WARNING

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

COURT FILE NO.: FC-18-CP-000047

DATE: 2019/09/30

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1

AND IN THE MATTER OF

E.P. (D.O.B. […], 2017)

B E T W E E N:

The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa

Applicant

– and –

S.P. and K.L.

Respondents

COUNSEL:

Mark Hecht, for the Applicant

No one appearing for the Respondents

HEARD: August 19, 2019

REASONS FOR DECISION

corthorn j.

Introduction

[1] The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa brings this motion for summary judgment on a status review application. The subject of the application is EP (born on […], 2017). The Society requests an order for extended society care. The Society’s plan is to seek an adoptive home for EP.

[2] The father was noted in default and did not participate in the status review application.

[3] Knowing that the Society intended to proceed with this application, the mother acknowledged to the Society, in early 2019, that she is not in a position to put forward a plan of care for EP. The mother was served with the notice of application and the first of the three affidavits filed in support of the application. She did not deliver responding materials and was not served with the notice of motion for summary judgment or any of the other materials filed in support of the motion for summary judgment.

[4] The Society was initially prepared to consider that the mother have supervised access visits with EP. Because of the mother’s conduct in recent months, the Society is not willing, at present, to consent to the mother having access with EP. The mother’s recent conduct includes her failure to attend any access visits since May 2019 and her relapse with drug addiction.

[5] The Society requests that the extended society care order, if made, be silent on the mother’s access.

[6] The sole contentious issue on this motion is whether the order granting extended society care, if made, should be silent on access for the mother or it should provide that neither parent shall have access to EP. Given the father’s lack of involvement in EP’s life and default in this proceeding, his lack of access is not a contentious issue. Summary judgment can only be granted if the mother’s access is not a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Background

a) Society’s Initial Involvement with the Mother

[7] The Society’s involvement with the mother commenced in April 2012. At that time, the Society was contacted by the father (now deceased) of the mother’s first child, a boy born on […], 2012 (“the son”). During her pregnancy with the son and after his birth, the mother had addiction and/or mental health issues.

[8] The son was placed with the maternal grandparents in the fall of 2015. He was three years old at the time. That placement was approved as a kinship out-of-care placement. It was made pursuant to a voluntary services agreement executed by the mother. The son has remained in the care of his maternal grandparents, without interruption, since the fall of 2015.

[9] The mother lived at the maternal grandparents’ home from the summer of 2012 until the fall of 2015. The maternal grandparents asked the mother to leave their home in the fall of 2015. They did so because of the deterioration in the mother’s condition; she continued to struggle with mental health and addiction issues.

b) Society’s Involvement re EP

[10] The Society was made aware in July 2016 that the mother was pregnant with EP. At that time, the mother was participating in a program at the Ottawa Withdrawal Management Centre (“OWMC”).

[11] The mother tested positive for cocaine in August 2016 while she was pregnant with EP. During the pregnancy with EP, the mother took steps to address both her addiction issues and her problematic relationship with EP’s father. With respect to the latter, the mother first went to the Chrysalis Women’s Shelter in February 2017.

[12] The mother returned to Chrysalis upon discharge from hospital following EP’s birth in […] 2017. She brought EP with her to Chrysalis. In July 2017, the mother moved with EP into subsidized housing through the City of Ottawa. Initially, neither the staff at Chrysalis nor the public health nurse assigned to support both the mother and EP identified any parenting concerns. The mother and EP appeared to progress well; their situation remained stable until October 2017.

[13] To her credit, in October 2017 the mother informed the Society that she had relapsed and was again using both cocaine and crack. In addition, the mother reported concerns with respect to the behaviour of her former boyfriend. That behaviour included verbal aggression and hallucinations. The mother also expressed concerns about the safety of her home because of its proximity to the home of a known drug dealer.

[14] It is not clear whether the former boyfriend is EP’s father. It is also unclear whether, as of the fall of 2017, the former boyfriend was living with the mother and EP or staying with them temporarily. Clarification is not required on either point for the purpose of the Society’s motion for summary judgment.

[15] As of the fall of 2017, the mother was not well enough to care for EP, even with support from others (i.e., staff at Chrysalis). To her credit once again, the mother recognized her limitations. She entered into a temporary care agreement pursuant to which EP was placed in the care of the Society.

[16] Although the mother took steps in the fall of 2017 to address EP’s needs, she failed to address her own health issues. She chose to remain in her home, despite her safety concerns. She also refused the Society’s assistance to return to the OWMC.

[17] Understandably, the Society decided that the mother’s supervised access visits would occur at the Society’s offices. As of the fall of 2017, three visits per week were scheduled.

[18] In the fall of 2017 and spring of 2018, the mother made minimal progress toward addressing her addiction issues.

c) Order for Interim Society Care

[19] Given the mother’s lack of progress in late 2017 and early 2018, the Society removed EP to a place of safety and made an application to this court for an order placing EP in interim society care. The first appearance on that application was May 15, 2018. The mother never attended any of the court dates.

[20] The Society was unable to locate EP’s biological father, and an order was made dispensing with the requirement to serve the father with the application record.

[21] The mother did not respond to the application and was neither present nor represented by counsel or an agent at the hearing. The Society’s application for an interim society care order was heard by Justice Mackinnon on October 20, 2018. The evidence before Justice Mackinnon included:

• The mother missed numerous access visits, regardless of whether the frequency of the visits was three times per week (as it was initially) or once a week (a reduction in frequency that occurred over time);
• The mother’s poor attendance at access visits resulted in the termination of access in April 2018;
• The mother had one supervised access visit with EP in early October 2018 (before the Society’s application for an order for interim society care was heard);
• The mother continued to struggle with addiction issues. In the summer of 2018, she participated in a 45-day, in-patient program in eastern Ontario;
• Concerns escalated about the mother’s health. The mother was hospitalized for a number of days in the summer of 2018 because of her health issues; and
• As of early October 2018, the mother did not have a family doctor or any other health professional overseeing or treating her for her mental health issues.

[22] Justice Mackinnon found EP was in need of protection and made a final order placing EP in interim society care for six months. That six-month period expired on April 22, 2019. Pursuant to s. 122(4)(b) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (“the Act”), the interim society care order was automatically extended pending a final order on the status review application. The net effect of the October 2018 final order and the automatic extension is that the end of the 12-month maximum period permitted for interim society care is October 22, 2019 (s. 122 (1)(a)).

d) Status Review Application

[23] In the latter part of 2018 and the early part of 2019, there were minimal changes to the mother’s circumstances. In anticipation of the end of the period of interim society care, the Society commenced this status review application in March 2019. The application was heard on August 19, 2019. The Society seeks an order for extended society care.

[24] The Society relies on the evidence summarized above, evidence as to the mother’s continuing inability to address her mental health and addiction issues, and the mother’s consent to an order for extended society care. The evidence with respect to the mother’s continuing inability to address her mental health and addiction issues is discussed below under the heading “Analysis”.

[25] In February 2019, the mother acknowledged to child protection worker, Alexandra Danaj that she was unable to put forward a plan of care for EP. The mother expressed to Ms. Danaj the hope that EP would be adopted by the foster parents with whom EP had been living.

The Issues

[26] The issues to be determined on this motion are:

1. Is it possible to determine on this summary proceeding the Society’s request for an extended society care order?
2. If so, should the extended society care order be granted?
3. Is it possible to determine on this summary proceeding the Society’s request for an order that is silent on the issue of the mother’s access to EP?
4. If so, what term of access, if any, with respect to the mother is to be included in the order?

[27] Issue nos. 1 and 2 are discussed below under the heading of “Extended Society Care Order”, and issue nos. 3 and 4 under the heading “Access”.

[28] Before dealing with the substance of the application, it is important to consider the principles applicable generally to motions for summary judgment under the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLR”). It is also important to consider the principles applicable specifically to motions for summary judgment under the Act.

Summary Judgment

a) General Principles

[29] It is well-established that a summary judgment motion may be brought in a proceeding under the Act. The governing two-part test was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. First, the judge must determine, based only on the evidence in the record, if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. Resort to additional fact-finding powers is not permitted at this first stage. If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, then the matter may be summarily determined.

[30] If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, then the second step requires the judge to look beyond the evidence in the record. At this stage, the judge determines whether the need for a trial can be avoided by utilizing the additional fact-finding powers available to the judge under the relevant procedural rules. If it can, then the matter may, at the discretion of the judge, be summarily determined. If not, then summary judgment is not granted (Hryniak, at para. 67).

[31] Rule 16 of the FLR governs motions for summary judgment. The additional fact-finding powers are set out in r. 16(6.1). Those powers permit the judge hearing a motion for summary judgment to weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw any reasonable inference from the evidence, unless it is in the interests of justice that such powers be exercised only at trial.

[32] Pursuant to r. 16(4), the burden of proof rests with the moving party to set out “specific facts showing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.” A party responding to a motion for summary judgment is not entitled to “rest on mere allegations or denials” (r. 16(4.1)). A responding party is required, through affidavit or other evidence, to set out specific facts that demonstrate there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. In summary, each party on a motion for summary judgment is required to put their best foot forward.

b) Child Protection Matters

[33] In its recent decision in Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, 432 D.L.R. (4th) 497, the Ontario Court of Appeal set out “the proper approach to summary judgment in child protection matters” (at para. 1). Coincidentally, that case involved a motion for summary judgment in which the mother consented to an extended society care order but sought access.

[34] The Ontario Court of Appeal identified a number of principles to be applied on motions for summary judgment in child protection cases. Those principles are summarized at para. 80 of the decision:

1. Hryniak’s fairness principles for summary judgment must be applied recognizing the distinctive features of a child protection proceeding. In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial the court must exercise caution and apply the objectives of the CYFSA including the best interests of the child.
2. The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. Although r. 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
3. The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial.
4. Judicial assistance must be provided for self-represented litigants. In particular, judges must engage in managing the matter and must provide assistance in accordance with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.
5. The special considerations that apply to Indigenous children must be part of every decision involving Indigenous children.

[35] In Kawartha-Haliburton, the Court of Appeal directs that judges on motions for summary judgment in child protection proceedings undertake a best interests analysis (paras. 31 and 49). Above all, a cautious approach should be taken on motions for summary judgment in child protection proceedings (paras. 63 and 70-79). The Court of Appeal described the requisite approach as “highly cautionary” (para. 74).

[36] I turn to the principles to be applied in determining a status review application.

Status Review Application

[37] The authority to grant an extended society care order is found in s. 101(1), item 3 of the Act. It provides:

Where the Court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a Court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the Court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 102, in the child’s best interests …

3. That the child be placed in Extended Society Care until the order is terminated under section 116 or expires under section 123.

[38] The purpose of the Act is reflected in s. 101(1): the “child’s best interests” are the determinative factors. Section 74(3) of the Act sets out a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be considered by the court when determining the child’s best interests. More than ten factors are listed in s. 74(3). The factors relevant to this application are identified and discussed below.

[39] As set out in para. 83 of the decision in Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. S. (B.L.), 2014 ONSC 5513, on a status review application the following factors are considered:

a) The original order is presumed to be correct. The status review application is not a re-hearing of the order previously made;

b) Does the child continue to be in need of protection and, if so, is a court order required for the child’s protection?

c) To what degree do the risk concerns that formed the basis for the original order still exist? The existence or absence of those concerns may trigger the need for continued protection. Circumstances that have arisen since the date on which the original order was made may also contribute to the need for continued protection;

d) What order is in the best interests of the child?

e) The analysis must be carried out from the child’s perspective.

[40] I shall deal first with the Society’s request for an extended society care order and then with the issue of access.

Analysis

1) Extended Society Care Order

a) Summary Determination

[41] The only evidence before the court consists of the affidavits filed by the Society in support of the motion for summary judgment. The Society relies on three affidavits sworn by Ms. Danaj. The affidavits are dated March 21, May 23, and July 23, 2019. The Society’s Plan of Care is also dated July 23, 2019.

[42] The mother filed no responding materials. She did not attend on the return of the motion to request additional time to file responding materials or the opportunity to give oral testimony at the hearing.

[43] The affidavit evidence of Ms. Danaj sets out specific facts that demonstrate there are no genuine issues requiring a trial with respect to the request for an extended society care order. I am able to summarily determine this aspect of the motion without resort to the additional fact-finding powers in r. 16(6.1) of the FLR.

b) EP Remains in Need of Protection

[44] The concerns that existed when the order for interim society care was made remain. For example, the mother continues to have both addiction and mental health issues. In addition, she has failed to maintain regular access with EP. I find that the risk concerns have escalated since October 2018.

[45] With respect to the mother’s mental health and addiction issues, I point to the following. First, the mother failed to obtain the assistance of either a family physician or mental health professional to oversee and treat her mental health issues.

[46] Second, the mother received support from and, at times, lived with her parents in late 2018 and early 2019. In June 2019, EP’s maternal grandmother reported that the mother had once again relapsed. The maternal grandmother tried to assist the mother to obtain assistance, but the mother did not cooperate. The maternal grandmother expressed her belief that there was nothing more she could do because it was up to the mother to take the steps necessary to address her addiction issues.

[47] The mother continued to exercise access with EP until early 2019. Throughout late 2018 and early 2019, the mother continued to have supervised access visits with EP on a weekly basis. The mother’s attendance improved in comparison to the spring, summer, and early fall of 2018. The mother was, however, limited in her ability to set a routine, multi-task, and initiate, engage, and follow through with activities.

[48] The mother requested an access visit with EP in the spring of 2019 but did not attend for that visit—scheduled for May 28, 2019. The mother has not requested access with EP nor has the mother seen EP since the spring of 2019.

[49] On more than one occasion, the mother failed to exercise access for several continuous months. In 2018, the mother did not see EP for approximately five months. As of the date of the hearing of this application, the mother had not seen EP for approximately four months (May to August 2019).

[50] The mother’s mental health and addiction issues continue to have a significant negative impact on the mother’s ability to care for and be involved in a meaningful way in EP’s life. I find that EP is still in need of protection.

c) EP’s Best Interests

[51] EP is described in each of Ms. Danaj’s affidavits as “healthy, meeting her milestones … happy and curious”. EP is now two and a half years old. The factors relevant to the determination of what order is in EP’s best interests weigh entirely in favour of granting the order requested for extended society care:

• Through adoption, EP’s physical, mental, and emotional needs will be met (s. 74(3)(c)(i) of the Act);
• EP is now two and a half years old, will be in school in another two years, and requires stability and certainty in her life (ss. 74(3)(c)(ii), (vii), and (ix));
• The mother’s sporadic and limited involvement with EP to May 2019 is such that EP’s ties to her mother and to members of EP’s extended family on the mother’s side are limited and have diminished over time (s. 74(3)(c)(vi));
• There is no evidence that EP has any relationship with her half-sibling (s. 74(3)(c)(vi));
• EP has no relationship at all with her father or his extended family (s. 74(3)(c)(vi));
• The mother acknowledged that she is unable to present and did not present a plan of care to be compared to the Society’s plan to arrange for EP to be adopted (s. 74(3)(c)(viii)); and
• The degree of risk to EP has escalated from that which existed when the original finding was made that EP is in need of protection (s. 74(3)(c)(x) and (xi)).

[52] I order that EP be placed in the extended care of the Society in accordance with the Plan of Care dated July 23, 2019.

2) Access

a) Statutory Framework

[53] The court must consider the bests interests of the child when determining what term of access, if any, should attach to an order for extended society care. Sections 105(5) and (6) of the Act establish the statutory framework. They provide:

(5) A court shall not make or vary an access order under section 104 with respect to a child who is in extended society care under an order made under paragraph 3 of subsection 101(1) or clause 116(1)(c) unless the court is satisfied that the order or variation would be in the child’s best interests.

(6) The court shall consider, as part of its determination of whether an order or variation would be in the child’s best interests under subsection (5),

(a) whether the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and

(b) if the court considers it relevant, whether the ordered access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

[54] In Kawartha-Haliburton, the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed the “significant shift” under the Act in the approach to access for children in extended society care (para. 48). At para. 49 of its decision, the Court of Appeal emphasized that:

• a person requesting access no longer has the burden of demonstrating that they have a relationship with the child that (a) is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and (b) will not impair the child’s chances for adoption;
• a complete lack of evidence from an individual seeking access will not automatically preclude them from being granted access; and
• the court is required, instead, to approach the analysis by considering the child’s best interests and the potential for access to impair future adoption opportunities “only as part of this assessment and only where relevant.”

[55] What order, if any, for access is in EP’s overall best interests?

b) The Existing Order

[56] The October 2018 final order of Justice Mackinnon provides that EP’s access with the mother be at the discretion of the Society. With an order now made for extended society care, the existing access order is terminated (CAS of London and Middlesex v. TS and KM, 2018 ONSC 3238, at para. 83).

[57] Is the Society’s request for an order for extended society care that is silent on the issue of access capable of determination in a summary manner?

c) Summary Judgment

[58] Even though the mother has been found by this court to be unable to provide primary care to EP, the mother may still have a meaningful and beneficial relationship with EP (Kawartha-Haliburton, at para. 54). The evidence reviewed to this point addresses protection concerns. To what extent, if any at all, does that evidence and the other evidence in the record address the distinct issues of access? Does the record, as it relates to the issue of access, give me “confidence that [I] can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve [the issue of access]”? (See: Hryniak, at para. 50.)

[59] Each of Ms. Danaj’s three affidavits conclude with the same five paragraphs. Each affidavit concludes with an identical paragraph stating that the affidavit is made in support of the motion for summary judgment. In reality, there are four conclusory paragraphs identical from one affidavit to the next. In none of those paragraphs does Ms. Danaj address in any way the relationship between the mother and EP.

[60] The balance of the affidavit evidence addresses protection concerns, specifically the mother’s mental health and addiction issues. Therefore, on the face of it, the record does not permit the issue of access to be summarily determined.

[61] I find, however, that I am able to determine the issue of the mother’s access by relying on the additional fact-finding powers available to the court pursuant to r. 16(6.1) of the FLR. Most important for the purpose of this motion is the ability to “[draw] any reasonable inference from the evidence” (r. 16(6.1), item 3). I am satisfied that the evidence available to the court, including findings based on reasonable inferences, permits me to “reach a fair and just determination on the merits” (Hryniak, at para. 49).

[62] I find that the mother’s mental health and addiction issues and her pattern of not following through to seek the help she requires demonstrate that she faces significant difficulties in her day-to-day functioning. I find that, on at least two occasions, the mother has been completely absent from EP’s life: for five months in 2018 and four months in 2019. There is no evidence of EP experiencing or showing any distress during the periods when the mother was completely absent from EP’s life. I find that the mother does not have a beneficial and meaningful relationship with EP.

[63] I also find that the mother has been absent from her son’s life.

[64] It has been over seven years since the mother’s addiction issues were first brought to the attention of the Society. In that period, the mother has not been able to make any lasting progress in addressing her addiction and, more recently, mental health issues. She has not been able to make progress despite the opportunities she had to be involved in the lives of her children. I draw an inference and find that, as of the date of these reasons, the mother is not in a position to develop a beneficial and meaningful relationship with EP.

[65] Fully appreciating the importance of a cautious approach on this motion for summary judgment, I am satisfied that, if the issue of the mother’s access were to go to trial, the mother has little chance of success to secure an order for extended society care that includes access to the mother (Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.J.W., 2017 ONCJ 212, at para. 66, citations omitted).

[66] When determining the issue of access, I considered the best interests factors in s. 74(3)(c) of the Act, as they related to the extended society care order (see para. 50, above). In addition, I considered the following:

• EP’s mental and emotional needs will not be met if expectations with respect to access visits with the mother are created and dashed (s. 74(3)(c)(i));
• The potential for the mother and EP to develop a positive relationship is minimal, if it exists at all, given the mother’s historical lack of dependability and reliability with respect to access visits;
• Granting the mother access may contribute to delay in the adoption process (See: Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto v. K.B., 2018 ONCJ 650, 15 R.F.L. (8th) 166, at paras. 149-154).

[67] The Society submits that an order for extended society care that is silent on access enables the Society to move expeditiously towards permanence for EP through the adoption process. The Society acknowledges that it is not standard practice for it to request an order for extended society care that is silent on access.

[68] On the return of the application, the Society did not provide the court with any case law in support of entitlement to relief of the kind requested with respect to the mother’s access. Additional written submissions addressing that issue were requested and filed.

[69] The case authorities filed as part of the additional written submissions make it clear that the Act does not permit the court to make an order for extended society care that is silent as to access (Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. P.(D.), 2005 CanLII 5878 (S.C.), at paras. 30 and 31, as quoted in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.F., 2019 ONCJ 248, at para. 221). At para. 31 of her decision in P.(D.), Justice Goodman concluded that an order silent as to access is, in effect, an improper delegation to the Society (i.e., access at its discretion) of the court’s authority.

[70] The Society’s request for an order that is silent as to access is denied. The findings made support an order for extended society care with no access to the mother.

d) Disposition re Access

[71] Based on the father’s complete absence from EP’s life and lack of participation in this process, I find that the father does not have and is not capable of developing a beneficial and meaningful relationship with EP. Pursuant to s. 74(3)(c) of the Act, it is in EP’s best interests that the father has no access.

[72] The order for extended society care shall therefore provide for no access to either parent.

EP as an Access Holder

[73] There is no evidence as to the extent, if any at all, to which EP has had contact with the son (referred to in the balance of these reasons as the “brother”). It would be most unfortunate if the potential for EP to attempt to develop a relationship with her brother was stymied at this stage of her life without any consideration given to the fact that she has a sibling.

[74] The brother is five years older than EP. He currently lives with his maternal grandparents. There is authority under the Act for the court to order that EP is an access holder with respect to her brother. If such an order were made, it would be possible for EP, at a later date, to raise the issue of access with her brother.

[75] Second, and given that EP’s brother is in the care of the maternal grandparents, EP may also benefit from being an access holder with respect to them.

[76] In its materials on this motion, the Society did not address the potential for EP to be an access holder with respect to either her brother or the maternal grandparents. Although I have made a ruling with respect to the extended society care order with no access to the mother and father, the order does not finally determine the motion for summary judgment. The issue of whether EP is an access holder remains to be determined.

[77] Counsel for the Society shall therefore arrange to appear before me as soon as practicable to speak to the matter. On that appearance, counsel for the Society shall address the steps to be taken for the court to determine the issue of EP being an access holder with respect to her brother and the maternal grandparents.

Disposition

[78] I order as follows:

1. The child EP, born on […], 2017, shall be place in the extended care of the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa with no access to either S.P. or K.L.
2. The balance of the motion for summary judgment, specifically whether EP is an access holder, is adjourned to be brought back by the Society.

[79] The matter shall be spoken to on a date arranged by the Society. I remain seized of the matter.

Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn

Released: September 30, 2019