Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FC-15-2367 Date: 2019 07 17 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Odette Marcia Brissett, Applicant And: Thomas Michael David Coughlan, Respondent

Counsel: Altynay Teshebaeva, for the Applicant Megan Fife, for the Respondent

Heard: November 26,27,28,29,30, 2018

Reasons for Decision

D. Summers J.

Introduction

[1] This case is about the child, Leah, and her best interests. She was 3 years old at the time of trial. Her parents never lived together. According to the Applicant mother, Ms. Brissett, it is in Leah’s best interest to be in her sole custody and primary care. Child support is requested. That is the relief sought in her pleadings. At trial, she also argued for supervised access, a restraining order and permission to travel with the child outside of the country without the father’s consent or notice to him. Ms. Brissett brings her claims under the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, as am. (CLRA) and the Family Law Act, R.S.O, 1990 c. F.3, as am. (FLA).

[2] Mr. Coughlan opposes the application. He sought joint custody in his Answer but did not specify the particular parenting schedule he was seeking. At trial, he argued for sole custody with the child ultimately having her primary residence with him once she was school age. Until then, he proposed an equal time-sharing schedule on a two-week, two-week rotation and detailed ancillary parenting terms.

[3] Neither party had counsel of record when they filed their pleadings. Over the course of the litigation, there were times when each was represented by counsel and there were times when they each argued on their own behalf. On the first day of trial, Ms. Brissett represented herself. Thereafter, she had counsel.

[4] Neither party amended their pleadings, sought to do so, or raised any objection to the relief pursued during trial. Mr Coughlan stated the change in his position during his opening statement. Ms. Brissett made no comment until closing argument. I will decide the issues as they were argued before me.

The Issues

[5] The issues to be determined are:

1. Is it in the child’s best interests to be in the sole custody of the mother or the father? Should access be supervised or parenting time split equally?
2. Is the father in arrears of his child support obligation?
3. Should there be a retroactive adjustment in child support in accordance with the father’s income?
4. Is a restraining order against the father warranted?

Background

[6] The parties had an on again, off again relationship over 2 years or so. They did not live together. The relationship ended before Ms. Brissett learned she was pregnant.

[7] For a short time, the parties discussed how they might move forward as a family. Approximately a month before the child’s birth, they decided to remain apart.

[8] Leah Marie Coughlan was born September 12, 2015. From the beginning, Mr. Coughlan has struggled to have his access respected.

[9] Leah has been in her mother’s primary caregiver since birth. The father attended some prenatal appointments and stayed at the hospital for two days after Leah’s birth until mother and child were discharged. The parties’ ability to parent together quickly descended into conflict. The police have been involved on several occasions. No charges were ever laid. The Ottawa Children’s Aid Society investigated twice and took no further steps.

[10] Neither party has other children.

[11] Ms. Brissett was 24 years old at the time of trial. Her date of birth is April 16, 1994. She graduated from college in 2014 with a diploma in Early Childhood Education. It was not clear from her testimony whether she ever worked in that capacity. At the time of trial, she was unemployed and in receipt of social assistance. Her most recent position terminated in May 2018 when her probation period expired. She said she planned to look for a job once the trial was over. She claimed she had been too busy with the litigation to work.

[12] Mr. Coughlan was 28 years old at the time of trial. His date of birth is May 1, 1990. He has been a member of the Canadian Armed Forces since 2007. He is stationed Petawawa and shares his home there with his mother.

[13] Ms. Brissett owns a home in Ottawa. Sometime between October 21 and November 2, 2018, she left with Leah for Toronto. She did not notify Mr. Coughlan, provide him with an address, facilitate access or say whether she planned to return to Ottawa.

[14] By the time the trial commenced at the end of November 2018, it had been 6 weeks since Mr. Coughlan had seen Leah.

[15] At the conclusion of the trial, I made a temporary order directing Ms. Brissett to comply with the order of Justice P. Roger dated April 5, 2018 and make the child available the next morning at her address in Ottawa for access that weekend. Failing compliance with my order and Justice Roger’s order, I provided that the party not in breach could seek my assistance within 7 days of the alleged breach. My order further directed that Ms. Brissett immediately provide the father with the address where the child had been living in Toronto and that her passport and Leah’s passport be deposited with Mr. Coughlan’s lawyer. The parties were prohibited from removing Leah from Ottawa except for the purpose of Mr. Coughlan’s access.

Litigation History

[16] Leah was just 6 weeks old when Ms. Brissett commenced this application on October 30, 2015. There have been multiple court appearances since then. The substantive events and orders are described below.

April 5, 2016

[17] At the case conference on April 5, 2016, Master C. MacLeod, now Justice C. MacLeod, made a temporary without prejudice order, on consent, that Ms. Brissett have primary care and control of the child. Mr. Coughlan’s access was to take place in Ottawa, at times and locations agreed to by the parties. Child support of $500 per month was ordered without prejudice to retroactive adjustment. The amount was acknowledged to be less than provided in the Child Support Guidelines based on Mr. Coughlan’s income of $57,000. The reasons noted that the father had additional access related travel expenses. Ms. Brissett was ordered to provide the father with a copy of Leah’s birth certificate and OHIP card.

October 25, 2016

[18] On October 25, 2016, Justice Shelston determined Mr. Coughlan’s motion for access. His order provided for a gradually increasing access schedule on Saturdays starting with 2 hours effective October 29, 2016. On December 5, 2016, the access ordered increased to 4 hours and effective January 7, 2017, it increased again to 6 hours. On consent, the pickup and drop off was to take place at the supervised access centre. Mr. Coughlan’s cousin, Joanna Begin, was the designated person to do the pickup and drop off at an agreed location in Ottawa pending the involvement of the supervised access facility. Justice Shelston granted permission to the parties to come back to court on the issue of access after February 1, 2017. The order acknowledged receipt of child support payment that day of $2,250 day and declared that when added to amounts already paid, there were no arrears owing under Master MacLeod’s order for the period between May and October 2016.

January 5, 2017

[19] On January 5, 2017, Ms. Brissett appeared in procedural motions court without notice to Mr. Coughlan seeking permission to bring an urgent motion on the issue of access. Her motion was adjourned for service. She does not appear to have taken any further steps.

March 28, 2017

[20] The parties were next in court on March 28, 2017 on Mr. Coughlan’s motion for increased access. Ms. Brissett sought an adjournment to retain another lawyer. Justice T. Engelking granted the adjournment on terms and ordered access to Mr. Coughlan from Friday, March 31, 2017 at 9:00 AM until Saturday, April 1, 2017 at 3:45 PM and on June 10 for 6 hours again. He was anticipating a five-week deployment to Wainright, Alberta effective April 2 and was anxious to see Leah before leaving. Engelking J. further ordered that Mr. Coughlan would have access following his return from Wainright every weekend from Saturday at 9:00 AM until Sunday at 5:00 PM, effective June 17, 2017, pending the return of the motion. The order permitted to exercise access at his home in Petawawa. Otherwise, the parties were not to remove Leah from Ottawa.

August 8, 2017

[21] On August 8, 2017, the motion returned before Engelking J. for full argument. She ordered that Ms. Brissett would have temporary primary care of Leah and Mr. Coughlan would have access three weekends each month commencing August 12, 2017. Access weekends were defined as Saturday morning at 9:00 AM until Monday morning at daycare if Mr. Coughlan could make those arrangements with his employer. Otherwise, access ended Sunday at 6:00 PM at the Supervised Access Exchange. Christmas, March Break, Easter and Thanksgiving were to be shared equally, as agreed by the parties. Ms. Brissett was ordered to sign consents allowing Mr. Coughlan to communicate with Leah’s service providers including her doctors and daycare. Communication between the parties was to occur via text, email or a communication book that would travel with the child. Justice Engelking also addressed child support for the period between October 1, 2015 and April 30, 2016. She fixed arrears [sic] at $3,500 and held that no further support was owing for 2016 or 2017 up to August 31, 2017. Effective September 1, 2017, Mr. Coughlan was ordered to pay $603.00 each month based on his annual income of $65,978. He continues to pay that amount.

November 24, 2017

[22] The issue of access came back to Justice Engelking for a third time on November 24, 2017. The parties could not agree on how to implement her order of access three weekends each month. They reached agreement and signed Minutes of Settlement specifying that access would occur on the first three weekends of each month from Saturday at 9:00 AM until Sunday at 6:00 PM, or Monday if it fell on a long weekend. Pick up and drop off was to take place at Ms. Brissett’s home and either Ms. Brissett or her mother, Ms. Marcia Brissett, would facilitate.

March 20, 2018

[23] On this day, Ms. Brissett brought an urgent without notice motion for the return of the child. Justice J. Audet granted the order and suspended Mr. Coughlan’s access pending the return of the motion.

April 5, 2018

[24] The motion returned before Justice P. Roger on April 5, 2018. His order stated that it superceded all previous orders. The child’s primary residence and access schedule remained the same and further detail was added to the regular, long weekend and holiday access schedule. He also ordered that all communications between parties and between Mr. Coughln and Ms. Marcia Brissett be carried out by email, text or in a communication book [sic] to be purchased by the mother to travel with the child. Roger J. stipulated that communications be polite [sic], respectful and limited to matters relevant to the child and to access. Ms. Brissett’s request for a restraining order was denied and further motions pending trial were prohibited unless “absolutely necessary”. Costs of $300 were assessed against Mr. Coughlan.

October 16, 2018

[25] Ms. Brissett returned to court this day on a without notice procedural motion seeking leave to bring an urgent motion for a restraining order. Master M. Fortier dismissed her motion.

November 2, 2018

[26] This was the date of the assignment court. I include it because that was the day Mr. Coughlan and the court learned that the mother had removed the child from Ottawa to Toronto. Ms. Brissett’s request to adjourn the trial was denied.

Issue No. 1 - Is it in the child’s best interests to be in the mother’s sole custody or the father’s sole custody? Should access be supervised or shared equally by the parties?

[27] Ms. Brissett argues that sole custody with Leah in her primary care is the only outcome that is consistent with the child’s best interests. She claims that Mr. Coughlan is aggressive, intimidating, and harasses her. She says he is frequently late for access. She believes he does this deliberately to create havoc in her life. She claims that he creates and exposes the child to stressful and dangerous situations that have scarred her. She believes he poses a threat to her and to the child. Respectful communications, she says, are impossible. She acknowledged there may be inherent appeal in joint custody but says where the parents do not have the capacity and desire to make it work, it serves to perpetuate conflict and delays decision-making contrary to the child’s best interests.

[28] Mr. Coughlan also acknowledged the appeal of joint custody. Indeed, that was the relief claimed in his pleadings, however, he argued only for sole custody. He says Ms. Brissett’s repeated access denials, her disregard for him as a parent, and lack of respect for court orders leaves him shorn of hope that she would comply with a joint custody order. Without custody, he fears that eventually he will be pushed out of Leah’s life. He denies the allegations of harm.

Legal Framework

[29] The Children’s Law Reform Act governs the custody and access issues in this case. The sole test to be applied to custody disputes is always the best interests of the child. The relevant provisions of the CLRA are set out below.

Entitlement to custody

20 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody of the child.

Rights and responsibilities

(2) A person entitled to custody of a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the person of the child and must exercise those rights and responsibilities in the best interests of the child.

Authority to act

(3) Where more than one person is entitled to custody of a child, any one of them may exercise the rights and accept the responsibilities of a parent on behalf of them in respect of the child.

Where parents separate

4. Where the parents of a child live separate and apart and the child lives with one of them with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other of them, the right of the other to exercise the entitlement of custody and the incidents of custody, but not the entitlement to access, is suspended until a separation agreement or order otherwise provides.

Access

(5) The entitlement to access to a child includes the right to visit with and be visited by the child and the same right as a parent to make inquiries and to be given information as to the health, education and welfare of the child.

Merits of application for custody or access

24 (1) The merits of an application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best interests of the child, in accordance with subsections (2), (3) and (4).

Best interests of child

(2) The court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including,

(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,

(i) each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,

(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;

(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;

(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;

(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;

(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and

(h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application.

Past conduct

(3) A person’s past conduct shall be considered only,

(a) in accordance with subsection (4); or

(b) if the court is satisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to act as a parent.

Violence and abuse

(4) In assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against,

(a) his or her spouse;

(b) a parent of the child to whom the application relates;

(c) a member of the person’s household; or

(d) any child.

Analysis

[30] Leah has been in the primary care of her mother since birth. By all accounts, she is delightful child – happy, healthy and meeting her developmental milestones. Ms. Brissett says they have a strong emotional bond and no one has ever expressed concern about the child in her care. She relies heavily on the length of time that Leah has been in her care as support for sole custody. I am satisfied that Ms. Brissett’s testimony was not as detailed as it might have been had she been represented by counsel that day to lead her examination in chief.

[31] Ms. Brissett called three other witnesses: her mother, Marcia Brissett; her friend from church, Jailene “Joyce” Levy, and the program supervisor at Leah’s daycare, Kelly McConnell. All said they observed much love and affection between mother and child. Ms. McConnell described Leah as a bright child with language skills beyond her years. She said Ms. Brissett was a caring mother, always looking for and providing the daycare centre with updated information about Leah. No evidence was provided to cast doubt on Ms. Brissett’s ability to care for her daughter nor was that the thrust of Mr. Coughlan’s case.

[32] Ms. Brissett’s mother is a significant presence in Leah’s life. She says she is very attached to her granddaughter and sees her most days. She agreed with the suggestion that she was one of Leah’s primary caregivers.

[33] I am equally satisfied that Mr. Coughlan provides proper care for Leah and their bond is strong and loving. He described their family routine during their weekends together that includes getting groceries and visiting his father before leaving Ottawa. Once home, they have lunch, play games, visit family and sometimes go to the park. According to Mr. Coughlan, Leah likes helping in the kitchen and enjoys eye-hand and memory games. He described what he does to comfort her when she is upset and how he keeps discipline in the moment by removing objects or using time outs. He says he takes great pride in showing off his daughter.

[34] Mr. Coughlan put considerable thought into to a plan of care for Leah. He produced evidence of daycare arrangements if awarded custody. He argued for a two-week/two-week parenting schedule until Leah starts school. He then asks that her primary residence be with him in Petawawa. Her school would be there. He says he wants his parenting relationship with Ms. Brissett to be fair and reasonable but acknowledges that “fair” is relative. He hopes that they can both can attend health care appointments and future events such as recitals. He asks that they rotate having Leah for special holidays and school breaks throughout the year rather than splitting them. He has also given thought to schedule changes, cancellation policies and Leah’s care if he is deployed.

[35] Mr. Coughlan’s mother, Katherine Coughlan, and his cousin, Joanna Begin, also testified. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Coughlan’s mother lives with him and Ms. Begin was the court ordered access facilitator for a time under the order made by Shelston J. on October 25, 2016. Mr. Coughlan and Ms. Begin are quite close and see one another regularly.

[36] Both Ms. Coughlan and Ms. Begin gave similar accounts of Mr. Coughlan’s abilities as a parent. They spoke of his “time out” method of discipline, how he uses age appropriate language to explain to Leah the consequences of her behaviour and the reason for discipline, how he is attentive to her needs and likes, how he takes time to make sure she has her favourite foods and toys, and how he is always there for her. Ms. Begin said Mr. Coughlan was always good with children but says she has seen a whole new side of him since Leah was born. She says he dotes on her. I do not doubt that Mr. Coughlan is an able and loving parent.

[37] In many ways, Leah is a fortunate child. She has devoted and loving parents and the support of her extended families. The shortcomings in her life rest not in the ability of her parents to love and care for her but in their struggles with one another. Leah is entitled to a life without conflict. She deserves harmony and the best of both her mother and father. The conflict and its cause is the crux of this case.

Significant Access Difficulties

[38] Both parties provided considerable evidence of access difficulties. Ms. Brissett blames Mr. Coughlan. She says his behaviour has exacted a terrible toll on her. She says access exchanges have been “extreme” and “hard to bear”. She claims that he is frequently late and that he is aggressive and intimidating. She worries about Leah. She claims the child is anxious and does not want to go with her father. She fears that Leah has been scarred by her exposure to various incidents.

[39] Mr. Coughlan does not deny that access has been difficult. Not surprisingly, he sees the problem differently. He claims Ms. Brissett has interfered with his access from the beginning and withheld it entirely on many occasions. I turn now to the consider the significant access difficulties as described to me.

September 27, 2015

[40] Mr. Coughlan’s first visit with Leah outside of the hospital lasted 45 minutes and occurred in the parking lot of a gas station. The parties agreed to a second visit for 1 hour on September 27, 2015. At that time, Mr. Coughlan planned to bring his mother.

[41] The parties met in the parking lot of a restaurant operated by Ms. Brissett’s father. Mr. Coughlan left his car there and walked to a nearby park with Leah and his mother. Although the hour had not passed, Ms. Brissett called Mr. Coughlan demanding that he return the child. According to Mr. Coughlan, he asked if there was a problem and she replied that she did not have to explain herself. As he was returning from the park, the police approached him in response to a call from Ms. Brissett. She said he was refusing to return the child to her. Ms. Brissett testified that she was thankful to see the child returned and claims no memory of the fact that Mr. Coughlan left his car at her father’s restaurant that day. The police report confirms no crime had been committed. This would not be the last time that Ms. Brissett would say that she had no memory of a certain event or imply that she did not have to explain herself when altering or impeding access.

October 31, 2015

[42] The next access visit was not until October 31, 2015. According to Mr. Coughlan, they had agreed he would pick up Leah and take her to his father’s house in Ottawa. However, when he arrived, Ms. Brissett insisted that he remain in the house where access could be supervised. She directed him to a designated room. Mr. Coughlan did not agree and instead chose to exercise access in his car. He remained parked in front of the house and after a time, the police arrived. Ms. Brissett had called alleging that he was withholding the child. When Mr. Coughlan returned Leah to the house, he was handed an envelope. In it was a handwritten letter from Ms. Brissett stating that his decision to take the child to the car for access was contrary to her best interests and no further access would be allowed before court. She had issued her application the previous day. Despite his requests, that was the last time Mr. Coughlan saw Leah in 2015.

Leah’s Baptism

[43] Ms. Brissett had Leah baptized sometime before the end of 2015. She did not consult Mr. Coughlan, invite him or even tell him about the ceremony. When asked why at trial, she said communication was not their strong suit. She also said that Leah was in her care, she considered the baptism personal to her, she did not think it was appropriate for him to attend, and does not remember him ever asking to be there. Mr. Coughlan, on the other hand, testified that they discussed baptizing the child at an ultrasound appointment. He said they agreed that he would choose the godmother and she would choose the godfather. I accept Mr. Coughlan’s testimony, however, even if Leah’s baptism had not been discussed, there is no reasonable justification in the circumstances of which I am aware for Ms. Brissett’s failure to, at a minimum, tell him of the plans she made and allow him the opportunity to participate.

January 16, 2016

[44] Mr. Coughlan believes that January 16, 2016 was the next time he was allowed to see Leah after October 31, 2015. It was a 45 minute re-introduction visit.

February 29, 2016

[45] Mr. Coughlan’s mother travelled with him for this visit. When he arrived at Ms. Brissett’s home, she was not there. He emailed her asking her whereabouts before driving to the maternal grandmother’s home where he talked to Ms. Brissett’s brother. He said his sister was out getting groceries with another brother. With the hope of still seeing Leah during the time left, Mr. Coughlan went to the store. Ms. Brissett said he had no right to approach her on the street and stated that access had not been agreed or confirmed for that day. An encounter followed between Mr. Coughlan and Ms. Brissett’s brother with each removing the other’s hand from either his arm or the child’s stroller. Ms. Brissett called the police. This incident also gave rise to CAS involvement. Ms. Brissett was not satisfied with the police decision that charges were not warranted. Over three weeks later, she went to the police station on two separate occasions determined to have Mr. Coughlan charged. They refused. Although the occurrence report describes the child as calm and un-phased, Ms. Brissett says Leah was traumatized by the event. I do not accept her assessment of the impact on the child.

April 1, 2016

[46] On April 1, 2016, Mr. Coughlan learned of Ms. Brissett’s last minute plans to travel to Florida with Leah to visit family from April 8 to April 16, 2016 because his consent was needed. Following her return from Florida, Ms. Brissett failed to advise Mr. Coughlan that Leah was home, safe and sound, in Ottawa and failed to respond to his phone calls or email inquiries. On April 26, 2016, a full 10 days after her return, he finally received an email from her then lawyer confirming the information. When Ms. Brissett was asked why she did not inform Mr. Coughlan that she had returned with Leah, she testified that she needed time to “decompress” from the trip and that she relied on counsel to deal with matters. This was the only and altogether insufficient explanation offered by Ms. Brissett. Moreover, it was delivered without a hint of remorse for the disrespect demonstrated toward Mr. Coughlan as a parent.

April 30 and May 1, 2016

[47] Mr. Coughlan had not seen Leah since February, 2016 and his access was slow to improve under the consent order of Master MacLeod dated April 5, 2016. The day following court, he sent an email Ms. Brissett’s counsel with an access proposal that extended through to Father’s Day on June 19, 2016. Eventually, Ms. Brissett agreed to what were yet again termed re-integration visits on April 30 and May 1, 2016 to take place at a shopping centre. Although access was to start at 10:00 AM, it was 10:50 AM before Mr. Coughlan saw Leah that first day. Ms. Brissett ended the visit early claiming the child was not coping well. The next day, May 1, was Mr. Coughlan’s birthday and his last chance to see Leah before a five-week deployment to Wainright, Alberta. That visit also ended early with Ms. Brissett alleging that Mr. Coughlan did not know how to sooth the child or care for her properly. When he objected to yet another visit being cut short, Ms. Brissett said that as Leah’s primary caregiver, she did not have to explain herself. She then took the child to the bathroom, contacted mall security and ended the visit.

Father’s Day, 2016

[48] While in Wainright, Mr. Coughlan called and sent multiple emails to both Ms. Brissett and her then lawyer in an effort to arrange access on Father’s Day. He proposed to spend time with Leah at the home of his father in Ottawa. Although Ms. Brissett’s lawyer responded that it would not be possible to accommodate his request to see her because the last access visit at the mall had not gone well, Ms. Brissett claimed she did not recall Mr. Coughlan asking to see Leah on Father’s Day. I do not accept her disclaimer. I find it hard-hearted and self-focused to have denied father and daughter time together on their first Father’s Day.

July, August and September, 2016

[49] Mr. Coughlan’s continued efforts to arrange access were unsuccessful. On July 13, 2016, he sent an email to Ms. Brissett and her lawyer stating that it had been 74 days since he last saw his daughter. When asked about this, Ms. Brissett said simply that she could not confirm or deny whether that much time had passed without access.

[50] Ms. Brissett finally responded to Mr. Coughlan’s requests for access and agreed to three visits to take place in July in the toddler zone of the Fun Haven Amusement Center in Ottawa. This was yet another series of reintroduction visits with Ms. Brissett insisting that access be supervised. The first two visits did not go well. According to Mr. Coughlan, she interfered with his efforts to comfort Leah and ended the visits either questioning his care or stating that he had violated her conditions. Ms. Brissett did not stay for the third visit. Both grandmothers were present and having a cordial conversation. Mr. Coughlan said that visit went well.

[51] On September 28, 2016, Mr. Coughlan emailed Ms. Brissett and her lawyer stating that over 60 days had passed since he last saw Leah. He also noted that it had been over 30 days since they last responded to his communications. Despite his continued requests, he did not see Leah again until late October when Justice Shelston’s order dated October 25, 2016 provided him with access. When asked, Ms. Brissett once again said she could neither confirm nor deny this gap in access.

December 17, 2016

[52] On December 17, 2016, Mr. Coughlan had access with Leah in Ottawa at his father’s home. His cousin, Joanna Begin, was present. She had been appointed to facilitate access pick up and drop off pending the involvement of the supervised access exchange. That day, Leah stumbled and bumped her cheek on a dining room chair. The result was a small bruise. Otherwise, she was fine. Later that afternoon when the child was returned to her mother, Ms. Begin tried to explain what happened to cause the bruise. Ms. Brissett walked off without listening, however, within minutes, the maternal grandmother called demanding to know what happened. She said they were taking the child to CHEO. The maternal grandmother, Marcia Brissett, later recounted this event as the child climbing on and falling off a chair. The Children’s Aid investigated and determined the incident was accidental.

December 24, 2016

[53] On Friday, December 23, 2016, Ms. Brissett emailed Mr. Coughlan saying Leah was not well and that she was cancelling access the next day. Mr. Coughlan responded to say he would like to come to Ottawa anyway to see Leah for a short visit at Ms. Brissett’s house before Christmas. Ms. Brissett did not respond nor did she reply to his requests over the next week for health updates and confirmation of his next scheduled visit on December 31.

December 31, 2016

[54] Mr. Coughlan did not hear from Ms. Brissett regarding this visit but chose to attend at her home that day anyway. He said he thought he should do so because it was his court ordered day. No one was there and once again, Ms. Brissett claimed no memory of receiving an email from him about access. She said if access did not happen, there must have been a reason. When asked whether she gave notice, she answered, “I can only inform as soon as I am able, so if I did not inform, I was not able to”. That was the extent of her explanation.

[55] Mr. Coughlan said he believes he saw Leah approximately 14 times over the course of 2016.

March 28, 2017

Mr. Coughlan’s struggle to see Leah continued. In March 2017, he returned to court as permitted under Justice Shelston’s order of October 25, 2016. Ms. Brissett sought an adjournment that was was granted, on terms, by Justice Engelking. She ordered access pending the return of the motion that included an immediate visit for Mr. Coughlan to ensure him a visit with Leah before leaving for his deployment to Wainright, Alberta. Her order also provided overnight access for the first time and permitted Mr. Coughlan to exercise access at his home in Petawawa. He testified that the overnight access the access went well. Leah was 1 ½ years old at this point. He said she was a little nervous initially to be in a new environment but adapted well.

August, September, October 2017

[56] The motion returned before Justice Engelking on August 8, 2017. Notwithstanding her order for access to Mr. Coughlan on three weekends each month commencing August 12, 2017, all but one weekend in August was frustrated. Access was withheld again on the weekend of September 23 and 24 and Ms. Brissett indicated her intention to continue withholding access until Oct 7, 2017.

Thanksgiving, 2017

[57] As permitted by Justice Engelking’s order, Mr. Coughlan kept Leah with him until Thanksgiving Monday. Ms. Brissett expected that Leah would return to her on Sunday. When that did not happen, she called the military police. Mr. Coughlan showed them the court order and they left. He recalled having little access after that until late November when the matter was back before Justice Engelking.

Christmas 2017

[58] On December 24, 2017 at 8:37 AM, Ms. Brissett emailed Mr. Coughlan saying that she was cancelling his access that was scheduled to start that morning at 9:00 AM. Although Mr. Coughlan had been on the road for approximately 2 hours by then, she said there had been a weather warning issued and attached it to her email. Ms. Brissett claimed that as the primary parent, she was looking out for Leah’s best interests and that included her not being on the road in bad weather. The alleged weather warning began “Twas the Night Before Christmas …” Moreover, if this was a true weather warning, it applied to Southern Ontario and not the Ottawa region. Mr. Coughlan arrived on schedule and returned to Petawawa with Leah without incident. The weather was fine.

March 3, 2018

[59] Ms. Brissett sent an email Mr. Coughlan on March 2 to say she was cancelling access the next day as she had a family event. No details were provided. Mr. Coughlan responded that he too had family plans with Leah and would pick her up as scheduled. He arrived on March 3 to find no one at home. Ms. Brissett claims that she did not see Mr. Coughlan’s response or the subsequent emails sent asking Leah’s whereabouts. She confirmed that she has email service on her phone.

March 10, 2018

[60] Ms. Brissett withheld access again on March 10, 2018. When Mr. Coughlan arrived to discover that no one was home, he emailed Ms. Brissett. He did not get a response. In addition to it being his regular weekend, she knew that he had arranged vacation over the March Break and hoped to have Leah with him. She said a week was too long and because she was not in school, she did not have a March Break. Throughout that week, Mr. Coughlan continued to pursue access and his hope to spend extra time with Leah. His requests were ignored.

March 12, 2018

[61] On this day, Mr. Coughlan arrived at the daycare asking to pick up Leah. According to Kelly McConnell, the program supervisor, Mr Coughlan was told the child could not be released to him because he was not on the contact list. Mr. Coughlan said he was not leaving without his daughter and asked that the police be called. Ms. McConnell said Mr. Coughlan stood firm with his arms crossed in front of him. She described his behaviour as intimidating but not aggressive. Soon the police arrived as did Ms. Brissett. She left with Leah and Mr. Coughlan was told not to return to the daycare. He has not. Ms. McConnell confirmed that the children, including Leah, were in the midst of their afternoon nap and unaware of the incident.

March 17, 2018

[62] Mr. Coughlan picked up Leah for access as scheduled and later that day emailed Ms. Brissett advising that he would not return her until Monday, March 26, 2018. He said it had been 27 days since he last saw Leah and he was keeping her to recoup his lost time. Ms. Brissett did not respond until Sunday evening when she asked why Leah had not been returned. Mr. Coughlan replied pointing his email of the 17.

[63] Mr. Coughlan’s actions gave rise to an urgent without notice motion before Justice J. Audet on March 20, 2018. She ordered Leah’s immediate return and the temporary suspension of Mr. Coughlan’s access pending the return of the motion on April 5, 2018.

June 9, 2018

[64] Ms. Brissett denied scheduled access that weekend because Joanna Begin arrived, as Mr. Coughlan’s designate, to pick up Leah. Mr. Coughlan provided Ms. Begin with his handwritten authorization to act on his behalf. Notwithstanding this and the fact that Ms. Begin had previously been authorized by the court to facilitate pick up and drop off and was known to both Ms. Brissett and the child, access was denied.

October 13, 2018

[65] On Saturday, October 13, 2018, Mr. Coughlan emailed Ms. Brissett at 9:08 AM stating that he was at the house to pick up Leah. He did not get a response. Ms. Brissett testified that she left that day because Mr. Coughlan had not arrived by 9:00 AM. She said that was the court ordered time for pick up and she cannot always wait around. When asked whether she checks her voicemail when waiting for someone to arrive, she said it “would depend on what she has time for.” According to Mr. Coughlan, he left a message earlier that morning to say he might be delayed up to 30 minutes due to traffic. In any event and as it turned out, he was only 8 minutes late but Ms. Brissett and Leah were gone.

October 20, 2018

[66] This access weekend gave rise to police involvement police again. Ms. Brissett alleged that Mr. Coughlan was angry when he arrived - screaming and yelling, kicking and pounding on her screen door causing damage. She said she and Leah were frightened and hid together in the house while her mother, Ms. Marcia Brissett, dealt with Mr. Coughlan. Ms. Brissett said she was not prepared to release Leah to her father and waited for the police to respond to her call. They arrived and facilitated the access exchange.

[67] Mr. Coughlan returned Leah to her mother on Sunday, October 21, 2018, as scheduled. That was the last time he saw her before trial.

Gatekeeping

[68] A number of themes emerge from the evidence. The first and most concerning is Ms. Brissett’s disregard for Mr. Coughlan’s parental rights and court orders. She frequently withheld access and eventually thought she could remove the child from Ottawa without notice to Mr. Coughlan or permission from the court. I find her readiness to do as she pleases indicates a fundamental weakness in her ability to place Leah’s interests ahead of her own. Her behaviour points to a basic lack of respect for Mr. Coughlan as the child’s father, for court orders, and for the importance of fostering stability for the child by encouraging and facilitating regular access with her father. It is my impression that she sees Leah as her child and not as their child. I find that Ms. Brissett is determined to limit and control access without justification. Her behaviour is that of a gatekeeper.

[69] Ultimately, I find Ms. Brissett’s actions demonstrate disrespect for Leah. It is also the child’s right to know and spend time with her father. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary – evidence that I find does not exist here - it is in Leah’s best interests to have a full and meaningful relationship with her father. Her best and most realistic chance of doing that is to be in his care under a consistent schedule that meets her development needs and abilities.

[70] Another theme in the evidence relates to Ms. Brissett’s propensity to ignore Mr. Coughlan’s communications. On more than one occasion, she claimed that she did not receive Mr. Coughlan’s emails but offered no explanation for this. I did not believe her testimony in this regard. She did not say there was a problem with her computer or her phone or that she failed to receive emails from other senders. The most she said was that she does not check her email unless she is expecting a message. I do not accept this offering. At best, it is a convenient but unpalatable excuse for shirking her responsibility to be attentive to email from Mr. Coughlan. The parties were ordered to communicate in writing about access and matters relevant to Leah. Both parties have relied on email. Although not exclusively, Mr. Coughlan’s emails have been either proactive or responsive, as called for in the circumstances. By and large, Ms. Brissett’s emails were proactive when she was cancelling access but seldom responsive to Mr. Coughlan’s requests for information, his attempts preserve access or secure make up time. In my view, the parties are obliged to respond to emails from one another when it concerns Leah. Ms. Brissett’s failure to do so again points to a basic lack of respect for Mr. Coughlan, court orders, ultimately for Leah.

[71] Another theme partnered to Ms. Brissett’s limited regard for court orders is this. She holds Mr. Coughlan to account, expecting him to comply with the precision of the order while she ignores them at will. In this regard, I note her decision to leave her home and withhold access on October 13, 2018 because he was 8 minutes late, never mind that he had called earlier to advise of traffic problems that might delay him by up to 30 minutes. The double standard that pervades her evidence cannot be ignored.

[72] I find the conflict between the parties stems primarily from Ms. Brissett’s unrelenting interference with access and her frequent refusal to communicate with Mr. Coughlan rather than any inherent communication difficulty between them. There is no evidence of conflict over child related decisions or their respective parenting views. Mr. Coughlan’s emails tend to be thorough and to the point although over time, they indicate increasing frustration and resentment toward the situation. I find his frustration also manifested itself in his decision to attend at the daycare and ultimately resort to self-help by withholding Leah in an effort to recoup lost access time. Those decisions were wrong and should not be repeated. Ms. Brissett’s written communications, on the other hand, are often vague and unresponsive. The conflict is more fundamental. It rests in Ms. Brissett’s resistance to Mr. Coughlan’s desire and determination to be a parent to Leah.

[73] The Divisional Court recently said, “Gatekeeping is born of a fundamental disrespect for the other parent, as a parent. An order for sole custody to the gatekeeping parent can reinforce that disrespect. Where, as here, parental conflict arises because of the gatekeeping, the intractable nature of the problem is obvious: awarding sole custody to the gatekeeper supports and rewards past gatekeeping and reinforces its lessons for the future.” See J.Y. v. L.F.-T, 2019 ONSC 1718, (Div.Ct), para 15. In that case, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge’s decision that a joint custody order was the “best way forward” to ensure the continued involvement of a parent in the child’s life in the face of efforts by the other parent to marginalize him or her.

[74] Here, given that Mr. Coughlan did not pursue joint custody at trial, I must decide between two competing claims for sole legal custody, primary residence, and requests for access by each party that could not be much farther apart. To do so, I have considered Leah’s needs and circumstances in the totality of the evidence presented at trial that includes Ms. Brissett’s considerable history of gatekeeping and disregard for breach court orders. While I am satisfied that both parents are able and loving, Leah is still very young and has been in her mother’s primary care since birth. By all accounts, she is thriving and with the exception of Ms. Brissett’s interference in the child’s relationship with her father, her needs have been met. I find that it is in Leah’s best interests to maintain stability in her day-to-day care with an order that she be in Ms. Brissett’s sole custody and reside primarily with her.

[75] I find no evidence to indicate any basis for the supervised access order sought by Ms. Brissett. Nor am I satisfied that the rotating two-week\two-week parenting schedule sought by Mr. Coughlan is in Leah’s best interests. In my view, she is too young to apart from her primary caregiver for that period of time, especially when the geographical distance between the parties’ homes is considered and the fact that it does not allow for mid-week access beyond telephone or FaceTime contact.

[76] My order for sole custody should not embolden Ms. Brissett. The findings against her with respect to her blatant gatekeeping behaviour and lack of compliance with court orders are serious. My order is not a reward for her behaviour. It is made despite her behaviour after weighing other factors. My order is best viewed by Ms. Brissett as another chance to comply and demonstrate respect for Mr. Coughlan and for Leah by facilitating the terms of the detailed access and parenting order that I make below. The order is intended to counter Ms. Brissett’s gatekeeping behaviour and involve Mr. Coughlan in Leah’s life in a meaningful way. It also seeks to maximize the time that Leah and her father can spend together in a manner that is consistent with her best interests considering her age and the travel time required for access. Ms. Brissett’s interfering behaviour must stop.

[77] For the next 18 months, I shall remain seized of any access breaches arising out of this order.

Issue No. 2 - Is the father in arrears of his child support obligation?

[78] Ms. Brissett claims Mr. Coughlan is in arrears of Engelking J’s order dated August 8, 2017. That order directed Mr. Coughlan to pay child support arrears for the period between October 1, 2015 and April 30, 2016 fixed at $3,500. Engelking J. further ordered that there be no arrears of child support for the remainder of 2016 or 2017 to August 2017. Effective September 1, 2017, she ordered Mr. Coughlan to pay monthly child support of $603 based on his annual income of $65,978.19. He was also ordered to pay costs of $500.

[79] Mr. Coughlan said he has not paid the sum of $3,500 or the cost order of $500 because disputes that he was in arrears. He claims that it was impossible for him to be in arrears as no order was ever made requiring him to pay support during that period. He said the only months in question for retroactive support are February, March and April 2016. It was not clear why he saw his potential obligation as limited to only those three months.

[80] Court orders are presumed to be correct. Non-compliance is not an option. If Mr. Coughlan wished to dispute or question Justice Engelking’s order, his options were to appeal or possibly seek clarification from her. He did not do either. Moreover, in my view, the intent and effect of Justice Engelking’s order is clear. She was addressing retroactive support for the seven month period between Leah’s birth and May 1, 2016 during which Mr. Coughlan did not pay support. Her order for $3,500 is equal to 7 months at $500 per month. That is the amount ordered by Master MacLeod effective May 1, 2016. His order specifically stated that it was without prejudice to retroactive adjustment.

[81] I find that Mr. Coughlan owes $3,500 in child support and $500 in costs to Ms. Brissett as ordered by Engelking J on August 8, 2017. This sum of $3,500 is subsumed in my calculation of retroactive support below.

Issue No. 3 - Should there be a retroactive adjustment in child support?

[82] Considering the circumstances of this case including the October 30, 2015 commencement date of this application and the factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case known as D.B.S., 2006 SCC 37 guiding the exercise of my discretion to order retroactive child support, I find it appropriate to order a retroactive adjustment effective October 1, 2015. My findings regarding Mr. Coughlan’s income and the corresponding table amount of support owed under the Child Support Guidelines O.Reg. 397/97, are set out below. For this purpose, I have estimated Mr. Coughlan’s income in 2016 to be the same income as 2015 as I did not receive proof of income for that year. I also estimated his 2018 income based on his pay stubs showing his year to date income as of mid-November, 2018. My estimate below of $69,204 includes the sum of $5,580 representing the taxable land duty allowance he receives. Based on this income he shall pay child support of $646 per month effective August 1, 2019. To ensure that disclosure is complete and support is calculated accurately, I order Mr. Coughlan to provide me with a copy of his 2016 and 2018 Notices of Assessment within 21 days from the release of my reasons together with proof that copies have also been provided to Ms. Brissett. Accordingly, I reserve the right to adjust the calculations below if his actual income for those years is different from my estimates. Any additional amount owing for 2019 can be determined when the parties exchange their income tax returns in the spring of 2020. Annual income disclosure will be included in my order below.

YEAR	INCOME	CSG TABLE	ORDERED PAID	OWED
2015	$63,411	$578 x 3 mos.	$0	$1,734
2016	$63,411	$578 x 12 mos.	$500 x 8	$2,936
2017	$73,908	$672 x 11 mos.	$500 x 8	$1,670
(Nov.2017 CSG)		$690 x 1 mos.	$603 x 4
2018	$69,204	$646 x12 mos.	$603 x 12	$516
Total owed:				$6,856

[83] Despite Justice Shelston’s Trial Scheduling Order requiring Ms. Brissett to provide her updated Financial Statement and Income Tax Returns and Notices of Assessment for 2015, 2016 and 2017 by November 21, 2018, she arrived at trial without these documents. I directed her to prepare her Financial Statement over lunch, provided a somewhat extended lunch break for her to do so, and allowed her until the next morning to produce her Income Tax Returns. Although Ms. Brissett did not a claim section 7 expenses, her income information was needed to ensure the court was in a position to address support in the event Mr. Coughlan succeeded in his custody claim. As that was not my ruling, I need not make any income findings for Ms. Brissett.

Issue No. 4 - Is a restraining order against the father warranted?

[84] Ms. Brissett seeks an order restraining Mr. Coughlan from being within a certain distance of her address, her family and the child’s daycare, however, her allegations of aggression, intimidation, harassment and harm by Mr. Coughlan were not borne out by the evidence. The police have been involved on a number of occasions but not in relation to violence or threats of harm. To the extent that the CAS expressed concern, it related to the conflict that the child was exposed to during access exchanges. That conflict was not one sided. It is not to be repeated.

[85] Mr. Coughlan has not returned to Leah’s daycare since March 12, 2018 and I am satisfied that he is unlikely to repeat that incident.

[86] The evidence of harassment presented by Ms. Brissett consisted of pictures of screen shots and her insistence that Mr. Coughlan was calling her repeatedly. Some of the calls were, indeed, from Mr. Coughlan’s telephone. I note that his calls coincided primarily with dates and times that he was to pick up Leah. For example, his number appeared several times on October 13, 2018 around the time he learned that access was being withheld. There were several calls from other numbers at random times that Ms. Brissett attributed to Mr. Coughlan. I accept his evidence that he has only one telephone number and did not make the other calls that Ms. Brissett points to.

[87] I do not find that Ms. Brissett has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety or Leah’s safety. I decline her request for a restraining order.

[88] For the reasons given, I make the following order:

1. Ms. Brissett shall have custody of the child, Leah Marie Coughlan, born September 12, 2015. The child’s primary residence shall be with her at 226 Royalton Private, Ottawa, ON.
2. Unless it is a medical emergency, Ms. Brissett shall make all decisions for the child in consultation with Mr. Coughlan, in advance, in writing. She shall seek and consider his opinion. All communications shall be carried out by email. If the parties cannot come to a mutual decision within 14 days, Ms. Brissett may make the final decision. Unless the parties otherwise agree, in writing, Ms. Brissett shall advise Mr. Coughlan, by email, of her final decision within the next 48 hours.
3. Mr. Coughlan shall continue to have parenting time with Leah first three weekends of each month. Effective immediately and continuing until his first parenting weekend in November, 2019, Mr. Coughlan’s parenting time shall start Friday at 6:00 PM and continue until Sunday at 6:00 PM. During the winter months starting with his second weekend in November 2019 and ending with his first weekend in April 2020, Mr. Coughlan’s parenting time shall revert back to Saturday at 9:00 AM until Sunday at 6:00 PM. If his parenting time occurs on a weekend when Monday is a school holiday or PD day once Leah is in school, access shall end Monday at 6:00 PM except for Labour Day weekend when access shall end at Sunday at 6:00 PM. If Mr. Coughlan’s parenting time coincides with a school holiday or PD day that falls on Friday, his weekend with Leah shall start Thursday evening at 6:00. This seasonal schedule shall continue each year.
4. Pick up and drop off take place at the front step of Ms. Brissett’s home. The parties are responsible for pick up and drop off. Neither parent shall be in the company of a third party for this exchange.
5. In August 2019, Mr. Coughlan shall be entitled to one week of summer vacation with Leah. It shall be exercised to coincide with two of his parenting weekends such that he will pick up Leah at 6:00 PM on Friday of the first weekend and return her to Ms. Brissett the following weekend on Sunday at 6:00 PM.
6. Commencing in July 2020, Mr. Coughlan shall have two non-consecutive vacation weeks during the school summer break. The first week shall be taken in July and the second week in August and exercised in the manner described in paragraph 5 above to coincide with his parenting weekends. In 2023, each party shall be entitled to two consecutive weeks of summer vacation with Leah in each of July and August. In 2025, each party shall be entitled to have Leah in his or her care for one month.
7. In even numbered years, Mr. Coughlan shall have first choice of his summer vacation time with Leah. In odd numbered years, Ms. Brissett shall have first choice. Before May 15 each year, the parent with first choice shall provide the other with notice, in writing, of his or her chosen vacation weeks.
8. Commencing in 2023, the summer holiday schedule shall override the regular parenting schedule to ensure each party has equal time with Leah.
9. The parties shall share the two-week school Christmas break equally commencing in 2019 even though Leah is not yet in school. The break is defined as starting at 9:00 AM on the Saturday following the last day of school and ending at 6:00 PM on the Sunday immediately preceding the child’s return to school. If Christmas falls on Saturday, the first half of the break shall begin Friday, December 24 at 2:00 PM. Mr. Coughlan shall have Leah in his care for the first half of the Christmas Break in odd numbers years and Ms. Brissett shall have Leah in her care for the second half. In even numbers years, Ms. Brissett shall have Leah in her care for the first half of the break and Mr. Coughlan shall Leah in his care for the second half of the break.
10. In odd numbered years, Leah shall spend March Break with her father. In even numbers years, she shall spend March break with her mother. March Break is defined as starting at 9:00 AM Saturday and ending at 6:00 PM Sunday on the following weekend. In odd numbered years when Mr. Coughlan has Leah for March Break, Ms. Brissett shall have Leah in her care for the Easter weekend. In even numbered years when Ms. Brissett has Leah in her care for March Break, Mr. Coughlin shall have Leah in his care for Easter. The Easter weekend is defined as starting at 9:00 AM on Friday and ending at 6:00 PM on Monday.
11. Except as otherwise stated, the holiday schedule shall override the regular weekend access schedule.
12. Mother’s Day and Father’s Day shall be spent with the respective parent regardless of who is caring for the child that weekend. Access if needed on those days shall be from Sunday at 10:00 AM until 6:00 PM.
13. The parties shall communicate on all child related matters, by email. Communications shall be brief, courteous, responsive and informative.
14. Each party shall be entitled to telephone or FaceTime access with Leah on Wednesdays at 5:00 PM when she is in the care of the other parent. The conversation shall not exceed 10 minutes.
15. In the event that Mr. Coughlan is unable to travel to Ottawa for work related reasons or otherwise to do the pick up and/or drop off in person, he may provide a third party of his choice who is known to the child with his written authorization to act as his agent for this purpose. Should that be necessary, he shall provide Ms. Brissett with at least 2 hours of notice.
16. Unless there is a medical emergency, a minimum of 7 days notice is required to cancel access. In the event of an emergency, Ms. Brissett shall immediately advise Mr. Coughlan of the address of hospital or clinic where the child has been taken and the treatment recommended or received. Within 7 days she shall provide proof in writing from the health care professional or hospital of Leah’s attendance, the reason for it and the treatment prescribed. If access is cancelled by Ms. Brissett in the absence of a medical emergency, Mr. Coughlan shall be entitled to make up access on the last weekend of the month that would otherwise by Ms. Brissett’s weekend with Leah. If access is cancelled by Mr. Coughlan, he will not be entitled to make up access.
17. Both parents shall be entitled to attend all special events and activities involving the child. At the end of each month, Ms. Brissett shall provide Mr. Coughlan, by email, a calendar and/or schedule of Leah’s appointments, events and activities scheduled for the following month.
18. Ms. Brissett shall ensure that Mr. Coughlan is listed as Leah’s father and a contact person with all service providers including her doctors, dentists and other health care providers, her daycare, and her school once she is registered. Ms. Brissett shall provide Mr. Coughlan with written proof within 14 days of the release of these reasons that she has advised these third parties and within 7 days of registering Leah in school.
19. Ms. Brissett shall advise all third parties involved in Leah’s care, education, and activities that her father, Mr. Coughlan, is entitled to receive all relevant information about her care and education and general welfare directly from the service provider. If requested by the third party, Ms. Brissett shall immediately sign the necessary consents to ensure that Mr. Coughlan has full access to the information. Ms. Brissett does not comply with this term of my order, Mr. Coughlan may provide a copy of it to Leah’s health care and other service providers including her daycare and school as authorization to list him as a contact person in their records and to release information to him.
20. Ms. Brissett shall not move the child’s permanent residence to a location outside of a 20 km radius from her current home at 226 Royalton Private, Ottawa, ON without Mr. Coughlan’s consent or leave of the court unless it is closer to his residence. Mr. Coughlan shall not unreasonably withhold his consent.
21. Neither parent shall remove Leah from the Province of Ontario or the Outaouais region of Quebec without the consent of the other, in writing.
22. I will remained seized of this matter for one year to deal with any access breaches.
23. Neither parent shall disparage the other or allow third parties to disparage the other parent in any manner that may be heard by or observed by Leah, or otherwise come to her attention.
24. Ms. Brissett shall not change the child’s surname.
25. Ms. Brissett’s passport and Leah’s passport are currently in the possession of Mr. Coughlan’s counsel. Their passports shall be released to Ms. Brissett within 7 days.
26. Each party shall provide the other with all documentation required for travel with the child. The parent travelling with the child shall provide the other with the itinerary including all flight and contact information a minimum of 14 days prior to departure.
27. The residential terms of this order are enforceable by the Ottawa Police Services, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and all enforcement officials having jurisdiction in any area where it appears that the child may be and to whose attention this order is brought. Such police and enforcement officers shall take all actions as may be required to locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the parent entitled to the child’s residential custody, including the power of search and entry at any time.
28. Effective August 1, 2019 and on the first day of each subsequent month, Mr. Coughlan shall pay child support to Ms. Brissett for Leah Marie Coughlan, born September 12, 2015 under the Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $646 based on his 2018 estimated income of $69,204.
29. Mr. Coughlan shall pay to Ms. Brissett, the sum of $7356. This amount represents the costs owing under Justice Engelking’s order dated August 8, 2017 and the retroactive amount calculated above. Payment shall be made within 30 days. Subject to any further adjustments I may make upon receipt of Mr. Coughlan’s 2016 and 2018 Notices of Assessment, there shall be no further amounts owed for the period prior to December 31, 2018 inclusive.
30. By June 15 every year, the parties shall exchange complete copies of the income tax returns and Notices of Assessment for the previous calendar year. Any adjustment required to ensure that child support has been paid in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines for the income tax year in question shall be calculated by June 30. Any amount owing or reimbursement required shall be satisfied in full by July 30.
31. Mr. Coughlan shall maintain Leah as a beneficiary of the extended health care coverage available to his through his employment. Any reimbursement received for an expense paid directly by Ms. Brissett shall be forwarded to her within 7 days of receipt.
32. Within 14 days of the release of these reasons, Ms. Brissett shall provide Mr. Coughlan with a certified copy of Leah’s birth certificate and health care card.
33. Ms. Brissett’s claim for a restraining order is dismissed.
34. If the parties cannot agree on costs, Ms. Brissett shall provide her costs submissions within 15 days. Mr Coughlan shall have 15 days after that to provide his submissions with a further 5 day right of reply to Ms. Brissett. Submissions shall not exceed 3 pages exclusive of Offers to Settle and Bills of Costs. Reply submissions shall be limited to 1 page.

Justice D. Summers Released: July 17, 2019