COURT FILE NO.: FS-17-21897

DATE: 20190821

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

M.Y. Applicant

– and –

G.B. Respondent

Counsel:

Alexandra Carr, for the Applicant

Self-represented

HEARD: February 21, 2019

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

This case refers to a proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to a publication ban pursuant to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017. Those subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Services Act, 2017 deal with the consequences of failure to comply with the statutory publication ban. Those sections provide:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Kristjanson J.

[1] The Applicant M.Y. and her common law partner, the Respondent G.B., had a relationship marked by domestic violence and allegations of abuse. Since their separation in October 2017, G.B. has engaged in a campaign of vitriol against M.Y. and those who provide her support. They have a child, H.B., who is now six, and who has been living with M.Y. since separation. M.Y. has brought this summary judgment motion seeking sole custody and supervised access by G.B. She also seeks a permanent restraining order and a vexatious litigant order against G.B.

[2] G.B. contests the summary judgment motions and argues that the parenting issues should be determined at trial. He seeks joint custody and unsupervised access.

[3] This was scheduled as a full day motion and there is not sufficient time to argue the vexatious litigant motion, which is adjourned to be brought back on 21 days’ notice. Given G.B.’s completely inadequate financial disclosure, the mother has also requested, and I agree that issues relating to child support are adjourned and may be pursued by the mother later.

[4] I find that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial on either the restraining order or the parenting issues. I grant summary judgment and I order sole custody to the mother, with supervised access to the father. I grant a permanent restraining order against the father, and other relief set out below.

Background Facts

[5] M.Y. and G.B. began dating in 2011. They cohabited between May 2013 and October 2017. M.Y. has a child of her first marriage, A.Y., now 10 years old. Since October 2012, her son has been residing with M.Y. and his father on a week about schedule with a weeknight overnight with the other parent. M.Y. and her son’s father share decision-making and parenting on a 50/50 basis, a parenting plan agreed on after a section 30 assessment was performed in 2012.

[6] H.B. was born in 2013 and is now six years old. Following the birth M.Y. was diagnosed with post-partum depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She has been on long-term disability since her maternity leave ended in May 2014. She is receiving therapy and taking medication for her mental health issues.

[7] G.B. pled guilty and was convicted of assaulting M.Y. on May 3, 2014. G.B. received a 12-month suspended sentence, 12 months’ probation, and a five-year firearms prohibition. Following the assault, the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (“CCAST”) removed both H.B. and A.Y. from M.Y.’s care. H.B., who was under the age of one, was placed in foster care. H.B. remained in foster care until July 2014 when CCAST approved a kinship placement with M.Y.’s brother. H.B. was subsequently returned to her parents’ care in August 2014 on a temporary basis. In May 2015, CCAST withdrew its protection application.

[8] Following the May 3, 2014 assault, A.Y. remained in the care of his father. In October 2014, A.Y. began living with M.Y. again on a 50/50 schedule.

[9] The relationship ended on October 28, 2017, and H.B. has lived with M.Y. since then. The end of the relationship involved allegations of violence by both M.Y. and G.B., neither of whom were charged. CCAST conducted an investigation. CCAST closed its file in relation to M.Y. in December 2017.

Issues

[10] This case raises the following major issues:

(1) Is this case suitable for summary judgment?

(2) Should G.B. be subject to a permanent restraining order under section 46 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3?

(3) What parenting arrangements are appropriate?

(4) Should support issues be adjourned in light of the lack of disclosure?

Summary Judgment

[11] This summary judgment motion is governed by Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules (“FLR”).

[12] The burden of proof is on the applicant. FLR 16(4) requires the party moving for summary judgment to adduce evidence that sets out specific facts showing that “there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.”

[13] FLR 16(4.1) requires the responding party to adduce evidence of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, not mere allegations or denials. The responding party must put their best foot forward on the motion. The motions judge is entitled to assume that the parties have put before her all of the evidence that they would be able to adduce at trial. See: Sweda v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200.

[14] Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. See: Kawartha Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, para. 80.

[15] If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order: FLR 16(6). In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence and may use additional fact-finding powers set out in FLR 16(6.1) to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, or draw any reasonable inference from the evidence. For the purposes of exercising FLR 16(6.1) powers, the court may hear oral evidence in a mini-trial.

[16] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-step process for determining whether summary judgment should be granted. The motions judge must first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based on the evidence without using the additional fact-finding powers set out in FLR 16(6.1) If, after this initial determination, there still appears to be a genuine issue for trial, the judge may resort to the additional fact finding powers in FLR 16(6.1) and (6.2) to decide if a trial is required.

[17] There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result (Hryniak, para. 49). As the Supreme Court stated, at para. 50 of Hryniak, “the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute.” Summary judgment rules must be interpreted broadly, to include proportionality and access to affordable, timely and just adjudication (para. 5). This is consistent with FLR 2, which directs the court to ensure that a case is dealt with justly by ensuring that the process is fair to all parties, saves time and expense, and is dealt with in a manner appropriate to the case’s importance and complexity.

[18] The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial: Kawartha Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316 at para. 80.

[19] Much of G.B.’s evidence relates to allegations that the CCAST abused his daughter while she was in their care in May-June 2014; that the CCAST and its lawyer, M.E., attempted to cover-up the abuse and pedophilia of CCAST employees; that the police failed to properly investigate the abuse of H.B. by the CCAST; and that CCAST and its lawyer provided evidence to M.Y.’s lawyers and offered a legal assistant to M.Y.’s lawyers. I consider these allegations in the context of the restraining order.

[20] G.B. also calls a great deal of evidence about M.Y.’s mental health issues. M.Y. acknowledges her mental health issues and has pursued treatment. She has co-parented her first child for 7 years on a 50/50 basis and has been the sole caregiver for H.B. since October 2017. Many parents have mental health issues; the key is that the parents recognize the issues and pursue appropriate treatment, and do not pose a danger to their children. Mental health issues are not a bar to parenting as G.B. seems to posit. On the evidence before me, I do not find that M.Y.’s mental health issues pose a risk of harm to her children.

[21] I have carefully considered the allegations of violence against both parents. Only G.B. has been charged and convicted. Again, M.Y. has proved her ability to parent since 2012. The CCAST commenced a protection application in 2014, which it withdrew in 2015. The CCAST conducted another investigation of M.Y. in 2017, which is closed.

[22] On considering all the evidence, G.B. has significant anger issues; he has demonstrated this anger both pre- and post-separation in a significant number of abusive and threatening e-mails, videos, and in materials filed in this Court. This is relevant to both the restraining order and the parenting issues.

[23] In this case, I have found that the issues before the court can be determined by summary judgment, as discussed below. In so doing, I have been careful to consider relevant, material evidence. Where there are issues with the evidence, including contradictions, I consider whether the information is admissible, relevant, material, and probative, and not otherwise excluded. I have made use of additional fact-finding powers set out in FLR 16(6.1) to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and set out those findings below. I do not find that a mini-trial or a trial is required on any issue.

Restraining Order

[24] On December 6, 2017 Justice Paisley granted an ex parte restraining order under section 46 of the Family Law Act against G.B., prohibiting direct or indirect contact with M.Y. and her two children except through M.Y.’s lawyers. The restraining order was continued as a temporary order by Justice Hood on March 15, 2018. G.B. was ordered to pay M.Y. costs of $7,642.00 on the temporary restraining order motion by April 19, 2018; those costs remain outstanding.

[25] M.Y. now seeks a permanent restraining order.

Facts Relevant to Restraining Order

[26] In her affidavit evidence, M.Y. sets out reasons why she is afraid of G.B., who she says is violent and physically and emotionally abusive. She also points to significant post-separation threats made to those who provide support to her, which threatens her psychological safety. I summarize key elements of the evidence below.

(a) Physical Assaults

[27] As set out above, on May 3, 2014 G.B. pled guilty to assault against M.Y. He obtained a suspended sentence including 12 months of probation and a prohibition from using firearms, ammunition or explosives for five years.

[28] Although G.B. pled guilty and was convicted of assault on M.Y. for the May 3, 2014 domestic violence incident, in this litigation he seeks to contest the circumstances, and maintains that in fact M.Y. was attacking him and H.B., and he was the victim of the assault. For this, he has asked the court to listen to an audiotape, which, for reasons discussed below, I have not done so, but I do consider the affidavit evidence and submissions of G.B. on this point. He agrees that he kicked down the door in order to get at M.Y., but states that the door was already weak. He states that as she came running down the hall towards him, “I had to push her away and she hit her head on the corner of the wall and was injured.” He concedes she lay on the ground bleeding.

[29] There is a difference between G.B. and M.Y. as to words he said over her as she lay bleeding on the floor following the assault. M.Y. recorded the incident on her phone, although I have not listened to the audio recording. She states that on the recording G.B. says that he hoped that M.Y. was dead. G.B. maintains he said: “you are not dead, you’re still breathing.” G.B.’s version of events is that he was holding H.B. at the time of the altercation and that M.Y. punched H.B. in the face and bloodied her nose. He states on the tape that he is screaming, “I have a baby in my arms!” eight times and then “ Look at the baby!” 21 times while M.Y. repeatedly screams “Help me, help me!” on the tape, which he says occurred while M.Y. was swinging her fists at him and she was essentially pretending to be a victim.

[30] M.Y. required stitches on her head as a result of the assault. G.B. also states that M.Y. punched H.B. in the face during this incident and received a bloody nose. There is no evidence that medical care was provided to H.B. G.B. took H.B. and left the house. The next day, G.B. returned to the house. M.Y. called 911. After the police attended, CCAST removed H.B. and A.Y. from M.Y.’s care, placing H.B. in foster care and leaving A.Y. in the care of his father. M.Y. and G.B. then reconciled, and G.B. completed the Partner Assault Program.

[31] In his written submissions on the motion, G.B. specifically states that the reason he pled guilty was that while he was detained for a show cause bail hearing, the Crown sent five lawyers over and they were arguing about ways to hold him in jail indefinitely, and so were engaged in a criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice, and that:

After being told I would be denied bail and held in jail for a year, I agreed with an extortion offer of the crown, that I would plead guilty to a simple assault (for a crime I did not commit) if I left the court that day; and in exchange, agreed to take down my internet website dirtycops.info which made allegations of corruption against Stephen Harper and Peter McKay and a number of other crown agents, I also agreed to stop discussing Colonel Russell Williams publicly.

[32] Having pled guilty and been convicted and sentenced, G.B. may not rely on an alternative version of events in which he is not guilty and M.Y. is the aggressor, as in this case it would be an abuse of process: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E. Local 79, 2003 SCC 63. More importantly, the police investigated the incident, and M.Y. was not charged. There is nothing in evidence in relation to the contemporaneous police reports or the reasons on sentencing. Although G.B. alleges that M.Y. punched H.B., there is no contemporaneous evidence of harm to H.B., although she was taken into care by the CCAS. This is, therefore, a clear incident of domestic violence which I am to consider in the context of the best interests of H.B., and one that is relevant to the restraining order.

[33] There was also a significant assault on October 31, 2017. M.Y.’s evidence is that she had changed the locks on the house on October 28, 2017, ending the relationship by locking G.B. out of the house. M.Y. describes G.B. trying to break into the house through the basement window, chopping branches off her father’s memorial tree in the backyard of the house, and lingering in her garage unbeknownst to her for two days. When she entered the garage, she says G.B. began grabbing her, and choking her. G.B., on the other hand, alleges that M.Y. assaulted him. The police arrived and entered the home. G.B. and M.Y. both made complaints of violence against the other. The police contacted CCAST which opened an investigation. After receiving letters from her psychiatrist and her therapist in November and December 2017, CCAST completed its investigation of the October 31, 2017 incident and closed its file, leaving H.B. in M.Y.’s care.

(b) Threats by G.B.

[34] In an e-mail to M.Y.’s lawyer sent on November 15, 2018, G.B. states that unless he obtains joint custody and equal access: “…this will never end between M.Y. and I… No matter what the court decides.”

[35] In November or December 2016, G.B. sent his sister G.N. a text message saying in part: “if she touches me again I am going to kill that insane cunt dead… If she touches me again I will fucking kill her.” While G.B. agrees that he sent this text, he argues that it was in the context of M.Y.’s physical abuse (hitting) of him, and the e-mail does refer to M.Y. touching G.B. That being said, death threats against intimate partners must be taken very seriously by the courts. G.B. did not call the police in 2016 to complain of assaults by M.Y.

[36] G.B. has sent emails threatening M.Y.’s psychiatrist and psychotherapist that he would file lawsuits against them for failing to advise CCAST of allegations that M.Y.’s mental health puts H.B. in danger.

[37] G.B. has made threats against M.Y.’s family of criminal investigation, charges of perjury and threats to expose his allegations that M.Y. and her family killed their mother.

[38] G.B. has attacked M.Y. in many ways—primarily as a violent, dangerous, lying woman with significant mental health issues who poses a danger to her children—in numerous e-mails to third parties and in affidavits before this court. G.B. does not deny sending these e-mails. He has not been sending the e-mails to M.Y. directly but sends them to third parties complaining about M.Y. M.Y. acknowledges her struggles with mental health, for which she has appropriately sought treatment.

[39] G.B. sent an e-mail February 4, 2019 to some of M.Y.’s relatives stating “this will be the second Christmas since your… family stole my H.B. with lies. I hope you feel happy being counted among such disgusting animals. I hope your children are safe.” While G.B. explains that he intended this sincerely, to a reasonable recipient this is reasonably perceived as a threat to the safety of their children.

[40] In March 2018, G.B. contacted the Toronto Police Service complaining about alleged criminal behaviour by M.Y. That investigation closed in April 2018 after the TPS received Justice Hood’s endorsement, and after the Toronto Police Service communicated with M.Y. and her lawyers.

[41] When he learned that M.Y. intended to take the children to the U.S., G.B. wrote to M.Y.’s lawyers and family members, stating that because M.Y. wrote to G.B.’s sister, and her long-standing mental health issues: “US-ICE has today been sent images of H.B., M.Y., A.Y., M.Y.’s brothers and sisters, M.Y.’s vehicle and license number and her psychological assessment. If she attempts to enter the USA without proper paperwork with my child she may have issues.” He also indicated he was contemplating bringing a civil action against M.Y.’s lawyer and the law firm for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress against H.B. G.B. also wrote that he had turned over a hard drive containing M.Y.’s personal information and her family estate files to the Toronto Police Service. He stated he was willing to surrender it and its contents to M.Y. when police were finished with it. He stated: “I have a copy of all files on the drive for my own records.”

(c) Abeldanger

[42] In order to put the evidence into context, it is necessary to discuss an organization called “Abeldanger.” Both G.B. and one of his affiants, K.A., refer extensively to their participation in a group called Abeldanger, and Abeldanger’s focus on and interest in G.B.’s family litigation. K.A. describes Abeldanger as an intelligence network which emerged in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, originally as a Marine based intelligence unit with a single purpose, to seek out and bring to justice corruption within the government. Abeldanger is said to have over 60,000 members currently. According to K.A., President Clinton disbanded the organization in 1994, but the members of Abeldanger did not disband and instead went underground to develop networks and alliances with like-minded individuals on active duty. Members of Abeldanger include acting admirals and generals within the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US government. K.A. describes Abeldanger today as “an organization which locates corruption within the systems of government and uses information submitted by its Agents which is distilled down through a network to reach the decision-makers who when decide what to do about it.” K.A. states that Abeldanger’s work has resulted in the resignation of Chief Executive Officers from hundreds of companies in the USA and around the world, and much of the upper management of the US Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. K.A. states that he is aware that a number of journalists who work with Abeldanger are about to begin reporting on stories “which involve H.B. and her treatment by the Children’s Aid Society, The Toronto Police, [M.Y.’s lawyers] and the Courts.” I note that all the information about Abeldanger are bald statements, unsupported by evidence, which is outside the direct knowledge of the affiants, and of little or no evidentiary value.

[43] Throughout their affidavits, G.B. and K.A. describe what they say is a significant focus of this international organization, Abeldanger, on G.B.’s family law dispute. G.B. states that he is not responsible for what Abeldanger does, but somehow, he has up-to-date knowledge about what Abeldanger is doing, including a campaign by Abeldanger focusing on M.Y., her lawyers, CCAST, and judges who have been involved in this family file. G.B.’s knowledge allegedly extends to Abeldanger’s data mining of M.Y.’s lawyers, the recent creation by Abeldanger of a number of internet memes, and threats to disseminate information about M.Y., her files, and her mental health widely across the internet. I find it implausible that an international intelligence organization focused on government corruption is devoting its resources to G.B.’s custody case, without G.B.’s involvement.

[44] In an email sent to M.Y.’s lawyers in August 2018 G.B. states that he had previously been involved in Abeldanger but has not been involved since October 28, 2017, which is the date his relationship with M.Y. ended. He goes on to state: “as such I wish to make it clear that the planned operations of Abeldanger as against [M.Y.’s family], CCAS Toronto, The Metro Police and [CCAST lawyer] are not of my doing or of my control. I also note that I offered you a warning that these people had learned of your actions last January and were at that time preparing an offensive, which I suspect included data mining you and your staff and friends etc.…. Files located within [M.Y.’s computer] which were improperly placed on my digital storage device were transferred to them without my knowledge on or about October 31, 2017.” He goes on to state in that email: “Abeldanger’s disclosure of and use of evidence of your client’s mental health history, such as that located in recordings of she and her lawyers and psychologist are not of my doing or responsibility.”

[45] G.B.s’ statement that files on M.Y.’s computer were transferred to Abeldanger without his knowledge is directly contradicted by his affidavit of September 6, 2018, where G.B. states that on October 31, 2017 he backed up the contents of his external hard drive to the Abeldanger cloud server for safekeeping. Further, in his affidavit of February 15, 2019, he states that “This entire family court matter, and all other legal and personal files, are also widely distribute across the internet and distributed in my Wikileaks folder.” I draw the reasonable inference that G.B. in fact did upload M.Y.’s files to various locations on the internet, and has taken no steps to retrieve, restrict, or otherwise protect M.Y.’s personal information from further dissemination. More importantly, these are clearly threatening to M.Y. and her lawyers.

[46] In an email sent to M.Y.’s lawyers August 21, 2018, G.B. refers to the lawyers’ attempted bribe and conspiracy with the CCAST, as a result of which he states that “your client is about to become one of the most famous (mentally ill) women in Canada….” He also attaches an email to the CCAST and its lawyer, stating that “every person on the CCAS Board of Directors is about to be ‘called out’ in a very public way for abusing my child and threatening my life. Their lives are all going to be [a]ffected by your actions. Their social media profiles images and home addresses… and most of their friend connections. All because their lawyer passed on their attempt to bribe [M.Y.’s lawyer].”

[47] In an email sent to M.Y.’s lawyers in November 2018, G.B. makes a number of references to the knowledge he has gained about the lawyers since the Abeldanger data mining began on the two lawyers, their friends and associates.

• He states that members of the firm, their friends, and associates have been traced and recorded.

• He yet again shifts the blame for this to Abeldanger. He states that “Should those involved in this movement use the images of you, your firm, friends and/or associates in their campaign, and should you and your associates take issue to these acts, I wish to inform you that these actions are perpetrated by truth from your own client and are the responsibility of Abel Danger, with whom I have no active role. As such, I take no moral responsibility nor have any legal responsibility for those actions.”

• He goes on to state that he has received a number of “sample memes” from Abel Danger which he attached to the e-mail. One contains a picture of M.Y.’s lawyer, with a caption underneath saying: “RAPED A BABY? No problem! See us at [name of law firm] #Toronto. “give $ to me and I’ll fix it.” Another involves a picture of the lawyers at M.Y.’s lawyers’ law firm on a CBC Toronto screen; under a heading, “Breaking News “[name of Law firm] announces ‘purple tie” Pedophile Division.”

• There are a number of memes of a police officer, with headings such as “Raping a baby is perfectly fine as long as CAS employees do it, according to [named police officer] of the Metro Toronto Police.”

[48] In November 2018 G.B. sent an e-mail to M.Y.’s lawyer recording that Abeldanger would upload to the web a number of M.Y.’s video recordings and clips from family videos.

[49] G.B. made several threats, attempting to shift the blame to Abeldanger, and referring to an information campaign on the internet which would focus on his daughter H.B. In his November 21, 2018 affidavit G.B. states:

What has happened to H.B. has resulted in members of the Abeldanger intelligence agency, of which I am a former member, enlisting their members to create an information campaign to distribute information on H.B.’s behalf on the Internet…

Memes have been and are being circulated around the intelligence world, in preparation for an information campaign in the Toronto area which focus on H.B.

[50] In his affidavit he includes one of the memes allegedly created by Abeldanger members. It is a picture of one of the justices who rendered a decision earlier in this proceeding. He states that “While not created by me, these Memes represent the truth of this matter from evidence; and causes serious questions to be asked about the integrity of [two justices of the Superior Court involved in earlier stage of this proceeding] both of whom are pictured in memes and identified as judges for the Superior Court of Justice.”

[51] In his affidavit of September 6, 2018, G.B. states that that he associates with people in the intelligence community in a philanthropic matter, and those people have begun to “chum” the various Intel boards with M.Y.’s information which had been stored on his drive. He states that he “wrote and warned [M.Y.’s lawyer] the people who I develop operational models for in the intelligence world are examining M.Y.’s file and were prepared to take action against [M.Y.’s lawyer], CAS and CCAS for the abuse of H.B., and also the Metro Toronto Police for their refusal to bring charges against M.Y. for her assaulting H.B., and aggravated assaults against me… They have also focused their attention on evidence of M.Y.’s involvement in conspiracies to defraud her elderly stepparents and the possibility that she and her brother… may have killed their mother in 2013.”

(d) False Identity: Plenty of Fish Operation Boxer Scam

[52] There is a significant issue regarding a false identity set up on Plenty of Fish, a social media dating site, where a friend of G.B.’s, Mr. K.A., befriended and lured M.Y. under the false identity, “Stephen_theboxer”. K.A. used the false identity to elicit personal information about M.Y., her whereabouts, her daily activities with the children, and solicitor/client privileged information. This is a gross invasion of personal privacy, which I accept caused M.Y. fear and has undermined her sense of physical and psychological safety. Both G.B. and K.A. claim that G.B. had no knowledge of the Plenty of Fish scam.

[53] In his affidavit of September 6, 2018, G.B. states that he explained to K.A. in the winter of 2017 that M.Y. had been on the social media site Plenty of Fish during their relationship. In his affidavit of September 6, 2018 K.A. explains that G.B. did more than simply tell him about M.Y.’s presence on the site. In fact, K.A. states:

On or about November 15, 2017, G.B. showed me that he had connected M.Y.’s social media profile on the Internet site Plenty of Fish, to a website called Visual Ping. Visual Ping permit someone to monitor the activity of a webpage automatically to determining the activity of the user.”

[54] The only inference available is that G.B. was in real time, post-separation, monitoring M.Y.’s activity on the Plenty of Fish social media dating site. This kind of post-separation real-time surveillance of the former spouse’s action is repugnant and cannot be condoned in family law litigation. It is another sign of G.B.’s failure to understand boundaries, and his controlling nature.

[55] G.B. and K.A. both state that G.B. had no knowledge of K.A.’s involvement in the Plenty of Fish scam. K.A. describes this “operation” as “part of a larger data mining project by Abeldanger.” K.A. describes “Operation Boxer” as follows: “On or about March 25^th, 2018, an identity was set up on the social media network Plenty of Fish named Stephen_theboxer in order to observe and seek evidence about the well-being of H.B.and learn about the activities of M.Y.” K.A. does not state who set up the false identity. G.B. states that it was not until August 2018 that he learned of K.A.’s actions, and was then given the “conversation”; hundreds of messages exchanged between M.Y. and the false identity. G.B. states that in reading that exchange “it became obvious [K.A. under the false identity] elicited some valuable information about M.Y. and the falsehoods she has sworn to in this matter.” G.B. chose to attach the entire conversation – about 3 inches of material – between M.Y. and the false identity as evidence on this custody application. The chats commenced in March 2018. M.Y. first learned that this was a false identity six months later, through K.A.’s September 6, 2018 affidavit.

[56] M.Y.’s lawyer objects to the admissibility of the Plenty of Fish messages. I held a voir dire and determined that they would not be admissible. The statements are not made under oath, meet none of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and have no evidentiary value. More importantly, it is repugnant to the values of the legal system for a former common law partner to entrap or act as an accessory to the entrapment on social media sites of their former partner. This gross invasion of privacy cannot be countenanced by this court. Even if the statements were not hearsay, I would exclude them because the prejudice they cause to the administration of justice outweighs their minimal probative value. I similarly strike all paragraphs in K.A.’s affidavit that purport to describe the messages, as well as the portions of his affidavit where he purports to analyse M.Y.’s messages as displaying atypical narcissism and projection, as he is not qualified as a psychologist or psychiatrist.

(e) The Justice System

[57] G.B. has continually stated, in sworn evidence, that he will continue his campaign to expose M.Y., her family, crown attorneys, police, lawyers and judges in relation to their conduct as he perceives it to affect H.B., to support M.Y., or to undermine him. He explicitly refers to the widespread distribution of information across the internet to expose this conduct.

[58] G.B. states in his February 15, 2019 affidavit:

(5) “I have no faith, confidence, and very little or any respect for the Superior Court of Justice, based on my previous experiences with the courts, and judges, whom I have repeatedly captured showing decisions and actions conditioned as against me” (para.118)

(6) “I intend to use every day of my life while separated from H.B., to distribute information and inform as many Canadians as possible about the evidence M.Y.… has presented to this court” (paragraph 122)

(7) “I will refuse to accept any court order to suppress the truth about M.Y., her family, and each and every member of the system of justice; and or Canadian public; who has a hand in corruption as against myself, or my daughter” (para. 127)

(8) “I know that [a judge who issued an endorsement earlier in this case] should be investigated and prosecuted for criminal conspiracy; as is the fact that his endorsement of M.Y., suggest our crown engages in extortion covenants, using pedophilia to manage and control our justice system” (para. 128)

(9) “If this court refuses to address the wrongs committed against my daughter, and “spins” the evidence to support a paradigm preconditioned against G.B., and or H.B. G.B, is will be the final straw, and I will begin to distribute evidence of M.Y.’s allegations of pedophilia by judges on the benches, police and the system of justice, and of Crown servants, irregardless of any order attempting to suppress and gag truth” (para. 134)

(10) “This entire family court matter, and all other legal and personal files, are also widely distribute across the internet and distributed in my Wikileaks folder” (para. 54)

(11) “I intend to expose [three judges involved in earlier portions of this case] for their part in the abuse of my child” (para. 98)

(12) He suggests that [a judge who issued an endorsement earlier in this case] is also a suspect in the alleged rape of H.B. G.B …” He also refers to ““extortion covenant” evidence suggesting officials rape children as part of their employment contract with the crown” (para. 116)

(13) “… I intend to make sure the lives of each and every crown servant against whom I have amassed personal evidence, are exposed publicly and ‘shaded’ and are personally effected by the discovery of their own actions, just as their actions have each affected the lives of my daughter H.B. and myself. (para. 124)

(14) Under the heading “Corruption and Conspiracy of the Crown, Police and [a judge who issued an endorsement earlier in this case],” G.B. states that a judge who issued an endorsement earlier in the case had prior knowledge of manipulation of this court matter and a “back door financial deal” between the CCAST and M.Y.’s lawyers; and that there is a conspiracy within the crown and police as against G.B. (paras. 68-81)

(f) Threatening and Abusive Comments to Lawyers

[59] G.B. has threatened M.Y.’s lawyers. On August 30, 2018, he wrote an e-mail to a Ministry of the Attorney General (“MAG”) lawyer L.B. about M.Y.’s lawyer in this proceeding, stating:

[M.Y.’s lawyer] is a repugnant cunt and one day perhaps her own child’s brains will be sprayed across a Yorkville sidewalk and she will than appreciate her disgusting behaviour.”

[60] The child of M.Y.’s lawyer is also a lawyer for M.Y. and known to G.B. G.B. explains that referring to her child’s brains sprayed across a sidewalk refers to his nephew, who was gunned down in Yorkville, and M.Y.’s lawyer’s advice that H.B. not attend the funeral. He specifically states in his affidavit that in this email to MAG lawyer L.B.:“I also chose to juxtapose to L.B. the image of [M.Y.’s lawyer’s daughter ] being a hypothetical victim of the exact same crime, which actually took the life of my nephew.” He goes on to state that clearly he “voiced no threat in my email to [M.Y.’s lawyer].” This explanation does not take away from the fact that this e-mail would be perceived as a threat to M.Y.’s lawyer, and specifically one designed to undermine the lawyer’s psychological safety regarding her child, and to fear for the physical safety of her child.

[61] In this e-mail G.B. also threatens to expose “all of the justices” he has been involved with, and states that M.Y. is “about to be the most famous insane woman in Canada,” a threat of making information public. G.B. specifically refers to the restraining order: he states, “I am restricted from intimidating [M.Y.’s lawyer], her daughter or her client so I ask that you not let them know about this e-mail.”

[62] In his affidavit of September 6, 2018, G.B. explains the e-mail to the MAG lawyer L.B. as follows, specifically acknowledging that it was “fueled by anger.” He states: “I do not retract calling [M.Y.’s lawyer] a cunt for her actions, I only wish there was a more vile term to fit what a lowlife human being this woman has shown herself to be in this single act. That [M.Y.’s lawyer] would express such evil will and repugnant intent against my grieving sister is a new low, and I will gladly sharing this ugly display of behaviour to all who may listen; and will continue to do so by broadcast; if necessary, until her abuse of my child is stopped by this court.… This act is combined with [M.Y.’s lawyer’s] fraud upon the court of not disclosing her unhealthy alliance with CCAS as specifically against the father of H.B.”

[63] In his affidavit of November 21, 2018, G.B. attacks MAG lawyer L.B. as a criminal, whom he states he knows to be an accessory to the murders of several women by Col. Russell Williams, a notorious Canadian serial killer. He also states that MAG lawyer L.B. “intentionally manipulated the criminal justice system to destroy my former marriage.”

[64] He goes on in his affidavit to state that “the evidence now suggests [M.Y.’s lawyer] is …not only a child abuser of H.B. but the most vile person I note to be breathing air,” and extends an “apology to [M.Y.’s lawyer] for any emotional discomfort she had may have experienced by my exposing her vile and evil personality.”

[65] In his affidavit of November 21, 2018, G.B. refers to M.Y.’s lawyer as a “disgusting ‘CUNT’”, and states that “she will be known as such until a more repugnant word for that woman is discovered.” He goes on to state that M.Y.’s lawyers actions against H.B. are actionable in civil court and will be addressed forthwith, as “fraud, intentional infliction of emotional and mental distress, civil conspiracy (with M.Y., [the CCAST lawyer], and CAS/CCAS), unjust enrichment, and alienation of affection.”

[66] In another e-mail sent in November 2018 to M.Y.’s lawyer, he states: “Should you threaten to take the custody of my child again, your threat will be met by an equal response… If you or M.Y. are ever successful in taking my child with your lies… I will respond in kind for the rest of time.”

[67] In his affidavit of November 21, G.B. states that the logo of M.Y.’s lawyers law firm “follows the pedophilia nomenclature as identified in the FBI field guide identifying pedophile friendly organizations combined with the known abuse of H.B. by [M.Y.’s lawyer] and M.Y., The Metro Toronto Police, and CAS/CCAS Toronto has been a driving force behind this operation for Abeldanger operatives. People are outraged and prepared to fight back.”

[68] He has threatened that an associate of his who controls a large YouTube channel has begun to make “free commercials” for the law firm of M.Y.’s lawyers , such as “If you want to set your partner up on an assault and win at all costs, call (M.Y.’s lawyer)”, “if you wanna torture your dying Mother and still keep your child…Call (M.Y.’s lawyer)”. These are obviously unwanted.

[69] G.B. has also made several very disturbing comments about the CCAST and their lawyer, M.E. He has specifically sworn that he intended to expose M.E.’s clients, including the Vatican, “for their involvement in child and human trafficking,” and goes on to state in his February 15, 2019 affidavit “I will not stop exposing these people until [CCAST lawyer M.E.] has suicided, been murdered by his own partners, or is in prison for what he has done to my daughter.” (para. 107)

The USB Key

[70] G.B. sought to introduce into evidence a USB key. Several affidavits refer to videos, audiotape, and documents on a USB key. A USB key was taped to the Answer.

[71] The contents of the USB key are described in various ways. M.Y. in her affidavit says that on March 13, 2018, her lawyer was served with a USB stick with 3087 files. G.B. states in his affidavit of February 15, 2019: “I appreciate that the Judge who reads this affidavit for the first time, is coming to a huge pile of affidavit evidence; audio and video files; and historical court records in the 1000’s on the attached USB stick.” In his affidavit of September 12, 2018, G.B. states that CAS and CCAS documents from M.Y.’s May 27, 2014 affidavit are located on the USB stick, as well as evidence of M.Y.’s efforts to investigate CCAST employees that G.B. suspects abused H.B. while in CCAST care in May-June 2014. These documents are not listed anywhere nor are they printed out and made exhibits to any affidavit before me.

[72] K.A. gives evidence of a “Toshiba 1 Tera-Byte computer storage device” which G.B. retrieved on October 31, 2017, and he states that “G.B. began to search that storage device and learned that M.Y. used his drive to store files from her MacBook Pro computer.” (Feb. 27, 2018, para. 278). It is unclear when K.A. first accessed this drive. He does not state when he gained access. He states that he found on the Toshiba drive “a very large cache of investigation materials that M.Y. had amassed” into her friends and family; “hundreds of hours of recordings with CCAS staff members and court proceedings”; various audio and video recordings, and a “file entitled CCAS which included a massive number of files and documents; surveillance photos and video,” as well as “a collection ofvideos” mentioned by her former husband, D.Y. K.A. states that “G.B. showed me a series of videos he discovered on his hard drive which originated on M.Y.’s MacBook Pro” (para. 418); he states that “thousands of hours of recordings are found on the drive, all categorized by M.Y. and labelled by subject folder.” He then purportedly views and draws conclusions about M.Y. There is no evidence that any of the videos are authentic.

[73] Where there are documents, those documents must be described, listed, printed and set out as exhibits to the affidavit. This was not done. Video and audio files should also be described and listed, with certified transcripts as exhibits to the affidavits. This was not done. On a summary judgment motion, a litigant cannot simply put 1000’s of hours of recordings on a USB key, with almost no explanation of the contents, and expect the judge to review the evidence, or expect to play video and audiotapes with no foundation. Every piece of video or audio evidence must be authenticated: it must be established that it is an accurate depiction of events that it has not been altered, and it must be verified on oath by a person capable of doing so, such as the person who made the recording or set up the system: (R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1197; R. v. Andalib-Goortani, 2014 ONSC 4690 at para. 28).

[74] In court, G.B. sought to play videos from the USB stick in court, as well as one audio file. M.Y.’s lawyer objected on the basis that she had no notice that any of the USB key documents would be played in court. G.B.’s Form 14C Notice of Confirmation of Motion dated February 18, 2019 did not refer to playing videos or an audiotape in Court and made not reference to the specific videos and audiotape to which he wished to refer. I held a voir dire. I excluded the USB key evidence since the affiants were unable to, and did not, establish the authenticity of audio and video files, as well as on the grounds of fairness/the court’s ability to control its proceedings.

[75] Neither G.B. nor K.A. can establish that the video, audio, and photographic materials on the USB key which they claim G.B. found on M.Y.’s hard drive are accurate and have not been tampered with or altered. The primary precondition – trustworthiness – has not been established. Given the vast array of material which may be on the USB key – M.Y.’s family photos and videos, child protection proceedings from 2014-2015, M.Y.’s alleged investigation of CCAST employees, alleged videos of M.Y. and her ex-husband – there are significant authenticity issues and the probative value regarding custody and access is minimal.

[76] Moreover, admitting the evidence would cause significant prejudice to the administration of justice as well as to this proceeding. If partners were encouraged to obtain evidence surreptitiously with a view to litigation, that deceitful practice would tarnish the reputation of the justice system. In the context of family litigation, it would undermine the overarching goal of bringing peace to situations of family conflict. As the Court of Appeal held in Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 655 at para. 12, it is “sound public policy” to “try to discourage the use of secretly recorded conversations in family proceedings”; the same extends to misappropriation of private files of a spouse.

[77] Furthermore, admitting 3087 files, including thousands of hours of video and audio files would completely derail the present proceeding, thus undermining the fairness of the summary judgment process. The court has an inherent power to preserve its own process (Toronto (City) v C.U.P.E. Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 37) as well as a residual discretion to exclude evidence when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. When I weight this heavy prejudice against the dubious probative value of the files on the USB key, I conclude that this a further reason why it should not be admitted.

[78] In oral argument, G.B. indicated that he wished to play the videos which he described as M.Y. assaulting her former husband. The probative value was alleged to be her predisposition to violence. Even assuming that the authenticity of the videos had been established (it wasn’t), they would be of tenuous evidentiary value given that the relationship ended eight years ago; M.Y. was never charged nor convicted; M.Y. and her ex-husband have been co-parenting for years, after a section 30 assessment was completed; M.Y. has been in therapy for the last five years; and the CCAST was monitoring M.Y. during a child protection proceeding which it ultimately withdrew, and recently investigated M.Y. and closed its file. On the totality of the evidence, I find that M.Y. is capable of parenting her daughter, even if the eight year old videos show the couple engaged in domestic violence.

[79] In oral argument, G.B. also wanted me to listen to the audiotape purportedly made by M.Y. on her phone in October 2014, which has not been authenticated. No certified transcript of the tape was provided as it should have been. However, I read G.B.’s description of the audiotape, and accept G.B.’s version of the words on the tape. This was the incident that led to the assault guilty plea by G.B. G.B. agrees he kicked down a door to get to M.Y. G.B. agrees he pushed M.Y., who fell to the floor, bleeding, and required stitches. I do not need to resolve the difference between the words M.Y. remembers (I hope you’re dead) and G.B. remembers (You’re not dead. You’re still breathing). Accepting that G.B. was holding H.B., he screamed 21 times in a loud voice about having the baby in his arms. This is a terrifying incident of intimate partner violence, in 2014. The police investigated; G.B. was the one who was charged. H.B. was taken away from both parents and was placed in foster care. The CCAST was involved in the life of this family until the protection application was withdrawn in 2015. The inference is that the CCAST did not have protection concerns. That was four years ago. M.Y. has parented both A.Y. and H.B. since that time; other than the complaint made by G.B. following the date of separation incident in October 2017 which was investigated, and closed, by the CCAST, there have not been other complaints. I conclude that there are not currently protection concerns.

[80] Actually listening to the audio tape is not required given the minimal evidentiary value of the tape in the context of all of the other evidence.

Legal Framework: Restraining Order

[81] Section 46(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”) permits the court to make an interim or final restraining order against a person if the applicant has “reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.” The order can be made against a person with whom the applicant: FLA, s. 46(2).

[82] Section 46(3) provides that a restraining order may contain one or more of the following provisions:

1. Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.

2. Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.

3. Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. Any other provision that the court considers appropriate.

[83] Key elements in determining whether a restraining order should issue are summarized by Paulseth, J. in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.S., 2017 ONCJ 506 at para. 44:

• Restraining orders are serious and should not be ordered unless a clear case has been made out. See: Ciffolillo v. Niewelglowski, 2007 ONCJ 469.

• A restraining order is serious, with criminal consequences if there is a breach. It will also likely appear if prospective employers conduct a criminal record (CPIC) search. This could adversely affect a person’s ability to work. It may affect a person’s immigration status. See: F.K. v. M.C., 2017 ONCJ 181.

• It is not sufficient to argue that there would be no harm in granting the order. See: Edwards v. Tronick-Wehring 2004 ONCJ 195.

• Before the court can grant a restraining order, it must be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds for the person to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of their child”. See: McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254.

• The person’s fear may be entirely subjective so long as it is legitimate. See: Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154, 2011 CarswellOnt 146 (Ont. SCJ); McCall v. Res, supra.

• A person’s subjective fear can extend to both the person’s physical safety and psychological safety. See: Azimi v. Mirzaei, 2010 CarswellOnt 4464 (Ont. S.C.).

• It is not necessary for a respondent to have actually committed an act, gesture or words of harassment, to justify a restraining order. It is enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. An applicant does not have to have an overwhelming fear that could be understood by almost everyone; the standard for granting an order is not that elevated. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.

• A restraining order will be made where a person has demonstrated a lengthy period of harassment or irresponsible, impulsive behaviour with the objective of harassing or distressing a party. There should be some persistence to the conduct complained of and a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement. See: Purewal v. Purewal, 2004 ONCJ 195.

• A restraining order cannot be issued to forestall every perceived fear of insult or possible harm, without compelling facts. There can be fears of a personal or subjective nature, but they must be related to a respondent’s actions or words. A court must be able to connect or associate a respondent’s actions or words with an applicant’s fears. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.

• Courts should have regard for the passage of time. Events that once triggered a temporary restraining order may not be so compelling on the issue of a permanent order. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., 2015 ONCJ 242.

• In Catholic Children’s Aid Society v R.M. (2015) O.J. No 4305 (SCO), Justice Chappell considered the long history of domestic violence, the history of failing to comply, current threats at the time of access visits, and the fact that the protection of the Society would no longer be a “safety buffer” in granting a restraining order in a matter under the same Act.

[84] On the basis of all of the evidence set out above, I find that a clear case has been made out for a permanent restraining order. I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for M.Y. to fear for her own safety and for the safety of her children. This encompasses both physical safety and psychological safety, based on an egregious and continuing series of threats and menace to M.Y. and those who G.B. perceives support M.Y. G.B. has demonstrated a lengthy period of harassment and irresponsible behaviour with the objective of harassing or distressing M.Y., and those who support her. I have set out above numerous threats of disseminating M.Y.’s personal information, including personal health information, across the internet; threats to expose M.Y. and her family members for criminal acts; threats to sue her psychologists/therapists; threats to sue her lawyers; threats to many lawyers involved in this family proceeding and earlier child protection proceedings; internet postings attacking police officers, M.Y.’s lawyers, and judges in this case; and threats of continued engagement on all fronts unless G.B. gets his way. G.B. is unable to respect the outcome of judicial proceedings. His language is extreme, abusive and angry. He refers to death as well as exposure. I find that there has been persistence to the conduct complained of and there is a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement: Purewal v. Purewal, 2004 ONCJ 195.

[85] I therefore issue a permanent restraining order in the same terms as the original, except that the parties may communicate about child-related issues through G.B.’s sisters rather than through M.Y.’s lawyers, given the costs of communication through lawyers.

The Hard Drives

[86] There is a dispute in the evidence about the ownership of some hard drives. There is no dispute, however, that G.B. has in his possession a hard drive or drives which he knows contain M.Y.’s personal information including photos, pictures, documents and videos, and that G.B. has been posting M.Y.’s personal information on websites. He has made numerous postings about M.Y., suggesting that she has mental health issues. His YouTube channel page contains numerous videos pertaining to M.Y. He refers to his Wikileaks folder containing this information on the internet.

[87] In his affidavit of February 15, 2019 G.B. states that in March, 2018 Hood, J. ordered M.Y. to return G.B.’s clothes, belongings and data drives with his software models on them. I have reviewed Justice Hood’s order. He did not order what G.B. claims. Rather, Justice Hood ordered G.B. to provide a list to M.Y.’s lawyer by March 16, following which the parties were to work out a process for G.B. to attend and obtain the agreed items. There is no further information about the process or return of items in the affidavit evidence before me. If M.Y. has G.B.’s personal belongings, clothes and data drives, she should return those to G.B.

[88] M.Y. seeks an order returning her hard drive. Given the evidence before me, I order G.B. to return the hard drive(s) that he admits contains M.Y.’s information to her, and to destroy all copies of that information wherever stored or accessible (including in the cloud, in G.B.’s Wikileaks folder, on his Youtube channel or public postings), and further where G.B. has given that information to a third party, such as K.A., to retrieve that information and destroy it.

Parenting Issues: CLRA Best Interests of the Child

[89] Since the parties never married, parenting issues are governed by the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (“CLRA”). Under s. 20 of the CLRA, both parents are equally entitled to custody of a child; if a decision is made that one parent should have sole custody, then I must explain why: Rodriguez v. Guignard, 2013 ONSC 146.

[90] I must apply the factors relevant to the best interests of the child set out in section 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (“CLRA”). I must consider all the child’s needs and circumstances including:

(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,

(i) each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,

(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;

(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;

(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;

(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;

(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and

(h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application.

[91] Because G.B. has been convicted of assault against M.Y., M.Y. has given evidence of violence and abuse by G.B., and G.B. has given evidence that M.Y. herself has been violent both with him and in her previous marriage, I must also consider the violence provisions in ss. 24(4) and (5) of the CLRA which provide:

(4) In assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against,

(a) his or her spouse;

(b) a parent of the child to whom the application relates;

(c) a member of the person’s household; or

(d) any child.

Same

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), anything done in self-defence or to protect another person shall not be considered violence or abuse.

[92] I am to consider each parent’s past conduct only insofar as it relates to the violence provisions set out above, or if the court is satisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to act as a parent: CLRA, s. 24(3).

Facts Relevant to Parenting

Assessment of M.Y. and Her Plan

[93] M.Y.’s plan of care involves H.B. continuing to live with her and her half-brother in M.Y.’s home. M.Y. is a stay-at-home parent on disability leave from work. She has enrolled H.B. in a local school.

[94] I find that M.Y. has been exercising de facto sole custody since November 2017. In this time she has made important decisions, such as enrolling H.B. in school for the first time, and organizing extracurricular activities such as swimming lessons, ballet, and Tae Kwon Do, which have been in H.B.’s best interests. H.B. is thriving in her mother’s care, as exhibited in her report cards. M.Y. describes H.B.’s social engagement with neighborhood and school friends on play dates and birthday parties. H.B. has sleepovers with her cousins, both at her uncle’s home and at a family cottage. M.Y. takes H.B. and her half-brother to outings at the library, playgrounds and parks, and they do activities like rollerblading, biking, playing tennis, and working in the garden.

[95] M.Y. has identified three maternal uncles and their wives and children who live within walking distance and with whom H.B. is close, and a maternal aunt a short drive away. Although G.B. makes a significant number of allegations about the “criminal” conduct of M.Y.’s family, there have been no criminal charges, her brother was accepted for a kinship placement by CCAST, and G.B.’s bald allegations are not evidence that M.Y.’s family pose a risk of harm to H.B.

[96] Much of G.B.’s evidence and that of his affiants is to the effect that M.Y. suffers from severe mental health issues; some of his affiants repeat statements that M.Y. herself has made with respect to her mental health. M.Y. acknowledges that she has had mental health issues. There is, however, no evidence that her mental health issues prevent her from adequately parenting.

[97] G.B. raises a number of allegations of assault in addition to ones discussed earlier, in which he states that M.Y. was the aggressor. I have considered these allegations. G.B. claims that M.Y. assaulted him on May 14, 2014, October 31, 2014, and November 29, 2016; he has a photograph showing a cut lip and blood, and photos of leg/puncture type wounds. There were no complaints to police made at the time.

[98] With respect to the May 14, 2014 incident, G.B. states M.Y. hit G.B. in the mouth with her iPhone while she was driving. M.Y.’s evidence is that she was driving and G.B. was asking for the cell phone in her purse. She says he was getting angry and she was scared and reached for the phone and passed it to G.B. which accidentally hit his mouth. She states he immediately took photos of himself, smeared the blood over the passenger seat, and called his friends to say that she had intentionally hurt him. This allegation is five years old, and no complaint was made at the time.

[99] With respect to the October 31, 2014 allegation, G.B. states that M.Y. stabbed G.B. in the leg 9 times with a sharp object, puncturing the leg, on the front step of the home when H.B. was in his arms. M.Y. denies this and provides further details. She states that G.B. became angry when she refused to drive him to Belleville to serve legal documents. She states she tried to leave the house to get away from him but he slammed the door to prevent her from leaving. She says she tried again to leave open the door and he pushed her up against the wall. She states she tried to get her phone out of her purse to call the police but G.B. grabbed the purse to prevent her from calling; her car key fell on the out of the purse onto the floor and she was on the floor trying to grab them, G.B. grabbed her ankles and held her upside down. As she tried to get out of his hold she was desperate, yelled for help, grabbed the car keys and hit his leg with the keys until he let go. It is clear that there was domestic violence at this time; however, it is five years old, and CCAST does not have protection concerns. CCAST was involved with the family at this time, and no complaint was made.

[100] With respect to the assault alleged on November 29, 2016, G.B. states that M.Y. attacked G.B., blowing into his eardrum and striking him with her fists, and coached H.B. to kick and scratch G.B. while she sat on his lap. M.Y. states they had an argument and she locked him out of the house. G.B. found a spare key and tried to get into the house, she tried to prevent him from opening the door, but he forced his way into the house and grabbed her. She was scared and tried to get out of his hold. She fled into the bedroom. G.B.’s evidence is that it was after the November 2016 assault by M.Y. that he made the threat that he would “kill that insane cunt dead” if she touches him again. This threat was sent in an e-mail to his sister, G.N. What is clear is that there was a significant amount of domestic violence in the marriage, and that G.B. made a direct threat to M.Y.’s life in very strong language in 2016, which he sent at the time to his sister G.S. What is also clear, as discussed below, is that his sister G.N. was aware of G.B.’s significant anger issues.

[101] M.Y. has received support from a psychiatrist, a physician who is also a psychotherapist since December 12, 2014, and a psychiatrist/psychologist whom she has been seeing since 2013. G.B. himself acknowledges that during their relationship, M.Y. had hundreds of psychiatric appointments. It is appropriate and important to see M.Y. availing herself of psychiatric and psychological supports. The CCAST withdrew its protection application, and most recently investigated and closed an investigation referred by the police, which included allegations of violence made against M.Y. by G.B. The inference to be drawn from this is that having investigated very recently in a file closed in 2018, CCAST finds M.Y. to be an acceptable parent. She has been parenting on a 50/50 schedule her elder son and following the period in 2014 when her two children were taken away, she has been parenting her son on a 50/50 residential schedule for the last five years, which again demonstrates that she is a fit parent. G.B.’s evidence was adduced to show that because she has mental health issues she cannot be a fit parent; but on the totality of the evidence before me, that is not the appropriate inference to be drawn.

[102] Since November 2018 M.Y. has offered supervised access to G.B., which he has refused, as discussed below.

[103] There is contradictory evidence as to video calls with G.B. and his mother. In M.Y.’s affidavit of November 15, 2018, she states that between April 8, 2018 and September 23, 2018 she allowed G.B. to have video calls with H.B. three times a week, Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday evenings providing he complied with certain guidelines which I find to be reasonable such as not interrogating or asking H.B. questions about M.Y., and remaining child-oriented, optimistic and positive. It is M.Y.’s evidence that G.B. was incapable of sticking to the guidelines and on September 26, 2018 her lawyer advised G.B. the phone calls would be limited to twice a week on Thursday and Sunday evenings. In her affidavit of February 12, 2019, M.Y. states that she has continued to facilitate video calls, now once a week, but G.B. makes inappropriate comments. She cites G.B.’s statements to H.B. that police officers lie and that’s why he went to jail, and questioning H.B. about whether she thought it was fair that they had to wait a week to speak to each other, and that this was the only time they are allowed to be together.

[104] M.Y. states that she believes the phone calls are not in H.B.’s best interests given that G.B. makes inappropriate comments about H.B. living with him, and how M.Y. is preventing H.B. from seeing him on a regular basis. In addition, given the continuing threats that G.B. makes against her and others who support her, and on public websites, having to facilitate those phone calls is emotionally difficult and detrimental to her mental health. M.Y. states she is willing to reinstate phone calls once G.B. obtains a psychological assessment and counselling in order to deal with his anger and aggression towards M.Y., and to learn how to communicate with H.B. in a child-focused and appropriate manner.

[105] M.Y. specifically cites inappropriate comments made by G.B. to H.B. in phone calls of Thursday January 3, Thursday January 17, and Thursday, January 31, 2019, and Thursday February 7, 2019.

[106] M.Y.’s evidence is that video calls continued until at least September, 2018 and perhaps later. This evidence is contradicted by G.B., who states that he has not had video calls since June 2018 and those have been replaced by audio calls.

[107] P.G., in her February 2019 affidavit states that beginning in October 2018 she and G.B. have spent every Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday together, so she could be with him for phone calls with H.B. Her evidence is that at no time since October 2018 has M.Y. permitted a video call; they are audio only. She agrees with M.Y. that they were originally three times a week, and then were cut back to two times per week.

[108] G.B.’s evidence is that during calls, H.B. has been distracted, is telling her that her brother A.Y. is hurting her, and that M.Y. is coaching H.B. to say things such as “You said you were going to kill mommy”, and “you gotta have an appointment to see me.” His evidence is that M.Y. is a violent and abusive woman. He is concerned that M.Y. has denied H.B. access to him and cut off all contact with G.B.’s family. G.B. is having another child, and he is concerned that H.B. know her half sibling. G.B. and P.G. both complain that M.Y. is whispering in H.B.’s ear during calls, manipulating H.B. and distracting her. M.Y., for her part, claims that G.B. is inappropriate with H.B. on the phone.

[109] It is not necessary to resolve these inconsistencies for the purposes of the motion. What is clear is that M.Y. has facilitated calls with G.B., originally 3 times per week; then two times per week; now, weekly. There has been no court order as to the number or form of calls prior to this time.

[110] M.Y. attempted to introduce a letter from Dr. Peter Stenn, a treating physician with Humber River Regional Hospital, Mental Health and Addictions Outpatient Department, dated November 15, 2018. The letter was addressed to M.Y.’s lawyer, and was attached to a legal assistant’s affidavit. I did not allow this letter into evidence for the truth of its contents (relating to M.Y.’s progress, therapy, medication, and parenting ability, and including a summary of information relayed by M.Y.’s therapist), as it constitutes inadmissible hearsay and double hearsay, on key material issues, no exceptions to the hearsay rule apply, and the author was not made available for cross-examination. I similarly ruled that letters from Dr. Stenn and Dr. Liego which were sent to CCAST in the fall of 2017 were not to be relied on for the truth of their contents, but allowed them in as evidence that the letters were sent to the CCAST prior to the closing of the CCAST investigation file in December, 2017.

Assessment of G.B. and his plan

[111] G.B.’s evidence is that he was the primary caretaker of H.B. during their cohabitation. He gave evidence of singing, putting his daughter to sleep, and encouraging her development. He also speaks of his large and loving family, including two sisters, cousins, and H.B.’s grandmother.

[112] I find G.B.’s prior fraud conviction and incarceration is not relevant to his ability to parent. I do find, however, that his actions as set out in the section regarding the restraining order are relevant to his parenting ability, in particular, to his ability to support the role of M.Y. in H.B.’s life, and to put H.B.’s best interests first. Combined with his failure to commence supervised access, his threatening actions also demonstrate G.B.’s lack of insight into how his behaviour can cause H.B. harm.

[113] I have reviewed G.B.’s March 8, 2018 Form 35.1 affidavit in support of custody or access. His plan of care is to live in Midland, Ontario, although H.B. has lived all her life in Toronto. G.B. states that Y.T. will be living with him, although there is no information in any of the affidavits about Y.T. and her relationship with G.B, and no updated Form 35.1 was filed. G.B. indicates that he works full-time, building a software project, although his financial statement declares 0 income, 0 assets, and 0 expenses. His plan of care states that he would home school H.B., although in submissions he stated that now that she has commenced school, he was content that H.B. remain in school.

[114] G.B. states that he would monitor M.Y.’s “mental health/anger/violence issues”, and “make every effort to allow access when M.Y. is stable.” He would visit H.B.’s grandmother, aunts, uncles and cousins in the Quinte area, and enroll her in child centric activities such as dance, swimming and sports. He acknowledged his police record.

[115] In his affidavit of March 9, 2018, G.B. states he has not heard his daughter’s voice since December 4, 2017, although this is contradicted by the evidence of P.G. and his own later affidavit, a significant factor in evaluating his evidence as a whole.

[116] In December 2017, M.Y. offered G.B. supervised access in Toronto, with the goal to expand access. This offer was repeated in her affidavit of February 15, 2018. G.B. has never pursued supervised access.

[117] G.B. explains his failure to pursue supervised access relates to the alleged rape of H.B. while she was in CCAST care in 2014 following the assault. G.B. states that during the Plenty of Fish scam, M.Y. told the false identity that H.B. was raped while under CCAST care; that her family doctor requested a rape kit of the 11-month-old when M.Y. showed her a picture of H.B.’s diaper rash; and that the CCAST refused this request. M.Y. sent a picture of a terrible diaper rash to the false identity. G.B.’s evidence is that he only found out about the rape when he reviewed K.A.’s September 6, 2018 affidavit regarding the Plenty of Fish scam. It is important to note that there are no medical records physical support the rape allegation. As importantly, an 11-month old who has been raped will show signs of physical trauma; other than the diaper rash, there are no medical records or contemporaneous evidence of the alleged rape, and H.B. was in the care of G.B. and M.Y. for the next 3 years. M.Y.’s statement was not made under oath—it was made to a stranger on a dating site—and G.B. did not obtain the alleged record of M.Y.’s doctor suggesting a rape kit. The reasonable inference is that H.B. was not raped while in the care of CCAST when she was less than one year old.

[118] More importantly, G.B.’s stated reason for refusing supervised access is that he never wants his child to be raped, and he states in his February 15, 2019 affidavit that he refuses “to allow CAS any access to my daughter out of fear for her safety, and out of a complete mistrust in CAS and those who control that agency”. This does not explain G.B.’s refusal to attend supervised access between December 2017 and September 2018 when he first allegedly learned of the rape allegation – a period of nine months during which he exercised no in person access. His decision to forgo access without any justifiable reason, choosing instead not to see his daughter in person at all, indicates that G.B. is unable to put H.B.’s interests first, or to appreciate the best interests of H.B. to have a continuing relationship with her father.

[119] As importantly, the supervised access offer was to attend either a centre supervised by Access for Parents and Children in Ontario (APCO) or Brayden Supervision Services. APCO is a non-profit organization funded by the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario that provides supervised access to separated families. Brayden Supervision Services is privately owned. Neither is affiliated or controlled by the CCAST, or by any Children’s Aid Society. Again, the refusal to attend supervised access makes no sense.

[120] In her affidavit of December 4, 2017, M.Y. states that she has allowed H.B. to have daily phone calls with her father and when she is unable to reach him, she calls his mother, H.B.’s grandmother. There is no updating evidence regarding elimination of the calls, and no explanation by M.Y. why she chose to terminate calls with the grandmother. G.B.’s evidence is that that contact with his mother was eliminated by M.Y. in May 2018.

[121] There are some updates provided by M.Y. to G.B. in the materials, which convey information about H.B. and her development.

Other Parenting Evidence – G.B.’s Affiants

P.G.

[122] I accept P.G.’s account of the lack of video calls with H.B. in the four month period October 2018 to February 2019 and accept on this summary judgment motion that she witnessed a number of calls between G.B. and H.B. The majority of her affidavit, however, purports to provide expert evidence, which I disregard and do not admit. For example, P.G., a retired registered nurse, speaks about reading M.Y.’s psychological report from Dr. Holloway dated January, 2011 (not attached to her affidavit); states that this is probably the 50^th psychological report she has reviewed in her life; and concludes that the behaviour exhibited by M.Y. during the phone calls “is reflective of the statements made by Dr. Hollaway.” She goes on to give her opinion about various psychiatric disorders, and states that although she has never met M.Y., “my observation is that she is a very disturbed and maladjusted woman.” She refers to M.Y.’s actions as “vindictive and evil.” P.G. is not qualified as an expert in psychiatry or psychology; she did not file a Form 53 acknowledgment; any purported conclusions are not admissible in evidence.

[123] P.G. also gives hearsay evidence, based upon purportedly watching videos; this too is inadmissible. The videos are not attached to nor fully described in her affidavit, nor have they been authenticated

[124] Finally, P.G. states that she has witnessed G.B. working, and he is “paying his own way.” This is inconsistent with G.B.’s statement that he has no income and no assets.

K.A.

[125] K.A. swore two affidavits in support of G.B., the first dated February 27, 2018, and the second, the Plenty of Fish affidavit, dated September 6, 2018. K.A. states that he is retired from the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC), and met G.B. through Facebook in November 2015.

[126] K.A. purports to give expert evidence about M.Y.’s PTSD, stating that his knowledge of PTSD and the dangerous effects it can have on a person “is more advanced than most other people in the general population as I also have been diagnosed with PTSD.” K.A. is not an expert; he is not qualified to opine on PTSD and its effects on M.Y.; that information, contained in both affidavits, is not admitted and not relied on.

[127] K.A. makes a number of observations which are clearly based on belief, without explaining the source of his belief (for example: “I know that [G.B.’s] work in developing specialized models is sought by people in the military and civilian intelligence communities and G.B. is party to some very big events that take place in this world.”) I disregard all such statements. Much of his evidence is based on information provided to him by G.B.; he purports to give evidence based on what G.B. told him, and to draw conclusions about M.Y. on such basis; this is inadmissible hearsay, and improper opinion evidence, and is inadmissible.

[128] K.A. also purports to summarize e-mails and information sent to other people. For example, in para. 176 he states: “I estimate nearly 20 different people in G.B.’s life received multiple messages from M.Y. during this time; most people have deleted them or ignored them; many been saved and examined and are available to the court.” K.A. then goes on to detail the subject of the messages and the people to whom they were allegedly sent. These messages, allegedly sent to IH., M.S. and M.G. by M.Y., are not attached to the affidavit and their contents are not properly in evidence. He refers to a recording of a phone message available in the USB drive, which I suppose is the USB drive taped to the answer but not attached to his affidavit, and not authenticated, and K.A.’s conclusions have no evidentiary value.

[129] K.A. also attempts to introduce double hearsay of calls with I.H., D.S., a CCAS employee and a meeting with a nurse, in which he reports double hearsay of the nurse allegedly reporting on M.Y.’s treatment of her mother, which I also disregard.

[130] I also reject conclusions based on these hearsay conversations and K.A.’s conclusion that “after examining the evidence” he alleges that M.Y. assaulted G.B. I similarly reject his conclusions that M.Y. assaulted G.B. on May 3, 2014 based on his listening to an unauthenticated audiotape; of note, the police attended at the house, charged G.B., and G.B. pled guilty to an assault on M.Y. that day. K.A. similarly reports on other alleged assaults based on G.B.’s recounting and G.B.’s e-mails and geo-tagged photos (unauthenticated) which K.A. viewed long after the fact; I disregard this evidence.

[131] K.A. attests to meeting M.Y. and G.B. three times in person, in July 2016, April 2017 and on July 25, 2017 on a highway stop. M.Y.’s evidence is that she has met K.A. twice, once in her home in April 2017 for a few hours, and once for a 45-minute highway stop. M.Y. denies discussing her post-traumatic stress disorder or health issues with K.A., any injuries, the events of May 3, 2014 which led to G.B.’s arrest, and other matters as set out in her affidavit. Considering all the other evidence, even accepting K.A.’s account, I do not find that the statements attributed to M.Y. affect the parenting analysis. M.Y. acknowledges calling K.A. October 28, 2017 to ask him to pick G.B. up as she was afraid he would get in and hurt her, and denies that she accused G.B. of rape and murder while H.B. sat on her lap. Again, on the totality of the evidence, I find that M.Y. is a good parent.

[132] In his second affidavit, K.A. concedes that G.B. “has erupted in angered words in emails, as I have received the emails as well.”

[133] K.A. states, without foundation, as a bald allegation in an area of what is reserved to expert psychologists and psychiatrists that “I know H.B. has been negatively [a]ffected psychologically by the acts of her Mother and her lawyers.” I disregard this opinion, particularly given the very limited time K.A. has ever spent with H.B. (on his own evidence, three times in 2016-2017).

G.S.

[134] G.S. is G.B.’s sister. Her affidavit evidence is supportive of G.B. In February 2018 she states that from all observations, G.B. is H.B.’s main caregiver as M.Y. is often unwell; this is essentially a bald allegation, with no specific dates/times or concrete observations. By the time of the summary judgment, M.Y. had been the primary caregiver since October 2017. In addition, G.S. does not state how many personal visits she had with the family; M.Y.’s evidence is that G.S. had only been to their home three times for birthday parties during her entire relationship with G.B., and does not have first-hand information as to who was the primary caregiver. It is also not necessary to find who was the primary caregiver; I accept that both parents love H.B. and were providing guidance, support and care to H.B. during the relationship. G.S.’s evidence is vague and often based on information provided by G.B.

[135] Most importantly, G.S. fails to acknowledge or deal with e-mails she exchanged with M.Y. in which G.S. acknowledges G.B.’s anger issues and warns M.Y. of G.B.’s temper. In her affidavit, G.S. states that M.Y. has recurring bouts of mental illness which cause her to create havoc in the lives of others. Her contemporaneous e-mails, however, tell another story, as G.S. wrote to M.Y. as set out below:

• G.S. wrote to M.Y.: “As far as [G.B.] is concerned M.Y., I believe some people are happy as being miserable. You look at them cross side and he has a fit… You disagree with him and he has a fit… If he doesn’t get his own way he has a fit… These kinds of people you can’t please no matter how hard you try so I would just get on with your life with the kids and let him wallow in his misery.” (December 2016)

• G.S. wrote to M.Y.: “Just be careful!! Don’t fight with him! Stay out of his way. You don’t want to get in a fight and get the CCAS involved. That could be disastrous for the children.” (December 2016)

• On July 5, 2017, G.S. and M.Y. exchanged troubling emails. M.Y. described that “G.B. is in his mood again. The kids saw him throw a cup of coffee at the front door in anger. He splashed his urine on the bedroom window. Now he broke the door. The kids screamed in terror… G.B. is angry and I don’t feel safe if he comes in the door.” M.Y. wrote: “I am scared to let him in the house because he is violent now. A.Y. is terribly distressed. I had to squeeze him so that he felt safe. No one should see a door being attacked to break it down in violence.” G.S. responded by stating: “just stay away from him and keep your cool. Don’t antagonize him or it will make it worse. …M.Y. this is why I keep my distance from [G.B.]. Do I love him? Yes. He is my brother and the love I have for my family is indestructible. But in all honesty I have to say that there are many times that I don’t like him. I don’t like the way he treats people who dare to disagree with him. He is a bully at times.… He is moody and I don’t need that.… That is why I keep my distance to him.”

• On July 26, 2017 G.S. sent an email stating: “as a rule when someone dares to disagree with [G.B.] it puts him in a very foul, vengeful mood. Since you are the only one there, please be careful as I do not want you to be the person he takes his anger out on. He can be like that. I find it really strange that he does not want H.B. to hear mom talked about the pain she is in but it is okay for H.B. to witness the fights and fist going through the doors and the gouging. His anger is not that he does not want H.B. to hear mom talked of paying… His anger is that mom chose to disagree with his choice of medicine. M.Y. just be very quiet and let him get his self out of his mood… for the sake of peace in your family.

[136] Because of her failure to grapple with these difficult emails, in which G.S. clearly acknowledges that G.B. has anger issues, has foul and vengeful moods, and is a bully, and M.Y. had confided that G.B. broke down the door with an axe, the failure to acknowledge this in any way undermines the reliability of the evidence contained in G.S.’s affidavit and I place no weight on it.

G.N.

[137] G.N. is G.B.’s sister. She deposes to knowing G.B.’s previous wife and living with that family for over half a year and deposing to no violence or abuse in that family. She refers to M.Y.’s recurring episodes of which she was aware that cause her to act out and create havoc in the lives of others. G.N. does not however provide any dates or provide any specific examples, merely conclusory statements, nor does she establish how she is aware of these episodes. She refers to M.Y. sending her hateful and disturbing messages but does not attach those messages.

[138] G.N. baldly states, “I don’t believe G.B. has ever abused M.Y.” However, she does not deal with the December 2017 e-mail sent by G.B. to G.N., in which G.B. tells G.N. “if she touches me again I am going to kill that insane cunt dead”, and “if she touches me again I will fucking kill her.” These are clearly very abusive words and G.N.’s failure to deal with those threats, making statements solely in support of G.B., bald allegations with no detail, combined with the natural love and affection of a sister, leads me to place no weight on G.N.’s affidavit.

M.S.

[139] M.S. met G.B. in 2015 on Facebook; they have never met in person and have a Facetime relationship. Like many of the affiants, he speaks of G.B.’s Facebook postings about H.B., and positive Facetime interactions with G.B. and H.B. M.S. states that he has never met M.Y. and M.Y. states she has never met M.S., although she acknowledges some Facetime. I do not find that the affidavit provides any useful evidence regarding M.Y. given the scant contact, and it is primarily based on information provided by G.B.

F.B.

[140] F.B. is G.B.’s mother and H.B.’s grandmother. Her evidence is that she has not spoken to H.B. since early December 2017, as M.Y. has denied all communication.

[141] Some of her evidence relates to very early years prior to H.B.’s birth, where F.B. recounts some public scenes involving M.Y., but so stale-dated as to not be useful.

[142] After H.B. was born and the family moved to Toronto, F.B. remained in Trenton and then Brighton, but had Facetime with the family. She gives evidence of M.Y.’s tantrums, and gives hearsay evidence based on what G.B. told her with respect to alleged assaults by M.Y. on G.B. She states that M.Y. was coaching H.B. on the telephone. She gives her opinion that leaving H.B. in M.Y.’s home without G.B. there to protect her is extremely dangerous to H.B. and M.Y. Given the vagueness and lack of detail of any alleged incidents in more recent years, I do not find this affidavit helpful, although I accept F.B.’s evidence that she has not been in communication with her granddaughter since December, 2017, and that she loves and misses her granddaughter.

M.G.

[143] M.G. gave evidence as a friend of G.B.’s; she states they met online nine years ago. She states she met M.Y. on one occasion in September 2016; M.Y. agrees they met for approximately 10 minutes in September 2016. M.G. attached some messages from M.Y. on Vleepo, a social media platform, which were generally odd and in which M.Y. was reciting G.B.’s history of violence and abuse. M.Y. acknowledges that in the fall of 2017 she sent e-mails to G.B.’s friends and family, describing some of G.B.’s abusive behaviours, begging them for help, and asking them if they would let G.B. live with them. She states she had made the decision that she could not continue in the abusive relationship but wanted G.B. to have somewhere to stay when he left M.Y.’s home. She says that in hindsight these communications may have appeared strange or inappropriate, but she was trying to free herself from the abusive relationship and was scared if she involved the police, the children might be taken from her care.

[144] The remainder of her affidavit is completely based on what G.B. told her, and that is not helpful to my determination. She states that she submitted a letter to CCAS on December 3, 2017 documenting the messages and her concerns based on what G.B. told her, although that letter is not attached to her affidavit.

I.H.

[145] I.H. met G.B. online; she states she met G.B. and M.Y. in person on one occasion in 2015, and she and G.B. have worked together online. I.H.’s affidavit attaches an e-mail from M.Y. dated September 6, 2017 which is consistent with M.Y.’s account of G.B. as abusive. Given the attenuated nature of the relationship, I place no weight on the affidavit.

K.H.

[146] K.H. describes himself as G.B.’s best friend. He and G.B. did not speak between November 2016 and the time he learned that G.B. and M.Y. had split up. He states that he visited G.B. and M.Y. many times, including by FaceTime. Much of his evidence involves bald allegations without detail, inappropriate comments on M.Y.’s psychiatric state, and information lacking evidentiary basis or clearly based on what has been told to him. I do not find it particularly helpful given that.

M.N.

[147] M.N. has known G.B. since they attended university together in 1990. She has not met M.Y. but has spoken on the phone with M.Y. She has viewed G.B.’s Facebook postings. Her affidavit is not useful.

V.L.

[148] V.L. states that she met G.B. and H.B. in person one day in 2016, but otherwise they have a Facetime relationship. V.L. has never met or spoken to M.Y. She did receive messages from M.Y. on October 28, 2017 saying that G.B. was going to kill her and asking her to take G.B. away. Otherwise her statements about M.Y.’s mental health and G.B.’s role in the family lack an adequate evidentiary foundation.

Others

[149] G.B. has included an affidavit of G.T. which was sworn five years ago in the CCAST proceeding in 2014 and not in this proceeding. I place no weight on this affidavit, which essentially states that both G.B. and M.Y. are good parents. G.B. has included a report from a psychologist, Betty Kershner, prepared in 2014 for the CCAS protection proceeding. There is no Form 53 acknowledgement of expert provided, it was prepared for another proceeding five years ago, it relies on information not provided (Affidavit of O.G., Child Protection Worker, May 9, 2014), and I place no weight on it. G.B. includes what purports to be a report (labelled “Second draft – for review by client), unsigned, by Dr. Robin Holloway; this is not an expert report under the Rules, there is no expert acknowledgment, the author was not available for cross-examination, it is 8 years old, and it is not admissible into evidence. I have similar concerns with the affidavit of Dr. Cara Brown, prepared in the 2014 CCAST child protection proceedings, and do not admit nor rely on this evidence.

Best Interests Analysis: Maximum Contact and Joint Custody

[150] This is a case to be determined under the CLRA; the maximum contact principle is expressed through best interest analysis. The Court of Appeal held in Lemon v. Lemon, 2018 ONCA 684 para. 35:

The CLRA’s best interests analysis already contemplates the importance of the parental bond and maximum contact through the best interests lens. That is, s. 24(2) of the CLRA explicitly requires the court to consider familial relationships – s. 24(2)(h) – as well as love, affection and emotional ties – s. 24(2)(a) - in making custody and access orders that are in the children’s best interests.

[151] The courts accept that generally, the best interests of the child are fostered by ensuring the child has a loving relationship with both parents – this is the essence of the maximum contact principle. Both G.B. and M.Y. love their daughter. Thus, I consider each parent’s willingness to facilitate contact with the other parent under the best interests analysis.

[152] I agree with Chappell. J. in Jackson v. Jackson, 2017 ONSC 1566, at para. 59:

Quite apart from the terms of section 16(10) of the Divorce Act, it is a well-established principle that the best interests of the child are generally fostered by ensuring that children have a loving relationship with both parents, and that such a relationship should only be interfered with in demonstrated circumstances of danger to the child's physical, emotional or mental well-being…. If one parent does not facilitate a child's relationship with the other parent, or improperly undermines that relationship, this will be an important consideration in determining their ability to meet the child’s needs…. (emphasis added; internal citations omitted)

[153] Justice Chappell in Jackson v. Jackson 2017 ONSC 1566 at para. 65 has set out the following principles governing joint custody (some internal citations omitted):

These can be summarized as follows:

1. There is no default position in favour of joint custody. Each case is fact-based and discretion-driven.

2. Joint custody should only be considered as an option if both parents are fit parents and able to meet the general needs of the children. This is a threshold issue before the court considers the question of whether the parties are able to effectively communicate on issues relating to the children.

3. The quality of past parenting and decision-making, both during the parties’ relationship and post-separation, is a critical factor in determining whether joint custody is appropriate.

4. However, the mere fact that both parents acknowledge that the other is a “fit” parent does not mean that it is in the best interests of the child for a joint custody order to issue. The decision regarding the appropriate decision-making arrangement must take into consideration all factors relevant to the child’s best interests.

5. Although some measure of communication and cooperation between the parties is necessary to support a joint custody order, the court is not required to apply a standard of perfection in assessing the parents’ ability to work together. As Quinn, J. remarked in Brook v. Brook, 2006 CanLII 12294 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 1514 (Ont. S.C.J.), “the cooperation needed is workable, not blissful; adequate, not perfect.”

6. The fact that one party insists that the parties are unable to communicate with each other is not in and of itself sufficient to rule out the possibility of a joint custody order. The court must carefully consider the parties’ past and current parenting relationship and reach its own conclusions respecting the parties’ ability to communicate, rather than simply relying on allegations of conflict by one or both of the parties …The existence of conflict and strife between the parties from time to time, and at the time of trial, will not necessarily preclude the court from making an order for joint custody. The question to be determined is whether the nature, extent and frequency of the conflict between the parties is such that it is impacting or likely to impact on the well-being of the children. If the evidence indicates that the parties, despite their conflict with each other, have been able to shelter the child from the conflict reasonably well and put the child’s interests ahead of their own when necessary, an order for joint custody may be appropriate… The question for the court to determine is “whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis”

7. Where an objective review of the historical and more recent evidence clearly indicates that there has never been an ability to cooperate or communicate effectively, or that one or both of the parties is/are unable to put the needs of the child before their own, joint custody is not an appropriate order … In these circumstances, hoping that communication between the parties will improve once the litigation is over does not provide a sufficient basis for making an order of joint custody…There must be a clear evidentiary basis for believing that joint custody would be feasible….

8. In cases involving very young children, the court must take into consideration the fact that the child is unable to easily communicate their physical, emotional, developmental and other needs. Accordingly, the need for effective communication between the parties in a joint custodial arrangement will be particularly pressing in such circumstances…

9. The wishes of the child will also be relevant to the decision respecting the appropriate custodial disposition in cases involving older children. Although a child’s wishes in such circumstances do not necessarily synchronize perfectly with the child’s best interests, “the older the child, the more an order as to custody requires the co-operation of the child and consideration of the child’s wishes” …

10. Evidence as to how an interim custody and access order has worked, and in particular, whether the parties have been able to set aside their personal differences and work together in the best interests of the child, will be highly relevant to the ultimate decision regarding the appropriate custodial regime.

11. In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. The Ontario Court of Appeal has clearly stated that one parent cannot create conflict and problems with the other parent by engaging in unreasonable conduct, impeding access, marginalizing the other parent, or by any other means and then justify a claim for sole custody in their favour on the basis of lack of cooperation and communication …Where the parties are both competent and loving parents, but one of them is the major source of the conflict, this factor may support an order for sole custody in favour of the other party…

12. There has been an increasing willingness in recent years to order joint custody rather than sole custody where such an order is considered necessary to preserve the balance of power between the parties, particularly in cases where both parties are caring and competent parents but one party has been primarily responsible for the conflict between the parties.

[154] An objective review of the evidence clearly indicates that G.B. and M.Y. cannot communicate, primarily because of G.B.’s aggressive, angry and inappropriate post-separation campaign to attack M.Y. by any means possible. Considering his obvious anger directed to M.Y., I do not believe it appropriate to require any level of direct communication between the two parties. I acknowledge that both are loving parents, and I infer from the fact that the CCAS returned H.B. to the care of both parents in 2014 that both M.Y. and G.B. are competent parents. M.Y. been co-parenting her older son with her former husband for 7 years and except for the five-month period immediately following the assault by G.B. on M.Y., that co-parenting relationship has continued.

[155] A thorough review of G.B.’s affidavits indicates his anger, aggressiveness, and what I see as threats or perceived threats against an astonishing number of people involved in this matter, including those supporting M.Y. (such as lawyers and therapists), and those involved in the justice system (such as the CCAST, crown prosecutors, and members of the judiciary).

[156] As set out above with key points summarized below, I make the following findings:

(a) Each parent has love and affection for H.B. However, the emotional ties with M.Y. are more consistent and developed given that she has been the sole caregiver since November 2017. G.B. has chosen not to pursue the offer of supervised access and so has not spent time in person with H.B. since November 2017;

(b) There is a high level of conflict between the parties which has not declined post-separation. Indeed, G.B. has taken numerous actions which fan the flames of conflict. He has been physically abusive in the past. He is verbally aggressive and abusive to M.Y., and to those who he perceives to be supporting M.Y. G.B. is unable to accept any opinion or judgment which does not accord with his beliefs about the case and reacts in negative and threatening ways to obtain what he thinks is the proper disposition;

(c) Because of the conflict, which is attributable now to G.B., the parties are not able to make decisions together jointly, and cannot communicate or discuss parenting issues;

(d) G.B. focusses on himself and his interests; he does not focus on H.B. and what she needs, or the impact of his actions on H.B., including the impact of his verbal abuse and social media/internet attacks on M.Y. By contrast, M.Y.’s evidence focusses on H.B.;

(e) M.Y. has a well-founded fear of G.B.’s anger and threats, which undermines her sense of physical and psychological safety;

(f) G.B. has not demonstrated insight into the impact of the conflict and his behaviour and choices on H.B.;

(g) There is no evidence that suggests the conflict between the parents can be resolved. All evidence is to the contrary, particularly given G.B.’s statements that the only outcome he will accept is equal access and joint custody or “otherwise this will never end between M.Y. and I…No matter what the court decides,” and his statements that he has “no faith, confidence, and very little or any respect” for the court, and he will “refuse to accept any court order” that does not accord with his views;

(h) M.Y. has been H.B.’s sole caregiver since November 2017, has arranged school and extracurricular and social activities for H.B., and H.B. is doing well, as set out in her report cards;

(i) M.Y. has provided a stable home environment for H.B., and is able to provide H.B. with guidance, education and the necessaries of life. It is in H.B.’s best interests to continue this familiar, stable environment;

(j) H.B. has lived in Toronto since birth and has many cousins and family in Toronto as well as friends and a school community;

(k) G.B. has not adequately explained why he has moved to Midland, nor why he needs to remain in Midland. To the extent that the move creates access difficulties, these are of his own making;

(l) G.B. has had limited contact with H.B. since separation, and has not exercised in-person access since the fall of 2017 despite M.Y.’s offer. His reasons for not exercising in-person supervised access do not make sense and most importantly, are not in accordance with H.B.’s best interests;

(m) M.Y. has diligently pursued therapy and medication since 2014. Other than attending an anger course at the time of his assault conviction in 2014, G.B. has not pursued courses or counselling to deal with his obvious anger issues;

(n) There is no communication between the parties. At this point, a restraining order prevents it. The mother is fearful of G.B., and G.B.’s behaviour is so concerning that a restraining order was granted in December, 2017 and has continued since that date;

(o) The father has demonstrated a lack of responsibility towards H.B. G.B. has not voluntarily paid a cent of child support and has not obtained a paying job to obtain money to pay child support; this is important, since child support is the right of the child.

[157] G.B. is unable to put H.B.’s needs first. It is important that H.B. be protected on the internet, and also that her mother is protected from internet attacks. As H.B. gets older and googles her name and her mother’s name, as children do, she will be exposed to a level of malevolence that is shocking, and has the potential to destabilize H.B.; G.B. must rise above his anger at M.Y. to put protection of H.B. first.

[158] In his written submissions, G.B. takes the position that “this matter must proceed to trial so that H.B.’s rights may best be addressed after witnesses, evidence and psychological reports are examined in court.” This was the opportunity for G.B. to put his best foot forward, to introduce admissible evidence on all issues. For all the reasons set out in this decision, having reviewed the admissible evidence, I find that there is no genuine issue regarding trial relating to parenting. I find on all the evidence that there is no issue requiring a trial on the permanent restraining order or on joint custody. These two parents cannot put aside their differences and work together in the best interests of H.B. There are simply no facts that would support an order of joint custody, in part due to G.B.’s continued threats. On the evidence before me, joint decision-making will lead to continued conflict, and inappropriate attempts to exert control which are a significant concern. Based on the evidence and having regard to the factors set out in the CLRA, I find that sole custody to M.Y. is the only order that is in the best interests of the child, and a trial is not required on issues relating to custody. Similarly, I find that there is no issue requiring a trial in terms of access. G.B. has failed to avail himself of the opportunities for supervised access. He has not seen H.B. in person for almost two years. It is essential to attempt to reconnect, but it will have to be a gradual reconnection. Given all of the evidence, and concerns re how G.B. communicates to H.B. given the threats and statements about H.B.’s mother, and evidence of inappropriate, non-child-focused statements to H.B. on video calls, a period of supervised access is critical.

[159] Given G.B.’s post-separation actions, I must carefully consider how G.B. can be more effectively involved in H.B.’s life. G.B. needs to make meaningful changes that will allow him to spend time with H.B. These changes include:

1. Ceasing to threaten M.Y. and those who support her, including threats to post on the internet details of M.Y.’s life, mental health, or actions;

2. Not posting negative comments about M.Y. or her family on social media;

3. Not surveilling M.Y. on social media;

4. Getting a job that will enable him to pay child support, and to pay for supervised access as required;

5. Learning how to manage his anger and vindictiveness, in order to reduce parental conflict, so that H.B. understands from each parent that she is supported in her relationship with the other parent, and so that the parents may each engage fully in H.B.’s upbringing.

6. Attending at supervised access, so that H.B. may have her right to access respected by G.B.

[160] M.Y. seeks orders that G.B. undergo a psychiatric assessment and anger counselling. I am of the view that the court has jurisdiction to make a therapeutic order pursuant to section 28(1)(b) and (c) of the CLRA, for the reasons set out by Justice Audet in Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, 2018 ONSC 5983. I do not have an evidentiary foundation for an order for a psychiatric assessment. However, there is significant evidence about G.B.’s anger issues, as reflected in the reasons for a permanent restraining order.

[161] In order to ensure that G.B. deals with his anger issues, and to determine the effect of that anger on H.B., G.B. is required to engage in psychiatric or psychological counselling for a period of at least 12 hour-long sessions, to address his anger and aggression. G.B. is to provide a copy of this decision and a complete record of his criminal convictions to the psychiatrist/psychologist. G.B. shall sign a release to permit the psychologist/ psychiatrist to speak to M.Y. and/or her lawyer, at the discretion of the psychologist/psychiatrist. The psychiatrist/psychologist must provide written confirmation to M.Y.’s lawyer that he/she has received this decision, the criminal record, and the signed release, and confirmation that he/she is regulated as a member of the relevant College pursuant to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c 18. Upon completion, the professional must provide M.Y.’s lawyers with a confirmation that G.B. has completed at least 12 one- hour-long sessions and that supervised access and video phone calls do not pose a risk to the child.

Child Support

[162] M.Y. has claimed for child support. Under section 21(2) of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, G.B. is obligated to disclose financial information necessary to determine his income for the purposes of calculating child support. G.B. is also required under the Family Law Rules to provide financial disclosure including a sworn financial statement that accurately sets out his assets and income. G.B. has sworn one financial statement, dated March 9, 2018, in which he claims 0 income, 0 assets and 0 expenses. Every item on the financial statement is 0. It is unclear how he meets his basic needs. He claims to be self-employed with a business named Andley Engineering. He has provided no Notices of Assessment or income information, nor an updated financial statement prior to the summary judgment motion as required by the Family Law Rules.

[163] G.B. states in his February 15, 2019 affidavit that he has “gifted the CureBreastCancer Project and software model” to a foundation; it is not clear why he would gift something of value when he has not paid child support. He similarly claims that he has been involved in philanthropy. However, paid work to ensure child support is paid has precedence over unpaid philanthropic work. G.B. claims he has a written proposal for $4.5 million in production investment for his FanBase software project but did not provide the written proposal as an exhibit. In his affidavit of September 6, 2018, G.B. states that: “ have appreciated a benefactory relationship of our project partners who have taken care of my financial needs”, and “Benefactors take care of my expenses while I work. Were I to need money to assist me in taking care of H.B. it would be available to me -or- like many parents I can apply for social assistance.” He states that “I am existing on a benefactory relationship with my project partners but I have ample resources available to me should I need to support H.B. here at my home.” It is unclear how G.B. has “ample resources” available to look after H.B. at home, but no resources to pay child support.

[164] G.B. has provided no disclosure of the amounts of money he is been provided by his “partners.”. On his financial statement, he has not disclosed his expenses and the money he has received for assistance with those expenses, and he has not declared financial support from his benefactors as income. As noted, G.B. has not paid any child support for the maintenance of H.B. in M.Y.’s home. He states that he has a five-year lease on a beautiful waterfront home which has been exchanged for a small percentage of an ongoing software project but has not disclosed the value of that transaction nor the lease in his financial disclosure.

[165] G.B. states in his written submissions that in March 2018, Justice Hood ordered that no support would be ordered by the court, the request for child support was denied by Justice Hood, and so the matter is res judicata. I have reviewed the endorsement of Justice Hood. There is no mention there of a final order on child support. He was dealing with a motion for a temporary restraining order.

[166] Given the lack of financial disclosure, and the reasonable fear by M.Y. that to pursue financial disclosure and child support at this time would lead G.B. to react vindictively to the detriment of the family, I grant M.Y.’s request to reserve M.Y.’s right to review child support and retroactively analyse what G.B.’s contribution should have been, once she has proper disclosure. Given the extreme and continued threats and harassment of M.Y. and people associated with her, the child support aspect of this motion is adjourned, sine die, preserving M.Y.’s right to review the issue of child support.

[167] M.Y. seeks a variety of additional relief. Most of this relief is appropriate given the restraining order and the parenting arrangements and is set out in the order below.

COSTS

[168] M.Y. has been successful and is entitled to her costs of this motion. M.Y. is to provide her Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle, plus up to three pages addressing costs, by September 4^th. G.B. is to respond, subject to the same limits, by September 18^th; if reply is necessary, M.Y. is to provide reply by September 24^th.

ORDER

[169] Order to go as follows, anonymized for the purposes of publication:

1. The mother’s summary judgment motion is granted.

2. A permanent restraining order pursuant to section 46 of the Family Law Act shall issue providing that except during scheduled access times, the Respondent shall be restrained from directly contacting, threatening, intimidating, molesting, harassing, annoying or causing a third party to contact, threaten, intimidate, molest, harass or annoy the Applicant, her daughter or her son as follows:

(a) The Respondent shall not telephone or communicate with the Applicant directly or indirectly for any purpose, (i) except through his sisters, G.N. or G.S., for the purpose of arranging access or communicate about the child H.B., and (ii) through her counsel for litigation-related purposes.

(b) The Respondent shall not come within 500 metres of the Applicant’s home or anywhere that the Applicant or H.B. or A.Y. happen to be, save and except for such access with H.B. as is ordered by the court or agreed between the parties.

(c) The Respondent shall not come within 500 metres of A.Y.’s home with his father;

(d) The Respondent shall not come within 500 metres of or make contact with any official at A.Y.’s or H.B.’s school, day care facilities, or anyone providing the children with extra-curricular activities;

(e) The Respondent shall not threaten, intimidate, molest, harass or annoy Lenkinski Law, counsel for the Applicant, any of its lawyers or any of its employees.

3. The 25G restraining order of Justice Paisley shall be turned into a final order, except that in paragraph 1(a), access to H.B. is to be arranged through G.N. and G.S. rather than through counsel.

4. The mother shall have sole custody of H.B., and H.B.’s primary residence will be with her mother.

5. The father shall forthwith remove any public posts, videos, documents or messages that he has made about the Applicant, her family members, her children or the issues before the court, on any public internet site.

6. The father shall not post anything involving the Applicant, her family members, her children or the issues before the court, on any public internet site.

7. Within 14 days of this Order, the father shall return to the mother all hard drives containing the mother’s personal information, including documents, video and audio recordings, by couriering them to the mother’s lawyer in protective packaging. The father shall provide the mother’s counsel with the courier details within two days of sending them.

8. The father shall destroy any copies he has made, whether stored by him, uploaded to the internet, or given by him to third parties, of any documents, videos or audio recordings, or any other items from the mother’s hard drives, and shall retrieve and destroy all such materials and information provided by him to all third parties.

9. The mother has leave to travel with H.B. outside Ontario or Canada without the prior consent or authorization of the father.

10. The father shall not remove H.B. from the City of Toronto, Province of Ontario except with the written agreement of the mother.

11. The mother may apply for a Canadian passport for H.B. including any renewal passport, and the consent of the father for the issuance of such a passport is dispensed with.

12. The father shall have supervised access with H.B. on the following basis, until further written agreement between the parties or court order:

(a) The father shall have bi-weekly access with H.B. in Toronto, for two hours a week, at a supervised access centre run by Access for Parents and Children in Ontario (“APCO”), at either of the two listed below, the site and the time to be chosen by G.B. subject to the mother’s choice as to whether it is to be a week when she has parenting time with her son, and once chosen the location, time and day will remain the same for each visit:

(i) The Albion site at Albion and Kipling on Sunday commencing at 10 am or thereafter; or

(ii) The Falstaff site at Jane and Wilson, on Saturday or Sunday commencing at 10 am or thereafter.

(b) The mother shall transport H.B. to the access centre at the time of visitation and pick her up after the visitation.

(c) The father shall refrain from making any comments about the mother, her family, these proceedings or this order during the access visits and his behaviour shall always remain child focused and appropriate.

(d) The father shall be responsible for all costs associated with the use of the APCO visitation centre.

(e) The party requesting copies of the access reports shall be responsible for payment for the reports.

13. G.B. is required to engage in psychiatric or psychological counselling for a period of at least 12 hour-long sessions, to address his anger and aggression. G.B. is to provide a copy of this decision and a complete record of his criminal convictions to the psychiatrist/psychologist. G.B. shall sign a release to permit the psychologist/ psychiatrist to speak to M.Y. and/or her lawyer, at the discretion of the psychologist/psychiatrist. The psychiatrist/psychologist must provide written confirmation to M.Y.’s lawyer that he/she has received this decision, the criminal record, and the signed release, and confirmation that he/she is regulated as a member of the relevant College pursuant to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c 18. Upon completion, the professional must provide M.Y.’s lawyers with a confirmation that G.B. has completed at least 12 one-hour-long sessions and supervised access and video phone calls do not pose a risk to the child.

14. Once the mother’s lawyers have received the confirmation of completion of counselling, and the father has complied with paras. 5-8 of this Order, then weekly video access shall commence, at a date and time to be chosen by the mother to accommodate the child’s school, extracurricular and sleep schedule. The father’s video access may include the child’s grandmother and members of the father’s family.

15. G.B. may not bring any motion to change or commence any proceedings to have access with H.B. until he has completed at least 12 bi-weekly supervised access visits as set out in paragraph 11, provides the court with the access reports, has completed the counselling set out in paragraph 12, and has complied with paras. 5-8 of this Order.

16. The mother’s vexatious litigant motion is adjourned, to be brought back on 21 days notice, before me if I am available.

17. The mother’s right to claim child support both retroactively and prospectively is specifically preserved, and she has the right to seek child support and seek a determination of the father’s income in the future.

18. The father shall pay the outstanding costs of the motion before Hood, J. in the amount of $7,642.00, plus interest, by September 21, 2019.

19. M.Y. is to provide her Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle, plus up to three pages addressing costs, by September 4th. G.B. is to respond, subject to the same limits, by September 18th; if reply is necessary, M.Y. is to provide a reply by September 24th.

Kristjanson J.

Date: August 21, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: FS-17-21897

DATE: 20190821

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

M.Y. Applicant

– and –

G.B. Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Kristjanson J.

Released: August 21, 2019