SCJ 2021

The offender pleaded guilty to arson with disregard for human life after setting fire to a neighbour's house with his brother.

The fire caused $150,000 in property damage and destroyed the home.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness was significantly reduced due to his severe cognitive limitations, functioning at the 1st percentile.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's reduced culpability, the court imposed a two-year conditional sentence followed by three years of probation.

The self-represented applicant brought an application for habeas corpus, claiming his arrest for failing to appear and subsequent detention were unlawful.

He advanced Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) concepts, rejecting his legal name and the court's jurisdiction over him as a 'living man'.

The court dismissed the application, finding no valid legal foundation or reasonable grounds for his complaint, and noting that such jurisdictional arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts.

The court also noted the applicant had not exhausted his legal avenues, such as seeking a bail review.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for repeated harassing telecommunication and breach of recognizance.

The charges arose from a prolonged dispute regarding a local dog park, during which the appellant repeatedly emailed a volunteer and posted about her online in breach of his bail conditions.

On appeal, the appellant raised numerous grounds, including errors in arraignment, limitation periods, mens rea, and the trial judge's handling of his self-represented status and the appointment of section 486.3 counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings sound, his legal analysis correct, and his management of the trial exceedingly fair to the self-represented appellant.

The 60-day conditional sentence and suspended sentences were upheld as fit.

The plaintiff contractor brought a motion for summary judgment against the corporate owner and its principal for unpaid amounts on a commercial redevelopment project.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the debt, rejecting the defendants' claims of a fixed price and substandard work.

The court also found that the corporate owner breached the statutory trust provisions of the Construction Act by receiving funds after substantial performance was certified and failing to remit them to the plaintiff.

The individual principal was held personally liable for the breach of trust as he had effective control of the corporation and knew or ought to have known of the breach.

The applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis following her largely successful motion for disclosure.

The respondent argued for no costs or a modest amount due to his limited financial means.

The court found the applicant's approach reasonable and the respondent's protracted approach to disclosure caused delay, but declined to find bad faith.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the amount of $5,650.00, representing slightly less than full indemnity.

The plaintiff commenced a divorce proceeding and a separate civil tort action against the defendant spouse, alleging assault and negligence.

The defendant moved to strike or stay the civil action as an abuse of process, arguing it improperly circumvented the family law regime.

The court declined to strike the entire civil action, finding it is not prima facie an abuse of process to commence a separate tort proceeding.

However, the court struck certain improperly pleaded claims, struck the jury notice, and ordered joint case management of both proceedings to avoid duplication and ensure judicial efficiency.

The John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party in three joined habeas corpus applications.

The applicants, who are inmates, challenged the denial of their requests to transfer to minimum-security institutions.

The JHSC sought to intervene on the threshold question of whether such a denial constitutes a deprivation of liberty.

The court granted the motion on terms, finding that the JHSC had a genuine interest and could make a useful contribution regarding the constitutional and practical context of transfer decisions.

However, the court restricted the JHSC from participating in the development of the evidentiary record to avoid duplication and prejudice.

The respondent estate brought a motion on the first day of trial to amend its Answer to include the equitable defence of laches against the applicant's claim to set aside a marriage contract.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing that laches is not a legally tenable defence to a statutory claim under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and that the amendment would cause uncompensable prejudice.

The court granted the motion, finding that a claim for declaratory relief under section 56(4) is equitable in nature and can be defended by laches.

The court also found that any disadvantage to the applicant could be compensated by costs, an adjournment, or trial management.

The applicants sought a declaration that an option in a 1997 mining rights option agreement was void under the 21-year perpetuity period in s. 13(3) of the Perpetuities Act.

The court held, in a case of first impression, that the option concerned an incorporeal interest akin to a profit à prendre and therefore fell within s. 14, which provides a 40-year vesting period for easements, profits à prendre, and similar interests.

Applying a textual, contextual, purposive, and original-meaning interpretation, the court concluded that s. 13(3) addressed options relating to corporeal hereditaments, while s. 14 addressed incorporeal hereditament interests.

Because the option was created in 1997, it remained presumptively valid and the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving and 'over 80', arguing that the Crown's cross-examination of its own police witness during a blended trial and voir dire resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when he was not permitted to contact his father to arrange counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the procedural irregularity did not render the trial unfair and that the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant sought to contact his father for emotional support rather than to retain counsel was entitled to deference.

The appeal against sentence was allowed to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences committed in association with a criminal organization that imported firearms from the United States to Toronto.

The Crown sought sentences of 9 and 12 years, while the defence sought 4 and 6-8 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the severe risk firearms pose to the community, while also considering the offenders' lack of prior records and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court sentenced the first offender to 6 years and the second offender to 9 years in custody, with credit given for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a paragraph from the plaintiff's Reply and Defence to Counterclaim under Rule 25.11.

The plaintiff, a dentist, sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal and discrimination, alleging a pattern of discriminatory conduct against female employees.

In her Reply, she alleged a broader pattern of spurious allegations against any employee who left the practice.

The court found the impugned paragraph was a bald statement without supporting facts, overly broad, and amounted to a fishing expedition that would prejudice and delay the fair trial of the action.

The motion was granted and the paragraph was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend her Statement of Claim and to examine a former employee of the defendant as a non-party witness, after the action had already been set down for trial.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that a change in the law regarding the Consumer Protection Act's application to waivers, the discovery that the witness was no longer employed by the defendant, and the pending summary judgment motion constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

Leave to examine the non-party witness was granted with terms to prevent a reopening of discovery.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff unit owner's motion for partial summary judgment regarding a condominium lien for common element damage, the successful defendant condominium corporation sought costs.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $13,500 on a full indemnity basis, noting the Condominium Act's intent to protect innocent unit holders from the financial burden caused by defaulting owners.

However, given the plaintiff's modest means and the fact that the action was ongoing, the court ordered the costs payable at the end of the proceeding rather than forthwith to avoid depriving the plaintiff of his day in court.

The Crown applied under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to have a key complainant in a human trafficking case testify via videoconference from outside Canada.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the witness's disruptive behaviour at the preliminary inquiry demonstrated that remote testimony would impede the court's ability to control the proceedings and undermine effective cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding the accused failed to show that remote testimony would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The court permitted the witness to testify from her home, subject to strict conditions to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages extracted from a seized cell phone, alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court dismissed arguments that the police failed to file timely Reports to Justice, conducted an unlawful warrantless search during intake, and relied on a facially invalid warrant.

Although the Crown conceded a minor s. 8 breach because the police retrieved the phone from a locker 25 minutes after the warrant's time window expired, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was minimal and the evidence highly reliable.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 37 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, bringing the net delay below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that exceptional circumstances, including a complainant's disruptive conduct at the preliminary inquiry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overall complexity of the multi-accused case, justified the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The Estate Trustee brought a motion for directions regarding the payment of unsecured debts allegedly owed by the deceased to his son and son-in-law.

The debts arose from unpaid wages and financial assistance provided to the deceased over many years.

One of the beneficiaries opposed the payment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and lacked corroboration.

The court found that the deceased had acknowledged the debts and intended to repay them upon the sale of his property.

The court also found that the claims were not statute-barred as they were contingent loans, and alternatively, the son and son-in-law were entitled to the funds on the basis of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

The court ordered the debts to be paid from the estate.

In a fraud action, the defendant volunteered to have the proceeds of the sale of her home held in trust pending trial, resulting in a consent order.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to use a portion of the frozen funds to pay for her living and legal expenses.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vary the consent order.

The court held that the consent order was equivalent to a Mareva injunction and that it had the jurisdiction to permit the defendant to use the frozen assets for reasonable expenses.

The motion was granted, allowing the defendant to use up to $175,000 from the proceeds.

The parties agreed upon a timetable leading up to a certification motion in a class proceeding.

The court endorsed the agreed-upon schedule, setting dates for the exchange of motion records, cross-examinations, and factums, with the motion returnable for three days in May and June 2022.