COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-4551-00
DATE: 2019 12 11
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
DRAGO EDGREDZIJA
J. Figliomeni, Counsel for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
JASON GULLETT carrying on business as PRESTIGE STEEL BUILDINGS and PRESTIGE BUILDINGS 2016 LTD.
R. Chown, Counsel for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: In Writing
REASONS FOR DECISION
LEMAY J
[1] The Defendant successfully moved to set aside both a default judgment and a writ of execution in this matter. I provided oral reasons on October 22nd, 2019, and reserved the right to add to, amend or otherwise alter those reasons. I provided the parties with written reasons that were edited for clarity, but were not substantively different from the reasons that were given orally (see 2019 ONSC 6475). It is now time to fix the costs.
Background
[2] In order to understand the reasons for my costs decision, the procedural history of this matter is necessary. Some of that history is set out in my reasons for judgment, but other relevant steps took place after the Defendants’ law firm became involved in this matter in late July of 2019. For convenience, I will set out the whole history below.
a) The History Up to Execution on July 25th, 2019
[3] The Statement of Claim was served on November 3rd, 2018, and the Defendants were noted in default on December 4th, 2018. There is no issue between the parties that the Defendants did not take any steps between November 3rd, 2018 and December 4th, 2018, and did not contact counsel for the Plaintiff in this time period.
[4] On December 12th, 2018, the personal Defendant, Mr. Gullett sent an e-mail to the Plaintiff’s counsel asking to be notified before Plaintiff’s counsel noted the Defendants in default. There had been a telephone call from Mr. Gullett to Plaintiff’s counsel prior to this e-mail.
[5] Plaintiff’s counsel did not communicate with Mr. Gullett or otherwise tell him that he was already noted in default. Plaintiff’s counsel moved, without notice to the Defendants, for default judgment. This judgment was granted by Doi J. on June 3rd, 2019.
[6] The default judgment was served on Mr. Gullett on July 17th, 2019. Garnishment proceedings were initiated by the Plaintiff’s counsel, and the judgment was collected on July 25th, 2019 and held by the Sherriff. At that point, counsel for the Defendants became involved in the matter.
b) Steps Taken After July 25th, 2019
[7] On July 25th, 2019, counsel for the Defendant, David Thompson, spoke to Mr. Figliomeni and asked for his client’s consent to setting aside the default judgment. Mr. Figliomeni stated that he would seek instructions from his client in this regard.
[8] The next day, July 26th, 2019, Mr. Figliomeni sent an e-mail to Mr. Thompson and asked for an explanation as to why the Defendant had not responded to the claim as well as for particulars of his defence. On August 7th, 2019, Mr. Thompson wrote and provided those particulars to Mr. Figliomeni and asked again whether Mr. Figliomeni’s client would be prepared to consent to setting aside the default judgment and returning the funds.
[9] Between August 7th, 2019 and September 5th, 2019, Mr. Figliomeni did not respond to Mr. Thompson’s August 7th, 2019 e-mail, or to any of the follow-up communications from Mr. Thompson. Those communications were an e-mail sent on August 12th, 2019 and a letter sent on September 5th, 2019, which I will return to shortly.
[10] Mr. Figliomeni was, however, still engaged in this matter. Specifically, Mr. Figliomeni received a telephone call from Mr. Peter Lamprey, a real estate solicitor acting for Mr. Gullett on August 30th, 2019. At that time, Mr. Lamprey was seeking information about the claim, and whether it had been paid, because it was clouding title on a real estate transaction.
[11] Mr. Figliomeni responded to this phone call on September 3rd, 2019 advising that the Sherriff’s office was in receipt of the funds, and that Mr. Figliomeni was expecting that the amounts would be paid out in full by the middle of September. An actual copy of Mr. Figliomeni’s letter was not filed as part of the motion record, although it is referenced in Mr. Gullett’s Affidavit.
[12] On September 5th, 2019, Mr. Thompson wrote to Mr. Figliomeni and advised that the Defendant would be bringing a motion on September 10th, 2019 to set aside the default judgment. Mr. Thompson’s assistant followed up on this the next day. Mr. Figliomeni responded and advised that he was not available. Mr. Figliomeni also stated:
We disagree that the motion is urgent and will need to examine your client before the motion can be heard. Please see my email below and be sure to provide copies of all correspondence to Mr. Thompson.
[13] The problem is that the matter had become urgent at this point, as Mr. Figliomeni was attempting to obtain the money from the Sherriff’s office for his client and was hoping to be in receipt of the funds by the middle of September. There is then considerable correspondence between the parties over the next couple of days that does not need to be reproduced.
[14] Ultimately, on September 9th, 2019 at 4:23 p.m., Mr. Thompson’s assistant sent Mr. Figliomeni the following e-mail:
Good Afternoon,
Further to the below, we have received confirmation from the Sherrif’s Office at 75 Mulcaster Street in Barrie, Ontario that funds that were garnished from our client on August 6, 2019 will not be released.
The funds will be held until such a time that a court order has been issued in relation to the motion to set aside the default judgment. On this basis, we are content to adjourn the motion and will not be attending the Brampton courthouse tomorrow.
In an effort to expedite this process, please advise if your office has a proposed timetable for the delivery of motion materials and any cross-examinations of affiants. Please also provide your availability for the moth of September for the motion to be heard.
Please provide responses to the above requests by no later than September 11, 2019.
[15] It is clear that the motion had been adjourned from September 10th, 2019 and it was clear that the only reason it had been adjourned by Mr. Thompson was because the money was going to be held by the Sherriff and not released. Indeed, at 11:15 am on September 11th, 2019, Mr. Thompson’s assistant e-mailed Mr. Figliomeni to remind him that the Defendants were still seeking a date for the return of the motion and a proposed timetable, and that Mr. Thompson’s office would unilaterally book a date if they did not hear by 3:00 p.m. on September 11th, 2019.
[16] Mr. Figliomeni sent a letter to the Sherriff’s office at approximately noon on September 11th, 2019. That letter, which was not copied to Mr. Thompson or to the Defendants, reads as follows:
This letter is further to ours of September 10, 2019 and your teleconference with my associate, Jonah Waxman, this morning.
We write to confirm that Jason Gullett has threatened but not filed a motion to set aside the garnishment order and stay the enforcement proceedings.
We therefore look forward to receiving the garnishment funds in the amount of $59, 321.72.
[17] When this letter came to Mr. Thompson’s attention, he responded (in part) as follows:
It has come to my attention that your office contacted the enforcement office after my office advised you that we had confirmation from them that the funds were being held until the motion was heard. You sent a letter to the enforcement office this morning stating that “Jason Gullett has threatened but not filed a motion to set aside the garnishment order to stay the enforcement proceedings.” This was misleading because you did not explain that you have been served with motion materials and that the motion was going to be heard on an emergency basis on September 10. You then requested an adjournment in order to cross-examine my client, and the only reason the motion record is not filed at the moment is because my office was waiting on your office to provide us with your availability for the motion to be heard. You know that my client has done much more than simply threaten a motion yet you have attempted to get funds released prior to this motion being heard. In my view, this constitutes sharp practice and I would ask you to refrain from any further attempts to circumvent the adjudication of this motion.
[18] I make no determination as to whether Mr. Figliomeni’s conduct is sharp practice within the meaning of the Law Society’s Rules of Professional Conduct as that is not within my purview. I do conclude, however, that Mr. Figliomeni’s correspondence did not reflect the reality of the file. When Mr. Figliomeni’s letter was sent, it was clear in my view that the motion was going to proceed. Mr. Figliomeni’s statement that there was a motion that had been “threatened but not filed” is disingenuous at best, particularly since said motion had not just been threatened, but had actually been served on Mr. Figliomeni. The reason that the motion had not been filed was that the Court office would not accept it on short notice, which is standard practice.
[19] At the appearance on September 27th, 2019, an adjournment was granted for cross-examinations of both Mr. Gullett and Mr. Thompson. The adjournment was contested by the Defendants, and the Plaintiff was awarded $1,000.00 in costs. The Plaintiff’s counsel claimed $6,000.00 in costs for the motion to adjourn and (presumably) for costs thrown away.
[20] Since the September 27th, 2019 hearing, an extensive cross-examination of the Defendant was conducted. That cross-examination was almost a thousand questions and covered a variety of issues. It consumed the better part of a day
[21] Mr. Thompson was also cross-examined, which necessitated his replacement as counsel on the file by Mr. Chown. The contents of this cross-examination were of no relevance to the issues I had to determine.
[22] At the hearing of the motion before me, Mr. Figliomeni asked me for a further adjournment so that he could conduct a further cross-examination of Mr. Gullett on newly produced documentation. I denied the adjournment on the basis that it was an attempt to inquire into the merits of the claim, rather than the question of whether there was an air of reality to the Defendants’ defence. When I made this decision, there had already been a significant cross-examination of Mr. Gullett.
[23] The motion then proceeded, and I disposed of the matter by setting aside both the noting in default and the writ of execution, and directing that the funds that had been collected from Mr. Gullett be returned to him.
[24] Finally, in both his correspondence and in argument, Mr. Figliomeni made much of the fact that Mr. Thompson’s firm had been retained by the Defendant and had been acting for him as far back as November 14th, 2018. The problem with this assertion is that it is clear from the records that Mr. Thompson’s retainer was for an unrelated matter. I did (and do) not view this as being a “material omission” from Mr. Thompson’s correspondence or from the Defendant’s Affidavit. The fact is that Mr. Thompson did not have counsel on this matter until July of 2019.
[25] With these facts in mind, I now turn to the positions of the parties.
The Positions of the Parties
[26] The Defendants acknowledge that Mr. Gullet did not deal with the claim in a timely way, and that this is a factor that the Court can consider in assessing both the quantum of costs and who should pay those costs.
[27] However, the Defendants seek their partial indemnity costs in the sum of $23,978.36 inclusive of HST and disbursements. The Defendants advance the following points in support of their position:
a) Given the exacting manner in which the motion was litigated by Plaintiff’s counsel, an award of costs against the Plaintiff is appropriate.
b) The conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel in seeking to obtain the funds from the Sherriff’s office merited caution on the part of the Defendant, and justifies an award of costs to the Defendant.
c) While proportionality is usually an important principle in costs assessment, in this case proportionality should be a significantly reduced factor because of the exacting way that the motion was addressed by the Plaintiff.
[28] The Plaintiff takes the position that the setting aside of the default judgment and the writ of execution were indulgences that were granted to the Defendants. As a result, the Plaintiff seeks his costs on a partial indemnity basis in the sum of $8,500.00.
[29] The Plaintiff also advances the following points:
a) That the Plaintiff should not be sanctioned for cross-examining the Defendant or his counsel.
b) That costs should be assessed at this amount as that was what was in the reasonable expectation of the parties. The Plaintiff takes the view that the Defendant’s costs request is unreasonable and disproportionate.
[30] The Defendants filed their submissions, including the September 11th, 2019 letter from Mr. Figliomeni first in the costs adjudication process. The Plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ submissions, and there was nothing in the Plaintiff’s submissions about the September 11th, 2019 letter from Mr. Figliomeni. It is also clear from reading the Plaintiff’s submissions that they had received the Defendants’ submissions before preparing their own submissions. As a result, for the purposes of this motion, I am of the view that it is undisputed that the September 11th, 2019 letter was sent to the Barrie Enforcement Office by Mr. Figliomeni and not copied to counsel for the Defendants.
Issues
[31] The submissions of the parties raise the following issues for me to determine:
a) Did the Defendants ask the Court for an indulgence? Does this request justify departing from the normal rules of costs?
b) Did the Plaintiff’s conduct serve to unnecessarily complicate and/or lengthen the hearing of this motion?
c) Is the conduct that the Plaintiff engaged in deserving of chastisement by the Court?
d) What is the reasonable expectation of the parties in respect of costs?
[32] These issues require me to address the relevant factors under Rule 57.01, and I will address those as they arise.
Issue #1- Was the Order Granted an Indulgence?
[33] Generally, costs follow the result of the motion or action. However, there are circumstances where costs will be awarded to the unsuccessful party. Those circumstances often arise when the successful party is seeking an indulgence from the Court.
[34] In his reasons in Mollicone v. Town of Caledon ( 2011 ONSC 883) M.G. Quigley J. explains the term indulgence as follows (at paragraph 14):
Although the roots of the word “indulgence” and its signification of an ecclesiastical dispensation for sin can be traced to Canon Law in the 14th century and the liturgy of the Catholic Church, it has also come to have a secular meaning that is relevant here. An indulgence is something that is granted as a favour or privilege. It contemplates liberal or lenient treatment to the person who receives it, embracing notions of tolerance. In the context of business or the law in which it is used here it signifies the granting of permission to do something that is time or performance related that would not otherwise be permissible, such as extending a period of time to permit what would otherwise be out of time payment of a sum or performance of an obligation. It connotes notions of forbearance. Indeed, in this sense and in a legal context, it can be seen as the extension of the equity of the Sovereign’s grace and mercy to permit an oversight or failure on the part of a litigant to be overlooked.
[35] In the case before me, what was granted to the Defendants was an indulgence. It was made necessary in part because Mr. Gullett did not follow up on the litigation in a timely way. Mollicone, Fox v. Bourget ((1987) C.P.C. (2d) 94 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)) and Algra v. Mingay and Feltham v. Mingay (2019 ONSC 5410) are all cases where the unsuccessful party was awarded costs because the other side was seeking an indulgence.
[36] If there were no other considerations in this matter, then I would agree with counsel for the Plaintiff that costs should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Defendants did not pursue this claim in a diligent way and had to ask the Court for the indulgence of setting aside a judgment.
[37] However, there are other factors to consider in this case and I turn to them now.
Issue #2- Did The Conduct of the Plaintiff and its Counsel Increase the Costs Unnecessarily?
[38] The facts set out above reveal two very significant issues with the conduct of the Plaintiff and his counsel:
a) The position taken on the motion by the Plaintiff.
b) The conduct of detailed cross-examinations of the personal Defendant and his counsel.
[39] On the first point, as I observed both in denying the adjournment request and in my reasons on the merits, the test for setting aside a default judgment is not high. It requires that the Defendants show they had an arguable case on the merits. Throughout this case, counsel for the Plaintiff has asserted that the test really requires that we consider the merits. Counsel’s view of the test was that the standard on this motion was somewhere between that applicable on a motion under Rule 20 and the standard used on a motion under Rule 21.
[40] I disagreed with this view. The case law is clear that the test is not nearly so high. By insisting on applying such a high standard, the Plaintiff expended unnecessary resources and forced the Defendant to do the same.
[41] Counsel for the Plaintiff argues that this material will be helpful in the merits of the case. That may be possible but, at this point, it is simply speculation. I certainly do not have any undertaking on the part of counsel for the Plaintiff to either forego discovery or treat the cross-examination transcript as a discovery transcript. Even if that speculation does turn out to be true at the end of the case, it does not change the fact that it was entirely unnecessary to collect this information for this motion.
[42] Given that the potential usefulness of the evidence collected on the motion is, at this point, speculative, there is no reason for the Court to take account of the potential future usefulness of the information or to defer the fixing of costs to the trial judge. A significant amount of effort has been expended on this motion, and the Court should not delay in fixing the costs. This conclusion is supported by Rule 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the Court shall, unless satisfied that a different order is necessary, fix costs and order them payable within thirty (30) days. I am not satisfied that a different Order is necessary.
[43] I acknowledge that D. Fitzpatrick J. granted the Plaintiff an adjournment for the purposes of conducting cross-examinations of both Mr. Gullett and Mr. Thompson. However, a cross-examination that looks reasonable in prospect may very well not be reasonable in retrospect.
[44] In this case, it would not have been unreasonable to want to explore a couple of issues with Mr. Gullett. First, whether he had done anything between December 2018 and July of 2019. Second, if nothing had been done in that time period, why not? Third, whether there was any merit at all to the defence.
[45] In my view, this cross-examination should not have taken very long. It did not require a “deep dive” into the merits of the claim. However, that is exactly what counsel for the Plaintiff did during this cross-examination. The merits were explored in detail.
[46] There is also the fact that the Plaintiff cross-examined counsel for the Defendant. In my view this was an entirely unnecessary step. I am also concerned about Mr. Figliomeni’s insistence on cross-examining Mr. Thompson for two reasons, as follows:
a) The law in Canada is clear that a party should not be deprived of its choice of counsel for the purposes of having that counsel be a witness except in the clearest of cases. See, for example, Leonard v. Leonard ([1999] O.J. 2181 (O.C.A.))
b) The decision to cross-examine Mr. Thompson necessitated additional expenditures of time and money for the Defendants, and made the motion more complicated than it needed to be. The Defendants were required to retain and instruct a second counsel, who would have had to become familiar with the file.
[47] Finally, there is the fact that counsel for the Plaintiff did not follow what I have referred to as “best practices” in managing this case. When he was contacted both by e-mail and by telephone by Mr. Gullett and asked about a noting in default, he should have responded to Mr. Gullett and told him that he had already been noted in default.
[48] The Plaintiff’s conduct in all of these matters made the hearing of the motion longer and more difficult than it ought to have been. This is a factor that strongly supports an Order of costs in favour of the Defendants in spite of the fact that the Defendants were given an indulgence.
Issue #3- Is the Plaintiff’s Conduct Worthy of Chastisement?
[49] The question of whether Plaintiff’s conduct is worthy of chastisement is separate and apart from the question of whether the Plaintiff took steps that made the matter longer and/or more complicated than it needed to be. It is a question of whether the Plaintiff and/or his counsel’s conduct is worthy of chastisement within the meaning of the principles set out in Clarington v. Davies 2009 ONCA 722.
[50] In other words, it is a question of whether substantial indemnity cost could be ordered against the Plaintiff, or even against his counsel personally. Counsel for the Defendants did not seek costs on a substantial indemnity basis or against counsel personally. Had such a request been made, I would have given it serious consideration. I will set my reasons for making this observation out in detail, as they also drive my conclusions on why the Defendants are entitled to the entirety of their partial indemnity costs even though they obtained an indulgence from the Court.
[51] I am most concerned about the Plaintiff’s conduct (or the conduct of counsel) as evidenced in the communications between August 7th, 2019 and September 11th, 2019. I make no conclusions about whether that conduct is a breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. I also make no conclusions as to whether that conduct was the responsibility of Mr. Figliomeni or whether he was proceeding under instructions. I do conclude that this conduct fell substantially below the expectations that the Court has for the conduct of litigants in three significant respects.
[52] First, there is the failure to respond to the August 7th, 2019 e-mail from Mr. Thompson. In my view, that e-mail merited a timely response. This is particularly true when Mr. Figliomeni is anticipating that the money will be paid out by mid-September. It would certainly appear that the lack of a response was intended to let the clock run out and put the Defendants in the position where they either had to bring an emergency motion or where they were prejudiced by the Plaintiff having the money in his actual possession.
[53] Second, the failure to acknowledge that the motion might be urgent on September 6th, 2019, when Mr. Figliomeni knew that the money from the Sherriff might be paid out in the next week or two is not in accordance with the facts of the file. At this point, it should have been clear to Mr. Figliomeni that the motion was potentially urgent because the Plaintiff would have been significantly prejudiced by a payout of the money.
[54] Third, and most concerning, there is Mr. Figliomeni’s letter of September 11th, 2019. At the moment he sent this letter, Mr. Figliomeni knew the following:
a) He has been served with a motion record to set aside the default judgment and to have the monies paid back from the Sherriff.
b) This motion was originally returnable on September 10th, 2019 because of urgency.
c) The motion likely could not be filed with the Court office because it was short served.
d) The Defendant had imposed a deadline of September 11th, 2019 for Mr. Figliomeni to advise them of his availability, failing which they were going to fix a return date for the motion.
e) The Defendants had adjourned the motion on the understanding that the monies would not be paid out by the Sherriff.
[55] Mr. Figliomeni’s letter of September 11th, 2019 states that the motion has not been filed, which is technically correct. However, the letter is a clear attempt to have the monies paid out by the Sherriff in spite of the fact that the Defendants’ counsel is operating on the understanding that these monies will not be paid out until the motion is heard. This is a clear attempt to circumvent Defendants’ counsel and, although Mr. Figliomeni’s September 11th, 2019 letter is not technically incorrect, it is misleading. Indeed, it is arguable that the letter is intentionally misleading.
[56] Although no decision is necessary on whether substantial indemnity costs would have been appropriate in this case, these facts make it clear that the Defendants’ request for partial indemnity costs is entirely justified by the conduct of the Plaintiff and his counsel, even though the Defendants received an indulgence from the Court.
[57] The only question remains what costs are reasonable in the circumstances, and I turn to that issue now.
Issue #4- What Are the Reasonable Expectations of the Parties?
[58] In my view, the Defendants’ costs are within the reasonable expectations of the parties for several reasons.
[59] I start with the Plaintiff’s counsel’s assertion that the reasonable partial indemnity costs are $8,500.00. The problem with this assertion is that the Plaintiff’s bill of costs is incomplete and/or understates the time spent in at least the following material respects:
a) In the Plaintiff’s bill of costs, there is no time spent on the work done on this motion between the end of July and the attendance before D. Fitzpatrick J. The time spent before D. Fitzpatrick J. has already been accounted for in his costs award, but the rest of the work is unaccounted for.
b) In my view, the time spent on the cross-examinations understates the time actually spent. I have reviewed the transcripts and it appears that the examinations themselves would have been in excess of the total time of 5.2 hours that Mr. Figliomeni claimed as the total time spent on this activity. This does not account for the preparation time, which would have been several more hours.
c) The time spent at the motion itself is understated in Mr. Figliomeni’s bill of costs. He claims 2.5 hours for the preparation and attendance at the motion, but counsel were present at Court at 10:00 am and were not heard until the afternoon. Indeed, it was almost 5:00 pm when I gave oral reasons and then adjourned the submissions on costs.
d) There is nothing in Mr. Figliomeni’s bill of costs about the preparation of costs submissions.
[60] It is difficult to precisely see where (and to what extent) the Plaintiff’s bill is understated, as it is simply divided into a couple of general categories. There are no dates or detailed docket-type entries that would allow a complete assessment of the bill.
[61] However, based on these omissions alone, I am of the view that at least double the time would have been spent by the Defendants’ counsel. This would bring the reasonable costs to at least $17,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements. The actual amount might even be higher, as there was a day of cross-examinations, a full day at Court and the preparation of costs submissions.
[62] Costs for the Defendants’ counsel would have been increased even beyond this amount. It must be remembered that Mr. Thompson had to be replaced on the file after he became familiar with it because of the fact that Mr. Figlioimeni insisted on cross-examining Mr. Thompson.
[63] If counsel insists on cross-examining the lawyer with carriage of the file, the costs associated with briefing a new counsel must be within the reasonable contemplation of the counsel seeking the cross-examination and his client.
[64] By taking the costs of these cross-examinations into account as a reasonable expectation of the parties, I am not “sanctioning” the Plaintiff or his counsel. Instead, I am simply assessing the actual costs of the motion based on what actually took place.
[65] This brings me to the principle of proportionality. In normal circumstances, the Plaintiff could argue that the costs sought by the Defendants were disproportionate, especially given that the overall value of the action appears to be in the range of $60,000.00.
[66] However, as noted in Savage v. Cathers (2017 ONSC 7591 at para. 13), where a party’s positions unnecessarily cause the other side to take many steps, “the importance of proportionality as a costs factor is reduced, perhaps significantly.” In this case, the Plaintiff required the Defendants to take (and/or participate in) a whole series of unnecessary steps which I have detailed above, but which include much of the correspondence between September 6th and 11th, 2019, the cross-examinations and the lengthy submissions.
[67] The Defendants should be compensated for those unnecessary steps, and the Plaintiff should not be able to hide behind the principle of proportionality in order to avoid the reasonable costs consequences of his conduct.
[68] Finally, the Plaintiff claims that the costs of the action were fixed by Doi J. at $6,000.00, and that this is clear evidence of what is the proportionate amount of costs to award in this case. I disagree. As I have set out above, the conduct of the Plaintiff and the exacting manner in which this motion was pursued justify both a departure from the proportionality principle and the payment of the costs sought by the Defendants.
[69] Having reviewed the Defendants’ bill of costs, I see nothing unreasonable about the amounts claimed. The Defendants have provided a detailed, itemized day-by-day bill that outlines exactly what was done, with the exception of redacting privileged conversations and items. The bill of costs also reduces unnecessarily duplicative time, and charges travel time at half the regular rate.
[70] Based on all of these reasons, the partial indemnity costs sought by the Defendant are entirely reasonable, and are to be paid by the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days.
Conclusion
[71] For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendants’ costs in the sum of $23,798.36, inclusive of disbursements and costs. Those amounts are to be paid within thirty (30) days of the release of these reasons.
[72] The parties are to agree on the form of the Order within seven (7) calendar days of the release of these reasons. If there are any issues in that regard, the Trial Coordinator may be spoken to for an appointment to see me.
LEMAY J
Released: December 11, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-4551-00
DATE: 2019 12 11
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
DRAGO EDGREDZIJA
Plaintiff
- and -
JASON GULLETT carrying on business as PRESTIGE STEEL BUILDINGS and PRESTIGE BUILDINGS 2016 LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEMAY J
Released: December 11, 2019