the barriers to the remarriage of the deponent within the deponent’s religion the removal of which is within the other spouse’s control;
(f) the date of the request described in paragraph (e); and
(g) that the other spouse, despite the request described in paragraph (e), has failed to remove all of the barriers referred to in that paragraph.
Powers of court where barriers not removed
(3) Where a spouse who has been served with an affidavit under subsection (2) does not
(a) within fifteen days after that affidavit is filed with the court or within such longer period as the court allows, serve on the deponent and file with the court an affidavit indicating that all of the barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e) have been removed, and
(b) satisfy the court, in any additional manner that the court may require, that all of the barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e) have been removed,
the court may, subject to any terms that the court considers appropriate,
(c) dismiss any application filed by that spouse under this Act, and
(d) strike out any other pleadings and affidavits filed by that spouse under this Act.
Special case
(4) Without limiting the generality of the court’s discretion under subsection (3), the court may refuse to exercise its powers under paragraphs (3)(c) and (d) where a spouse who has been served with an affidavit under subsection (2)
(a) within fifteen days after that affidavit is filed with the court or within such longer period as the court allows, serves on the deponent and files with the court an affidavit indicating genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e); and
(b) satisfies the court, in any additional manner that the court may require, that the spouse has genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e).
[16] Usually, the s. 21.1 process is initiated well before trial because the remedy provided under the Divorce Act is to strike pleadings if the barriers are not removed, not to make an order requiring a party to grant a Religious Divorce: see Sablani v. Sablani, 2023 ONSC 6288, at para. 14.
Analysis
[17] With reference to s. 21.1 of the Divorce Act, the parties agree that:
a. The applicant served and filed an affidavit sworn July 21, 2023, which sets out the facts required by s. 21.1(2) of the Divorce Act, including the applicant’s request that the respondent remove all barriers to remarriage and the respondent’s refusal to do so.
b. Despite more than 15 days having passed since the applicant’s affidavit was filed, the respondent has not filed an affidavit per s. 21.1(3) of the Divorce Act indicating that all the barriers to remarriage have been removed, nor has the respondent satisfied the Court in some other manner that all barriers have been removed.
c. The respondent has served and filed an affidavit per s. 21.1(4) of the Divorce Act indicating that he has genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers to religious remarriage.
[18] The issues to be decided on this motion are therefore, (a) whether the respondent has genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers such that the court should refuse to exercise its powers under s. 21.1(3)(c) and (d) of the Divorce Act, and (b) if not, the appropriate remedy to be granted.
Respondent’s Grounds for Refusing to Remove the Barriers
[19] The only barrier to religious remarriage submitted by the applicant is the respondent’s refusal to provide consent to a Religious Divorce.
[20] The reason the respondent provided for refusing his consent was set out in his “Affidavit-Religious Divorce”, sworn November 3, 2023:
… [T]he act of “talaq”, as understood within my faith, is a religious pronouncement that must align with the principles of Sharia Law. To perform this act in a context that contravenes the dictates of Sharia would be to deny a fundamental aspect of my religious belief.
To grant a “talaq” in circumstances where the underlying legal resolution (in matters of support, equalization, custody, and access) does not accord with Sharia Law would, in my genuine religious belief, be equivalent to renouncing the religious authority of Sharia. It would imply an endorsement of the principle that the secular law’s approach to these matters is congruent with or superior to Sharia Law, which my faith does not allow me to concede.
My religion mandates that any act of “talaq” must be premised on and consistent with Islamic principles, a requirement that I cannot fulfill under the current legal circumstances without contravening my faith.
[21] I find the respondent’s reason as set out in his affidavit unclear. He did not provide evidence as to how the legal resolution fails to accord with Sharia Law or how granting talaq would be the equivalent of renouncing the religious authority of Sharia. Further, no expert evidence was tendered on the motion.
[22] The respondent submitted that according to the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 43 (“Amselem”), he need not objectively prove the validity of his religious belief. While I agree, Iacobucci J., writing for the majority in Amselem, made clear that the Court may inquire into the sincerity of a claimant’s belief:
[51] That said, while a court is not qualified to rule on the validity or veracity of any given religious practice or belief, or to choose among various interpretations of belief, it is qualified to inquire into the sincerity of a claimant’s belief, where sincerity is in fact at issue … It is important to emphasize, however, that sincerity of belief simply implies an honesty of belief. [Citations omitted].
[23] Like the majority in Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (“Bruker”), I query whether the respondent, in good faith, sincerely objects to removing the barriers as a matter of religious belief or conscience. Abella J., writing for the majority in Brucker, held:
[68] … It is not clear to me what aspect of [Mr. Marcovitz’s] religious beliefs prevented him from providing a get [Jewish act of religious divorce]. He never, in fact, offered a religious reason for refusing to provide a get. Rather, he said that his refusal was based on the fact that, in his words:
Mrs. Bruker harassed me, she alienated my kids from me, she stole some money from me, she stole some silverware from my mother, she prevented my proper visitation with the kids. Those are the reasons … [Appellant’s Record, at p. 66]
[69] This concession confirms, in my view, that his refusal to provide the get was based less on religious conviction than on the fact that he was angry at Ms. Bruker. His religion does not require him to refuse to give Ms. Bruker a get. The contrary is true. There is no doubt that at Jewish law he could refuse to give one, but that is very different from Mr. Marcovitz being prevented by a tenet of his religious beliefs from complying with a legal obligation he voluntarily entered into and of which he took the negotiated benefits. [Emphasis in original].
[24] The same situation exists here. It is not clear to me what aspect of the respondent’s religious beliefs prevent him from providing talaq. During oral testimony, the respondent admitted that his religion allows him to consent to talaq. He also admitted that he has so consented twice before, following his two prior marriages. The fact that Sharia Law allows him to withhold his consent does not equate to him being prevented from doing so by any genuine religious or conscientious belief.
[25] Counsel for the respondent argued that the reason the respondent refuses to consent to a Religious Divorce stem from the differences between Canadian and Sharia Law in terms of parenting time for minor children. Counsel submitted that the dissolution of the respondent’s current marriage is different than the dissolution of his two prior marriages because there are minor children involved. The respondent did not have any children with his first wife and the youngest of his children with his second wife was a teenager. No expert evidence was, however, presented as to the differences or how they would prevent the respondent from consenting to a Religious Divorce.
[26] Nevertheless, I do not find the minor children to be the reason the respondent withholds consent. On cross-examination, the respondent was asked if his young children are the reason and he very clearly responded “No, it’s not for that, not for this reason.”
[27] What then is the reason for refusing consent? The respondent initially testified that it is because the applicant has not attended before the Imam (Islamic religious leader). However, on cross-examination the respondent subsequently admitted that the applicant had in fact attended before the Imam.
[28] The respondent then testified that he is withholding his consent because the applicant sued him in this court:
Q. She has been to his office.
A. Just like couple of weeks ago, that’s it, but from the beginning she’s suing me.
Q. Oh, so you’re not giving her the consent for the Religious divorce because she’s suing you?
A. Yeah, she’s suing me, yeah, not through the religious court, but through the civil court.
Q. Okay, because she took you to court, to civil court, that’s why you’re refusing?
A. Yeah. Yeah, she has to go to the religious court.
[29] The respondent appeared angry at the applicant for commencing this application. On cross-examination, he read a text message that he sent to the applicant refusing talaq. The message was in part translated by the respondent as follows:
…And now I’ll bring it, you are greedy and angry or – and another hand, you – what you think I owe, and your late payment and your support and kids’ support, it will be if I divorce you religiously, and I told the court, the religious court in Lebanon that I’m not – I didn’t divorce you and I’m not going to divorce you, even if the civil court in Canada will force me without my consent. And you can ask you cousins, the Sheikhs, your cousins, to make you understand the law of the religion. Don’t forget a swear that I’m not the one who bought the scissors and that you are the one who paid for them…
[30] The respondent’s evidence on cross-examination explaining the text message further demonstrated his anger and frustration towards the applicant.
[31] The applicant’s evidence is that the respondent is using the Religious Divorce to try to gain leverage in the civil application. She testified that during a meeting with the parties’ Imam, the respondent offered to consent to the Religious Divorce if the applicant gave him sole custody of the children so he could move with them to Lebanon. When this evidence was put to the respondent on cross-examination, he refused to answer the question, claiming the conversation was privileged. When pressed further, he denied the conversation took place. I do not find the respondent credible. Had the conversation not taken place, he would have simply denied it in the first instance. His hesitation corroborates the applicant’s evidence and detracts from the respondent’s claims of any genuine religious belief for refusing consent.
[32] I find that the respondent has not presented any credible evidence of a genuine religious or conscientious belief preventing him from consenting to talaq such that the Court should refuse to exercise its discretion under paragraphs (c) and (d) of s. 21.1(3). The grounds presented for refusing consent have less to do with a genuine religious belief and more to do with the fact the respondent is angry with the applicant for suing him in this Court.
The Appropriate Remedy
[33] The applicant requests an order (a) compelling the respondent to attend at the Imam and consent to a Religious Divorce, and (b) dismissing the respondent’s application and striking the respondent’s pleadings and affidavits per ss. 21.1(3)(c) and (d).
[34] While considering the enforcement of an agreement to obtain a get in Bruker, Abella J. explained the nature and operation of s. 21.1 of the Divorce Act:
[7] In response to concerns (regarding gets), after consultation with the leaders of 50 religious groups in Canada and with the specific agreement of the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Anglican churches, in 1990 the then Minister of Justice, Doug Lewis, introduced amendments to the Divorce Act … giving a court discretionary authority to prevent a spouse from obtaining relief under the Act if that spouse refused to remove a barrier to religious remarriage (s. 21.1). At second reading, the Minister outlined the motivation for these amendments, explaining:
The bill before us today is an amendment to the Divorce Act which would provide a court with discretionary powers to preclude a spouse from obtaining relief or proceeding under the Divorce Act where that spouse refuses to remove a barrier to religious remarriage and where the power to remove the barrier to religious remarriage lies solely with that person. Where the court is satisfied that the spouse who refuses to remove the barrier has genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for doing so, it need not exercise its discretion to grant the remedy provided for in this legislation.
. . . A spouse should not be able to refuse to participate in a Jewish religious divorce — called a Get — in order to obtain concessions in a civil divorce. The Get should not be used as a bargaining tool for child custody and access or monetary support.
…I am concerned about protecting the integrity of the Divorce Act and preventing persons from avoiding the application of the principles contained in the act. For example, a wife may feel compelled to agree to custody arrangements which are not truly in the best interests of a couple’s child to obtain a Get.
[35] The same concerns apply here. The respondent has, to date, refused to remove the barriers to Religious Divorce, the removal of which is within his power and control. The respondent cannot refuse talaq because he is angry at the applicant, or to obtain concessions in the civil divorce. Talaq, like a get, shall not be used as a bargaining tool for parenting time or any other issue related to civil divorce.
[36] Paragraphs 21.1(3)(c) and (d) clearly provide the Court with authority to dismiss the respondent’s Answer and strike his pleadings and affidavits in these circumstances. The more difficult issue is whether the Court can also compel the respondent to consent to talaq.
[37] The applicant submits an order striking the pleadings does not go far enough. More is needed to free the applicant from the respondent’s control. Without an order compelling a Religious Divorce, the applicant will be unable to remarry within her faith or travel to her home country without fear of the respondent confiscating her passport or otherwise punishing her.
[38] The respondent submits that the Court should be cautious in granting any remedy to avoid infringing upon the protected Charter right of freedom of religion. In obiter dicta in Salehi v. Tawoosi, 2016 ONSC 540 (“Salehi”), Meyers, J. noted the distinction between striking pleadings and a mandatory injunction requiring a party to remove all barriers to a Religious Divorce, the latter of which may offend protected freedom of religion rights:
[48] … Section 21.1 threatens to deny a respondent standing in court if he fails to grant a religious divorce. That is, if he does not exercise his religious divorce process, we will not allow him to participate in the civil divorce process. But going further - to order a person to do a religious act - implicates issues of freedom of religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I note that s. 21.1(4) contains a defence to an application under s.(3) where the respondent proves that he has a genuine religious issue. In Bakhshi v. Hosseinzadeh, 2015 ONSC 7407, the court did order a husband to provide a religious divorce. In that case, the court relied on a decision that struck pleadings under the provincial equivalent of s.21.1 of the Divorce Act. The court in that case did not advert to the distinction between striking pleadings to try to encourage or coerce a religious divorce and the making of a mandatory injunction whereby a government official positively compels the respondent to perform a religious act. In my view, that distinction may well make a difference. This issue was not argued before me from first principles. Had I not declined to entertain the issue of the Iranian divorce for the grounds set out in the preceding paragraph, I would have declined to make the order sought at least without the benefit of further argument on the fundamental issues.
[39] The applicant relies on three decisions as authority for the Court to compel a Religious Divorce. These cases all dealt with marriages that occurred in Iran under Iranian law. Of the cases provided, only two involved orders to compel a Religious Divorce. In Etemad v. Hasazadeh, 2014 ONSC 6737 (“Etemad”), Backhouse J. made no such order. The husband was instead given 30 days to take the necessary steps to unconditionally obtain a Religious Divorce in Ontario, failing which the parties were to make further submissions. The husband ultimately consented to the Religious Divorce, and no further submission or order was required.
[40] While Barnes J. in Hesson v. Shaker, 2020 ONSC 1319, ordered the husband to consent to a Religious Divorce, Etemad was the only case cited as authority to do so, which for the above reasons I do not find as sufficient.
[41] That leaves the British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Kariminia v. Nasser, 2018 BCSC 695 (“Kariminia”). Forth J. reviewed the concerns with making an order to compel a Religious Divorce, but found that religious freedoms are subject to limitations, particularly when they offend jurisprudence on the equality of the sexes and cause harm to the other spouse:
[44] I have paid due consideration to the obiter dicta of Myers J. in Salehi, and recently of Steeves J. in A.M. v. M.S; however, I find it appropriate in the circumstances to follow the decisions of Backhouse J. in Etemad and McLeod J. in Bakhshi, and order that the claimant apply for an Islamic Iranian divorce.
[45] I acknowledge that this precise issue was not decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bruker, as noted at para. 88:
… this Court has not been asked either to order specific performance or, as previously noted, to determine the enforceability of a Jewish marriage contract, and the reference to these cases should not be taken as endorsing either remedy.
[46] However, I put stock in the [Supreme] Court’s statements that religious freedoms are subject to limitations when they disproportionately collide with other significant public rights and interests and that conduct which would potentially cause harm to or interfere with the rights of others would not automatically be protected.
[47] I accept that if the respondent chooses to travel to Iran, she will put herself at risk of not being able to return to Canada under her own volition. This dilemma has caused substantial harm to the respondent as, up to this point, she has chosen not to visit her elderly mother and disabled sister. In addition, it has potentially harmed the Children’s interests, as they have not had the opportunity to travel to Iran and visit their grandmother and aunt either.
[48] The cause of this situation is the claimant’s refusal to consent to an Islamic Iranian divorce, which normally would be his religious right. However, as the claimant’s conduct has resulted in direct, substantial harm to the respondent, and the claimant has failed to respond to this application, appear at this hearing, or put his religious rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in issue, I find that the right is not protected in the circumstances.
[50] Pursuant to s. 15 of the Charter, “[t]he promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration”. Discrimination, on the other hand, perpetuates or promotes “the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration”.
[51] With these principles in mind, I find that it is against Canadian public policy to recognize that the right to the parties’ Islamic Iranian divorce is exclusively the claimant’s, as a man. As discussed, such a finding would effectively restrict the respondent from visiting her aging mother and disabled sister in Iran. This is unwarranted in light of Canadian views and jurisprudence on the equality of sexes, and the harm to the respondent is an injustice that offends Canadian morality.
[52] The parties are divorced by order of this Court, and there is no basis for the claimant’s failure to grant the Islamic Iranian divorce.
[Citations omitted].
[42] The respondent submits that Kariminia ought not to be followed because (a) the husband therein did not participate in the proceeding or put his religious beliefs in issue, and (b) Kariminia is a non-binding British Columbia decision. The respondent submits that no Ontario authority exists to compel a Religious Divorce.
[43] I agree with the respondent. No authority has been provided to allow me to compel the respondent to provide a Religious Divorce. It is well settled that the civil court process is not to be used for the enforcement of religious rules. In Bruker, Deschamps, J., dissenting held:
[130] I do not feel that the courts have reversed or qualified their approach to sanctioning purely religious obligations. Whether a court is asked to compel a party to appear before rabbinical authorities or to order the payment of money, the same principle is in issue: can the authority of the courts be based on a purely religious rule? I do not think it can…
[131] Furthermore, this principle of non-intervention in religious practices was one of the most important bases for the adoption of the subjective standard of sincere belief …
[132] It should be noted that the religious consequences of not having a get do not override secular law rules…secular law has no effect in matters of religious law … Where religion is concerned, the state leaves it to individuals to make their own choices. It is not up to the state to promote a religious norm. This is left to religious authorities.
[44] Similarly, the Court ought not interfere in the religious process here. While I empathize with the applicant’s situation, she has not provided any authority upon which the Court may compel the respondent to consent to a Religious Divorce.
Conclusion
[45] For the above reasons, the applicant’s request for an order compelling the respondent to consent to a Religious Divorce is dismissed.
[46] While I am prepared to make an order striking the respondent’s pleadings and affidavits filed per ss. 21.1(3)(d), I note that the order granting the parties’ civil divorce has only recently been made. I therefore order that, within 60 days of January 3, 2024, the date of the Divorce Order, the respondent shall file an affidavit indicating all barriers to a Religious Divorce have been removed per s. 21.1(2) of the Divorce Act, failing which the respondent’s pleadings and affidavits shall be immediately struck and the respondent will be unable to further participate in these proceedings.
[47] While I cannot compel the respondent to provide a Religious Divorce, I strongly encourage him to do so. The parties are now civilly divorced and like Forth, J. in Kariminia, I see no basis for the respondent’s failure to grant talaq herein.
[48] With respect to the remaining issues in dispute, counsel shall contact the trial coordinator to schedule further oral arguments for a date following the expiry of the 60-day period for the respondent to provide his affidavit.
[49] The applicant shall serve and file with the court her proposed draft Order dealing with the remaining issues in dispute at least five days prior to the continuation of the motion. In the event the respondent fails to file the requisite affidavit as noted above, the continuation of this proceeding will proceed as a summary hearing without the respondent’s involvement.
[50] Costs of this motion shall be addressed at the continuation of the motion. The parties shall file their respective Bills of Costs and any cost submissions, not to exceed three pages (12-point font and double spaced) in length, at least five days prior to the continuation of the motion.
[51] I remain seized.
Original Signed by “Justice J.E. Bezaire”
Jennifer E. Bezaire
Justice
Released: January 15, 2024
COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-21543-0000
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Rouba Zoughaib
and
Hassan El-Mokadem
RULING ON MOTION
Bezaire J.
Released: January 15, 2024