COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-578535

MOTION HEARD: 20190816

REASONS RELEASED: 20190822

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

BETWEEN:

RE/MAX ALL-STARS REALTY INC.

Applicant

• and-

REAL ONE REALTY INC.

Respondent

BEFORE: MASTER M.P. McGRAW

COUNSEL: M. Crane Email: mark.crane@gowlingwlg.com -for the Moving Party, the Proposed Intervenor, Ontario Real Estate Association

C. Alexiou Email: calexiou@dakllp.com -for the Applicant, Re/Max All-Stars Realty Inc.

Z.M. Kaslik Email: zmk@kasliklaw.com -for the Respondent, Real One Realty Inc.

REASONS RELEASED: August 22, 2019

[Note: These Reasons For Endorsement have been amended to correct the position of the Toronto Real Estate Board in paragraph 1]

Amended Reasons For Endorsement

I. Introduction

[1] This is a motion by the Ontario Real Estate Association (“OREA”) for leave to intervene in this Application. OREA’s motion is opposed by the Applicant, Re/Max All-Stars Realty Inc. (“RMAR”) and supported by the Respondent Real One Realty Inc. (“ROR”). The Toronto Real Estate Board (“TREB”) is aware of this motion but did not appear.

[2] In this Application, RMAR seeks, among other things, an order setting aside the decision of an Appeal Panel constituted by OREA pursuant to Schedule “C” Arbitration of the TREB By-Law Revised (May 10, 2017) (the “By-Law”) dated June 6, 2017 (the “Appeal Decision”). In the Appeal Decision, the Appeal Panel allowed ROR’s appeal of an Award dated July 29, 2016 made by an Arbitration Panel constituted by TREB (the “Arbitration Decision”). RMAR also seeks an order that the Arbitration Decision is valid and binding or alternatively, that the matter be remitted to a different OREA Appeal Panel for a new hearing. The Appeal Decision and the Arbitration Decision relate to a dispute between RMAR and ROR over entitlement to a commission from a residential real estate transaction.

[3] This Application is returnable September 24, 2019 and will be heard together with a motion by ROR to dismiss the Application for delay (the “Delay Motion”).

II. The Parties and the Application

[4] OREA is a non-profit corporation registered pursuant to the Corporations Act (Ontario) which represents approximately 78,000 real estate brokers from 38 real estate boards. RMAR and ROR are real estate brokerage firms registered pursuant to the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act (Ontario) and are both members of TREB.

[5] Pursuant to Rule 2.1.7 of the Canadian Real Estate Association Rules, all Boards and Associations are required to provide their members with a binding arbitration process to resolve commission disputes. Schedule C of the By-Law (“Schedule C”) creates an optional arbitration scheme which TREB members can use to resolve disputes with respect to commission payments arising from residential and commercial real estate transactions.

[6] On October 8, 2015, ROR commenced an arbitration pursuant to Schedule C claiming commission of $106,220 arising from the sale of the property located at 5 Descourcy Court in Markham (the “Arbitration”). The hearing of the Arbitration was held on July 26, 2016. In the Arbitration Decision, the Arbitration Panel dismissed ROR’s claim determining that RMAR was entitled to retain the commission.

[7] On August 31, 2016, ROR appealed the Arbitration Decision to OREA pursuant to ss. 23-24 of Schedule C (the “OREA Appeal”). The OREA Appeal was heard on March 21, 2017 by the Appeal Panel constituted by OREA pursuant to s. 30 of Schedule C (the “Appeal Hearing”). In the Appeal Decision, the Appeal Panel allowed ROR’s appeal and determined that ROR was entitled to a commission of $105,894.56.

[8] RMAR commenced this Application by Notice of Application issued on July 7, 2017. On August 15, 2017, counsel for OREA advised counsel for ROR and RMAR that OREA intended to seek to intervene in the Application.

[9] On February 12, 2019, ROR served its Motion Record in support of the Delay Motion. On February 22, 2019, RMAR served its Application Record on ROR.

[10] This motion first came before me on July 19, 2019. As set out in my Endorsement dated July 19, 2019, at the commencement of that attendance, OREA’s counsel provided the Court with the Endorsement (unreported) of McEwen J. dated November 30, 2012 in Aimhome Realty Inc. v. Homelife/Leader Inc.; Court File No.: CV-12-461832 (S.C.J.) which had not been filed with the Court and had only been provided to other counsel the day before. At the same time, ROR filed its Factum and Book of Authorities and RMAR filed a Supplementary Factum and transcripts from cross-examinations conducted earlier that week. At my urging, counsel also engaged in significant discussions with a view to determining whether by agreement and/or with the Court’s assistance, the parties could agree on terms which would permit OREA to participate in the Application.

[11] Therefore, at the request of RMAR, I granted an adjournment of this motion to permit the parties to review Aimhome and continue their discussions with a view to resolving this motion.

III. The Law and Analysis

[12] Rule 13.01 states:

. “(1) A person who is not a party to a proceeding may move for leave to intervene as an added party if the person claims,

(a) an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding;

(b) that the person may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding; or

(c) that there exists between the person and one or more of the parties to the proceeding a question of law or fact in common with one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding.

(2) On the motion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the determination of the rights of the parties to the proceeding and the court may add the person as a party to the proceeding and may make such order as is just.”

[13] When determining whether leave to intervene should be granted, the court should consider the nature of the case, the issues which arise and the likelihood of the proposed intervenor being able to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the matter without causing injustice to the immediate parties (Peel (Regional Municipality) et al. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. et al., [1990] O.J. No. 1378 (C.A.) at para. 10; Jones v. Taige (2011), [106 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.)] at para. 22).

[14] Rule 13.01(1) has been interpreted to require that a proposed intervenor must establish “the presence of an adverse affect on a person’s legal rights” such that they have rights or interests at stake or relief is sought against them as opposed to adverse findings or observations or negative comments (Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Co. v. Geto Investments Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 378 (S.C.J.) at para. 20). Courts have been reluctant to grant leave to intervene in private litigation and the standard to be met by a proposed intervenor is more onerous or more stringently applied than where issues of public policy arise (Geto at para. 17; Jones at para. 23).

[15] RMAR relies heavily on the Divisional Court’s decision in Ontario (Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act) v. C. (J.G.), [73 O.R. (3d) 141 (Div. Ct.)]. In that case, Benotto S.J. denied leave for the License Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”) to intervene on an appeal of a decision by one its members denying a registration. LAT sought leave to intervene to make submissions on the admissibility of evidence of a youth offence and conditional discharge. In denying leave, Benotto S.J. held:

“[5] LAT seeks to intervene in the appeal either as a party or as a friend of the court. It wishes to support the decision of its member regarding the Youth Court record and the discharge. Also, it seeks the direction of the court concerning the admissibility of such evidence. LAT is concerned that if it is unable to participate, the court will not have the benefit of legal submissions on these points because Mr. C. is unrepresented.

[6] LAT states that a consideration of the factors set out in rule 13.03 support this application. Those factors are: the nature of the case, the issues that arise, and the likelihood of the moving party being able to make a useful contribution without causing injustice to the immediate parties.

[7] LAT argues that Mr. C.'s position may go unanswered if intervention is not granted. It refers to cases which show an increasingly [page143] broader interpretation of rule 13.03. It states that there is nothing to prevent a tribunal from being a party before the court if it otherwise satisfies the test that it be allowed to do so. There is no case law that states that a tribunal can never intervene.

[8] The respondent states that Rule 13 is not applicable, and that it is entirely inappropriate to allow a tribunal to intervene in the hearing of the appeal.

[9] Neither party could find a single case where Rule 13 was interpreted to allow a tribunal to intervene in the hearing of an appeal from one of its decisions. The issue here does not go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

[10] It has long been the law that, even where the tribunal is given a statutory right to participate, the role is limited:

. . . active and even aggressive participation can have no other effect than to discredit the impartiality of an administrative tribunal either in the case where the matter is referred back to it, or in future proceedings involving similar interests and issues or the same parties. The Board is given a clear opportunity to make its point in its reasons for its decision and it abuses one's notion of propriety to countenance its participation . . . Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 684, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 161, at p. 709 S.C.R.

[11] More recently:

. . . this proceeding is a statutory appeal, not a judicial review, and there is no common law principle that can be invoked to confer standing on an administrative tribunal in a statutory appeal from one of its decisions . . . British Columbia (Securites Commission) v. Pacific International Securities Inc. (2002), 2002 BCCA 421, 215 D.L.R. (4th) 58, 2 B.C.L.R. (4th) 114, at para. 45

[12] LAT has no special expertise in the issue of Youth Court records or conditional discharges. It is therefore distinguishable from cases such as Louie v. Lastman, [2001] O.J. No. 4941, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (C.A.) on which the moving party relies.

[13] In any event, the factors in rule 13.01 do not apply. LAT does not have an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding. Indeed, as an independent arbiter, it cannot have an interest in the outcome. It will not be "adversely affected" by a decision and does not have a common issue with the party. LAT has the right to develop its own processes.

[14] The provisions of rule 13.02 do not apply here for there is no special expertise that LAT can offer by way of argument.” (Motor Vehicle Dealers at paras. 5-14).

[16] The parties were unable to refer me to any reported case dealing with an application to set aside an OREA appeal decision. Counsel for OREA advises that the only such application other than the present one is Aimhome. In that case, the applicant sought to quash a decision of OREA on similar grounds to the present case but had also commenced an application in Divisional Court. The application in Divisional Court named OREA as a party but the application before McEwen J. did not. The Divisional Court application was not being pursued. McEwen J. held:

“The Resp has not attended today. I am concerned, given my review of the materials that the Resp does not appreciate the consequences of this Applic - perhaps due to the different proceedings that have taken place. I am also concerned that TREB and/or OREA might deem it necessary to make submissions in this Applic given the relief sought and the fact they are persons who may be affected by any an order made” (Aimhome at pp. 1-2).

[17] McEwen J. adjourned the application on condition that the applicant serve the Endorsement on TREB, OREA and the respondent “so that they appreciate that the Application will be proceeding in the Superior Crt” adding:

“The Applicant shall provide TREB and OREA with the Application Materials. If they see fit they can participate as interested parties and the Applic shall add them to the Application if they indicate they wish to participate in the Application” (Aimhome at p. 2).

[18] Although this Application is not for judicial review and does not involve a tribunal created by statute, the Supreme Court has provided some helpful guidance regarding the intervention of tribunals on appeals of their own decisions in Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44:

“52 The considerations set forth by this Court in Northwestern Utilities reflect fundamental concerns with regard to tribunal participation on appeal from the tribunal's own decision. However, these concerns should not be read to establish a categorical ban on tribunal participation on appeal. A discretionary approach, as discussed by the courts in Goodis, Leon's Furniture, and Quadrini, provides the best means of ensuring that the principles of finality and impartiality are respected without sacrificing the ability of reviewing courts to hear useful and important information and analysis: see N. Semple, "The Case for Tribunal Standing in Canada" (2007), 20 C.J.A.L.P. 305; L. A. Jacobs and T. S. Kuttner, "Discovering What Tribunals Do: Tribunal Standing Before the Courts" (2002), 81 Can. Bar Rev. 616; F. A. V. Falzon, "Tribunal Standing on Judicial Review" (2008), 21 C.J.A.L.P. 21.

53 Several considerations argue in favour of a discretionary approach. Notably, because of their expertise and familiarity with the relevant administrative scheme, tribunals may in many cases be well positioned to help the reviewing court reach a just outcome. For example, a tribunal may be able to explain how one interpretation of a statutory provision might impact other provisions within the regulatory scheme, or the factual and legal realities of the specialized field in which they work. Submissions of this type may be harder for other parties to present.

54 Some cases may arise in which there is simply no other party to stand in opposition to the party challenging the tribunal decision. Our judicial review processes are designed to function best when both sides of a dispute are argued vigorously before the reviewing court. In a situation where no other well-informed party stands opposed, the presence of a tribunal as an adversarial party may help the court [page177] ensure it has heard the best of both sides of a dispute.

55 Canadian tribunals occupy many different roles in the various contexts in which they operate. This variation means that concerns regarding tribunal partiality may be more or less salient depending on the case at issue and the tribunal's structure and statutory mandate. As such, statutory provisions addressing the structure, processes and role of the particular tribunal are key aspects of the analysis.

56 The mandate of the Board, and similarly situated regulatory tribunals, sets them apart from those tribunals whose function it is to adjudicate individual conflicts between two or more parties. For tribunals tasked with this latter responsibility, "the importance of fairness, real and perceived, weighs more heavily" against tribunal standing: Henthorne v. British Columbia Ferry Services Inc., [2011 BCCA 476], 344 D.L.R. (4th) 292, at para. 42.

57 I am thus of the opinion that tribunal standing is a matter to be determined by the court conducting the first-instance review in accordance with the principled exercise of that court's discretion. In exercising its discretion, the court is required to balance the need for fully informed adjudication against the importance of maintaining tribunal impartiality.

58 In this case, as an initial matter, the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 expressly provides that "[t]he Board is entitled to be heard by counsel upon the argument of an appeal" to the Divisional Court: s. 33(3). This provision neither expressly grants the Board standing to argue the merits of the decision on appeal, nor does it expressly limit the Board to jurisdictional or standard-of-review arguments as was the case for the relevant statutory provision in Quadrini: see para. 2.

59 In accordance with the foregoing discussion of tribunal standing, where the statute does not clearly resolve the issue, the reviewing court must rely on its discretion to define the tribunal's role on appeal. While not exhaustive, I would find the following factors, identified by the courts and academic commentators cited above, are relevant in informing the court's exercise of this discretion:

• (1) If an appeal or review were to be otherwise unopposed, a reviewing court may benefit by exercising its discretion to grant tribunal standing.
• (2) If there are other parties available to oppose an appeal or review, and those parties have the necessary knowledge and expertise to fully make and respond to arguments on appeal or review, tribunal standing may be less important in ensuring just outcomes.
• (3) Whether the tribunal adjudicates individual conflicts between two adversarial parties, or whether it instead serves a policy-making, regulatory or investigative role, or acts on behalf of the public interest, bears on the degree to which impartiality concerns are raised. Such concerns may weigh more heavily where the tribunal served an adjudicatory function in the proceeding that is the subject of the appeal, while a proceeding in which the tribunal adopts a more regulatory role may not raise such concerns.” (OEB at paras. 52-59)

[19] I have also considered Rule 1.04(1) which provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits together with Rule 1.04(1.1) which requires the court to make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding.

[20] Turning to a consideration of the present case, in RMAR’s Notice of Application, the grounds for the Application include: the Appeal Panel exceeded its jurisdiction (para. 2(a)); the Appeal Panel made unreasonable errors (para. 2(b)); the Applicant was not given an opportunity to respond to the Respondent’s case during the OREA Appeal (para. 2(c)); the Applicant was not treated equally and fairly during the OREA Appeal (para. 2(d)); and the Appeal Panel erred in making numerous findings (paras. 2(e)-(f)).

[21] The relief which RMAR seeks on this Application in grounded in s. 46(1)6 of the Arbitration Act 1991 (Ontario):

“The applicant was not treated equally and fairly, was not given an opportunity to present a case or to respond to another party’s case, or was not given proper notice of the arbitration or of the appointment of an arbitrator.”

[22] Although ROR has not served its Responding Application Record, in its Motion Record in support of the Delay Motion, ROR submits that this Application was commenced in contravention of Schedule C. Specifically, ROR intends to argue on the Application that as a TREB member, RMAR agreed pursuant to section 37.01 of the By-Laws to not commence proceedings with respect to the Arbitration Decision and the Appeal Decision and therefore is prohibited from bringing this Application. Section 37.01 states:

“37.01 No action or proceeding, either at law or equity, shall be brought by any Member of TREB against any other Member or any servant or agent of TREB, acting in good faith, for or by reason of, any act, matter or thing done or omitted to be done in pursuance, or purporting to be in pursuance, of this Schedule.”

[23] Further, section 38.01 of Schedule C states:

“38.01 TREB, its Members and all parties to a Claim hereby agree to exclude application of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1991 (Ontario) (as amended from time to time) from Arbitrations conducted by TREB pursuant to this Schedule, save those provisions thereof (Subection 5(4) and Sections 19, 39, 46, 48, 50) from which, pursuant to Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 (Ontario)(as may be amended from time to time), contracting out is expressly prohibited. All Members of TREB acknowledge that this provision does not apply to OREA Appeals.”

[24] OREA initially sought to file affidavit evidence on the Application. However, OREA’s counsel advised the Court that OREA now only seeks to file a Factum and make written and oral legal submissions with respect to: i.) the interpretation of Schedule C including whether ss. 37-38 of Schedule C prohibit RMAR from commencing legal proceedings such as this Application and any other jurisdictional issues raised by the parties; and ii.) the integrity and fairness of the process with respect to the Appeal Hearing. OREA also seeks to “fill in any gaps” in the record and answer any questions which the Court may have. Counsel further advised that OREA has no interest in the underlying commission dispute between the parties and will not make any submissions on the merits or ultimate result of this dispute.

[25] RMAR submits that OREA should be denied leave as the Application is a private dispute between the parties in which OREA has no genuine interest and will not be adversely affected. RMAR also argues that OREA cannot make any useful contribution as the records from the Arbitration Hearing and the Appeal Hearing will be before the Application Judge and counsel for RMAR and ROR are capable of making all necessary submissions such that any submissions from OREA would be unnecessary, unhelpful and irrelevant.

[26] Having considered the relevant factors, I conclude that it is just in the circumstances to grant leave for OREA to intervene in this Application. I arrive at this conclusion largely on the basis that OREA has a genuine interest in and may be adversely affected by the outcome of the Application particularly as it relates to the issue of whether RMAR is prohibited from commencing this Application by ss. 37-38 of Schedule C and any additional jurisdictional issues which the immediate parties may raise.

[27] While the test for leave to intervene in private litigation is more stringent, in my view, the issue of whether RMAR is prohibited from bringing this Application goes beyond the commission dispute between the parties. OREA has a legitimate interest in the Court’s determination of this issue, the disposition of which may adversely affect OREA’s administration and adjudication of appeals under Schedule C. This issue has not been judicially considered and given its potential impact on OREA, it is just and reasonable that OREA be permitted to make submissions. Further, OREA is uniquely placed to make a useful contribution to the determination of this issue with respect to, among other things, the history and purposes of Schedule C and ss. 37-38 and how the Court’s interpretation of ss. 37-38 may affect other provisions. In my view, it would not be fair, just or reasonable in the circumstances for OREA to rely solely on the submissions of the immediate parties who, as member brokerages, are not in the same position as OREA to more fully and properly advise the Court regarding the administrative scheme at issue and any other jurisdictional issues. Accordingly, I reject the assertion that OREA’s submissions would be repetitive of the parties’ arguments or simply constitute a “me too” as expressed in some cases cited by RMAR (see Jones at para. 29). The fact that OREA will not file any evidence or make any submissions on the merits of the underlying commission dispute between the immediate parties’ further supports this conclusion. To the extent to which there is any overlap of submissions, I am satisfied that they would be minimal, of the kind discussed as acceptable in Peel and in any event easily managed by the Application Judge.

[28] In my view, Motor Vehicles Dealer is distinguishable from the present case. In that case, the LAT sought to intervene to make submissions in support of a decision of its own member on evidentiary issues where there were no jurisdictional issues. By contrast, OREA does not seek to make any submissions with respect to the findings or underlying merits of the Appeal Decision or support the Appeal Decision. Rather, unlike Motor Vehicles Dealer, OREA seeks to make submissions on issues going to the Appeal Panel’s jurisdiction. Notwithstanding RMAR’s efforts to downplay the extent to which the Application raises jurisdictional issues, at paragraph 2(a) of its Notice of Application RMAR asserts that the Appeal Panel exceeded its jurisdiction, a position more fully and prominently advanced in its Factum filed on the Application. This is in addition to whether RMAR is prohibited by ss. 37-38 of Schedule C to commence these proceedings. Unlike the LAT, which had no special expertise on evidentiary issues, OREA is uniquely placed to assist the Application Judge on jurisdictional issues. The present case is also distinguishable from Geto where the party seeking leave was a defendant who had previously been a party to the action, was to be a witness at trial and whom the court concluded was at most a person about whom other witnesses at trial may make negative comments.

[29] I am also satisfied that OREA’s participation in the Application would not result in any injustice or actual prejudice to the parties. RMAR submits that since OREA is an independent arbiter which is one and the same with the Appeal Panel and not exercising a regulatory function, its intervention would be improper and raises serious concerns about its impartiality particularly if the Application Judge sends the matter back to be heard by a reconstituted Appeal Panel. In my view, any concerns about OREA’s impartiality are diminished by the fact that it does not seek to make submissions on the underlying commission dispute, the merits of the Appeal Decision or to support the Appeal Decision but rather on the interpretation of ss. 37-38, Schedule C and other jurisdictional issues. In drawing this conclusion, I make no findings as to whether or not, as RMAR submits, OREA is “one and the same” with the Appeal Panel.

[30] There is also no suggestion that granting leave would delay the hearing of the Application. In any event, RMAR took almost 2 years to deliver its Application Record and made no submissions in this regard.

[31] I have also considered Aimhome, and while McEwen J’s comments and conclusions are helpful, I conclude that they are not determinative of the issues on this motion. Specifically, Aimhome is of limited precedential value on the motion before me given that there was no Rule 13 motion before McEwen J. It is also unclear if any submissions were made regarding the addition of OREA and TREB as parties including whether the applicant consented or did not oppose their addition. McEwen J. granted an adjournment concluding that OREA and TREB “may” be affected by the outcome of the application and the application ultimately did not proceed on that attendance or at any time. Accordingly, at best, Aimhome provides limited support for OREA’s position and does not affect my ultimate conclusions on this motion.

[32] Given my conclusions above, I make no findings with respect to whether OREA’s proposed intervention to make submissions on the integrity of the process, procedural fairness and/or natural justice would, without the ss. 37-38 issue and other jurisdictional issues, satisfy the test for leave under Rule 13.01(1). It is sufficient for the purposes of this motion that I have concluded that OREA is entitled to leave based on my consideration of the relevant factors and circumstances set out above. In my view, providing further comment would run the risk of intruding into the discretion of the Application Judge to determine what submissions are required from the parties. This is consistent with the positions of the parties who agreed that if I concluded that OREA was entitled to intervene, any further terms or restrictions on its involvement (other than those which it agreed to such as not filing evidence) were more properly left to the Application Judge. It would be inappropriate for a Master on a Rule 13 motion to impose terms and conditions as to what submissions OREA should be permitted to make given the risk that it may fetter the discretion of the Application Judge to make a determination of the Application based on what submissions the Judge concludes are necessary. While it is appropriate for a Master to consider the relevant factors under Rule 13.01(1), once leave is granted, the Judge hearing the Application must be able to exercise their discretion to determine what submissions from the parties are necessary and appropriate in order to make a fully informed determination of the Application on its merits (OEB at para. 57).

[33] I arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to whether it is appropriate for OREA to “fill in the gaps” on the record. While this appears to be consistent with OREA answering any questions which the Application Judge may have, this too is properly left to the Application Judge’s discretion. Similarly, I conclude that any costs related to OREA’s participation in the Application be left to the discretion of the Application Judge. It is also unnecessary for me to determine, as ROR has argued, that OREA’s intervention is necessary because of its enforcement role under the By-Law and that OREA would not be bound by an order of the Application Judge if it was not granted leave to intervene.

[34] Finally, I conclude that OREA’s participation on this Application is consistent with Rule 1.04(1) and proportionality given that its involvement will lead to a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of the Application and is proportionate to the importance of the matters at issue.

III. Disposition and Costs

[35] Order to go as follows: i.) OREA is granted leave to intervene as an added party in this Application; ii.) OREA may serve and file a Factum and Book of Authorities and shall receive all materials; iii.) the costs of OREA’s participation in the Application are reserved to the Application Judge.

[36] The parties may contact to me to schedule a telephone case conference if case management or directions are required with respect to a timetable for the service and filing of additional materials in advance of the Application hearing.

[37] If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may file written costs submissions not to exceed 3 pages (excluding Costs Outlines) with me through the Masters’ Administration Office on or before September 30, 2019. If the parties cannot agree on a timetable to do so, they may schedule a telephone case conference with me.

Released: August 22, 2019

Master M.P. McGraw