COURT FILE NO.: 33-2153506
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Branon Dale Hover, Bankrupt
BEFORE: Master Kaufman
COUNSEL: Percy Ostroff, Counsel for the Bankrupt
Stéphanie Lauriault, Counsel the Attorney General of Canada
HEARD: July 23, 2019 and September 9, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Mr. Hover (“the bankrupt”) is a 42-year-old second-time bankrupt. His first bankruptcy occurred in 1999, when he was about 21 years old. He has worked in the landscaping and property maintenance field since 1993. He was the sole shareholder of Silverstone Contracting Corp. (“Silverstone Contracting”), which filed an unsuccessful proposal in December of 2015 and subsequently became bankrupt. Mr. Hover filed for personal bankruptcy on August 9, 2016.
[2] The Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) opposes Mr. Hover’s discharge on the grounds that this is a tax driven bankruptcy, that the bankrupt’s assets are not of a value equal to $0.50 on the dollar, and that he was previously a bankrupt. There is no dispute that these grounds exist, and that Mr. Hover cannot receive an absolute discharge. The only issues in this application are whether conditions should be imposed and the length of a suspended order of discharge.
[3] In deciding what order to make on an application for discharge, the Court may consider, in addition to the conduct listed in sections 173(1) and 172.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. , 1985, c. B-3 (“BIA”), any other conduct or affairs that relate to the bankruptcy. The courts take a more lenient approach where the assignment into bankruptcy was not made to evade the payment of income taxes and results from other causes, such as unfortunate financial circumstances.
[4] For reasons that follow, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr. Hover failed to cooperate with the CRA’s audit, and that he transferred his corporation’s control to his sister in order to continue to operate his business while avoiding the payment of corporate and personal income taxes. I am also satisfied that the bankrupt’s declared income was set artificially low in order to avoid making surplus income payments.
[5] Accordingly, the Court imposes a conditional and suspended order of discharge on the terms that follow.
I. Bankrupt’s conduct or affairs that relate to the bankruptcy
a) The Canada Revenue Agency’s Audit
[6] The bankrupt was the director and principal of Silverstone Contracting. The company provided property maintenance and repair, landscaping, and snow and ice removal services. The bankrupt has been operating his own businesses since he finished Grade 10. He carried on business under the name “Hover Landworks” until 1999, when he filed for his first bankruptcy. Thereafter, he was involved in other business ventures until he incorporated Silverstone Contracting in February 2007.
[7] The CRA began auditing the bankrupt and his corporation on May 12, 2015. The auditor spoke to the bankrupt’s sister, Ms. Angel Hover, to arrange for an initial interview. Ms. Hover initially advised that the meeting could occur in the last week of May.
[8] Between May 12, 2015 and September 2, 2015, the bankrupt, through his sister, set and then cancelled five meetings with the auditor. During that period, Ms. Hover had already contacted a Licensed Insolvency Trustee (Trustee) to seek bankruptcy protection for Silverstone Contracting. In an e-mail to the trustee dated July 21, 2015, Ms. Hover wrote that they were “able to get CRA to back off until the 30th of July. But then they are coming full steam ahead.”
[9] A first meeting with the auditor occurred on September 2, 2015, but the bankrupt was unable to answer certain questions. The parties agreed that Angel Hover would answer those remaining questions. The auditor met with Ms. Hover on October 2, 2015.
[10] The auditor subsequently sent Ms. Hover an Audit Query Sheet on November 9, 2015. He followed up on December 2, 2015 because he had not received a response. Another meeting was arranged for December 30, 2015 to review the Query Sheet and corporate bank accounts.
[11] On December 21, 2015, Ms. Hover cancelled the meeting, informed the auditor that the company was insolvent, and that further dealings would have to go through the trustee.
b) The CRA’s reassessments
[12] The CRA audit of Silverstone Contracting related to the 2012-2014 taxation years. Its audit of the bankrupt focused on the 2011-2013 period. On July 8, 2016, it notified them of the audit’s results.
[13] The CRA concluded that Silverstone Contracting deducted expenses that were personal in nature (such as leases for a Chevrolet Corvette and a Cadillac Escalade), deducted amounts in excess of the allowable lease limits, failed to support certain deductions for professional fees or bad debts, and earned income that had not been reported.
[14] With respect to unreported income, the CRA undertook a net worth analysis. It compared the amount deposited into the bankrupt’s accounts to the amount of income the corporation reported. The CRA concluded that the Silverstone Contracting failed to report income of $76,148 in 2012 and $328,804 in 2013. In total, Silverstone Contracting failed to report $900,699 in income between 2012 and 2014.
[15] With respect to the audit of the bankrupt, the CRA found that Mr. Hover should have included in his income certain amounts as shareholder benefits (i.e., lease payments for the Corvette and the Escalade). Moreover, Mr. Hover did not report rental income earned from Silverstone Contracting (i.e., the corporation deducted rent expenses in relation to the bankrupt’s property). Finally, using a net worth analysis, the CRA concluded that Mr. Hover deposited more money into his bank accounts than he reported. The CRA found that the bankrupt underreported $729,029 in income for the years 2011-2013.
[16] Further to the CRA’s reassessments, Silverstone Contracting owed $779,304.89 in unremitted GST/HST, source deductions, and corporate taxes. The bankrupt owed CRA $662,722.44 in personal income taxes. This represents over 90% of the bankrupt’s total unsecured debt.
[17] Neither the bankrupt nor Silverstone Contracting exercised their right to object to the CRA’s reassessments. While both parties made arguments and presented evidence regarding the correctness of the CRA’s assessments at the hearing before this Court,[^1] I must take this debt as proven for the purposes of this application.[^2]
c) Silverstone Contracting’s Assets and Operations are transferred to Silverstone Group
[18] On August 20, 2014, Ms. Angel Hover, incorporated 2430810 Ontario Inc., which carried on business as Silverstone Group. She is the sole shareholder of this corporation.
[19] Silverstone Group assumed the leases for all but three items of Silverstone Contracting’s heavy machinery and equipment after the trustee released its interest in these items. Of note, Silverstone Contracting acquired three pieces of heavy machinery (a backhoe, dump truck, and tractor) in June and July 2015 (i.e., during the audit period) after paying certain down payments. This equipment was subsequently transferred to Silverstone Group.
[20] Based on the CRA’s GST/HST installment records, the period when Silverstone Group starts generating revenue coincides with the period where Silverstone Contracting stops operating:
Silverstone contracting revenues
February 1, 2015 to April 30, 2015: $116,633.89
May 1, 2015 to July 31, 2015: $70,122.40
August 1, 2015 to October 31, 2015: 0
Silverstone Group revenues
May 18 to May 31, 2015: 0
June 1 to June 30, 2015: $61,749.92
July 1 to July 31, 2015: $98.153.81
[21] From 2010 to 2014, Ms. Hover declared a modest income in her income tax returns:
2010: $16,040
2011: $18,130
2012: $18,140
2013: $6,721
2014: $5,717
[22] After 2015, Ms. Hover starts declaring significant income:
2015: $60,485
2016: $80,145
2017: $95,877
2018: $75,707
[23] Printouts of Silverstone Contracting and Silverstone Group’s respective websites reveal that these are almost identical. The companies use the same logo and list the same services offered. Both websites list the bankrupt, Branon Hover, as president. Silverstone Group claims to have been in business for over 25 years, which can only be accurate if it is considered to be a continuation of Mr. Hover’s various businesses.
[24] Mr. Hover describes himself as being vice-president of the Silverstone Group from January 1993 to present on social media platform LinkedIn. An advertisement published in May 2016 in the Ottawa West News for Silverstone Group mentions that Mr. Hover is the vice-president of Silverstone Group, which has purportedly been servicing Ottawa and the valley for over 24 years.
[25] Finally, Mr. Hover testified that Silverstone Group operates out of his property, and that all of Silverstone Group’s machinery is stored behind Mr. Hover’s residence. One vehicle on Mr. Hover’s property is a Polaris Slingshot, a three-wheeled recreational vehicle. Mr. Hover testified that it belonged to his sister and that he only took it out once. Ms. Hover testified that she uses it primarily. In cross-examination, she was shown a Facebook post where she is pictured in this vehicle. In response to a comment by one of her friends about using the vehicle, Ms. Hover writes: “If Brannon ever let’s [sic] me scoop it again, I’m always the last to use it.” This directly contradicts the bankrupt and his sister’s testimony and undermines their credibility. It also suggests that Mr. Hover is the beneficial owner of assets placed under Ms. Hover’s name to protect them from bankruptcy.
[26] The bankrupt and his sister testified that Silverstone Contracting and Silverstone Group are two separate companies engaging in different lines of work. Mr. Hover testified that Silverstone Contracting was primarily a landscaping company, and that it subcontracted out paving jobs. Ms. Hover testified that Silverstone group was primarily an asphalt and snow removal company that subcontracts landscaping services. She testified that Silverstone Group assumed Silverstone Contracting’s leases because there was no waiting period, and because she knew where they came from.
[27] I do not accept this testimony. Based on the abovementioned evidence, I find it much more likely that Silverstone Group acquired the machinery because it was required to carry out Silverstone Contracting’s operations. I find it highly suspicious that Silverstone Contracting would acquire new machinery (and make down payments) in June and July 2015 at a time when Ms. Hover informed the trustee that Mr. Hover had decided to put the company into bankruptcy. I also find it telling that Ms. Hover chose to carry on a business under the name “Silverstone,” that her company kept the same logo, and that it lists Mr. Hover as vice-president.
[28] Ms. Hover testified that the website for Silverstone Contracting and the advertisement in Ottawa West News contained mistakes. She testified that the website designer “put things” in the advertisements without her consent, such as naming her brother as the contact for the company. She testified that the Ottawa West News advertisements erroneously contained the Silverstone Contracting’s telephone number. I find it implausible that a website designer and a newspaper would publish these advertisements without first submitting proofs and having them approved. It is also implausible that both services mistakenly identified Mr. Hover as a contact person Silverstone Group.
[29] I find that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that Silverstone Contracting transferred its assets and operations to Silverstone Group for the purposes of continuing its business, maintaining its assets and goodwill, and avoiding its debts to CRA.
[30] In R. v. Uhrig,[^3] the Court of Appeal for Ontario commented on the cumulative weight circumstantial evidence can have:
When arguments are advanced, as here, that individual items of circumstantial evidence are explicable on bases other than guilt, it is essential to keep in mind that it is, after all, the cumulative effect of all the evidence that must satisfy the standard of proof required of the Crown. Individual items of evidence are links in the chain of ultimate proof: R. v. Morin, 1988 8 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345, at p. 361. Individual items of evidence are not to be examined separately and in isolation, then cast aside if the ultimate inference sought from their accumulation does not follow from each individual item alone. It may be and very often is the case that items of evidence adduced by the Crown, examined separately, have not a very strong probative value. But all the evidence has to be considered, each item in relation to the others and to the evidence as a whole, and it is all of them taken together that may constitute a proper basis for a conviction: Cote v. The King (1941), 1941 348 (SCC), 77 C.C.C. 75 (S.C.C.), at p. 76.
d) The Bankrupt’s surplus income
[31] The bankrupt testified that he can only work part-time as a result of injuries he sustained in a motorcycle accident in 2002. I will comment more on this accident below in addressing the bankrupt’s financial prospects for the future. He testifies that he works 14 hours per week. He declared net employment income of $2,161.70 per month, and discretionary expenses of $5,881 per month in his Monthly Income and Expense Statement dated March 2019. The bankrupt testified that he receives money from his sister as a gift to cover his expenses. According to Ms. Hover, she gifts her brother between $1,800 and $2,800 per month.
[32] On July 22, 2015, Ms. Hover wrote to the trustee to enquire about Mr. Hover’s personal bankruptcy. The email reads in part:
Branon has asked me to ask you how long until he would be discharged on a personal bankruptcy and is there anything that would delay the discharge or prolong it.
You mentioned 2000 a month… that’s after tax or before tax money.
[33] I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the “2000 a month” is a reference to the superintendent’s surplus income standards. In 2019, single persons earning under $2,203 per month are not required to pay any surplus income. Mr. Hover declares income of $2,161 per month, just under that limit.
[34] In another e-mail to the trustee dated May 3, 2016 (prior to the bankruptcy date of August 9, 2016) Ms. Hover writes to the trustee: “So branons [sic] mortgage is more than he will be allowed to make” [emphasis added]. I conclude, based on this correspondence and my findings above, that Mr. Hover set his income at a rate that was designed to avoid making surplus payments.
[35] I conclude that Mr. Hover earns more income from Silverstone Group than he reports, and that his sister’s “gifts” should be imputed as income. Accordingly, Mr. Hover should have declared at least as much income as the total of his discretionary and non-discretionary expenses: $5,881 per month.
II. Section 172.1 BIA factors
[36] There is no dispute that the bankrupt’s income tax debt exceeds $200,000, and that it represents over 75% of his total unsecured proven claims. Pursuant to subsection 172.1(4), in deciding this application, the Court must take into account four factors, analysed presently and in turn:
(a) the circumstances of the bankrupt at the time the personal income tax debt was incurred.
[37] I conclude that the bankrupt’s circumstances were in the nature of culpable neglect, as opposed to misfortune.
[38] The bankrupt testified that his bankruptcy was caused by the combination of an inability to collect receivables, an inability to retain qualified employees, and mental health issues. Mr. Hover testified that he brought an action against the Hellenic Centre to recover monies owing. I find that, while these issues may very well have played a role in his bankruptcy, the main cause of his bankruptcy was his decision to operate his company in a way that utilized the monies generated for purposes that shirked its statutory obligations. Mr. Hover preferred to live beyond his means and spent money on expensive cars rather than pay his taxes.
[39] Mr. Hover testified that he relied on his bookkeepers and that he simply provided them with his receipts. Given the extent of the undeclared income, I do not accept this explanation. The causes of the reassessment are not complicated or technical tax issues. The bankrupt was merely required to differentiate between personal and business expenses, and report all of his income. I found Mr. Hover to be an intelligent business person whose business generated sales in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. He certainly had the capacity to discharge his tax obligations.
(b) the efforts, if any, made by the bankrupt to pay the personal income tax debt.
[40] The bankrupt made no efforts to pay his personal income tax debt. To the contrary, he managed his affairs so as to avoid paying this debt.
(c) whether the bankrupt made payments in respect of other debts while failing to make reasonable efforts to pay the personal income tax debt;
[41] While the CRA presented evidence that would support this finding for Silverstone Contracting, I have not been presented with evidence that Mr. Hover preferred other debts to the one to CRA.
(d) the bankrupt’s financial prospects for the future
Medical evidence
[42] Mr. Hover was in a serious motorcycle accident in 2002. Two medical practitioners testified for the bankrupt as to the consequences of the accident: Dr. Seale and Dr. Reesor.
[43] Dr. Edward Seale is a family medicine physician. He suspects that the bankrupt will no longer be able to maintain his business or be retrained for employment purposes.
[44] Dr. Seale provided a report in which he listed the injuries the bankrupt suffered in 2002: a significant head injury, multiple musculoskeletal injuries, and a complication of a pulmonary embolism. Dr. Seale reported that Mr. Hover was able to return to the physical work landscaping entails, but that his injuries have caught up with him and that he suffers from pain and diminished mobility.
[45] In cross-examination, Dr. Seale admitted that he was surprised to see the bankrupt put up a retaining wall. He testified that Mr. Hover is not aware of what he is doing to his body, and that he will eventually pay a price. Dr. Seale conceded that Mr. Hover would be able to perform managerial responsibilities to a degree.
[46] Dr. Reesor is a PhD in psychology who has been treating the bankrupt since his accident. He reported that Mr. Hover has been diagnosed with a mixed personality / mood change disorder arising from a somatic brain injury (chronic); a depressive disorder (chronic, recurrent); an adjustment disorder with anxious features; and a cognitive disorder. Dr. Reesor reported that he has had problems regulating his emotions, problems with social and relationship functioning, and personal organization / problem solving issues. While occupational restoration may be possible, he is of the opinion that there is a poor to guarded prognosis regarding a meaningful and sustained occupational involvement in the future.
[47] Dr. Reesor testified that the bankrupt has limited self-awareness and judgment. When asked about whether the bankrupt could improve his chances of maintaining and sustaining an occupation, he responded that it was remarkable that Mr. Hover accomplished as much as he did.
Conclusion on bankrupt’s financial prospects for the future
[48] I accept that Mr. Hover has suffered from a traumatic and serious motorcycle accident in 2002, and that he continues to suffer from physical and mental impairments to this day. I accept Drs. Seale and Reesor’s testimonies that the bankrupt has exercised poor judgment to the detriment of his health.
[49] This being said, in looking at the bankrupt’s financial prospects for the future, the Court should also consider the bankrupt’s past ability to generate income. The accident occurred in 2002, 17 years ago. Mr. Hover testified that his sister became involved in his company in 2005, doing administration and “paperwork.” I am of the view that the bankrupt needs his sister to operate the company. During CRA’s audit, she was the point of contact for the auditor. She was also the person who communicated with the trustee, asked questions, and relayed the bankrupt’s instructions.
[50] However, the evidence also establishes that the bankrupt contributes significantly to the business. When the auditor reached Mr. Hover on the phone to arrange for an initial interview, Mr. Hover told him that “he is very busy” and would not have time until three weeks later because he could not “stop running his business” for the audit and “he cannot lose out on jobs.” Mr. Hover acknowledges working part-time for the company, running errands and making deliveries. The company ledger shows that he gets reimbursed for purchases that he makes with his own money.
[51] It is difficult to assess with precision what roles Mr. Hover and his sister perform in the company. Nonetheless, I conclude that the bankrupt underplays his involvement, and Ms. Hover overplays hers. I conclude that Mr. Hover and his sister worked together to generate significant revenues after the accident, and that they have continued to do so after the bankruptcy.
[52] Mr. Hover has been in the landscaping business for over 25 years. He remains able to oversee and direct projects, estimate costs, review schedules, and monitor progress. Dr. Seale admitted that the bankrupt would be able to accomplish managerial responsibilities to a degree. I accept that Mr. Hover has limitations with respect to performing physically demanding work.
[53] I sum, I conclude that the bankrupt’s financial prospects are such that he should be required to pay a portion of his tax debt as a condition of discharge. Past income generation is helpful to the court in determining future ability in this regard.[^4] His financial prospects are either the same or, perhaps, slightly lower than in the years that preceded his bankruptcy. Between 2011-2013, Mr. Hover underreported $729,029 in income. As mentioned above, his income should be imputed to at least $5,881 per month.
III. Court’s determination
[54] Pursuant to section 172.1(3), on the hearing of an application for a discharge in an income tax driven bankruptcy, the Court shall:
a) refuse the discharge;
b) suspend the discharge for any period that the court thinks proper; or
c) require the bankrupt, as a condition of his or her discharge, to perform any acts, pay any moneys, consent to any judgments or comply with any other terms that the court may direct.
[55] Refusing discharge is a severe penalty that it is reserved for extreme cases where the Court believes that the bankrupt is incapable of rehabilitation. This is not the case here.
Suspension of discharge
[56] The Court orders a period of suspension of 18 months from August 9, 2019.
[57] Had the bankrupt declared surplus income, as I found that he should have, the hearing for of Mr. Hover’s application could not have been held before the expiry of 36 months after the date of the bankruptcy.[^5] Mr. Hover’s bankruptcy date was August 9, 2016 and, accordingly, this application could not have been heard before August 9, 2019. I am of the view that a period of suspension is required so as to avoid making the underreporting of income a gainful proposition, and to maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy process.
[58] Pursuant to subsection 172.1(5), if the Court makes an order suspending the discharge, the order must require the bankrupt to file income and expense statements with the trustee each month and file all returns of income required by law to be filed.
Conditions of discharge
[59] The BIA confers upon this Court wide discretion in determining the terms of a bankrupt’s discharge. Each case must be considered on its specific and unique facts, and the Court must balance the (1) the interests of creditors in recovering payment of their claims, (2) the legitimate interests of the bankrupt in obtaining relief from his financial obligations, and (3) the integrity of the bankruptcy process and the public perception of that process.[^6] The conditions imposed should strike a balance that respects the need to deter and denunciate certain behaviour while avoiding the imposition of payment that the bankrupt cannot meet. Rehabilitation is one of the goals of the bankruptcy regime. The conditions imposed should be sufficiently burdensome to express the Court’s disapproval, without being unduly harsh.
[60] There are presently many factors that weigh against leniency for the bankrupt.
[61] First, where it is determined that bankrupts have deliberately avoided their income tax obligations, conditions should be imposed that demonstrate the court’s disapproval.[^7] Most Canadians pay income tax at source. Where a person takes improper advantage of the fact that their taxes are not collected via source deductions, failure to pay income tax as it is earned is considered misconduct rather than misfortune.[^8]
[62] Secondly, income tax debts are given special consideration in determining the question of discharge.[^9] Income taxes are collected for the benefit of the community, and the failure to pay one’s fair share places that burden on the other members of the community. Parliament has recognized the special status of income tax debts in enacting a restrictive regime in s. 172.1 BIA, which provides a means of recognizing the socially important character of this type of debt. The regime is designed to prevent bankrupts with significant income tax debts from abusing the insolvency system.[^10]
[63] In the circumstances, the bankrupt shall be granted a conditional discharge upon paying to the Trustee the sum of $150,000 in monthly installments of no less than $1,000 per month. This amounts to 22% of the bankrupt’s total income tax debt, inclusive of penalties and interest. The bankrupt is required to remain current with all obligations to CRA until he receives an absolute discharge.
[64] The parties before this Court submitted for consideration cases where the condition of discharge was calculated as a percentage of the tax debt owed. In Re Baran, for instance, Justice D.M. Brown (as he was then) surveyed the case law and noted that courts most usually impose payments in the range of 5% to 15% of the tax debt as a condition of discharge, although there have been cases that resulted in payments of 50% or more.
[65] The amount chosen in the present case is based primarily on the fact that, had the bankrupt declared surplus income as he should have for 36 months, he would have repaid approximately $66,000 based on the imputed income of $5,881 per month. The condition of discharge cannot entail the payment of a lesser amount than the statutory scheme requires.
[66] Ultimately, this Court is of the view that requiring the bankrupt to pay more than the amount prescribed could have a crushing effect on the bankrupt and his prospects of rehabilitation.
[67] The Court has indeed found that Mr. Hover wilfully evaded his obligations to pay income taxes. However, Mr. Hover also has many qualities of a successful and industrious entrepreneur. He overcame a tragic accident and built his company from the ground up. He generated hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue per year. He is only 42 years old and he should be encouraged to continue his trade. The Court wishes him well. But he must pay his taxes like everyone else. The conditions presently imposed reinforce the importance of this obligation to society.
Conclusion
[68] The Court orders:
a) That the bankrupt be granted a conditional discharge upon paying the sum of $150,000 to the Trustee for the general benefit of creditors, with minimum payments of $1,000 per month commencing December 1, 2019;
b) That the bankrupt file income and expense statements with the trustee each month and file all returns of income required by law to be filed. He shall not be discharged unless and until he is current with all of his obligations with the CRA;
c) That the bankrupt’s discharge is suspended for a minimum of 18 months from August 9, 2019 and until all of the payments under the conditional order are paid;
d) In the event that the bankrupt seeks protection from creditors in the future, whether under the BIA or similar legislation, he shall seek leave of the court prior to filing for such protection; and
e) Provided that the bankrupt makes the payments as set out above, no interest will be payable. In the event that payments are not paid, or are more than 10 days late, interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at the rate of 5% per annum.
Master Kaufman
Registrar in Bankruptcy
Date: October 31, 2019
[^1]: For example, a dispute arose as to whether the Cadillac Escalade had been equipped with a plow for snow removal, thereby justifying the lease payments as a business expenses, and whether the Corvette was used to entertain clients.
[^2]: See Re Baran, 2013 ONSC 7501, [2013] G.S.T.C. 146. See also s. 152(8) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), which deems every assessment valid and binding subject to being varied or vacated on an objection or appeal.
[^3]: 2012 ONCA 470, at para. 13.
[^4]: See Re Somers (1994), 1994 7475 (ON SC), 28 CBR (3d) 140 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re Janowsky, [1993] BCJ No. 730 (CA);
[^5]: See BIA, s. 172.1(b)(ii).
[^6]: See Re Melnitzer (1993), 18 C.B.R. (3d) 245, at para. 14.
[^7]: See Re Van Eewen, 2013 BCSC 1113, [2013] 5 C.T.C. 297.
[^8]: See Re Perrier, 2016 BCSC 912, [2016] G.S.T.C. 48. See also Re Tjelta, 2012 BCSC 984, 2012 D.T.C. 5125, at para. 14.
[^9]: See Re O'Reilly (Bankruptcy), 2004 22697 (S.C.J.).
[^10]: See Canada (Attorney General) v. Koch, 2012 QCCA 2207, at paras. 21-22.