REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

On appeal from the convictions entered on February 26, 2019 by the Honourable Justice E. Rondinelli of the Ontario Court of Justice.

SCHRECK J.:

[1] Luca Mario Ciciarelli did not file personal income tax returns for the years 2001 to 2007 and 2013. In his view, he was not legally required to do so. At his trial on eight counts of failing to file a tax return contrary to s. 238(1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”), Mr. Ciciarelli, through his counsel, advanced a number of arguments as to why he was not legally required to pay tax: (1) he is not a “person” within the meaning of the ITA; (2) the payment of taxes is optional because the income tax system is described in some government publications as being based on “voluntary compliance”; (3) he never entered into a contract with the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) in which he agreed to pay taxes; (4) he was not required to pay taxes because the CRA did not answer all of his inquiries; (5) the T1 tax return form is not a “prescribed form” and therefore “unauthorized”; and (6) he was entitled to rely on the defence of due diligence because he did “research” into whether he had to pay his taxes.

[2] The trial judge rejected all of Mr. Ciciarelli’s arguments and convicted him on all counts. He appeals his convictions and has advanced essentially the same arguments as he did at trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

I. EVIDENCE

[3] There is no issue that the appellant did not file income tax returns during the relevant periods despite having been advised by the CRA of his obligation to do so. At trial, the appellant testified that he had not filed any returns because his “research” had led him to conclude that he was not obliged to do so and the CRA had failed to persuade him otherwise in responding to the numerous inquiries he had made. It was his position that by making such inquiries, he exercised due diligence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Pseudolegal Arguments

[4] The arguments advanced by the appellant are not new. The have been advanced many times in various forms, never with success: R. v. Klundert (2008), 2008 ONCA 767, 93 O.R. (3d) 81 (C.A.); R. v. Ricci (2004), 2004 CanLII 33347 (ON CA), 190 O.A.C. 375 (C.A.); R. v. Mori, [2016] O.J. No. 2350 (C.J.), aff’d 2017 ONSC 1551, 2017 D.T.C. 5031; Girard v. Canada, 2014 TCC 107; Stein v. Canada, 217 FCA 71; R. v. Millar, 2017 BCSC 402, 378 C.R.R. (2d) 312; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Watson, 2005 BCSC 1225, [2005] 4 C.T.C. 202, leave to appeal refused 2006 BCCA 233, [2006] 4 C.T.C. 61; Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 72, [2009] 5 C.T.C. 235; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76; Pomerleau v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123, 96 C.P.C. (7th) 249; R. v. Tyskerud, 2013 BCPC 27, 2013 D.T.C. 5049; R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 88; R. v. Dick, 2003 BCPC 13; R. v. Callow, 2000 ABQB 335, [2000] 3 C.T.C. 427; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448; R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291; Bydeley v. Canada, 2012 TCC 142, [2012] 5 C.T.C. 2099; M.N.R. v. Camplin, 2007 FC 183, 2007 D.T.C. 5165; Hovey Ventures Inc. v. The Queen, 2007 FCC 139; Cudmore v. Canada, 2010 FCC 318, [2010] C.T.C. 2271; Kion v. Canada, 2009 TCC 447, 2009 D.T.C. 447; Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675, [2001] B.C.T.C. 675. Litigants who advance this type of argument have been referred to as “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants”: Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 74 Alta L.R. (5th) 1.

[5] In essence, the appellant submits that nobody is obliged to pay income tax unless he or she wants to. According to him, the wording of the Income Tax Act supports this conclusion, because the word “person” in s. 248(1) of the ITA does not actually mean “person” but, rather, means “corporation”. The appellant submits that it was in fact Parliament’s intent in enacting the ITA that nobody be obliged to pay taxes unless they want to and the CRA employees who attempt to enforce the payment of taxes are misguided. He suggests that the fact that the tax system is described in certain CRA publications (but not the legislation) as being based on “voluntary compliance” supports his conclusions. He argues that even if Parliament did purport to require individuals to pay taxes, such legislation would be invalid because it would be contrary to the legal maxim “le contrat fait la loi”, which, according to the appellant, is some type of overriding constitutional principle to which all legislation is subordinate. In addition to this, he submits that the T1 form that millions of Canadians use to file their tax returns is not a “prescribed form” and therefore “unauthorized”.

[6] I do not intend to engage in any analysis of the appellant’s submissions. The trial judge gave full reasons for rejecting them and many of the authorities I have cited also explain why they cannot succeed. Their shortcomings are obvious. If the appellant were correct, millions of Canadians would stop paying income taxes, the Government of Canada would be financially crippled and likely unable to continue paying for infrastructure, health care, national defence, old age security and numerous other services on which we all depend.

[7] The submissions made in this case are frivolous, vexatious and devoid of any merit whatsoever. I adopt what was said by Campbell T.C.J. in relation to a similar argument in Cassa v. Canada, 2013 TCC 43, at paras. 13-14:

Whatever it is, it is without merit, it detracts from the court proceedings and it is total and utter nonsense. My method of dealing with any attempt by the Appellant to employ this nonsense in my Court was to simply ignore it.

The majority of the Appellant’s proposed appeal is peppered throughout with many of the concepts and language referred to in Meads. It contains statements and assertions that are unintelligible, incomprehensible, meaningless, irrelevant and factually hopeless. I consider those types of arguments an abuse of the Court’s processes. Such “song and dance” routines hinder and limit the availability of Court resources for those self-represented litigants who are making an honest attempt to advance their appeals through the Court system in a timely manner.

B. The Role of Counsel

[8] In most cases of this nature, pseudolegal arguments are advanced by unrepresented litigants. It may well be that the appellant and others like him honestly believe that they are not legally required to pay taxes, although I doubt this to be the case. However, in this case the arguments were advanced by counsel, both at trial and on appeal.

[9] It is of course appropriate for counsel to advance novel and creative arguments, even where they are unlikely to succeed. The development of the common law depends on such advocacy. However, this does not include advancing arguments that have no basis in fact or law and which have been repeatedly rejected by the courts. Despite counsel’s protestations to the contrary, I cannot accept that he believed that there was any chance that the trial judge or this court would agree that his client is not a “person” and therefore not required to pay taxes. It follows that his only purpose in advancing these arguments must have been “purely dilatory … with the sole objective of obstructing the orderly conduct of the judicial process in a calculated manner”: Québec (Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v. Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 478, at para. 29.

[10] In my view, counsel had a professional obligation to decline to advance the arguments made in this case: D.J. Netolizsky, “Lawyers and Court Representation of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [OPCA] Litigants in Canada” (2018) 51 U.B.C. L. Rev. 411, at para. 13. His failure to fulfill that obligation resulted in the waste of scarce and valuable judicial resources in this court and the Ontario Court of Justice. While maintaining that his client should not be required to pay taxes, counsel was quite prepared to squander the taxes paid by others. In doing so, he abused his privileges as an officer of the court.

III. DISPOSITION

[11] The appeal is dismissed.

Justice P.A. Schreck

Released: November 21, 2019.

COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-0000028-AP

DATE: 20191121

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

LUCA MARIO CICIARELLI

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

P.A. Schreck J.

Released: November 21, 2019.

R. v. Ciciarelli, 2019 ONSC 6719

Case Summary

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I. EVIDENCE

II. ANALYSIS

A. Pseudolegal Arguments

B. The Role of Counsel

III. DISPOSITION

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 2

Legislation 1