SCJ 2020

The applicant, an unsecured creditor, sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to sue the licensed insolvency trustee.

She alleged the trustee improperly accepted an assignment in bankruptcy made by the bankrupt's wife using a power of attorney, arguing the power of attorney was defective and the wife was an undischarged bankrupt.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the power of attorney was valid, the wife was not mentally incapable under the Substitute Decisions Act, and the proposed claim disclosed no cause of action against the trustee.

Following the dismissal of a class action concerning medical device implants, the Crown sought over $6.3 million in costs.

The plaintiff argued for no costs based on public interest and access to justice principles under the Class Proceedings Act, and sought costs for an unproven fraud allegation against a witness.

The court significantly reduced the Crown's costs to $385,000, noting the public interest nature of the case, the access to justice mandate, and the Crown's own contribution to the 20-year delay.

OHIP was ordered to pay 10% of the costs, with the remainder payable by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

Class Counsel brought a motion for approval of a further instalment of fees in an ongoing competition law class action regarding alleged price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs had settled with fourteen groups of defendants and the action continued against the remaining non-settling defendants.

The court reviewed the risks undertaken, the results achieved, and the docketed time, finding the requested fees of $6,325,000, plus costs and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable.

The fee request was approved.

The plaintiffs in a class action regarding foreign exchange price fixing brought a motion to amend the Distribution Protocol for the $110 million settlement proceeds.

The proposed amendments included transferring unused funds from the Indirect Claims Fund to the Direct Claims Fund, setting a minimum $1,000 payout for approved Direct Claimants, and removing the requirement to consider compensation received in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, finding the amendments were administrative, imposed no additional burden on the defendants, and fell within the court's broad discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent had fled a car accident and was found hiding in her parents' shed after police conducted a warrantless search of her own home next door.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's finding that the warrantless search of the respondent's home violated s. 8 and was sufficiently connected to the discovery of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, on trial for first-degree murder, sought disclosure of police records relating to recent murder charges against a key Crown witness.

The records were held by a different police force and Crown office than those prosecuting the applicant.

The court determined that the third-party records regime under O'Connor applied, rather than the first-party Stinchcombe regime, because the prosecuting Crown did not have possession of the records and they were not 'obviously relevant' to the applicant's case.

Applying the O'Connor test, the court found the records were likely relevant to the witness's credibility and ordered their production to the defence.

The plaintiff estate moved for summary judgment for $100,000 in damages against the defendant, who had previously been convicted of arson for starting a fire in the deceased's condominium while intoxicated.

The defendant did not respond to the motion.

The court found no serious issue requiring a trial, as the defendant admitted to carelessly starting the fire, which caused significant damage to the unit and common areas.

The court granted summary judgment for the requested $100,000, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

The accused, charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences, underwent a 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused proposed a release plan involving a surety and GPS monitoring.

The court found the release plan inadequate and ordered the accused's continued detention, concluding it was justified under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, despite the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional institutions.

The plaintiff brought an action against his former employee and her company for repayment of an alleged oral loan used to lease a commercial truck.

The defendants argued the funds were a gift or, alternatively, loaned to the corporation rather than the individual defendant.

The court assessed the credibility of the parties and concluded the funds were a loan made personally to the individual defendant.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff in the amount of $34,459, representing the proven advances, plus 5% interest pursuant to the Interest Act.

The applicant, charged with domestic assault and related offences, sought a bail variation under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to remove a no-contact condition and return to the family home.

The complainant supported the variation and recanted her initial allegations.

The court dismissed the application, citing a history of violence, the use of a weapon, a previous bail breach, and the transparent nature of the recantation.

The court emphasized the need to protect the complainant and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, while ordering an expedited trial to mitigate the hardship of the bail conditions.

The defendant requested an order dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff claimed $500,000 against a family court supervisor, alleging obstruction and bias in her ongoing divorce proceeding.

The court found the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and appeared to be an impermissible collateral attack on the family court proceeding.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, subject to the plaintiff requesting a case conference to propose viable amendments.

During a homicide proceeding, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent from the deceased's phone to her father shortly before her death.

The Crown argued the messages were admissible to show the deceased's state of mind and to help establish the date of death.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, finding the messages admissible to show the deceased's intention that the accused move out of their shared apartment, and relevant to the date of death.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of an insurance contract and bad faith following a house fire.

The parties had previously engaged in an appraisal process under s. 128 of the Insurance Act but disagreed on the interpretation of the resulting report, specifically regarding deductions for prior payments and entitlement to replacement cost value versus actual cash value.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of credibility regarding the appraisal discussions, the cause of the delay in rebuilding, and the bad faith allegations that required a trial.

The court also granted in part the defendant's motion to strike certain paragraphs of the plaintiff's Reply.

At a case conference in a proposed class action regarding denied trip cancellation benefits due to COVID-19, the court determined the sequencing of a proposed Rule 21 motion by the defendant bank and the plaintiff's certification motion.

The court held that hearing the Rule 21 motion prior to certification would not substantially narrow the issues, as the substantive claims against the co-defendant insurer would remain identical.

Exercising its discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, the court ordered the Rule 21 motion to be heard at the same time as the certification motion.

The applicant, an incumbent biomedical waste disposal provider, challenged the award of a new primary supplier contract to a competitor.

The applicant alleged that the respondents engaged in bid repair and breached their duty of fairness by allowing the competitor to delay the implementation of services and assisting them with regulatory approvals post-award.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the duty of fairness to unsuccessful bidders ended once the contract was awarded, and that the post-award communications were operational in nature and did not constitute bid repair.

The court also rejected the argument that the respondents had irrevocably elected the applicant as the primary supplier by utilizing their services during the transition period.

The applicant father successfully opposed the respondent mother's motion to temporarily relocate their child to Kapuskasing for her employment.

Following the dismissal of the relocation motion, the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $11,245.65.

The court found the applicant was the more successful party but noted the respondent had some success regarding parenting time.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $8,500, noting the respondent should be sanctioned with substantial indemnity costs for a portion of the proceedings due to seeking orders post-hearing without a notice of motion or supporting evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80 care and control' after being found asleep in his parked vehicle, which was blocking a commercial driveway.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis that the vehicle's position created a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, satisfying the third limb of the test for care and control.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied to be seated outside the prisoner's dock during jury selection and trial.

He argued that sitting in the dock would reflect negatively on the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the seating of the accused is within the trial judge's discretion and that the customary position in the dock does not violate Charter rights or undermine the presumption of innocence.

The accused brought a Charter application to stay firearm charges or exclude a seized firearm, alleging excessive force during his arrest and breaches of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not use excessive force when arresting the fleeing accused.

The court also found no s. 7 breach regarding an officer commanding a witness to stop recording the arrest, as there was no actual prejudice to the accused's defence.

However, the Crown conceded that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were violated when an officer denigrated duty counsel's advice and threatened to charge the accused's family members if he did not confess.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the long-term repute of the justice system.

In an insurance coverage action, the parties brought three motions regarding discovery refusals and the examination of a second discovery representative.

The judge determined that the motions were within the jurisdiction of a Master and, pursuant to the Toronto Region Consolidated Practice Direction, transferred the motions to a Master for determination.

The judge also ordered a case conference to address procedural deficiencies and ensure the orderly development of the motions for hearing.