SCJ 2020

The applicant brought a motion seeking deductions from the respondent's share of their late father's estate, alleging the respondent financially enriched herself while acting as attorney for property.

The applicant also sought an order for the distribution of disputed chattels.

The court reviewed the respondent's informal accounting and ordered a deduction of $10,764.52 from her share of the estate for unaccounted withdrawals and inappropriate expenses.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for the disputed chattels, instead directing the estate trustee to sell them and divide the proceeds equally between the siblings.

The respondent landlords moved to quash the appellant tenants' appeal from Landlord Tenant Board decisions.

The motion was based on the appeal being out of time (dismissed by a prior judge) and lacking merit as it raised no question of law, and constituted an abuse of process due to the tenants' failure to pay rent and lack of good faith.

The court found no question of law and concluded the appeal was an abuse of process, quashing the appeal and vacating the stay of proceedings.

The moving party sought to validate her marriage to an elderly man with worsening dementia, which was challenged by the responding party, the man's son.

The son had previously obtained a guardianship order in the wife's absence and alleged the marriage was predatory.

The court found that the son failed to adduce sufficient evidence that his father lacked the capacity to marry on the date of the wedding.

The court placed little weight on retrospective expert assessments and relied on direct evidence of the couple's long-term relationship and the father's understanding of the marriage.

The marriage was declared valid, and the son was ordered to pay $50,000 in full indemnity costs due to his egregious conduct.

The mother brought a motion to vary an interim order that had granted the father sole care and custody of their four-year-old child.

Following the interim order, the father restricted the mother's access to FaceTime calls only.

The court found that the father's unilateral decision to withhold in-person access constituted a material change in circumstances that negatively affected the child.

The court varied the interim order to grant the parties joint legal custody and awarded the mother extensive daytime parenting time, finding it in the child's best interests to restore in-person contact.

The applicant brought a mid-trial application seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 278.93/4 hearing and to prevent disclosure of application materials to the complainant, relying on the recent decision in R. v. Reddick which found those provisions unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the principles of stare decisis did not apply because Reddick was decided in the context of a pre-trial application, whereas this was a mid-trial application.

Furthermore, the court held that even if stare decisis applied, the decision in Reddick was plainly wrong as it failed to fully consider the constitutional issues in the context of a mid-trial application and misinterpreted the legislation.

The applicant, charged with numerous firearms and drug trafficking offences following an undercover operation, sought a bail review and a s. 525 hearing.

He argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and delay constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found no material change, noting COVID-19 was considered at the original hearing and the delay was not unreasonable.

The court upheld the detention on the tertiary ground, concluding that releasing the applicant, given the formidable case and serious firearms charges, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) granted ex parte to the plaintiffs over a condominium redevelopment property.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure by omitting a standard form agreement of purchase and sale and relevant emails.

The court found the plaintiffs complied with their disclosure obligations, as the inclusion of the standard agreement was a triable issue rather than a deliberate omission.

The court also found the property was unique to the plaintiffs under the Dhunna factors.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed.

The accused, charged with two counts of second-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release (bail).

The Crown presented exceptionally strong evidence, including DNA, cell phone records placing the accused near the crime scene and a pawnshop where victims' items were sold, and testimony from five witnesses alleging confessions or suspicious inquiries.

The proposed sureties, the accused's mother and a friend, were deemed weak due to lack of positive influence, lack of knowledge about the accused's history, and questionable commitment to surety duties.

The court found that electronic monitoring could not compensate for the weak sureties and dismissed the application on both secondary and tertiary grounds, confirming the accused's continued detention pending trial.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant purchaser for a failed real estate transaction and added their own lawyers, KGB, as a defendant solely because KGB held the deposit in trust.

The defendant purchaser crossclaimed against KGB for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act, alleging KGB negligently drafted the agreement of purchase and sale.

KGB moved to strike the crossclaim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motion, finding that KGB owed no duty of care to the opposing party and that the underlying dispute was framed in contract, not negligence.

The crossclaim was struck without leave to amend.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary an interim child support order, arguing his income had decreased after he accepted a promotion to a managerial position that did not offer overtime pay.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing the father was intentionally under-employed to avoid paying child support.

The court found that the father's new position was a legitimate career advancement that increased his base salary, and he was not intentionally under-employed.

The court granted the motion to vary child support based on the father's reduced income, resulting in a set-off amount payable by the mother.

The moving party (defendant) sought summary judgment dismissing the responding party's (plaintiff's) action for a 50% interest in a residential property, or alternatively, an order for partition and sale.

The parties are sisters.

The moving party is the sole registered owner, but the responding party resides in the property and claims a beneficial interest based on an alleged written agreement.

The court found the alleged agreement to be invalid and likely forged, relying on expert handwriting evidence and factual inconsistencies.

However, the court concluded a trial was necessary to determine if the responding party had any monetary claim to the property's proceeds based on her financial contributions.

The court ordered the property sold, with 50% of the net proceeds paid to the moving party and the remaining 50% paid into court pending trial.

The defendants, former legal counsel for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence action.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants breached the standard of care during an underlying personal injury trial by failing to advise him about an updated loss of income report and abandoning his future loss of income claim without instructions.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The evidence demonstrated the plaintiff was aware of the supplementary report, understood the significant risks of proceeding to trial, and insisted on proceeding despite his lawyers' advice to settle or dismiss the action without costs.

The plaintiffs moved for approval of a settlement agreement and class counsel fees in a product liability class action concerning defective Takata airbags installed in Honda vehicles.

The settlement provided a recall remedy, reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, and an outreach program, though its total monetary value was not readily calculable.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant safety risks addressed.

The court also approved class counsel's fee request of $5,750,000 plus disbursements, finding it reasonable given the risks undertaken and the results achieved.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) regarding a jointly purchased investment property.

The applicants argued that the motion had already been settled via email correspondence between counsel.

The court found that the email exchange constituted a binding settlement agreement to consent to the CPL order while reserving costs.

Alternatively, the court held that a CPL was justified on the merits, as there was a triable issue regarding the parties' respective interests in the property.

The motion was granted.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record, arguing that counsel's ongoing business relationship with the plaintiff would inevitably make him a witness regarding the plaintiff's loss of income claim.

The court applied the factors from Essa (Township) v. Guergis and found the motion premature, as the plaintiff's income loss claim was currently based solely on tax returns.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew if the plaintiff pursues an income loss claim inconsistent with his tax returns.

The applicant brought a motion to incorporate and enforce the terms of interim and final family arbitration awards.

The respondent, who was self-represented, requested an adjournment which was denied.

The court granted the motion, incorporating the arbitration awards into a court order and directing the respondent to comply within ten days.

The court also dispensed with the respondent's consent for the release of funds held in an Australian bank and ordered the respondent to provide disclosure regarding the sale of the former matrimonial home.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice due to trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The trial, arising from a 2012 motor vehicle accident, had been adjourned multiple times and was scheduled for February 2021 in London, Ontario.

Given the suspension of civil jury trials, the elderly plaintiff's failing health, and the financial hardship of the co-plaintiff, the court found that further delay would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering the trial to proceed judge-alone unless jury trials resumed by the trial date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that further delay of their motor vehicle accident trial would cause prejudice.

The court reviewed the current state of court operations in London and the evolving jurisprudence on striking juries during the pandemic.

Adopting a 'wait and see' approach, the court found it premature to strike the jury notice for a trial scheduled three months away.

The motion was dismissed, but the plaintiffs were granted leave to renew the motion if jury trials are cancelled for the scheduled trial period.

The accused was charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and multiple firearms offences following a police investigation into her boyfriend's drug dealing.

Police observed the boyfriend conducting drug transactions from the accused's car and later executed search warrants, finding drugs at an apartment and a firearm in the accused's bedroom.

The court found the accused not guilty on all charges, concluding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the drugs found at the apartment, or that she knowingly possessed the firearm, particularly given her boyfriend's spontaneous confession that he had hidden the gun in her room without her knowledge.

The applicant church sought an interim injunction to exempt it from O. Reg. 82/20, which restricted religious gatherings to a maximum of ten people in regions designated as Stage 1 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The church argued the regulation infringed its freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the church established a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm.

However, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, as the public interest in protecting health and preventing the spread of COVID-19 outweighed the temporary restriction on the church's religious freedom.

The application for an interim injunction was dismissed.