SCJ 2020

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce its contractual rights following a $5 million default on bearer bonds issued for a renewable energy project in Poland.

The plaintiff sought to terminate the Administration Agreement and assume the role of Administrator of the Trust.

The court found that final relief could not be granted on an interlocutory motion due to credibility issues requiring a trial.

However, the court granted a temporary mandatory injunction allowing the plaintiff to assume the Administrator's duties pending trial, finding a strong prima facie case of default, irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favoring the plaintiff.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought permission to bring a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant objected, arguing that allegations of bad faith, mental distress, and discrimination created genuine issues for trial requiring credibility assessments.

The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with the motion, noting that judges have powers to determine credibility and address contested facts under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and set a timetable for the motion.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' four children attend school for in-person learning and that parenting transitions take place at the school.

The respondent father, a medical doctor, opposed in-person learning due to COVID-19 risks and the children's alleged history of respiratory issues.

Applying the Zinati factors, the court found no compelling medical evidence that the children were at increased risk and concluded that the benefits of in-person learning, including structure and peer interaction, outweighed the risks.

The court ordered the children to attend school in-person and requested further submissions on the issue of parenting transitions.

The Applicant sought costs following a successful motion to dispense with the Respondent's signature on a land transfer and the dismissal of the Respondent's cross-motion to set aside a previous order.

The Applicant had made a Rule 18 offer to settle that mirrored the court's ultimate decision.

The court awarded the Applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a full indemnity basis thereafter, fixing the amount at $9,654.

The parties agreed on a further order addressing the request for relief pursuant to a previous endorsement.

The court signed the consent order and remained seized of the matter to address any potential non-compliance.

The Crown applied for a temporary publication ban on portions of an agreed statement of fact and bail synopsis relating to an adult accused who pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The ban was sought to protect the fair trial rights of a young person co-accused who was scheduled to be tried for second-degree murder at a later date.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and concluded that a broad ban was not necessary, as alternative measures like jury instructions and the passage of time would mitigate prejudice.

However, a limited ban was granted for evidence that could identify the young person or would be presumptively inadmissible at their trial.

The plaintiffs, representing a faction of a non-profit religious temple, brought a motion seeking the interim appointment of a monitor to manage the temple's financial affairs due to alleged governance and financial irregularities.

The court found that the incumbent directors served on properly constituted governance boards and acted in good faith.

Although the court identified certain irregularities, such as the failure to provide audited financial statements, it concluded that these did not warrant the intrusive appointment of a monitor.

The motion was dismissed, but the court directed the temple to prepare audited financial statements, update its corporate profile, and provide refresher training on donation counting procedures.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's rulings in an ongoing shareholder valuation dispute pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The applicants argued the arbitrator failed to provide adequate reasons for the valuation date, acted unfairly regarding instructions to the valuator, improperly allowed the use of hindsight evidence, and erred in admitting evidence from the respondent's expert.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, adequately explained, and did not result in procedural unfairness.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions regarding interim parenting of their two young children.

The mother sought primary residence with alternate weekend access for the father, while the father sought a shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered a graduated access schedule for the younger child to eventually synchronize with the older child's schedule, emphasizing the need to accommodate the mother's return to work and the children's best interests.

The court also ordered the father to discharge a property encumbrance as previously agreed.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to adjourn a peremptory trial date, citing a lack of medical accommodations for her disability and an inability to participate due to COVID-19 restrictions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent had failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to support her requested accommodations beyond those already granted.

Emphasizing the high-conflict nature of the proceedings and the children's pressing need for finality, the court held that further delay was contrary to the children's best interests and the primary objective of the Family Law Rules.

In a bankruptcy proposal proceeding, the fourth mortgagee brought a motion for a vesting order to purchase the debtor's property, while a competing purchaser brought a cross-motion to set aside a previous vesting order on the basis of lack of notice.

The court found that the competing purchaser had been unfairly deprived of notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing.

The court terminated all previous agreements of purchase and sale and ordered a new confidential bidding process to ensure fairness.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder following a gang-related mass shooting, applied for bail under section 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that while the Crown's case was not overwhelming, it was not weak, and the proposed release plan with family sureties was insufficient to address the significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed and detention was ordered.

The two offenders were convicted of firearms offences after a loaded restricted firearm with an extended magazine was found in the vehicle they were occupying, shortly after an exchange of gunfire with another vehicle.

The Crown sought 6 years for the passenger and 2 years less a day for the driver, while the defence sought 30 months and 12 months respectively.

The court sentenced the passenger to 40 months and the driver to 18 months, finding their moral blameworthiness differed significantly.

The court granted credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest but declined to grant additional credit for the Covid-19 pandemic due to a lack of specific evidence regarding its impact on the offenders' incarceration.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim, arguing prejudice due to the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to hear the motion and took judicial notice of the fact that while a judge-alone trial could be scheduled in the near future, the timeline for resuming civil jury trials was unknown.

Balancing the substantive right to a jury trial against the need for a timely and affordable resolution, the court struck the jury notice but allowed the parties the option to return to court if a jury trial becomes available before the scheduled judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for indecent exposure under s. 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The charge arose from an incident where the appellant exposed his penis to a minor in a public parking lot.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the defence of accident and reversed the burden of proof when assessing his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not explicitly mention the defence of accident, the reasons as a whole demonstrated he was alive to the issue.

The court also found that although the trial judge erred in commenting on the appellant's failure to explain why witnesses would lie, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied given the formidable Crown case.

The applicant paternal grandmother brought a motion for access to her nine-year-old granddaughter following the death of the child's father.

The respondent mother consented to virtual access for the grandmother but opposed the participation of the child's paternal aunt, citing concerns about being undermined.

Applying the Chapman framework, the court found that the aunt had a positive relationship with the child, the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and stemmed from estate litigation rather than parenting concerns, and the mother's actions imperiled the relationship.

The court granted the motion, allowing the aunt to participate in the virtual access visits.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assaulting a peace officer and attempting to disarm a peace officer.

The charges arose after police forcibly entered his home without a warrant in response to a 911 call regarding a domestic dispute.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police had reasonable alternatives to a forced entry, as required by the Godoy framework.

The court concluded the police were not acting in the lawful execution of their duties, quashed the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The applicant, who had been granted bail twice but was unable to secure a surety, sought a bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code to be released without a surety.

The court considered the applicant's poverty, addiction issues, and the anticipated delay before trial.

Applying the principles from R. v. Myers and R. v. Zora, the court found that the certain cost to the applicant's liberty outweighed the hypothetical risks on the primary and secondary grounds.

The court ordered the applicant's release on his own recognizance without a surety, subject to conditions including reporting to police and seeking addictions counselling.

A trial management conference was held to provide directions for an upcoming 10-day virtual trial.

The action was proceeding against only one defendant, the others having been dismissed.

The court provided directions regarding the use of a shared document folder, the preparation of trial materials including an Agreed Statement of Facts and Joint Document Book, and the completion of a Report to Trial Judge.

The court also scheduled a practice run for the virtual platform and provided guidance on managing exhibits and video presence during the trial.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following convictions for aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and extortion.

The offences involved the offender confining and repeatedly cutting a victim over a drug debt.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent offences and a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.

The court found the criteria for a dangerous offender designation were met under s. 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court concluded that the risk could be managed in the community after a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 12.5 years, leaving 4 years and 164 days to serve after pre-sentence credit, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.