COURT FILE NO.: FC-06-14031
DATE: 2019/12/11
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Workie Woubeshaw, Applicant
-and-
Alemayehu Workeneh, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern
COUNSEL: Applicant, Self-Represented
Respondent, Self-Represented
HEARD: October 22, 2019
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This is in a motion and cross-motion for various interim relief. Both parties seek exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, custody of the children, and child support. Each party also seeks various other relief.
[2] Ms. Woubeshaw commenced this Application in 2014. There was an earlier proceeding commenced in 2006 that was dismissed for delay in 2007. The parties separated at the end of August 2014.
[3] The parties were married in 1994 in Ethiopia. They have two children: Y.G., born September 11, 2002, 17 years of age, and F.G., born May 20, 2009, 10 years of age.
[4] The matrimonial home is located at [XXX], Ottawa, Ontario. Mr. Workeneh and the children have resided in the matrimonial home since 2017. Ms. Woubeshaw is currently living in her car. Ms. Woubeshaw moved out of the matrimonial home at least two years ago, leaving the children in the care of Mr. Workeneh. Ms. Woubeshaw has stayed at shelters but states she was evicted. She now wishes to live in the matrimonial home with the children, where she states no one will bother her.
[5] Mr. Workeneh’s evidence is that the matrimonial home is registered in his sole name. Ms. Woubeshaw does not contest this, although I have not been provided with a copy of the land registration to confirm ownership.
[6] Neither party has filed an updated sworn financial statement as required under the Family Law Rules[^1]. The Continuing Record contains two financial statements for Mr. Workeneh, one sworn on July 23, 2019, and one sworn on December 14, 2014. The Continuing Record contains one financial statement for Ms. Woubeshaw, sworn on July 16, 2019. The Continuing Record contains copies of Mr. Workeneh’s notices of assessment for 2011, 2012 and 2013. It does not contain any tax returns and notices of assessment for Ms. Woubeshaw, nor any more recent tax information for Mr. Workeneh.
[7] Mr. Workeneh is employed with Bee Clean Baggage Service. In his financial statement sworn July 23, 2019, Mr. Workeneh states his income is approximately $35,000 per year. He has provided paystubs from March of 2019 in support of this income.
[8] Ms. Woubeshaw states she is self-employed. In her submissions to the court, she states she is developing a business. She has been employed in the past but was terminated. It is not clear when she was terminated. In her financial statement sworn July 16, 2019, Ms. Woubeshaw reports self-employment income of $50 per month. She does not report any other sources of income other than the Child Tax Benefit. Ms. Woubeshaw no longer receives the Child Tax Benefit because the children have not been in her care for approximately two years.
[9] On July 2, 2019, Justice Corthorn made a temporary without prejudice spousal support order requiring Mr. Workeneh to pay $575 per month to Ms. Woubeshaw. Ms. Woubeshaw states she has not yet begun to receive this support through the Family Responsibility Office.
[10] The issues to be decided are as follows:
What custody and access arrangements are in the children’s best interest?
Should either party be granted temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home?
What order should be made for temporary child support?
What order should be made for temporary spousal support?
Should an order be granted restraining either or both parties?
Should an order be made regarding the car loan, psychological damages, life insurance or other insurance, and disclosure of bank statements?
Divorce
[11] Both parties consent to a divorce issuing. A copy of the marriage certificate and certified translation has been filed with the court. Ms. Woubeshaw has filed an affidavit in support of a divorce. There is, however, no clearance certificate on the file, nor have I been provided with a draft divorce order. On consent, I grant an order splitting the corollary relief from the divorce. A divorce may issue upon receipt of a clearance certificate and a draft divorce order that provides for the divorce and for the corollary relief to be split from the divorce.
Procedural History, Previous Court Orders and Motions before me
[12] Both parties have been self-represented for most of this legal proceeding. The material filed in the Continuing Record is difficult to decipher. Most of the material in the court file is handwritten, incomplete, repetitive, and non-material.
[13] There has been significant inactivity in this matter. There were approximately four court appearances in 2014 and 2015. Several temporary and procedural orders were made. After 2015, the court file does not record any activity until January 3, 2019. The evidence does not explain what happened between 2015 and 2019. At some point, the status quo changed from Ms. Woubeshaw residing in the matrimonial home with the children to Mr. Workeneh residing in the matrimonial home with the children. Mr. Workeneh states Ms. Woubeshaw moved out of the matrimonial home and left him with the children, in the home, in 2017. Ms. Woubeshaw does not contest this.
[14] Since January of 2019, there have been six court appearances, none of which have resulted in any significant progress being made towards a final resolution. The procedural history of this matter is set out below.
• On September 9, 2014, Justice Polowin made an ex-parte without prejudice temporary order granting Ms. Woubeshaw temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and to have the children in her care. On September 11, 2014, Justice Beaudoin ordered Justice Polowin’s order to continue and provided for Mr. Workeneh to have access.
• On October 19, 2015, Master Champagne made several orders on consent, including that the parties list the matrimonial home for sale, with the proceeds of sale held in trust. The parties have not sold the matrimonial home. Mr. Workeneh states that the parties agreed not to sell the home. An agreement not to sell the home is consistent with the home still not been sold four years later, the lack of activity on the court file, and that neither party seeks an order for the home to be sold on this motion.
• On January 3, 2019, Justice Roger made an order for each party to provide disclosure and updated, complete financial statements.
• On April 15, 2019, Justice Summers noted that the disclosure Justice Roger ordered was still outstanding. Justice Summers identified that the issues in the proceeding as parenting, child support and equalization. Justice Summers granted leave for interim motions on parenting and the sale of the matrimonial home. She directed these motions to take place within three months, or else the matter should proceed to a settlement conference and then to trial.
• On April 23, 2019, Ms. Woubeshaw attempted to bring an urgent motion seeking exclusive possession and a restraining order. Master Kaufman found that the motion was not urgent and would have to be scheduled on the regular motion list.
• On July 2, 2019, Ms. Woubeshaw brought a motion before Justice Corthorn. Ms. Woubeshaw sought exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, child support, and spousal support. Justice Corthorn made an order granting Ms. Woubeshaw temporary access and temporary without prejudice spousal support of $575 per month. Justice Corthorn adjourned the motion to July 23, 2019, to provide proper service on Mr. Workeneh and time for him to file a response.
• The July 23, 2019 motion date was struck because it was not confirmed as required under the Rules.
• The motion was returned before Justice Ryan Bell on August 8, 2019. The motion was adjourned again. There were issues with service and filing of the motion material, and insufficient time had been set aside to hear the motion and cross-motion.
• Both motions were then returned before me on October 22, 2019, for a long motion.
[15] In her notice of motion filed on August 19, 2019, Ms. Woubeshaw seeks exclusive possession of the matrimonial home for herself and the children, custody of the two children, a restraining order, spousal support, child support, bank statements, $5,000 in damages for psychological harm, life insurance, and a divorce.
[16] In his notice of motion filed on August 8, 2019, Mr. Workeneh seeks child support, payment for a car loan of $7,000, custody, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and an order restraining Ms. Woubeshaw from being close to him or the house.
[17] There are significant deficiencies in the pleadings. Neither party seeks exclusive possession of the matrimonial home in their pleadings. Ms. Woubeshaw’s pleadings do not include a claim for spousal support. There have been several court appearances in this matter. The court record is difficult to follow and incomplete. Many Judges have made efforts to give direction to the parties, largely without success. In all of these circumstances, I order that the parties’ pleadings are deemed to be amended to include Ms. Woubeshaw’s claim to spousal support, Mr. Workeneh’s denial of that claim, and claims by both parties for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. This order is made to avoid wasting further judicial resources and because both parties have been aware of these claims for some time. If either party requires an order for further particulars of these claims, they may seek such by way of a procedural motion.
Issue #1: What custody and access arrangements are in the children’s best interest?
[18] Both parties seek custody of the children and that the children be in their care. I find that it is in the best interests of the children to remain in the temporary care of Mr. Workeneh, pending a final determination at trial.
[19] This finding is based on the following:
• The children have primarily resided in Mr. Workeneh’s care since 2017. The status quo is that Mr. Workeneh has been making the custodial decisions for the children and has been their primary caregiver;
• I do not accept Ms. Woubeshaw’s arguments that there is a basis for changing the status quo at this time. Ms. Woubeshaw’s alleges that the children are at risk of harm in Mr. Workeneh’s care. This allegation is not supported by the lack of intervention by the police (who have been called to intervene repeatedly by both parties), the school officials (the children attend school regularly), and the child protection authorities.
• Ms. Woubeshaw’s evidence acknowledges that the children are expressing views and preferences not to be in her care. Ms. Woubeshaw alleges this is because Mr. Workeneh has brainwashed the children. On the evidence, I find that it is more likely that the children have been exposed to distressing incidents with their mother, and that this provides a rational basis for their reluctance to be in her care. There have been several concerning incidents that Ms. Woubeshaw acknowledges, although in her view, these incidents reflect badly on Mr. Workeneh. One incident took place when Ms. Woubeshaw removed the children in an attempt to relocate them to reside with her at an apartment shelter. The children were upset by this and did not want to go with her. Another incident took place when Ms. Woubeshaw determined that her daughter was sick and needed to be taken to a medical clinic. Her daughter struggled to escape from the car, injuring Ms. Woubeshaw and resulting in a chasing situation on a major roadway. Ms. Woubeshaw’s submissions acknowledge incidents where the children have been distressed by her conduct, including attempting to remove the children. She acknowledges the children are scared to get into her car.
• I am also very concerned about Ms. Woubeshaw’s stability and mental health. Ms. Woubeshaw is having significant challenges in managing day-to-day life. She is not working. She has made little progress in developing her “business” to generate a reasonable amount of income. She is living out of her car, which she parks near the matrimonial home to watch the children. She has been kicked out of various shelters. She is following the children to various events (to the library, to activities, to the doctor, to school). Ms. Woubeshaw acknowledges in her submissions that she is “always” close to the children, which includes parking outside the home. In her submissions, Ms. Woubeshaw also spoke about having “visions” in a manner that raised concerns about whether Ms. Woubeshaw is seeing things that are not visually apparent to mentally healthy individuals.
[20] I also find that it is in the children’s best interest to provide for Mr. Workeneh to have a formal order for temporary sole custody pending trial. A formal order will benefit the children because it will allow Mr. Workeneh to make custodial decisions without interference from Ms. Woubeshaw. This order is needed because of Ms. Woubeshaw’s conduct. Ms. Woubeshaw has followed Mr. Workeneh and one of the children to the child’s doctor and objected to the doctor’s care. Ms. Woubeshaw has removed the child from school. Ms. Woubeshaw’s conduct appears to be unstable, concerning, and causing distress to the children.
[21] There is an issue regarding Ms. Woubeshaw’s access to the children. At present, Ms. Woubeshaw currently has access three days per week under the July 2 and 3, 2019 Order of Justice Corthorn. The evidence, referred to above, supports a finding that this access is not in the children’s best interest. There have been repeated police interventions since the July 2 and 3, 2019 Order. The children are distressed by these incidents. Ms. Woubeshaw’s evidence acknowledges that the children are expressing views and preferences not to be in her care.
[22] I find that it is in the children’s best interests for temporary access to be changed to be once a week, on Saturdays, for two hours, to be supervised. The access shall be supervised through Family Service Ottawa, unless the parties agree to a different supervisor, in writing, either on a longer-term basis or pending supervised services becoming available at Family Services Ottawa. Both parties shall immediately take all necessary steps to apply for supervised access at Family Services Ottawa.
[23] This temporary access may be reviewed upon either party providing further evidence of Ms. Woubeshaw’s mental health as it relates to her ability to meet the needs of the children. Either party may bring a further interim motion to seek such a variation, keeping in mind that this matter also needs to progress to trial, in the absence of the parties reaching an agreement to resolve the issues.
[24] The previous temporary orders made in 2014 and 2015 contain parenting terms that have not reflected the reality for these children for more than two years. The parenting provisions of these orders are no longer in the children’s best interests and are hereby varied.
Issue #2: Should either party be granted temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home?
[25] I order that Mr. Workeneh shall have temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at [XXX], Ottawa, Ontario.
[26] In doing so, I find that the parties previously agreed that the provisions in the October 19, 2015 Order for the sale of the home would not be given effect. Neither party seeks the sale of the home at this time. I, therefore, order that the provisions of the October 19, 2015 Order of Master Champagne requiring the home to be sold are varied to no longer be in effect. To the extent that the October 19, 2015 order for the sale of the matrimonial home may be construed as a final order, I find that it is fair, just and expedient to deem each party’s pleadings amended to include a motion to change that order given the parties’ apparent agreement not to sell the home under the 2015 Order.
[27] It is also clear from the record that the parties have long ago considered the 2014 and 2015 Orders for Ms. Woubeshaw to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and related terms to no longer be in effect. Mr. Workeneh and children have resided in the home, without Ms. Woubeshaw, since 2017. The September 9, 2014 order granting Ms. Woubeshaw temporary exclusive possession was also without prejudice. I find that there has been a material change since the 2014 and 2015 temporary orders related to the matrimonial home that requires those temporary orders to be varied and rescinded in their entirety.
[28] Section 24 of the Family Law Act provides that a court may grant an order of temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. In determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession, the court is required to consider several factors[^2]:
a) the best interests of the children affected;
b) any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations;
c) the financial position of both spouses;
d) any written agreement between the parties;
e) the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and
f) any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children.
[29] Section 24 of the Family Law Act provides that a court may grant an order of temporary exclusive possession In determining the best interests of a child, the court is required to consider[^3]:
a) the possible disruptive effects on the child of a move to other accommodation; and
b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained.
[30] I find that it is in the children’s best interests to remain in the matrimonial home with Mr. Workeneh and that this is a significant factor in granting him exclusive possession. Ms. Woubeshaw has been entering the matrimonial home when Mr. Workeneh is not there. She resides in her car outside of the home so that she can keep watch on the home and the children. This conduct is not in the children’s best interests.
[31] I have considered that Ms. Woubeshaw vacated the home in 2017 and had alternate accommodations available to her for some period of time after that. Ms. Woubeshaw states she has been evicted and is living in her car. In balancing these factors, I do not find that it fair to evict the children from their home due to Mr. Woubeshaw’s eviction.
[32] I am also concerned that Ms. Woubeshaw will not be able to maintain the property, either financially or otherwise, and this would jeopardize the family’s only significant asset. That asset is subject to Ms. Woubeshaw’s claim for an equalization payment. There has been a significant delay in making any progress on that issue – but that delay does not justify Ms. Woubeshaw gaining exclusive possession of the home at this time.
[33] Taking all of the factors under section 24 into consideration, I grant temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to Mr. Workeneh.
Issue #3: What order should be made for child support?
[34] Both parties sought an order for temporary child support. Given my order that the children remain in Mr. Workeneh’s temporary care, the issue is what temporary child support is payable by Ms. Woubeshaw.
[35] In her financial statement sworn July 16, 2019, Ms. Woubeshaw reports that she has income of $50 per month, plus the Child Tax Benefit, which she states she no longer receives. Ms. Woubeshaw has not provided any recent tax returns as required under the rules.
[36] Mr. Workeneh’s position is that Ms. Woubeshaw receives unreported income and can earn additional income. He argues that she needs to get a job to contribute to the financial support of the children.
[37] Ms. Woubeshaw does have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to earn income to contribute to the support of the children, and her own financial support. There is an issue as to whether she is doing so. On the one hand, Ms. Woubeshaw’s own statements suggest she can earn income – she says she is working at her business. On the other hand, Ms. Woubeshaw’s circumstances and questions regarding her mental health and stability suggest that her ability to earn income may be impaired.
[38] I find that there is insufficient evidence before me on this interim motion to impute income to Ms. Woubeshaw. Accordingly, given Ms. Woubeshaw appears to only have nominal income, and there is insufficient evidence to impute income to her at this time, I decline to make an order requiring Ms. Woubeshaw to pay temporary child support at this time. I have, however, made the order below, requiring Ms. Woubeshaw to provide ongoing disclosure regarding her income.
Issue #4: What order should be made for temporary spousal support?
[39] Ms. Woubeshaw sought an order for temporary spousal support. Under Justice Corthorn’s order dated July 2 and 3, 2019, temporary without prejudice spousal support is payable to Ms. Woubeshaw in the amount of $575 per month. Ms. Woubeshaw did not take issue with this amount of spousal support but states she has not yet begun to receive it.
[40] The Family Responsibility Office is tasked with enforcing support orders. I did not have evidence on the issue of what steps the Family Responsibility Office had taken to enforce the spousal support order or to otherwise confirm that the spousal support is not the being enforced or assign blame for the delay in enforcement.
[41] In his financial statement sworn July 23, 2019, Mr. Workeneh reports his income as being $35,075 per year. Mr. Workeneh has also not provided any recent tax returns as required under the rules.
[42] Neither party provided support calculation. I have reviewed the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG’s) calculations based on assuming a period of cohabitation of 20 years, that Mr. Workeneh’s income is $35,075/year, that Ms. Woubeshaw’s income is $600/year, and that the two children reside with Mr. Workeneh. The range under the SSAG’s for spousal support, assuming Ms. Woubeshaw is not paying child support, is $664/m (low), $775/m (mid), and $886/m (high).
[43] I am not prepared to change the temporary without prejudice order for spousal support to be payable to Ms. Woubeshaw of $575 per month. This is because Ms. Woubeshaw did not seek an increase in temporary spousal support. Even if she had sought an increase, I would not have granted an increase at this time, given the lack of information before me on her ability to earn income to contribute to her own support, and the support of the children, or to qualify for such benefits as under the Ontario Disability Support Plan.
Issue #5: Should an order be granted restraining either or both parties?
[44] Both parties sought a restraining order against the other. I do not find that there is a reasonable basis for Ms. Woubeshaw to fear for her safety. I find that Mr. Workeneh does have reasonable grounds to fear for his safety and the safety of the children due to Mr. Woubeshaw’s conduct, including her parking her vehicle outside of the matrimonial home to watch him and the children, following the children to and from school, into the home, and to appointments, and attempting to take the younger child in her car. I, therefore, make the restraining order as set out below.
Issue #6: Should an order be made regarding the car loan, psychological damages, life insurance or other insurance, and disclosure of bank statements?
[45] Each party sought final orders on the motion related to various financial claims. Neither party brought a motion for summary judgment. Even if I could construe their requests as a motion for summary judgment, there is insufficient evidence before me to grant summary judgment on these issues. I, therefore, dismiss Mr. Workeneh’s motion seeking an order that Ms. Woubeshaw owes him $7,000 related to a car loan, Ms. Woubeshaw’s motion seeking an order that Mr. Workeneh owes her $15,000 related to the use of the car, and Ms. Woubeshaw’s motion for psychological damages of $5,000. These issues are left to the trial judge to determine at trial.
[46] Ms. Woubeshaw sought an order requiring Mr. Workeneh to produce bank statements from his Royal Bank and Bank of Montreal accounts and RRSP accounts. Mr. Workeneh filed bank records for August of 2014, attached to his financial statement sworn July 23, 2019. It is not clear from the evidence why additional statements are required. I decline to make an order requiring Mr. Workeneh to produce additional statements at this time, except for the orders made below.
[47] Ms. Woubeshaw sought an order requiring Mr. Workeneh to provide life insurance. In her submissions, Ms. Woubeshaw explained that she was referring to medical coverage. The nature of the relief sought by Ms. Woubeshaw was not clear to the court.
[48] I decline to make a temporary order for Mr. Workeneh to maintain life insurance coverage for the benefit of Ms. Woubeshaw to secure any spousal support obligation he may have to her. Neither party presented evidence on whether Mr. Workeneh had life insurance available to him at a reasonable cost. Mr. Workeneh also has a child support obligation, which needs to be considered when determining what life insurance is available to provide security for support obligations. Given Ms. Woubeshaw’s current situation, I do not find that it is appropriate to make her a trustee of life insurance to secure the children’s child support obligation.
[49] In her submissions, Ms. Woubeshaw stated that she was also seeking medical coverage under Mr. Workeneh’s plan. I did not have evidence on whether there was a cost to maintaining such coverage. I find it is reasonable, however, to extend medical benefit plan coverage to Ms. Woubeshaw assuming there is no additional cost of such coverage, as long such coverage is available to Mr. Workeneh, and Ms. Woubeshaw is eligible for such coverage.
Disposition:
[50] Given the reasons above, I make the following orders:
The parties’ pleadings are deemed to be amended to include Ms. Woubeshaw’s claim to spousal support, Mr. Workeneh’s denial of that claim, and claims by both parties for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. If either party requires an order for further particulars of these claims, they may seek such by way of a procedural motion.
On consent, I grant an order splitting the corollary relief from the divorce. A divorce may issue upon receipt of a clearance certificate and a draft divorce order that provides for the divorce and for the corollary relief to be split from the divorce.
The provision of the temporary Orders of Justice Polowin dated September 9, 2014, Justice Beaudoin dated September 11, 2014, and Order of Master Champagne dated October 19, 2015, relating to Ms. Woubeshaw temporary without prejudice exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at [XXX], Ottawa, Ontario, are rescinded.
Mr. Workeneh shall have interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at [XXX], Ottawa, Ontario, pursuant to s.24 of the Family Law Act.
The provisions of the temporary Order of Master Champagne dated October 19, 2015, relating to the sale of the matrimonial home, are rescinded.
The parenting provisions contained in the Temporary Orders of Justice Polowin dated September 9, 2014, Justice Beaudoin dated September 11, 2014, and Master Champagne dated October 19, 2015, are hereby varied to rescind these provisions in their entirety.
Mr. Workeneh shall have temporary sole custody and primary residence of the children Y.G., born September 11, 2002; and F.G., born May 20, 2009.
Ms. Woubeshaw shall have temporary access to the children Y.G., born September 11, 2002; and F.G., born May 20, 2009, once a week, on Saturdays, for two hours, to be supervised. The access shall be supervised through Family Service Ottawa, unless the parties agree to a different supervisor, in writing, either on a longer-term basis or pending supervised services becoming available at Family Services Ottawa. Both parties shall immediately take all necessary steps to apply for supervised access at Family Services Ottawa.
Ms. Woubeshaw’s temporary access to the children may be reviewed upon either party providing further evidence of Ms. Woubeshaw’s mental health as it relates to her ability to meet the needs of the children.
On a temporary basis, Ms. Woubeshaw’s obligation to pay Mr. Workeneh child support for the support of Y.G., born September 11, 2002; and F.G., born May 20, 2009, shall be $0 per month. This child support is based on Ms. Woubeshaw’s current income being $600/year (excluding spousal support), as reported by her in her financial statement sworn July 16, 2019.
The temporary without prejudice order of Justice Corthorn dated July 2 and 3, 2019, requiring Mr. Workeneh to pay temporary spousal support to Ms. Woubeshaw of $575 per month shall continue, on a without prejudice basis, pending further order or agreement of the parties.
On a temporary basis, Mr. Workeneh shall maintain coverage for Ms. Woubeshaw under his extended medical benefits available to him through his employment as long as this coverage is available at no additional cost, as long as such coverage is available to Mr. Workeneh, and Ms. Woubeshaw is eligible for such coverage.
Pursuant to s.35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act[^4],
a. Ms. Woubeshaw shall be restrained from, directly or indirectly, contacting or communicating with Mr. Workeneh or the children Y.G., born September 11, 2002; and F.G., born May 20, 2009, except for the purposes of supervised access in accordance with paragraph [50] 8. above.
b. Ms. Woubeshaw shall be restrained from coming within 100 metres of the matrimonial home located at [XXX], Ottawa, Ontario, or either child’s school.
The next step in this matter is for the parties to proceed to a settlement conference, and then trial, as directed by Justice Summers in her endorsement of April 15, 2019.
Both parties shall comply with their obligation to provide disclosure as previously ordered and in accordance with the Family Law Rules (Rule 13) and s.21 of the Child Support Guidelines[^5]. These obligations includes serving and filing up-to-date financial statements before each court appearance with the required income tax returns and notices of assessment, providing the other with proof of income, providing each other with supporting documents for all assets and debts for their respective Net Family Properties, including assets and debts at the date of separation at the end of August 2014, and to advise the other of any changes in their respective financial circumstances and incomes immediately upon such a change taking place.
In order to address service issues, and so that Mr. Workeneh has an address at which he may serve documents on Ms. Woubeshaw, Ms. Woubeshaw shall, within 30 days, serve and file with the court a Notice of Change setting out her current address for service. This address for service may be a P.O. Box or other temporary address. It does not need to be Ms. Woubeshaw’s residence.
Costs:
[51] If the parties are unable to agree on costs of this motion, Mr. Workeneh may file submissions concerning costs on or before January 10, 2020. Ms. Woubeshaw may file submissions concerning costs on or before January 24, 2020. Cost submissions of both parties shall be no more than three pages in length, plus any offers to settle and bills of costs and shall be spaced one point five spaces apart, with no less than 12 point font.
Date: December 11, 2019 Justice P. MacEachern
COURT FILE NO.: FC-06-14031 DATE: 2019/12/11
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Workie Woubeshaw, Applicant -and- Alemayehu Workeneh, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern
COUNSEL: Applicant, Self-Represented Respondent, Self-Represented
ENDORSEMENT
MacEachern J.
Released: December 11, 2019
[^1]: Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99 as am.
[^2]: Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3, as am, s. 24(3)
[^3]: Family Law Act, s. 24(4)
[^4]: Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, as am., s.35
[^5]: Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, as am., s.21