COURT FILE NO.: CV-18000003222-000

DATE: 2019 09 26

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

SANDRA MANTHADI

Jonathan Pinkus, for the Plaintiff

Plaintiff

• and -

ASCO MANUFACTURING

Defendant

Ranbir S. Mann, for the Defendant

• and -

63732 ONTARIO LIMITED, formerly known as ASCO MANUFACTURING LIMITED and ISRAEL FRIEDMAN and JAY FRIEDMAN

Third Parties

HEARD: June 26, 2019

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Fowler Byrne J.

[1] The Plaintiff has commenced an action for wrongful dismissal. She is seeking damages in the sum of $78,000, which is the amount equivalent to her renumeration for two years.

[2] A Statement of Defence was served by the Defendant, in which just cause for the dismissal was not alleged. The Defendant then commenced a Third-Party Claim against 63732 Ontario Limited and its directors, a previous employer of the Plaintiff. Requests to Admit were exchanged, and the Plaintiff brought this motion for summary judgment. The Third Parties did not appear at this motion, although properly served by all parties.

ISSUES

[3] In order to resolve this motion, the following two issues must be determined:

a) Is this an appropriate matter to resolve by way of a motion for summary judgment?

b) If so, should the Plaintiff be granted judgment in the amount she seeks?

BACKGROUND

[4] Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are not disputed by the parties.

[5] On or about February 7, 1981, the Plaintiff commenced employment as a welder with Asco Manufacturing Limited. As an aside, on December 20, 2017, Asco Manufacturing Limited changed its name to 63732 Ontario Limited (“637”) and shall be henceforth referred to as such in this judgment.

[6] On or about September 28, 2017, the Plaintiff was advised that 637 was being sold on November 24, 2017. On that same day, 637 maintains that the Plaintiff signed a document presented by 637 entitled “Settlement and Release Agreement”. Note that in this Agreement, 637 is referred to as Asco. The relevant provisions of this Agreement are as follows:

WHEREBY The following terms set out the Agreement between Manthadi, Sandra (hereinafter referred to as the Employee) and ASCO MANUFACTURING LIMITED (hereinafter referred to as “Asco”) in connection with the cessation of his employment effective the close of business November 24, 2017 (the “Termination Date”).

1. Severance/Termination Pay. Asco hereby pays to the Employee the sum of $5,900 less required statutory deductions representing 8 weeks gross compensation in full satisfaction of all claims, causes of action or demands including all severance pay, termination pay or other compensation howsoever arising to which the Employee would otherwise be entitled;

2. Written Notice. The Employee hereby acknowledges receipt of written notice delivered as of or before the date hereof proving him/her with written notice of the termination of his/her employment;

3. Salary Compensation. Asco will continue to pay the Employee his/her usual compensation less statutory deductions from the date hereof up to and including the Termination Date in addition to the compensation referred to in paragraph 1 hereof;

4. Vacation Pay. Asco has paid or will pay the Employee all vacation pay owing and accrued up to and including the Termination Date.

5. Non-Disclosure. The Employee agrees that the terms of this letter are not to be revealed to anyone except for the purposes of obtaining financial or other professional advice. Further, the Employee will not speak of Asco, its subsidiaries and affiliates, or any of their employees, officers or representatives in disparaging terms nor in any other negative way communicate about his employment with Asco.

6. Independent Legal Advice. The Employee has been instructed by Asco to seek independent legal advice as this document has significant legal implications. Notwithstanding the encouragement of Asco to do so the undersigned has acknowledged that he/she understands and is fully satisfied with the terms of this settlement and is signing this Settlement and Release Agreement notwithstanding their absence of independent legal advice.

7. Release. In consideration of the foregoing and by the Employee accepting these arrangement, the Employee hereby releases and forever discharges Asco, its officers and Directors, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, their employees and representatives, of and from all manner of actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, covenants, contracts, claims and demands whatsoever which Asco has had, now has or which his legal personal representatives, heirs, executors, administrators or assigns or any of them, hereafter can, shall or may have against Asco, its officers and directors and its subsidiaries and affiliates, their employees and representatives, for or by reason of any cause, matter or thing whatsoever in connection with the Employee’s employment with Asco, including without limitation the cessation of such employment. (emphasis added)

[7] The Plaintiff maintains that she was assured she would be offered continued employment with the purchaser. In fact, she states that she did not sign the Settlement and Release Agreement until late November 2017, after she accepted continued employment with the purchaser. She maintains that the date of September 28, 2017 was already written on the document when she signed it. Neither party provided evidence to the court of when the sum of $5,900.00 was paid to the Plaintiff, but it was in fact paid.

[8] As planned, on or about November 2, 2017, the assets of 637, including the name “Asco”, were purchased by 2603420 Ontario Inc.

[9] As of November 6, 2017, 2603420 Ontario Inc. started operating under its registered business name, Asco Manufacturing (“Asco”), which is the named Defendant in this proceeding.

[10] The relevant sections of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale between Asco and 637 are as follows:

13. Seller’s Representations and Warranties

Seller represents and warrants that will survive completion. Seller acknowledged that these warranties and Representations were made to induce the Buyer to enter into this Agreement of Purchase and Sale:

H. “Seller represents and warrants that it has provided notice of termination to all employees of the business which paid each of them severance pay of one week per year up to 8 weeks. The Seller shall pay all salaries, termination package, severance pay and payroll remittances, wages, vacation pay and benefits in addition to the said severance pay up to and including the Date of Closing.” Seller further represents and warrants that there are no outstanding disputes, actions, claims, grievances, court proceedings, human rights issues, government applications or investigations with respect to any employee of the Business. If in case Buyer seeks to retained any of the employees of Seller, the selection will be done on interview basis with a sole and absolute discretion of Buyer.

J. Seller will indemnify, defend and save Purchaser harmless from and against any financial loss, legal liability, damages or expense arising from any breach of the above representations and warranties.

[11] The parties agree that the Plaintiff worked continuously from the date of the notice in September 2017 until December 13, 2017, right through the termination date of November 24, 2017 referred to in the Settlement and Release Agreement. There was no lay off period for the Plaintiff between her employment with 637 and her employment with Asco.

[12] The parties disagree on the nature of the Plaintiff’s duties when she started working for Asco. The Plaintiff maintains that her duties remained the same and that she was verbally offered and accepted continued employment with Asco on an indefinite basis. Asco does admit that it hired the Plaintiff, but maintains that she was hired on a temporary basis, for general labour only, to assist with moving the purchased assets of 637 to a new location.

[13] Both parties agree that the Plaintiff required no interview or application when she was transferred to Asco. The Plaintiff was not asked to sign any document before starting her employment with Asco.

[14] On December 4, 2017, the Plaintiff received a letter from “Mr. Ken” at Asco. This letter indicated that the plant would be shutting down between December 4, 2017 and December 9, 2017, and “returning back to work” at a new location on December 11, 2017. In reality, the Plaintiff continued to work at the old location until December 13, 2017.

[15] Between December 18, 2017 and January 1, 2018, the Plaintiff sent text messages to Mr. Ken on three occasions, requesting information on when she would be returning to work. She never received a recall to work. Interestingly, Asco claims to have no knowledge of the Plaintiff’s text messages, nor do they have any explanation for the letter from Mr. Ken and the indication that the parties would be recalled after the move was complete on December 11, 2017.

[16] The Plaintiff received a Record of Employment on or about February 9, 2019. The Record of Employment indicates that her employment commenced on November 6, 2011, and was terminated due to shortage of work as of December 13, 2017.

[17] The evidence establishes that in 2017, while employed with 637, the Plaintiff earned $18.42 per hour and worked 44 hours per week. Her pay stubs from 637 listed no specific occupation. In 2016, her total income was $39,834.84. Commencing November 5, 2017, the Plaintiff’s pay stubs came from Asco. The pay stubs from Asco confirmed that she continued to earn $18.43 per hour plus vacation pay, and that her weekly hours were usually 40 hours per week until her last week, when she worked only 28 hours. Her pay stubs from Asco indicated her occupation as “general help”.

[18] The Plaintiff states that on or about April 27, 2018, she was diagnosed with thyroid carcinoma, a form of cancer. She states that she was not cleared to return to work by her doctor until February 12, 2019, although the letter from her doctor does not specifically indicate that date. As of the date of this motion, the Plaintiff has not been able to find alternate employment, despite her efforts.

ANALYSIS

I. Is a Determination of the Plaintiff’s Claim by Summary Judgment Appropriate?

[19] Asco maintains that summary judgment is not an appropriate method in which to adjudicate this action. For the reasons set forth herein, I disagree.

[20] Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, state that a court shall grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence. This determination shall be made upon considering the evidence submitted by the parties. As per Rule 20.04(2.1), when considering the evidence, the court may exercise any of the following powers, unless it is in the interests of justice for these powers to be exercised only at trial: (1) weighing the evidence; (2) evaluating the credibility of a deponent; and (3) drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

[21] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a trial is not required if a summary judgment motion can achieve a fair and just adjudication: para. 4. To do so, the motion materials must allow the judge to make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law to those facts in a manner that is proportionate, more expeditious, and less expensive than going to trial: Hryniak, at para. 4. The principal goal, though, remains the same: a fair process that results in a just adjudication of disputes: Hryniak, at para. 28. On a summary judgment motion, the evidence presented need not be equivalent to that of a trial, but must be such that the judge is confident that he or she can fairly resolve the dispute: Hryniak, at para. 57.

[22] When considering the evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the parties have placed before it, in some form, all of the evidence that will be available for trial. The court is entitled to assume that the parties have respectfully advanced their best case and that the record contains all the evidence that the parties will present at trial: Tagg Industries v. Rieder, 2018 ONSC 5727, at para. 11. The moving party bears the onus of showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, but the responding party must present its best case or risk losing: Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200, at paras. 26, 32-34, aff’d 2014 ONCA 878; Tagg Industries v. Rieder 2018 ONSC 5727 at para. 11..

[23] In the case before me, there are very few facts in dispute. The few facts that are in dispute are not material when the law is applied. The parties agree on the date on which the Plaintiff commenced working for 637, when she started working for Asco, the date she was terminated from Asco, her rate of pay, average weekly hours, her age, and the fact that she was not terminated for cause. The material facts are either admitted or not denied by Asco. If there is conflicting evidence of other facts, they are not material and will not impact my decision in this matter.

[24] The court has already determined that motions for summary judgment are often an appropriate vehicle in which to determine a wrongful dismissal action. This is particularly the case when cause is not alleged: Arnone v. Best Theratronics Ltd., 2015 ONCA 63, at para. 12, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 140.

[25] Asco has made a number of arguments as to why this action should not be resolved by way of motion for summary judgment. Firstly, Asco maintains that in an action under the Simplified Procedure, cross-examination on affidavits is not permitted. Accordingly, Asco has not had an opportunity to test the Plaintiff’s evidence and for that reason, the matter should proceed directly to trial. I disagree. The relevant and material facts on this motion have either been admitted or not refuted by the Defendants. As indicated above, the disputed facts, which are somewhat vague, are not determinative of the issues before the court.

[26] As the court noted in Commander Construction v. Sovereign General Insurance Company, 2012 ONSC 1075, there are cases where a motion for summary judgment in a Simplified Procedure action is appropriate, such as where the case is document driven or where there is limited contested evidence: para. 18. It cannot be the intention of r. 76 that motions for summary judgment are never appropriate where a summary trial is available. If a motion for summary judgment is appropriate, as determined by Hryniak, it should also be used in actions commenced under the Simplified Procedure.

[27] Asco also argues that there is a risk of contrary findings of material facts that may impact the remaining Third-Party Claim. Again, I disagree. If I grant judgment in favour of the Plaintiff, the right of Asco to seek indemnification from 637 will depend on their dealings, including the terms of their Agreement of Purchase and Sale, to which the Plaintiff was not a party. This court is not required to make any findings of fact in relation to the dealings between 637 and Asco or the Agreement and Purchase of Sale, save and except what has been admitted. Further, 637 elected not to participate in this motion. From this, I can draw the inference that they do not consider the outcome of this motion to be relevant to the Third-Party Claim.

[28] Accordingly, given the facts of this case and the issues in dispute, which are legal in nature, I find that a determination of the Plaintiff’s claim by a motion for summary judgment is appropriate. It is the most proportionate, most expeditious, and least expensive method of adjudication of the issues.

II. Should the Plaintiff be Granted Judgment in the Amount She Seeks?

Continuous Employment

[29] The determination of proper notice rests on whether the Plaintiff’s employment with Asco is considered, in law, to be a continuation of her employment with 637.

[30] If it is not, then the Plaintiff is not entitled to damages, as her period of employment is less than three months: Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 54. If on the other hand, the Plaintiff’s employment with Asco constitutes a continuation of her employment with 637, her employment with 637, commencing on or about February 7, 1981, should be considered when determining her proper notice period: Addison v. M. Loeb Ltd. (1986), 1986 CanLII 2474 (ON CA), 53 O.R. (2d) 602 (C.A.), at para. 22.

[31] Section 9(1) of the ESA states:

9 (1) If an employer sells a business or a part of a business and the purchaser employs an employee of the seller, the employment of the employee shall be deemed not to have been terminated or severed for the purposes of this Act and his or her employment with the seller shall be deemed to have been employment with the purchaser for the purpose of any subsequent calculation of the employee’s length or period of employment. 2000, c. 41, s. 9 (1).

[32] With respect to the Plaintiff’s entitlement to notice under the ESA, this provision regarding sale of a business is clear. This provision does not provide an exception where there was a termination letter given or even a settlement with the previous employer. It does not distinguish its applicability to situations when the employee does a different type of work with the new employer.

[33] In the case of Ariss v. NORR Limited Architects & Engineers, 2018 ONSC 620, the Plaintiff was employed by Dominik Thompson Mallette, Architects and Engineers Inc. (“DTM”) since 1986. In 2002, DTM sold its assets to NORR Limited Architects & Engineers (“NORR”). On September 4, 2002, the Plaintiff received written notice of termination from DTM effective November 1, 2002, and on the same day, received an offer of employment from NORR effective November 4, 2002. When the Plaintiff was terminated by NORR in 2016, the court found that for the purpose of notice, his employment was considered to have commenced in 1986. In support of this, the trial judge relied on s. 9 of the ESA,

35 There are two pre-conditions to be met for the operation of section 9(1). The pre-conditions are straightforward: “(1) that an employer sells his business to a purchaser; and (2) that the purchaser employs an employee of the employer” (Ontario (Employment Standards Officer) v. Equitable Management Ltd. (1990), 1990 CanLII 6973 (ON SC), 75 O.R. (2d) 506, 40 O.A.C. 334 (Div. Ct.)).

37 With the two pre-conditions met, two results follow. First, regardless of the letter of termination received from DTM, Ariss’ employment was not terminated. Second, for the purpose of notice of termination, vacations, and other subjects addressed in the ESA, Ariss’ service with NORR is deemed to have commenced in February 1986 (when Ariss was hired by DTM).

[34] This decision was upheld on appeal: Ariss v. NORR Limited Architects & Engineers, 2019 ONCA 449. Accordingly, for the purpose of the ESA and the calculation of the Plaintiff’s notice period thereunder, the Plaintiff is considered to have been continually employed by Asco since 1981.

[35] The law also supports this concept of continuous employment for the purposes of common law entitlement to damages for wrongful dismissal: Addison, at para. 22; Violo v. Delphi Communications Inc., 2014 ONSC 7008, at para. 16. Further, as stated in Ariss (ONSC), at para. 38:

If the statutory protection were not enough, Ariss also has the protection provided by the common law. There is nothing in any of the documents executed in 2002 to suggest that NORR intended that former DTM employees would not be credited for their years of service with DTM. Most important, there is nothing to that effect in the offer letter signed by Ariss. In the absence of notice from NORR that Ariss would not be credited for his years of service with DTM, recognition of that service is deemed to be part of Ariss’ contract of employment with NORR (Vinette v. Delta Printing Limited, 2017 ONSC 182, 278 A.C.W.S. (3d) 756, at para. 21).

[36] Asco has also argued that the Settlement and Release Agreement is determinative of the Plaintiff’s claim in that she has released any right to further damages under the ESA or pursuant to the common law. I disagree. This Agreement is between the Plaintiff and 637. Based on the principles of privity of contract, Asco cannot rely on a contract between the Plaintiff and 637 to maintain that the Plaintiff waived any claim it may have against Asco. The Plaintiff never agreed that this agreement would be enforceable by Asco: London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., 1992 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, at pp 415-416.

[37] In any event, paragraph 7 of the Settlement and Release Agreement states that the Plaintiff releases any claim Asco may have against Asco. Accordingly, it is not clear what the Plaintiff released. Whether or not this will be of consequence in the Third-Party Claim is not before the court today, and I specifically make no finding in that respect.

[38] Asco has also argued that the Plaintiff has provided affidavit evidence in support of this motion which is not supported by her pleadings. I disagree. The Plaintiff has alleged that she was wrongfully terminated and that her notice period should take into consideration her employment with 637. She has not taken a position on this motion that is contrary to what she had pleaded in her Amended Statement of Claim.

[39] Accordingly, I find that when determining the notice to which the Plaintiff is entitled, I am required to consider her past years of employment with 637, commencing in 1981.

Notice Period

[40] When determining the proper notice to be given to a terminated employee, the court should consider the character of the employment, the length of service, the age of the employee, and the availability of similar employment, having regard to the experience, training, and qualifications of the employee: Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd., 1960 CanLII 294 (ON SC), [1960] O.W.N. 253, at para. 21.

[41] It is not in dispute that at the time the Plaintiff was terminated, she was approximately 64 years old. In law, she had been continually employed from 1981 to 2017, a period of 36 years. She was employed as a welder during this time, although Asco claims she worked as a general labourer for the last month and a half. The Plaintiff maintains that she was unable to work full time for a period following her termination due to a cancer diagnosis, but was cleared for full time work in early 2019. She has provided evidence of her attempts to find alternate employment but she has not been successful. Asco has not produced any evidence to dispute this.

[42] The Plaintiff has provided a variety of cases with similar facts to show that the appropriate notice period would be twenty-four (24) months. The cases provided do not deal with welders or general labourers per se.

[43] I have reviewed other case law which indicate the proper notice period for older employees with long service, who were either welders or general labourers. In the case of Guerra v. Alexander Metal Products (1965) Ltd., 1997 CanLII 12342 (Ont. S.C.), a welder with 30 years seniority with a company was terminated due to lack of work. He had been subject to layoffs from time to time throughout his employment. While his age was not noted, I can infer that he was older given that he also commenced a claim with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario claiming discrimination based on his age. The court determined that 12 months was an appropriate notice period, which was subsequently reduced by 6 months based on his failure to mitigate.

[44] In the case of Di Tomaso v. Crown Metal Packaging Canada LP, 2011 ONCA 469, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the motion judge’s finding that a factory worker, who had worked with the employer for 33 years and who was 62 years old when he retired, was entitled to 22 months’ notice.

[45] In the case of Kwasnycia v. Goldcorp Inc., 1995 CanLII 7276 (Ont. S.C.), an electrician was terminated from his employment after 35 years of service. At the time of his dismissal, he was 57 years old. The court found he was entitled to 24 months’ notice.

[46] Based on the factors set out in Bardal that are particular to this case, I find that the proper notice period for the Plaintiff is 20 months. Based on her yearly renumeration of $39,834.84 in 2016, to which her hourly rate remained the same in her last six weeks of employment, the Plaintiff is therefore entitled to $66,391.40, subject to my comments on mitigation.

Mitigation of Damages

[47] It is well established that a dismissed employee must mitigate or minimize any damages arising out of their wrongful dismissal by making reasonable efforts to secure alternate, comparable employment: Michaels v. Red Deer College, 1975 CanLII 15 (SCC), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 324, at p. 331. The mitigation inquiry is fact-driven and considers all the relevant circumstances. The question is whether the employee has made reasonable efforts in the circumstances to find comparable employment: Michaels, at pp. 331-32, as cited in Ariss (ONCA), at para. 48. However, it is equally clear that the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee failed to mitigate his or her damages, a burden that is not light: Michaels, at p. 332.

[48] It is agreed that the Plaintiff has already received $5,900 from 637 as per the Settlement and Release Agreement. Asco maintains first, that this is not mitigation that should be accounted for, but rather a complete settlement of all employment claims again Asco and 637. In the alternative, Asco submits that if the payment does not resolve the Plaintiff’s claim against Asco, then any damage award made against Asco should be reduced by this amount. To order otherwise, it maintains, would amount to “double dipping”.

[49] Again, I disagree. The purpose of damages in a wrongful dismissal action are to compensate the Plaintiff for the notice they should have received on the day of their termination. The Plaintiff was not terminated by Asco until December 13, 2017. Accordingly, any monies she may have received previously from 637 purporting to satisfy its obligation to the Plaintiff, cannot be counted towards Asco’s obligation as of December 13, 2017.

[50] The Plaintiff provided a medical letter outlining ongoing attendances with her doctor until November 2018, and indicates she was cleared for work in February 2019. She has provided evidence of jobs she has applied for. Asco provided no evidence to refute this and made no submissions regarding the Plaintiff’s attempt to mitigate her damages. I am therefore satisfied that despite her lack of success, the Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to find such comparable employment and I will not reduce her damages on this basis.

Costs

[51] At the conclusion of the motion, counsel provided their Costs Outline, which the court considered after making this decision.

[52] Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43 provides that costs of and incidental to a proceeding are in the discretion of the court. “In Ontario, the normative approach is first, that costs follow the event; second, that costs are awarded on a partial indemnity basis; and third, that costs are payable forthwith, i.e. within 30 days. Discretion can, of course, be exercised in exceptional circumstances to depart from any one or more of these norms”: DUCA Financial Services Credit Union Ltd. v. Bozzo, 2010 ONSC 4601, at para. 5.

[53] Rule 57.01 (1) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure “lists a broad range of factors for the court to consider, including the result achieved in the proceeding, the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues and whether any step in the proceeding was improper, vexatious or unnecessary”: DUCA, at para. 6.

[54] As stated by Armstrong J.A. in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3rd) 291 (C.A.), the fixing of costs involves more than merely a calculation using the hours docketed and the cost grid. At para. 24 he cites to para. 4 of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier, 2002 CanLII 25577 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 4495: “In our view, the costs award should reflect more what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful parties rather than any exact measure of the actual costs to the successful litigant.”

[55] I have reviewed both Costs Outline. I see no reason to depart from the presumption that costs should follow the event, and that they should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis. The issues were not particularly complex. The use of the summary judgment motion in both wrongful dismissal actions and within an action brought under the Simplified Procedure is well established. It was never alleged that the Plaintiff was dismissed for cause. Her years of service, once determined, and her rate of pay were straightforward.

[56] The fees sought by the Plaintiff are reasonable. In fact, the Plaintiff is seeking costs in a sum less that what the Defendant would have sought if successful.

CONCLUSION

[57] Accordingly, for the reasons set out herein, I make the following orders:

a) The Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted;

b) The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $66,391.40 for damages for wrongful dismissal;

c) The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff her costs of this action, fixed in the sum of $11,958.96, inclusive of fees, taxes and disbursements, payable within thirty (30) days.

Fowler Byrne J.

Released: September 26, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18000003222-000

DATE: 2019 09 26

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

SANDRA MANTHADI

Plaintiff

• and -

ASCO MANUFACTURING

Defendant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Fowler Byrne J.

Released: September 26, 2019