COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-1-588

DATE: 2019/10/10

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Crown/Respondent

– and –

KEVIN NGUYEN and THI NGUYEN

Defendants/Applicants

Katherine Stewart, for the Crown/Respondent

Alana Page, for the Defendant/Applicant Kevin Nguyen

Jennifer Myers, for the Defendant/Applicant Thi Nguyen

HEARD: March 25-29, September 3-6 and 12, 2019

An Order restricting publication of this proceeding was made under ss. 645 (5) and s. 648 of the Criminal Code and continues to be in effect until after the conclusion of the trial.

SPIES, J.

Ruling ON Thi Nguyen’s CHARTER APPLICATION

Overview

[1] The Defendant, Kevin Nguyen, is charged with assault resist arrest, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking x2, possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and related offences. His mother, Thi Nguyen, is charged with possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000 and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm; the same proceeds and firearm Mr. Nguyen is charged with. The firearm was located during a search with a warrant in an apartment alleged to be where Mr. Nguyen and Ms. Nguyen were living at the time. At the time of Ms. Nguyen’s arrest, PC Kenny conducted a pat-down search of Ms. Nguyen before placing her in a scout car, and transporting her to 14 Division. After her booking Ms. Nguyen was subjected to a Level 3 search, which is the principal reason for this application Ms. Nguyen has brought.

[2] Ms. Nguyen seeks an order staying the proceedings against her pursuant to ss. 7, 8, 12 and 24(1) of the Charter. I heard this application and other applications brought by Mr. Nguyen in advance of their trial which is scheduled for October 21, 2019. Counsel agreed to be bound by my rulings even though I may not be the trial judge.

The Issues

[3] The position of Ms. Nguyen is that the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that a strip search of her was necessary in that there were no grounds to believe that she had any evidence or weapons on her person that would have gone undiscovered during the pat-down search thus making the strip search unlawful. She argues that the effect of the strip search was exacerbated by the extent of the search which included an internal search and the seizure of her bra. It is her position that the continuation of the proceedings against her, in these circumstances, would undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

[4] The Crown responds that the ordering of the strip search was reasonable in all of the circumstances and in particular given the potential safety concerns not only for other prisoners but also for Ms. Nguyen given that she was associated with a residence where drugs and a loaded firearm were found. Ms. Nguyen was treated respectfully by the female officers conducting the strip search. When they determined that there was wire in her bra, they gave Ms. Nguyen the option of removing the wire (so that she could continue wearing the bra) or keeping the wire in and not wearing the bra (and thus not destroying the bra). It is the Crown’s position that in any event this case is a far cry from "the clearest of cases" requiring a stay of proceedings. The Officers were acting in good faith.

The Evidence

[5] The evidence on this application is for the most part not in dispute. I heard the evidence of the officers involved in the arrest, search and booking of Ms. Nguyen, received an Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASF”) and an affidavit sworn by Ms. Nguyen that was not cross examined on.

[6] Ms. Nguyen’s first language is Vietnamese. Although she speaks some English, she is not comfortable in the English language. Based on the video of her booking, in my view, she clearly did not understand everything that was said and was happening to her. There is no evidence that any thought was given to getting an interpreter for Ms. Nguyen to explain the process. This is relevant only because in my view, this exacerbated the adverse impact the arrest and strip search had on Ms. Nguyen.

[7] The police were investigating a drug dealer known as "LC". They came to believe that LC was Kevin Nguyen and were in the process of obtaining a search warrant for an address that they believed was his residence, namely Unit 104, 1430 King St. West (the “Apartment”). There is no dispute that when police sought and obtained the search warrant, (the “Warrant”), Kevin Nguyen was the target. The police had no information that Ms. Nguyen had any drug or firearm involvement.

[8] Police officers detained and ultimately arrested Mr. Nguyen on June 4, 2017. I have determined in an application brought by Mr. Nguyen that police breached his ss. 8, 9, 10(a) Charter rights when they detained, arrested and searched his person and that as a result the evidence found on his person will be excluded from his trial and the Information to Obtain the Warrant; see R. v. Nguyen, 2019 ONCA 5849 (“Nguyen #1 Decision”).

[9] DC Worth, who assisted in the arrest of Mr. Nguyen, attended the Apartment at around 7:10 p.m. to “freeze” it shortly after Mr. Nguyen was arrested and before the Warrant was issued. He testified that he went into the Apartment alone and during a quick look around that lasted no more than 45 seconds, he confirmed no one was in the Apartment. There is no dispute that no one was in the Apartment at the time DC Worth entered it. He did not see a firearm or anything illegal although he said this was not intended as a search. It is admitted that the firearm was not immediately visible to police upon entry into the Apartment and based on this admission and the evidence of DC Worth, I find that the firearm was not in plain view. Police then secured the Apartment and waited outside the Apartment for the Warrant.

[10] Ms. Nguyen arrived at the Apartment with groceries and her dog at 7:43 p.m. At that time the police were still there waiting for the Warrant. She was advised of the pending Warrant. A police officer attended with her inside the Apartment so that the groceries could be put away, and then she and the officer left the Apartment. Ms. Nguyen was never in the Apartment on her own. There is also no evidence that any police officer saw Ms. Nguyen enter or leave the Apartment at any time prior to the arrest of Mr. Nguyen, or prior to the attendance of police on the perimeter of the Apartment or when DC Worth froze the Apartment.

[11] It is admitted that Ms. Nguyen was not detained and that she was permitted to leave the area if she chose to do so. She did not. Ms. Nguyen remained in the hallway outside the Apartment unit in the presence of police officers from the time she arrived at the Apartment until her arrest. She did not cause any problems to the police at any time.

[12] Once the Warrant was issued, Ms. Nguyen waited with police while they searched the Apartment. It is admitted that the Apartment contained female clothing and identification belonging to Ms. Nguyen. It is also admitted that in the living room of the Apartment one of the couches had bedding on it, including a bed sheet draped over the couch and a pillow. Also in the living room area officers located male clothing and identification and mail belonging to Kevin Nguyen. Prescription pill bottles bearing Mr. Nguyen’s name were also found in the kitchen area. Bundles of cash were located during the search; on the couch; under a blanket, in shoe boxes that contained men’s shoes that were in the corner of the living room and loose cash totaling $2,670 CDN in the top drawer of a dresser in the bedroom. No further evidence as to precisely where the firearm was located was introduced.

[13] PC Kenny was tasked to attend the Apartment after being advised that a firearm had been located in the Apartment. She was asked to prove it safe. When she arrived at the Apartment at 11:16 p.m., she observed Ms. Nguyen and noted that “Ms. Nguyen, the accused mother is outside of the address”. PC Kenny admitted that she did not see Ms. Nguyen in the Apartment at any time.

[14] When PC Kenny entered the Apartment, the firearm was on the couch, but she was not sure exactly where it was before the search. The magazine was in the butt of the firearm and the safety was off. It was fully loaded, and ready to fire. PC Kenny testified that she was also aware that ammunition (namely the ammunition in the firearm) and other drugs had been found in that Apartment. PC Kenny recalled being told about the drugs and the money and she recalled seeing a Scenes of Crime Officer taking photographs of the drugs and the money in the vicinity of the firearm.

[15] PC Kenny was not asked what kind of drugs were found in the Apartment. The only reference in the evidence to drugs in the Apartment was the prescription pill bottles in the name of Mr. Nguyen. This issue was discussed during closing argument and I was advised by Ms. Stewart that no cocaine was found but there was an unmarked prescription bottle that contained OxyContin.

[16] PC Kenny was instructed by DC Worth to place Ms. Nguyen under arrest for possession of a firearm, which she did at 11:35 p.m. without incident. Ms. Nguyen was upset but PC Kenny testified that she was very nice and handled herself in a very positive manner considering what she was dealing with. Ms. Nguyen was not aggressive and made no threats to hurt herself or anyone.

[17] PC Kenny performed a pat-down search of Ms. Nguyen at the time of her arrest. Nothing relevant was found as a result of this search.

[18] Ms. Nguyen was placed in a scout car at 11:51 p.m. notably upset, asking about her son. She was told that there was a camera and that it would record everything she said. She sat calmly in the scout car without resistance. Her handcuffs had been removed.

[19] PC Kenny and PC Van Ruyven transported Ms. Nguyen to 14 Division. She was distraught but did not cause any problems for the officers. While being transported to 14 Division, Ms. Nguyen was asked what her lawyer’s name was. She responded that she did not have one and was told that the officers would get her duty counsel so that she would speak to a lawyer. Ms. Nguyen responded, “no, I do not want to go to the court”.

[20] Ms. Nguyen arrived at 14 Division at around midnight and the officers pulled into the sally port. Both officers got out of the scout car. Just after midnight Ms. Nguyen stated that she wanted to go home. One of the officers responded: “soon, Angie, soon”. A minute later Ms. Nguyen asked if her son was inside and she was told that they would talk about that inside.

[21] Ms. Nguyen was left alone in the scout car for about 18 minutes. At about 12:19 p.m., a female officer, likely PC Kenny, came to the car door and stated, “soon my dear, soon”. When the officer closed the door and then opened the door again Ms. Nguyen moaned “noooooo”. The officer told her that it was only because they were going inside, it is only for two minutes, which seems to be a reference to putting handcuffs on Ms. Nguyen because the officer can be heard stating, “not to the back, just to the front, just to the front. Just for two minutes” Ms. Nguyen responded “don’t do that to me”. The officer replied:

Angie I have to. Don’t make me go hard with you. I want to do this delicately. Give me your hands please. It’s only for two minutes. I’m not even going to do them tight. That’s it. That’s not even tight. Okay. You’re going to be cooperative with me and we are going to get through this. That’s it. Okay. Lots of room. It’s not going to hurt you. Come.

[22] Ms. Nguyen was taken from the scout car at 12:20 a.m. and asked, “why did you do that to me?”. The officer responded that she had to because they were going into a locked facility.

[23] Once inside 14 Division, Ms. Nguyen was paraded by PC Kenny in front of Sgt. Powis, the booking sergeant whose job it was to determine the level of search required before Ms. Nguyen would go into the cells. All of this is captured on video.

[24] PC Kenny requested that a Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen be conducted. PC Kenny admitted that she did not know Ms. Nguyen’s history but testified that in requesting this search she was considering Ms. Nguyen’s own safety and the safety of others and to see if there was any other evidence of the offence. PC Kenny advised Sgt. Powis:

I am requesting a Level 3 search given that she was extracted from a residence where there was a search warrant being executed in regards to a firearm, ammunition, drugs and proceeds of crime. I’d like to make sure there’s nothing on her person that could hurt herself or anyone else while in custody, or any other evidence of the offence. [Emphasis added]

[25] There is no dispute that Ms. Nguyen was not extracted from the Apartment. In cross-examination PC Kenny testified that her choice of the word “extracted” was a “tactical term” that she used because she believed Ms. Nguyen had been “removed” from the Apartment. She agreed that this was an aggressive sounding word and I note that she did not use the term “extracted or even use the term “removed” when she gave her evidence at trial – instead she testified that she believed Ms. Nguyen had been “found in” the Apartment. PC Kenny also agreed that Ms. Nguyen may not have known what she meant by the term “extracted.” She disagreed however, with the suggestion that even if she had used the word “removed” that that was an aggressive word. She also disagreed that Ms. Nguyen would have been more accurately described as a “found in” but did not explain why which I found curious as that is language that she used in Court. In my experience that is the term police typically use when a search warrant is executed and there are persons present who are not the target of the search.

[26] PC Kenny testified that she believed that Ms. Nguyen was in the Apartment where the Warrant was executed. She did not put this in her notes and in fact, as already stated, her notes say the opposite and she admitted that when she saw Ms. Nguyen, she was outside the Apartment. PC Kenny testified that she got this information from “someone else” through “word of mouth” although she could not say who and she admitted that she did not check with anyone to confirm this.

[27] Sgt. Powis immediately informed Ms. Nguyen: "because of the allegations against you, because they found drugs, ammunition and weapons at your house, even though you tell me you didn't know anything about it, I'm going to authorize a Level 3 search". Sgt. Powis asked Ms. Nguyen if she knew what that is. Ms. Nguyen shook her head no. Sgt. Powis then quickly described the search as a “complete search” done with two female officers. I agree with Ms. Myers that it is unlikely that Ms. Nguyen had any idea what was about to happen to her. She deposed in her affidavit that she was scared at the station which is understandable.

[28] Sgt. Powis was asked what the word “extracted” meant to her and she testified that it meant that Ms. Nguyen had been “taken out” of her residence from where these items were located. Sgt. Powis was not aware that Ms. Nguyen had not in fact been inside the Apartment. She made no inquiries given what PC Kenney told her. She testified however that if instead she had been told that Ms. Nguyen had been arrested outside the Apartment, she still would have authorized a Level 3 search because Ms. Nguyen lived there and had access to everything in the Apartment. Those circumstances gave rise to a concern that Ms. Nguyen could have anything secreted on her person.

[29] Sgt. Powis testified that the Level 3 search was to ensure Ms. Nguyen did not have anything on her person she could use to hurt herself or anyone else while in custody and to ensure there was no evidence on her person. She was not necessarily looking for a firearm. If Ms. Nguyen had a weapon on her person, it could be used to hurt herself or somebody else. If drugs were concealed, she could take them and overdose. At a show cause, she would be in a detention facility and could pass things off to someone else or be harmed if word got out that she had something that someone else wanted. Court officers who would be transporting her are not armed and so there were concerns about moving her from the police station to the courthouse or detention facility.

[30] Sgt. Powis confirmed that Ms. Nguyen’s answers to her questions did not give her any concerns about her mental health or alcohol consumption. The fact Ms. Nguyen had said that she had not taken any alcohol or drugs and was not suicidal was considered by Sgt. Powis as part of the constellation of factors she considered in deciding whether to order a Level 3 search. She knew that Ms. Nguyen was cooperative. She knew Ms. Nguyen had no outstanding charges, no criminal record and had never been charged before. Ms. Nguyen was not known to police. Sgt. Powis also knew that no drugs or weapons were found on Ms. Nguyen when she was arrested. Sgt. Powis testified that she did not know that Mr. Nguyen was the target of the Warrant and that she did not know whether or not Ms. Nguyen was the target-she made no inquiries in this regard. Ms. Nguyen was handcuffed, but that would be the case for any person who was brought in custody if not inside a cell or interview room.

[31] Ms. Nguyen was only charged with possession of a firearm when she was brought into the station. Sgt. Powis was not aware if Ms. Nguyen was also going to be charged with possession of drugs but the fact that drugs had been found and she had not been charged should have suggested to her at least at that time, that was not going to happen. However, Sgt. Powis stated that the fact that Ms. Nguyen had not been charged at the time she authorized the search did not matter to her as the firearm and ammunition that was found was sufficient to authorize the Level 3 search in her view. In fact, she testified that any time a firearm is found in a residence she would order a Level 3 search of anyone found in the residence. In her view, depending on the size of the firearm, it could be found in various body cavities. Furthermore, she was not necessarily looking for a firearm, but rather, to ensure that Ms. Nguyen had no other weapons.

[32] Sgt. Powis testified that someone told her that Ms. Nguyen was going to be brought for a show of cause although she does not know who. That was her understanding when Ms. Nguyen was booked in. This was part of the constellation of factors that she considered in deciding to authorize the search.

[33] Sgt. Powis admitted that it was possible that Ms. Nguyen would be going home and admitted that at 12:23 p.m. when Ms. Nguyen asked her if she could go home, she told her that no decision had yet been made. She admitted that at this time it was still possible that Ms. Nguyen would be allowed to go home. This is significant because the Level 3 search was done right after this conversation.

[34] Sgt. Powis did not specifically recall if PC Kenny stated that no decision had been made yet as to whether Ms. Nguyen was staying overnight. However, given the evidence of PC Kenny I do not believe she would have told Sgt. Powis that Ms. Nguyen was being held for a show cause as that is not what she in fact believed at that time.

[35] In any event whether or not Ms. Nguyen would be released or held for a show cause would not have been Sgt. Powis’ or PC Kenny’s decision. Sgt. Powis made no inquiries about this from any of the investigating officers and it is significant that she did not wait to decide whether or not to do a Level 3 search until that issue was decided.

[36] If Ms. Nguyen was going to be taken for a show cause, Sgt. Powis made no inquiries as to whether or not Ms. Nguyen would be with other prisoners in court or at the detention center. She had no ideas of the procedures there. Sgt. Powis testified that what happens in a detention center has no bearing on her decision as to what to do in the station. Her duty is the safety of prisoners and everyone else who is there.

[37] PC Kenny’s police training began in 2014. She was trained by a female officer on how to do a Level 3 search and when to do so. She appeared to have no understanding of the concepts in R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 and seemed to have only a very general understanding of the law with respect to strip searches. It was her position that the search was necessary because Ms. Nguyen came from a residence where drugs and a loaded firearm was found. It did not matter to her that she did not have any reason to believe that Ms. Nguyen would be violent or hurt herself or anyone else because she did not “know” her.

[38] Sgt. Powis testified that her training was ongoing and that she kept up-to-date on cases. She admitted that the law with respect to strip searches has changed and that although in the past the fact that someone was going to be held for a show cause was enough, now, whether or not to authorize such a search must be considered on a case-by-case basis and the threshold is a lot higher. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into account.

[39] Ms. Nguyen was then taken to a private room where the strip search was conducted by two female officers; Officers Kenny and Yepes. The audio of the search being conducted is captured on the booking video. PC Kenny testified more than once that the search was done in a dignified and respectful manner but given the nature of the search in my view, it would be more accurate to state that they did the search in accordance with protocol and at no time was Ms. Nguyen completely naked. To suggest that there could be anything dignified about such a search no matter how carefully it is carried out suggested to me that Officer Kenny does not fully appreciate how degrading and humiliating such a search is, although at other points in her evidence she did acknowledge this to be the case.

[40] At one point during the search Ms. Nguyen stated again that she wanted to go home and PC Kenny advised her that it would just be a “couple of hours,” which she testified was her belief at the time. PC Kenny said that she believed that Ms. Nguyen would be either released without charge, or on a promise to appear.

[41] You can hear Ms. Nguyen say that she has her period, and an officer responds, “That’s okay”. She was told to squat and cough, spread her bum cheeks with both hands so the officers could look. An officer told her that they would get her a new menstrual pad.

[42] PC Kenny testified that when she determined that Ms. Nguyen was wearing a bra with an underwire, this was a safety concern as it is a hard object that could be used to harm herself or others although she admitted that she has never seen someone use the plastic or wire from an underwire bra as a weapon. PC Kenny gave Ms. Nguyen the option of either not wearing her bra or that she would remove the wire. Ms. Nguyen chose to place her bra with the rest of her property. PC Kenny testified that this is a “common practice” if a woman is in custody and that it has nothing to do with the nature of the charges. Sgt. Powis also testified that if a bra has an underwire made from either wire or plastic, it is removed as that underwire can be used as a weapon.

[43] Ms. Nguyen’s boots were removed as they had a fairly thick heel and so they were also considered a potential weapon. Apparently people in custody are normally not allowed to keep their shoes. Ms. Nguyen was in her socks and deposed that it was very cold in the police station. When asked if Ms. Nguyen could have been given slippers PC Kenny stated that it was “not that kind of stay”. There were no blankets available. Ms. Nguyen was very cold all night.

[44] The Level 3 search took approximately six minutes to complete. There is no doubt that the search was a horrible and humiliating experience for Ms. Nguyen. Ms. Nguyen deposed that she her period had just started, and she was very embarrassed and ashamed. The officers asked her to bend over; they made her cough a number of times, and they asked her to spread her butt cheeks. Nothing like this had ever happened to her before. Ms. Nguyen also deposed that she was ashamed. She had been naked in front of strangers - police officers. It was a stressful experience, one that she still remembers. Ms. Nguyen deposed that she still thinks about the strip search at the station, and when she does, she becomes anxious and her heart starts to beat faster.

[45] After the search, Ms. Nguyen was lodged in a cell by herself, which was being monitored by a camera.

[46] Ms. Nguyen was not released in a few hours as PC Kenny expected. She was taken to court the next day in a cubicle in a police van, in handcuffs. While she was in the holding cell at the courthouse, she was kept by herself in a cell. When Ms. Nguyen got to court, no lawyer was available for her. There was no interpreter. She did not get bail that day. Instead she was placed back in handcuffs and was transported in a cubicle in a police van to Vanier in Milton. Ms. Nguyen was strip searched on arrival at Vanier. This process was repeated each time she attended court. At no time before she arrived at Vanier was Ms. Nguyen placed in any holding cell with other prisoners. It took Ms. Nguyen a week to get bail. The reasons for this are not before me, and this unfortunate fact is not relevant to my decision but clearly there were some serious failures in our justice system if it took this long for Ms. Nguyen to be released on bail.

The law with respect to strip searches

[47] In determining whether or not the Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen was reasonable and lawful I begin with the settled law in Golden, supra where 18 years ago the Supreme Court of Canada established the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a strip search to be justified. There is no doubt that the principles from that decision are relevant to my determination of the issues in this case since a Level 3 search meets the definition of a strip search. At para. 47 of Golden the court adopted the definition of a strip search as “the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person’s private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female) or undergarments”.

[48] The principles that I have applied from Golden are as follows:

a) it is unquestionable that strip searches represent a significant invasion of privacy and are often a humiliating, degrading and traumatic experience for individuals subject to them; Golden, supra at para. 83;

b) warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. Although searches incident to a valid arrest are an exception to that rule, warrantless searches including strip searches are the exception and not the norm; Golden, supra at para. 84;

c) the purpose of s. 8 of the Charter is to protect individuals from unjustified intrusions upon their privacy and as a means to prevent unjustified searches before they occur, particularly in relation to strip searches which involve a significant and very direct interference with personal privacy. Strip searches can be humiliating, embarrassing and degrading for those who are subject to them, and any post facto remedies for unjustified strip searches cannot erase the arrestee’s experience of being strip searched. Thus, the need to prevent unjustified searches before they occur is more acute in the case of strip searches; Golden, supra at para. 89.[Emphasis added]

d) strip searches are inherently humiliating and degrading for detainees regardless of the manner in which they are carried out and for this reason they cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy; Golden, supra at para. 90;

e) a "frisk" or "pat-down" search at the point of arrest will generally suffice for the purposes of determining if the accused has secreted weapons on his person. “Only if the frisk search reveals a possible weapon secreted on the detainee's person or if the particular circumstances of the case raise the risk that a weapon is concealed on the detainee's person will a strip search be justified. Whether searching for evidence or for weapons, the mere possibility that an individual may be concealing evidence or weapons upon his person is not sufficient to justify a strip search; Golden, supra at para. 94; [Emphasis added] see also R. v. Gonzales, 2017 ONCA 543 at para.139;

f) the fact that a strip search is conducted as a matter of routine policy and is carried out in a reasonable manner does not render the search reasonable within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter. … Yet a “routine” strip search carried out in good faith and without violence will also violate s. 8 where there is no compelling reason for performing a strip search in the circumstances of the arrest; Golden, supra at para. 95; [Emphasis added]

g) it may be useful to distinguish between strip searches immediately incidental to arrest, and searches related to safety issues in a custodial setting. “We acknowledge the reality that where individuals are going to be entering a prison population, there is a greater need to ensure that they are not concealing weapons or illegal drugs on their person prior to their entry into the prison environment. … The type of searching that may be appropriate before an individual is integrated into the prison population cannot be used as a means of justifying … routine strip searches of individuals who are detained briefly by police, such as intoxicated individuals held overnight in police cells; Golden, supra at para. 96; [Emphasis added]

h) the court referred to R. v. Coulter, [2000] O.J. No. 3452 where Duncan J. noted that whereas strip searching could be justified when introducing an individual into the prison population to prevent the individual from bringing contraband or weapons into prison, and different considerations arise where the individual is only being held for a short time in police cells and will not be mingling with the general prison population, Golden, supra at para. 97; [Emphasis added]

i) the court went on to state however, that while police officers have legitimate concerns that short term detainees may conceal weapons that they could use to harm themselves or police officers, these concerns must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and cannot justify routine strip searches of all arrestees; Golden, supra at para. 97; [Emphasis added]

j) a strip search is a much more intrusive search than a pat down search and accordingly a higher degree of justification is required in order to support the higher degree of interference with the individual’s freedom and dignity. The onus is on the Crown to establish that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest; Golden, supra at para. 98;

k) in light of the serious infringement of privacy and personal dignity that is an inevitable consequence of a strip search, such searches are only valid at common law where they are conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of discovering weapons in the detainee’s possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest. The police must establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search in addition to reasonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest; Golden, supra at para. 99.

[49] The Crown relies on the decision of R. v. Clarke, 2003 64244 (ON SC), [2003] OJ No 3884 (Sup. Ct.) where at para. 89, Justice Ferrier noted that, taking a realistic approach to the issue, it would be a rare case for a strip search not to be justified when an accused is going to be entering the prison population (see also R. v. Jutras, [2007] O.J. No. 2396 221 (S.C.J.) at para. 97). Ferrier J. added that one could give numerous examples of very small, but nevertheless, deadly weapons which could easily be secreted on one’s person and not be revealed by a thorough pat down search. He went on to refer to the Coulter decision, supra, referred to with approval in Golden at para. 97, but I respectfully disagree with his conclusion at para. 91 that in Coulter Justice Duncan had “no hesitation in concluding that strip searching anyone who is entering the prison population is necessary, justified and reasonable”. The court in Golden certainly made it clear that there is no such thing as a routine strip search that is done without any regard to the circumstances of the particular case. In fact, Ferrier J. confirmed this in para. 93 where he stated that each case must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Ms. Myers also advised that Mr. Clarke was infamous as a detainee who would cause trouble.

[50] The Crown also referred me to R. v. Fuglerod, 2012 ONSC 6535, where Justice Code upheld the trial judge’s finding that a strip search was justified in a drinking and driving case, where the defendant told the officers he would not comply with a promise to appear and rolling papers (but no drugs) were found in his jacket. Justice Code found, at para. 23, that there was “nothing rare or exceptional about the facts that would exempt Mr. Fuglerod from the need for a reasonably conducted strip search once the … decision had been lawfully made to hold him for a bail hearing”. [Emphasis added]

[51] Ms. Myers submitted that Justice Code in effect reversed the onus and placed it on the defendant to establish that there were rare and exceptional facts that would “exempt him” from a strip search rather than considering whether or not the Crown had proven that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct a strip search. I agree that the decision can be interpreted in this manner but for my purposes, what is important is that Code J. found at para. 23 that the trial judge had set out the governing principles from Golden and Clarke and those are the cases that I have referred to.

[52] I was also provided with a copy of R. v. Melo, 2013 ONSC 4338, where Campbell J. upheld the decision of Pringle J not to stay the impaired driving charges, where one of the reasons of the trial judge was that the need for a strong judicial ‘message’ to the police about strip searches was not quite as obvious at that time. The issue before me is whether or there is a need to send a strong judicial message at this time.

[53] In R v. Lee, [2013] O.J. No. 637, (SCJ) Fuerst J. heard an appeal by the defendant from a conviction for impaired driving. A second pat down search had detected that the defendant was wearing an underwire bra and in accordance with a policy that the trial judge found was applied routinely and without exception, the officer asked the defendant to remove her bra on the basis that the underwire was a potential weapon. When she did so her breasts were briefly exposed.

[54] On appeal Justice Fuerst disagreed with the conclusion of the trial judge that this search was not a strip search and held (at para. 42) that:

the trial judge failed to consider the court’s caution in Golden that concerns that short-term detainees may conceal weapons must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and cannot justify routine strip searches. A “policy” applied “without exception” to any female detainee wearing an underwire bra is not a case-specific circumstance. Rather, it is a basis for routine strip searches of female detainees, in contravention of s. 8 of the Charter.

[55] Justice Fuerst went on at para. 43 to consider a number of additional factors that the trial judge failed to consider in deciding whether or not the strip search violated s. 8 of the Charter, including the fact that the detainee would be spending only a few hours in the police station cells, she would be monitored by video camera while she was in the cells, she would be placed in a cell by herself and would not be in contact with any other prisoners, the pat-down search did not reveal that her bra was coming apart or damaged such that the underwire was exposed or easily removable from its case, she made no threats to harm herself or others, she was not violent or physically aggressive with the officers and the officers had no information that she had a history of mental health problems.

[56] At para. 45 Justice Fuerst held that wearing an underwire bra is not tantamount to carrying two wires loose in a pocket where they are immediately accessible to the wearer. Like the case at bar, she also referred to the fact that the officers were asked but could not identify any occasion when a female prisoner used or attempted to use the wiring from her bra to injure herself or others. She also noted that the policy of removing underwire bras had not been reevaluated since the release of the decision in Golden. Since she concluded that there be a new trial, Fuerst J. did not address the issue of whether or not a stay would be appropriate although she did note at para. 47 that “conduct by the police violative of Charter rights that is systemic in nature may be a relevant consideration on a section 24(1) application.”

[57] Finally, Ms. Myers filed extracts from a report by Gerry McNeilly, the Independent Police Review Director from March 2019 titled “Breaking the Golden Rule. A Review of Police Strip Searches in Ontario.” She provided this more for some relevant history as this report of course is dated after the arrest of Ms. Nguyen.

[58] Although this was not put to the officers, I note that at p. 93 this report refers to a September 2015 Routine Order from the Office of the Chief of Police which directed Toronto officers that “Level 3 searches shall not be conducted on persons brought into custody by Toronto police officers based solely on the grounds that the person may come into contact with other persons in custody”.

Has the Crown established that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct a Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen?

[59] The burden is on the Crown to establish that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct a Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen. Having reviewed the law, in my view it is quite clear that they did not for a number of reasons.

[60] I found PC Kenny not to be a credible witness in my Nguyen #1 decision. I have a similar concern with respect to an aspect of her evidence that is relevant to the issues on this application brought by Ms. Nguyen. In particular I find it very difficult to believe that another officer told her that Ms. Nguyen was in the Apartment at the time the Warant was executed and that as such she was “removed” from the Apartment. As I have already stated, Ms. Nguyen was not in the Apartment when PC Kenny arrived, and she never saw her in the Apartment. She noted that Ms. Nguyen was not in the Apartment and she did not make a note of this information she supposedly received that Ms. Nguyen had been removed from the Apartment.

[61] Furthermore, it is significant that there is no evidence that any police officer saw Ms. Nguyen enter or leave the Apartment at any time prior to the arrest of Mr. Nguyen, or prior to the attendance of police on the perimeter of the Apartment or when DC Worth froze the Apartment. I heard from all of the police officers who attended at the Apartment and there is absolutely no reason why any one of them would have told PC Kenny that Ms. Nguyen had been in the Apartment when that was never the case.

[62] I find that the only conclusion I can reasonably come to is that PC Kenny was not told that Ms. Nguyen was in the Apartment when the Warrant was executed and that she either fabricated this evidence or simply made an assumption without taking any steps to determine if her assumption was correct.

[63] I considered whether or not this issue makes a difference, since Sgt. Powis testified that it was enough that Ms. Nguyen resided in the Apartment but in my view that is too simplistic. If an officer is going to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not there are reasonable and probable grounds that someone who is arrested is concealing evidence or a weapon on their person, it makes a difference whether or not the person is caught by surprise in the place to be searched, or is, like Ms. Nguyen, out with her dog buying groceries. Even if Ms. Nguyen heard somehow that her son was arrested, since she was not in fact in the Apartment when DC Worth arrived shortly after the arrest, it is ridiculous to think that she would have drugs or weapons concealed on her body while she was out grocery shopping.

[64] Ms. Stewart submitted that the analysis of whether or not the strip search of Ms. Nguyen was justified has to be based on the information provided to Sgt. Powis by PC Kenny and the risk presented by PC Kenny, not whether or not the information provided to her was correct. I accept that submission. However, in my view Sgt. Powis had to ensure she had sufficient information so that she was not merely rubber stamping the request by PC Kenny that a Level 3 search be conducted. I do find however that the conduct of PC Kenny may be relevant to what the appropriate remedy since I have found that the search of Ms. Nguyen was not reasonable.

[65] The issue then is whether or not the officers had reasonable and probable grounds that a Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen was necessary for the purpose of discovering weapons or drugs in her possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest; namely possession of a firearm.

[66] Ms. Myers submitted that there were no grounds to believe that any evidence or weapons would have been secreted on Ms. Nguyen’s person that would not have been discovered in the pat down search. PC Kenny did not find anything of relevance when she conducted the pat down search of Ms. Nguyen. Accordingly, Sgt. Powis needed more than the mere possibility that Ms. Nguyen might be concealing evidence or weapons upon her person to justify a strip search; Golden, supra at para. 94 and Gonzales, supra at para.139.

[67] As Ms. Myers submitted, the fact Ms. Nguyen was left alone in the police car, without handcuffs for 18 minutes, before being brought into the booking hall, makes it clear that the officers did not have any concern about her hurting herself or being a safety risk to others. If they really thought there was a risk that she had a weapon or drugs secreted on her person, they would not have left her alone at all.

[68] I agree with Ms. Myers that it would not have even been possible for Ms. Nguyen to have secreted a firearm on her person. If she had secreted ammunition, it would not be something that could be used to injure anyone. Furthermore there was no evidence of ammunition in the Apartment apart from what was in the firearm. Furthermore, to suggest that Ms. Nguyen had a weapon secreted on her person, in a place where a pat down search would not have located it, is no more than possible in my view and in fact would be unlikely given the fact that Ms. Nguyen had no criminal record, was not the target of the Warrant and had been arrested only because she also lived in the Apartment where the firearm was found. The fact PC Kenny believed Ms. Nguyen was going to be released in a couple of hours makes it clear that she did not believe that the drugs or the firearm belonged to Ms. Nguyen. Sgt. Powis testified she did not know who was the target of the Warrant but she could have readily determined this had she made any inquiries.

[69] The other issue I have with the decision Sgt. Powis made to authorize a Level 3 search is that she based it solely on the fact that Ms. Nguyen had been found in the Apartment where a firearm and drugs were found. She did not suggest there would ever be any exception to this view. As the court held in Golden, supra, at para. 90, strip searches are inherently humiliating and degrading for detainees regardless of the manner in which they are carried out and for this reason they cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy. Even where police officers have legitimate concerns that short term detainees may conceal weapons that they could use to harm themselves or police officers, these concerns must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and cannot justify routine strip searches of all arrestees; Golden, supra at para. 97. [Emphasis added] Furthermore, a "routine" strip search carried out in good faith and without violence will violate s. 8 of the Charter where there is no compelling reason for performing a strip search in the circumstances of the arrest; Golden, supra at para. 95. [Emphasis added] These principles from Golden make it clear that a strip search is unlawful if the officer automatically conducts such a search of everyone on a predetermined basis, rather than evaluating its need based on the particular circumstances of the case.

[70] Sgt. Powis’ decision to authorize a Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen simply because of where she was supposedly found or (had she been given correct information), because she lived in the Apartment where a firearm and drugs were found, was not reasonable as she failed to consider the need for the search on a case-by-case basis, contrary to the principles in Golden. Had she done so, there was nothing about Ms. Nguyen that should have added to her concern and in fact, given what she knew about Ms. Nguyen, that information should have led to her deciding there was no concern. At best any concern that Ms. Nguyen might be concealing evidence or weapons upon her person to justify a strip search was no more than a mere possibility.

[71] Sgt. Powis, testified that she believed that Ms. Nguyen was going to be held for a show cause and that was another reason why she authorized the Level 3 search. I have difficulty believing this as PC Kenny, who had more information about the circumstances of Ms. Nguyen’s arrest, did not believe that. In any event, that reasoning was flawed because as Sgt. Powis acknowledged, the law with respect to strip searches required her to consider the need for a strip search on a case-by-case basis even if she knew that Ms. Nguyen was in fact going to be held for a show cause. She failed to do so.

[72] Ms. Stewart argued that the fact that Ms. Nguyen ultimately never shared a cell with another prisoner has no bearing on the police decision to conduct a strip search - what matters at the time the strip search is conducted is the potential for exposure to the prison population. It is her position that Sgt. Powis would have no way of looking into a crystal ball to determine whether Ms. Nguyen would ever share a cell with anyone. Exposure to the prisoner population can take many forms and is not solely limited to the sharing of a cell. Finally she submitted that as a matter of common sense, police paddy wagons also need to be kept free of weapons or contraband for the safety of those imprisoned, as well as the safety of those coming into contact with them.

[73] This argument fails to take into account the need to do a case-by-case assessment before doing a Level 3 search for the reasons I have already stated. Furthermore, I do not accept that where there is no urgency in doing the strip search, as was the case here, that a strip search can be lawfully authorized on the “potential for exposure to the prison population”. That is contrary to the principles in Golden, supra at para. 96. In my view, even if Sgt. Powis did in fact believe that Ms. Nguyen was going to be taken for a show cause, she also admitted that no decision had been made and that it was possible that Ms. Nguyen would be released home. In my view it is clear that what St. Powis should have done is waited to consider whether or not to authorize a strip search until she knew what was going to happen to Ms. Nguyen and then, and only then, consider the need to conduct a Level 3 search.

[74] Ms. Stewart also argued that the safety concerns would have still been present had the information been put to the Sgt. Powis differently. A strip search would have still been justified on the basis that Ms. Nguyen was being held for bail (and thus being exposed to the general prisoner population) and that a loaded firearm, drugs, and proceeds of crime were located at her residence (whether she was inside or outside the residence at the time it was found). In all the circumstances, the ordering of the strip search of Ms. Nguyen was reasonable. For the reasons already stated I do not accept that submission.

[75] The impact of the strip search on Ms. Nguyen was exacerbated by the seizure of her bra and the internal examination. Ms. Stewart submitted that Lee, supra, is distinguishable because in Lee, the offence was not a violent one whereas a firearm is inherently violent. I do not accept that submission as the point made in Lee is that an underwire bar is not a weapon and can’t realistically be turned into a weapon. As Justice Fuerst held at para. 42 in Lee, supra, a policy applied “without exception” to any female detainee wearing an underwire bra is not a case-specific circumstance. Rather, it is a basis for routine strip searches of female detainees, in contravention of s. 8 of the Charter. An underwire bra should not be routinely seized or destroyed by removing the metal or plastic underwire.

[76] I also agree with Ms. Myers that the fact the officers did not consider something less than a Level 3 search is problematic. It is not one extreme to another. If Ms. Nguyen was stripped down to underwear and bra there were no reasonable and probably grounds to believe that she may have anything secreted inside of her body such that she would have to be naked, spread her butt cheeks, squat and cough in order to locate such contraband. A less intrusive search as a minimum, should have been considered as sufficient.

[77] For these reasons I have concluded that the Crown has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of the Level 3 search of Ms. Nugyen. I find that this search was a serious violation of her s. 8 Charter rights, causing her embarrassment, humiliation and long term anxiety and distress.

Is A Stay Of Proceeding the Appropriate Remedy?

[78] A stay only issues in the clearest of cases. It is the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order; R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para. 53. In light of that, the situations where a stay is granted will necessarily be limited. That said, there are rare occasions when a stay of proceedings will be warranted. Cases where a stay is appropriate will usually fall into one of two categories: 1) where the state conduct compromises the fairness of a defendant's trial; and 2) where state conduct creates no threat to trial fairness, but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process. This has been referred to as the residual category; R. v. O'Connor, 1995 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at paras. 68;73; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Tobiass, 1997 322 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 at paras. 89-91. Here, Ms. Nguyen argues that the continuation of the proceedings will risk undermining the integrity of the judicial process. She submits that the way she was treated is not how we should be treating persons who are presumed innocent.

[79] In Clarke, supra, Justice Ferrier declined to impose a stay in a case where the three defendants were strip searched upon booking, the strip searches were not conducted in accordance with TPS guidelines, and Mr. Clarke was ultimately strip searched three times. Ms. Stewart submits that the case at bar is a far cry from "the clearest of cases" requiring a stay of proceedings. The officers were acting in good faith. Sgt. Powis, in ordering the strip search, was simply acting on the information provided to her, which she had no reason to doubt. Given the circumstances of the allegations, this was not the case of a "close call" being made to conduct a complete search - it was amply justified on the basis of the allegations.

[80] I have not accepted these submission however and found that for many reasons, the Level 3 search of Ms. Nguyen violated her s. 8 Charter rights.

[81] The test for when a stay should be issued is found in R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 32 where the court said as follows:

The test used to determine whether a stay of proceedings is warranted […] consists of three requirements:

(1) There must be prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that "will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome" (citation omitted);

(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and

(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against "the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits" (citation omitted)

[82] As noted by Moldaver J., in Babos, supra, while the framework is the same for both categories, the analysis will often play out differently where the residual category is concerned. In the present case, there is no suggestion that Ms. Nguyen's fair trial rights are implicated, rather, the submissions have focused on the residual category.

[83] At the first stage of the test, the question is whether the state has engaged in conduct that is offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency. The court must assess whether proceeding in light of the impugned conduct would do further harm to the integrity of justice. The court must also consider whether proceeding would lend judicial condonation to the impugned conduct.

[84] In the present case, I have found that Sgt. Powis authorized a strip of Ms. Nguyen in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds. She did so based on what appears to have been standard practice and only because she was told Ms. Nguyen had been removed from an apartment where a firearm, ammunition and drugs had been found and that she believed Ms. Nguyen was going to be taken for a show cause hearing. She gave no consideration to the specific ciricumstances of Ms. Nguyen. I have found this was a significant violation of Ms. Nguyen’ s. 8 Charter rights. The seizure of Ms. Nguyen’s bra exacerbated the s. 8 violation.

[85] Ms. Stewart submitted that Ms. Nguyen was treated respectfully by the female officers conducting the strip search. When they determined that there was wire in her bra, they gave Ms. Nguyen the option of removing the wire (so that she could continue wearing the bra) or keeping the wire in and not wearing the bra (and thus not destroying the bra). The officers also provided Ms. Nguyen with menstrual products. This submission completely misses the point and is not in accordance with the law. The fact the officers treated Ms. Nguyen respectfully ignores the principles established in Golden, that strip searches are inherently humiliating and degrading for detainees regardless of the manner in which they are carried out and for this reason they cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy; Golden, supra at para. 90.

[86] Justice Fuerst decided Lee six years ago. Offering Ms. Nguyen the option of giving up her bra or having it destroyed was not necessary as the bra could not readily be used as a weapon. Effectively compelling Ms. Nguyen to give up her bra, rather than have it destroyed, was not reasonable and leaving her without a bra further exacerbated the unlawful search.

[87] Sgt. Powis assumed that Ms. Nguyen was going to be held for a show cause at a time when that was not the case. The officers gave no thought here as to whether or not a strip search was warranted in the circumstances. Sgt. Powis decided to authorize the Level 3 search based on the circumstances of the case, not the circumstances of Ms. Nguyen. The decision was made because she was found/living in an apartment where a firearm and drugs were found and she was going to be taken for a show cause. Furthermore, Sgt. Powis was misled as to the circumstances of Ms. Nguyen’s arrest.

[88] Applying the test in Babos, I find that there will be prejudice to the integrity of the justice system that "will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome".

[89] Given that it was about 18 years ago when the Supreme Court of Canada set out clear guidlenes for the circumstances in which a Level 3 search can be conducted, this law should be familiar to the officers. The law is clear and settled.

[90] I have considered whether or not there is an alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice to the integrity of the justice system. There is no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice in that no evidence was found on Ms. Nguyen as a result of the unlawful search.

[91] At the third stage, when balancing the interests, the court should consider such things as the nature and seriousness of the impugned conduct, whether the conduct is isolated or reflects a systemic and ongoing problem, the circumstances of the defendant, the charges he or she faces, and the interest in society in having the charges disposed of on the merits. As noted by Moldaver J., where the conduct is ongoing and systemic, it may be more difficult for the court to dissociate itself from it with anything less than a stay of proceedings; (Babos, supra, at paras. 40-41.

[92] Although I do not have any uncertainty in applying the first two requirements of the Babos test, balancing the residual category and the competing interests at play, the court in Babos at para. 43 applied R. v. Zarinchang, 2010 ONCA 286 at para. 60, noting that in some sense a defendant who is granted a stay under the residual category realizes a windfall, stated: “[t]hus, it is important to consider if the price of the stay of a charge against a particular accused is worth the gain. Does the advantage of staying the charges against this accused outweigh the interest in having the case decided on the merits?”

[93] The charges against Ms. Nguyen are serious but clearly the theory of the Crown will be that the firearm belonged to Mr. Nguyen, not Ms. Nguyen. Likely at its highest the Crown will argue that she was aware of the presence of the firearm and drugs in the apartment but since they were not in plain view, I would not say the Crown has a strong case. It was Mr. Nguyen who was the target of the Warrant. This means that suggesting that any sentence that will imposed on Ms. Nguyen could be reduced by these Charter breaches is an empty remedy as it is more likely that Ms. Nguyen would not be convicted.

[94] In my view the balance of interests militates in favour of a stay. The s. 8 breach of Ms. Nguyen’s Charter rights was very serious. The Supreme Court of Canada decided Golden eighteen years ago. It is extremely concerning that almost two decades after the Golden decision police compliance is still a serious issue. It is clear from the evidence that these officers believed that a Level 3 strip search was justified solely on the basis that Ms. Nguyen was found in or resided in an apartment where a firearm and drugs were found in addition to the fact Sgt. Powis believed she was going to be held for a show cause. This is so clearly contrary to the principles in Golden and the direction of the court not to do routine Level 3 searches. Furthermore, no regard was had to the Lee decision decided 6 years ago.

[95] When I balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, which in this case would clearly denounce the misconduct by the police and preserve the integrity of the justice system, against the interest that society has of having this case against Ms. Nguyen finally decided on the merits, in my view this is one of the exceptional cases where the charges against her should be stayed. That way this Court can send yet another message to the police that if they fail to apply the settled law that was decided so many years ago, and conduct unlawful Level 3 strip searches, given the humiliating and degrading nature of a Level 3 strip search, the charges against that defendant will likely be stayed. To move forward in the face of the police misconduct in this case would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system and would amount to judicial condonation of the impugned conduct.

[96] For these reasons a stay of proceedings is essential to denounce the police misconduct in Ms. Nguyen's case and to deter the police from continuing to act in flagrant disregard of the prevailing law. This is the only way that this Court can have some hope of the police finally properly applying the law so that the purpose of s. 8 of the Charter, which is to protect individuals from unjustified searches before they occur, particularly in relation to strip searches which involve a significant and very direct interference with personal privacy, can be achieved.

Disposition

[97] For these reasons I find that Ms. Nguyen has established a breach of her s. 8 Charter rights. Furthermore, I have determined that the appropriate remedy is that the proceedings against Ms. Nguyen should be stayed as a result, pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

SPIES J.

Released: October 10, 2019

Edited Decision released October 17, 2019

DATE: 20191010

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Crown/Respondent

– and –

KEVIN NGUYEN AND THI NGUYEN

Defendants/Applicants

Ruling ON THI Nguyen’s charter APPLICATION

SPIES J.

Released: October 10, 2019