Court File and Parties

Oshawa Court File No.: CR-18-14930 Date: 2020-01-14 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Her Majesty the Queen – and – Maneet Bajwa, Defendant

Counsel: Michael Hill, for the Crown Sandip Khehra, for the Defendant

Heard: December 2, 2019

Reasons for Sentence

Leibovich, J.

Overview

[1] Ms. Bajwa was charged with six gun-related offences relating to a December 12, 2017 purchase of two Glock firearms. Ms. Bajwa’s trial proceeded before me, sitting without a jury, on October 7, 2019. On October 10, 2019, I delivered written reasons, R. v. Bajwa, 2019 ONSC 5881, and convicted Ms. Bajwa of all counts. The matter was adjourned to December 12, 2019 for submissions on sentencing. Counsel for Ms. Bajwa asks that I strike down the mandatory minimum sentence in s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code and impose a sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community, a conditional sentence. The Crown submits that the convictions merit a sentence of three years, therefore I need not consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence. All parties agree that I should impose a DNA order, a weapons prohibition order, and a non-communication order with respect to Mr. Welch. The matter was adjourned to today, January 14, 2020, for my decision on sentencing.

The approach to assessing the constitutional validity of section 99(2) of the Criminal Code

[2] Section 99(2) of the Criminal Code requires an accused who is convicted of trafficking a firearm to receive a minimum sentence of three years for a first offence. In determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter, one must apply the analytical framework set out in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, at para. 46. Under Nur, the court must first determine what constitutes a proportionate sentence in view of the objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code and then determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence requires the judge to impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to a fit and appropriate sentence. If not, the court must then consider whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

Question 1: Does the mandatory minimum sentence require me to impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to a fit and appropriate sentence

[3] The first stage of the analysis is to determine what would be a fit sentence in this case, having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the range of similar sentences and the principals and objectives of sentencing.

Circumstances of the Offence

[4] Ms. Bajwa had a restricted firearm license that allowed her to buy firearms and transport them to her residence at 383 West Canal Bank Road in Bradford. Mr. Welch, Ms. Bajwa’s ex-boyfriend and the father of her daughter, did not have a license. On October 27, 2017, Ms. Bajwa purchased two Glock handguns and paid $1,769.07 in cash. Mr. Welch was with her at the time. Later that day, Mr. Welch and Ms. Bajwa had a subsequent discussion about the guns selected and whether Mr. Welch wanted her to change them. He said no. Ms. Bajwa picked up the guns on December 12, 2017. She drove to Mr. Welch’s residence and then delivered the guns. On December 13, 2017, the police executed a dynamic entry of Ms. Bajwa’s mother’s house in Brampton at 7:00 a.m. and arrested Ms. Bajwa. The police arrested Mr. Welch at his residence. A search of Mr. Welch’s residence uncovered the Glocks purchased by Ms. Bajwa in their original boxes with the trigger locks in the boxes but not attached to the handguns, and .4 grams of cocaine. Mr. Welch’s fingerprint was located on one of the Glocks. Initially, Mr. Welch was charged with Ms. Bajwa. I severed their trials. Mr. Welch’s trial has not yet been scheduled.

[5] Ms. Bajwa, through counsel, admitted the Crown’s case, and an agreed statement of facts was filed with related exhibits at her trial. Ms. Bajwa testified that she was threatened with harm to herself, her fiancé, and her daughter from two unknown males if she did not obtain the two Glock firearms. It was submitted that she acted under duress. I did not accept Ms. Bajwa’s evidence, nor did it raise a reasonable doubt. I found that even if it had raised a reasonable doubt the Crown had disproven the defence of duress beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, I found that the Crown had proven the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

[6] The Crown at sentencing wishes to rely on the additional aggravating factors which are set out in the agreed statement of facts, marked as Exhibit 2 on sentencing. At trial it was known that Ms. Bajwa had previously purchased two firearms. What was unknown was what happened to those firearms. The agreed statement of facts seeks to fill those gaps. The defence submits that the Crown should be precluded from relying on the information contained in the agreed statement of facts since they were the subject matter of two charges for which Ms. Bajwa was discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

[7] Evidence that discloses the commission by the offender of other untried offences is admissible at a sentencing hearing for the purpose of showing the offender's background and character, as that background and character may be relevant to the objectives of sentencing; R. v. Edwards, 54 O.R. (3d) 737 at paras 62-64; R. v. Deiaco, 2019 ONCA 12 at para. 5.

[8] The Court has a discretion to not hear the evidence. In R. v. Edwards, at para. 64, Rosenberg J.A. provided the following very helpful list of factors to consider in deciding how to exercise the discretion:

(i) the nexus between the evidence and the offence for which the offender was convicted -- the closer the connection the more likely the evidence will shed light on the circumstances of the charged offence;

(ii) the similarity between the evidence and the offence for which the offender was convicted;

(iii) the difficulty the offender may encounter in properly defending against the allegations in the proposed evidence;

(iv) the danger that the sentence hearing will be unduly prolonged;

(v) the danger that the focus of the sentence hearing will appear to be diverted from the true purpose of imposing a fit sentence for the charged offence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender in accordance with s. 718.1;

(vi) whether the offender has adduced evidence of good character; and

(vii) the cogency of the proposed evidence.

[9] The list of factors is not a closed list and other considerations apply. I agree that the fact that the accused was discharged at the preliminary inquiry in relation to her involvement in the previous purchase of two guns is a factor to consider but it is not a bar to admission. A preliminary inquiry is not a trial, a discharge is not tantamount to an acquittal as an accused’s guilt or innocence is not then determined. Rather, a preliminary inquiry is a pre-trial screening procedure aimed at filtering out weak cases that do not merit trial. Furthermore, a ruling by a preliminary inquiry judge is not binding on myself; R. v. Hynes, 2001 SCC 82, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 623, at paras. 30-31, 38, 43; R. v. S.J.L., 2009 SCC 14, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 426, at para 21; R. v. R.S., 2019 ONCA 906 at paras. 48-51.

[10] Applying the list above and considering the fact that the accused was discharged at the preliminary inquiry, I would nevertheless allow the additional factors set out in the agreed statement of facts to be admitted for the purpose of showing the offender’s background and character as those factors are critical in determining a fit sentence in this case. The proposed evidence is cogent, contained, and balanced. It has been presented as an agreed statement of facts. It deals with similar allegations to the charges that the accused was convicted and does shed some light on the circumstances of the offence. And while the agreed statement of facts contains aggravating factors it also contains relevant positive information about the offender. At the end of the day, Ms. Bajwa is being sentenced for the offences that I found her guilty of on October 10, 2019.

[11] Exhibit 2 establishes that Ms. Bajwa had previously legally purchased two other handguns. When Ms. Bajwa initially purchased the handguns, she stored them as required at her residence in Bradford. When Ms. Bajwa moved back in with her mother in Brampton, she left the guns with Mr. Welch’s brother-in-law, who Ms. Bajwa believed was a lawful registered firearms owner and had a proper safe. She knowingly did not comply with the law and change the registered address for the handguns. When the police executed a search warrant on Mr. Welch’s residence on December 13, 2018, they found an empty gun box for one of those handguns with the serial number printed on the box. This gun has never been recovered, but pictures of this gun were found on another man’s cell phone (who was arrested by the Durham Regional Police Service’s human trafficking unit). When the police executed a search warrant on Mr. Welch’s residence on December 13, 2018, they also found an empty gun box that matched the other handgun, but the box did not have a serial number on it. That gun was located on the kitchen floor of a drug arrest involving six people. The gun was loaded, and a large quantity of crack cocaine, fentanyl and Canadian currency was found at the scene.

[12] After she was arrested, Ms. Bajwa and her counsel spoke with the police and the Crown’s office and gave them the information they had with respect to where she believed the guns were. She believed that they were at the brother-in-law’s residence, but she did not have the address. The cooperation effort was frustrated by Mr. Welch’s family members who would not assist.

Circumstances of the Offender

[13] Ms. Bajwa is now 26 years old and was 24 years old at the time of the offence. She was born in Etobicoke but raised in Brampton with her mother and brother. She was raised in a conservative Sikh home with few freedoms. She was not allowed to have any boyfriends, or date. Her father was physically abusive to her mother and struggled with alcoholism. Ms. Bajwa witnessed the abuse. Her father left the family when she was in grade 4 and she was raised by her mother. Her father died in 2018 but she was unable to attend the funeral as she was on release for the current charges.

[14] Ms. Bajwa did not have a lot of money growing up. As noted by her brother in his letter filed at sentencing:

Maneet has lived a very difficult life. From a young age, we would happily run around the shopping mall parking lots collecting quarters from abandoned shopping carts in freezing temperatures just to purchase our bread and milk.

[15] Ms. Bajwa took a dental hygiene course in Barrie and completed a dental assistant program. It was in Barrie that she met Mr. Welch. They have a daughter together. As she explained during her testimony at trial, because she was not married and because Mr. Welch is black, she felt that she could not tell her family about her daughter and she kept it a secret until her daughter was two years old. When told, her brother and mother were very upset and heartbroken. Ms. Bajwa’s mother did allow Ms. Bajwa to move back in with her after Ms. Bajwa broke up with Mr. Welch, although Ms. Bajwa’s daughter stayed with Mr. Welch. Ms. Bajwa has allowed Mr. Welch to have sole custody of their daughter. Ms. Bajwa believed that this was for the best because her daughter would never be accepted by her family. Ms. Bajwa did not want her to be raised in such an unaccepting environment.

[16] Ms. Bajwa met her current husband in March 2017. They were engaged in September 2017 and now live with their new son, who is eight months old, in British Columbia. Ms. Bajwa worked at a dental clinic in British Columbia.

[17] While her relationship with her family was strained because of her relationship with Mr. Welch and the birth of their child, it appears that she now has strong family support. Letters from Ms. Bajwa’s brother, two cousins, two sisters-in-law, and her husband have been filed. Without minimizing the seriousness of the current offences, the letters speak to Ms. Bajwa’s general good character, their affection for Ms. Bajwa and their strong belief that she will lead a pro-social life.

[18] The author of the pre-sentence report states that Ms. Bajwa minimized her behaviour. Ms. Bajwa disputes this. She has filed a statement at sentencing and spoke at the sentencing hearing. She is unsure why the author of the pre-sentence report made this comment. She understands the severity of what she has done. She believes it was a miscommunication as she was unsure what she could say to the author. Mr. Khehra, counsel for Ms. Bajwa, notes that the author of the report did not have the reasons for judgement and only had the police synopsis.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[19] The nature of the offence is an aggravating factor. The trafficking of firearms is an inherently dangerous offence that could lead to serious injury or death. The guns were fortunately recovered in this case. There are a number of mitigating factors. They are:

1. Ms. Bajwa has no criminal record;
2. Ms. Bajwa had a difficult childhood;
3. Ms. Bajwa is a youthful offender;
4. Ms. Bajwa now has excellent family support;
5. Ms. Bajwa has a new child;
6. Ms. Bajwa has very strong prospects of rehabilitation;
7. While Ms. Bajwa did not plead guilty, she admitted the Crown’s case, saving significant court time; and
8. There is no evidence that Ms. Bajwa gained financially or otherwise by this transaction.

Positions of Counsel

[20] It is the Crown’s submission that while Ms. Bajwa did not herself use a firearm, her actions facilitated the use of guns by others. Ms. Bajwa abused the government’s trust in issuing her a license. She claims to be sorry, but her exculpatory explanation has been rejected. She is sorry for being caught. The mandatory minimum sentence is appropriate. Mr. Khehra submits that the mandatory minimum sentence is, as numerous other courts have found, unconstitutional. A conditional sentence can be sufficient to deter Ms. Bajwa and give effect to the principles of denunciation and general deterrence. Ms. Bajwa has excellent prospects of rehabilitation. There was no motivation for the offence, and it is evident that she was used by Mr. Welch.

Analysis

[21] Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the following in terms of the purpose of sentencing:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

a. to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; b. to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; c. to separate offenders from society, where necessary; d. to assist in rehabilitating offenders; e. to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and f. to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[22] Further, s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that:

A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[23] Trafficking in firearms is an extremely serious offence. In sentencing for this offence, rehabilitation cannot be ignored but the principles of denunciation and deterrence are of paramount concern; R. v. Slack, 2015 ONCA 94, 125 O.R. (3d) 60 at para. 23, R. v. Brown, 2010 ONCA 745; R. v. Delchev, 2014 ONCA 448; R. v. Dufour, 2015 ONCA 426; R. v. Villella, [2006] O.J. No. 4690 (S.C.J.) at para. 46, R. v. Marakah, 2015 ONSC 1576 at para. 41; and R. v. Mark, 2018 ONSC 447, at para. 25. Molloy J. in R. v. Hanse, 2019 ONSC 1640 at paras. 24-29 conducted a helpful review of the legions of cases that have pointed out that the problem of firearms in the Greater Toronto Area require the imposition of exemplary sentences.

[24] I rejected Ms. Bajwa’s evidence that she was under threat from two unknown males. Therefore, the motive for the offence and the scope and exact nature of the scheme are unknown. However, it is evident that this was not a regulatory offence, and this was what has become known in the cases as a true crime offence. I am mindful that Ms. Bajwa did not blame Mr. Welch for the transaction. Therefore, I must be careful not to engage in speculation or conjecture. However, the following facts are not in dispute. The beneficiary of Ms. Bajwa’s valid firearm license was Mr. Welch. The guns ended up at his house. Ms. Bajwa sought confirmation with him that the guns were okay. The admitted facts with respect to Ms. Bajwa’s two other guns, while showing her engaged in a pattern of worrisome conduct, also point to Mr. Welch as the beneficiary. There is no evidence that Ms. Bajwa received anything from this transaction. Ms. Bajwa, at the time of the offence, had everything to lose and nothing to gain. She was engaged to her fiancé who came from a very financially comfortable family. She had access to money, if needed. I don’t have any evidence regarding why Ms. Bajwa assisted Mr. Welch but it is also not disputed that Ms. Bajwa is indebted to Mr. Welch for raising their daughter, as their daughter is, through no fault of her own, ostracized from Ms. Bajwa’s family [1]. Ms. Bajwa is now removed from Mr. Welch’s influence. As stated, her prospects of rehabilitation are very strong. She can lead a pro-social life.

[25] I found the cases of R. v. Hewitt, 2018 ONCA 561, R. v. De Vos, 2018 ONSC 6813, and R. v. Sauve, 2018 ONSC 7375, to be the most helpful in establishing what a fit sentence would be in this case. In R. v. Hewitt, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a three-year sentence as within the range for similar offences and offenders and therefore declined to consider the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum. In that case, the accused pleaded guilty, had a very troubled personal history and was a first-time offender when she committed the index offence. She transferred nine non-restricted long guns, some without serial numbers, and at least one of which was stolen. She admitted that she asked for payment and admitted that she suspected the guns were stolen. At the time of transfer, she was subject to a prohibition order against possessing any weapons. The sentence imposed was pursuant to a joint submission.

[26] In R. v. De Vos, 2018 ONSC 6813, Corrick J. imposed an 18-month sentence on the accused. Mr. De Vos legally purchased three Glock handguns on two different occasions, and transferred them to his cocaine supplier, a known violent criminal. The firearms were ultimately trafficked by the supplier to two different people. Mr. De Vos’s defence of duress was rejected at trial on the basis that Mr. De Vos had a safe avenue of escape. Mr. De Vos was 36 years old and had no criminal record, had been steadily employed and had overcome his 15-year cocaine addiction. He cooperated against his supplier with the police, admitted the Crown’s case and had excellent rehabilitation prospects. Corrick J. rejected a conditional sentence, noting at paras 52 and 53 that:

Justice Lamer held in R. v. Proulx that conditional sentences can meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in some cases. However, he also noted that there will be cases, “in which the need for denunciation is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society's condemnation of the offender's conduct.”

Mr. De Vos’ illegal transfer of three handguns to a known violent criminal warrants a custodial sentence to adequately express society's condemnation of this conduct and to address the principle of general deterrence.

[27] However, a conditional sentence was imposed for a first-time 19-year-old offender with strong prospects of rehabilitation in R. v. Sauve, 2018 ONSC 7375. Lacelle J. noted at paras. 47 and 48 that:

So, there can be no doubt that significant sentences will be imposed depending on the circumstances. The sentences are generally jail sentences. The cases make clear that for offenders with prior criminal records, or connections to gang activity, organized crime, or a drug subculture, sentences will be in the penitentiary range. But there are myriad cases that fall below that range as well.

As I have said, in this instance, I am dealing with a youthful first offender. On the facts as I have found them, Mr. Sauve was involved in a single instance of weapons trafficking. I have no reason to doubt the evidence given in his videotaped statement that he participated in the offence at the invitation of his friend, Mr. Stewart. There is no evidence that Mr. Sauve profited from this activity, that he organized it, or that he is otherwise connected to or a participant in the subcultures typically associated with this conduct. Nevertheless, the offences are serious, and attract consideration of general deterrence and denunciation. The public must be protected from activity of this kind. However, the primary principles I must apply are individual deterrence and the rehabilitation of Mr. Sauve. I must show restraint in determining whether a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate, and in determining the length of that sentence.

[28] The circumstances of this case merit a sentence significantly lower than the sentence imposed in R. v. Hewitt, which was the result of a joint submission. A court will not depart from a joint submission unless the proposed sentence is contrary to the public interest. While the sentence imposed in that case again shows the need to impose exemplary sentences even for first-time offenders, the facts there are more serious than in this case. The accused profited from the venture, sold nine guns, some or all of which were stolen and was subject to a weapons prohibition order. While the circumstances in R. v. De Vos and R. v. Sauve are not exactly the same as the present case, they are sufficiently similar to be of guidance as to the appropriate sentence. In my view, having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the range of similar sentences and the principals and objectives of sentencing, an appropriate sentence would be a 12-month sentence. I will address whether the custodial sentence should be served in the community or not momentarily.

[29] Mandatory minimum sentences, by their very nature, have the potential to depart from the principle of proportionality in sentencing. As stated by C.J. McLachlin in R. v. Nur, at para. 44:

Mandatory minimum sentences, by their very nature, have the potential to depart from the principle of proportionality in sentencing. They emphasize denunciation, general deterrence and retribution at the expense of what is a fit sentence for the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the crime. They function as a blunt instrument that may deprive courts of the ability to tailor proportionate sentences at the lower end of a sentencing range. They may, in extreme cases, impose unjust sentences, because they shift the focus from the offender during the sentencing process in a way that violates the principle of proportionality. They modify the general process of sentencing which relies on the review of all relevant factors in order to reach a proportionate result. They affect the outcome of the sentence by changing the normal judicial process of sentencing.

[30] Therefore, the court must determine if the sentence imposed is not just disproportionate but grossly disproportionate. Grossly disproportionate is a high bar to meet. As stated by Trotter J.A. in R. v. Cowell, 2019 ONCA 972, [2019] O.J. No. 6284 at para. 119:

A mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter if it is grossly disproportionate: Morrison, at para. 164. Section 12 of the Charter prohibits any “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” The “gross disproportionality” test that has developed under s. 12 presents a high bar: Morrison, at para. 165. The punishment must be “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” (citations omitted): R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1072; see also Miller v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, at p. 688. Moreover, the threshold for gross disproportionality captures conduct that Canadians would find “abhorrent or intolerable”: R. v. Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 26.

[31] I have found that a fit sentence would be 12 months. The mandatory minimum would require me to impose a sentence two years longer. This would be in my view, a grossly disproportionate sentence and a violation of Ms. Bajwa’s s. 12 Charter rights. Accordingly, I find that s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code violates s. 12 of the Charter and is of no force and effect. Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentence does not apply.

[32] I note that the three-year mandatory minimum sentence has been found to be unconstitutional in R. v. Hussain, 2015 ONSC 7115, R. v. Harriot, 2017 ONSC 3393, R. v. De Vos and R. v. Sauve. Counsel have not suggested that these decisions are binding upon me, but Mr. Khehra submits that they are not clearly wrong and should be followed. Recently, in R. v. Gordon, 2019 ONSC 6508, Forestell J. reviewed the jurisprudence regarding whether a declaration of unconstitutionality by one Superior Court judge binds her fellow Superior Court judges. She followed the line of cases started by Strathy J. (as he then was), in R. v. Scarlett, 2013 ONSC 562 where he stated at para. 43:

The decisions of judges of coordinate jurisdiction, while not absolutely binding, should be followed in the absence of cogent reasons to depart from them: see Re Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd., […] R. v. Northern Electric Co. Ltd., […] Reasons to depart from a decision, referred to in Hansard Spruce Mills, include (a) that the validity of the judgment has been affected by subsequent decisions; (b) that the judge overlooked some binding case law or a relevant statute; or (c) that the decision was otherwise made without full consideration. These circumstances could be summed up by saying that the judgment should be followed unless the subsequent judge is satisfied that it was plainly wrong…

[33] Forestell J. concluded on this issue at para. 14 that:

I also agree that in this case, where there is a prior decision declaring the Act unconstitutional, I should follow that decision unless it is plainly wrong. The decision should be followed unless there are cogent reasons to depart from it.

[34] I agree that this is the appropriate approach, and while I have arrived at this decision independently of my colleagues, I find that the decisions referenced above declaring s. 99(2) unconstitutional are not plainly wrong and should be followed.

Question 2: Should the sentence be served in the community?

[35] As mentioned, the offence of trafficking a firearm requires the imposition of an exemplary sentence to denounce the conduct and deter others. The wreckage caused by the criminal use of firearms cannot be overstated. Those that transfer firearms to those who are not entitled to possess them bear responsibility for any criminal act that the gun is used for, whether to kill, injure, intimidate or aid in the commission of another offence. It is rare that a conditional sentence would be sufficient to denounce and deter this conduct. I have indicated that in my view a 12-month sentence is appropriate. Having a 12 month sentence served in the community would not be sufficient to denounce and condemn Ms. Bajwa’s conduct. However, Counsel for Ms. Bajwa has suggested a longer conditional sentence of two years less a day. Ms. Bajwa has also served eight days in pre-sentence custody, which with 1.5 credit is the equivalent of 12 days. A two years less a day conditional sentence involving virtual house arrest with extremely limited exceptions can, in the rather unique circumstances of this case, be sufficient to denounce Ms. Bajwa’s conduct and deter others. It must be remembered that Ms. Bajwa is a youthful first offender who had a difficult childhood and was raised in a home not open enough to enable her to disclose for two years the existence of her daughter. The charges resulted from one transaction that benefitted only Mr. Welch, not Ms. Bajwa. The guns were, thankfully, recovered the next day. Ms. Bajwa cooperated with the authorities and she admitted the Crown’s case. Ms. Bajwa has made terrible decisions. However, it is also evident that she has excellent prospects of rehabilitation and can lead a pro-social life.

Disposition

[36] Therefore, I impose the following sentence:

1. Count 3 – two years less a day sentence, less credit for 12 days pre-sentence custody, to be served in the community upon the mandatory terms set out in s. 742.3(1) of the Code, and the following conditions:

a) Remain in your residence at all times, subject to the following exceptions and the travel related to those exceptions: * scheduled meetings with your conditional sentence supervisor; * attendance at your place of worship, reported in advance to the supervisor; * medical appointments for yourself, or son, reported in advance to the supervisor; * performance of 200 hours of community service as approved and coordinated by her conditional sentence supervisor; * not to communicate with Mr. Welch, except through counsel in relation to family law matters or Mr. Welch’s related criminal matter; * such further and other exceptions as may be approved in advance by your supervisor.

For sake of clarity, Ms. Bajwa is allowed to travel to British Columbia to serve her sentence at her residence there.

2. Concurrent sentences for counts 1, 2 and 4.
3. A lifetime weapons prohibition order and DNA order shall be imposed.
4. Counts 5 and 6 shall be stayed pursuant to the principles set out in R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

The Honourable Justice H. Leibovich Released: January 14, 2020

Footnote

[1] Trial Exhibit 9 is an angry text threatening Ms. Bajwa not to try and blame Mr. Welch for what happened. The text also states that it is Mr. Welch who takes care of her daughter. I found that the text did not make Ms. Bajwa’s testimony about the unknown assailants any more or less believable. However, it does acknowledge the obvious that Ms. Bajwa is beholden to Mr. Welch for raising their daughter.