Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: 05-265/17 DATE: 20190606 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF PETER TREZZI, DECEASED

RE: ALFRIDA GINA TREZZI, in her personal capacity, and in her capacity as estate trustee of the Estate of Peter Trezzi, Applicant AND: ALBERT TREZZI, in his personal capacity, and in his capacity as estate trustee of the Estate of Peter Trezzi, EMILY TREZZI, BIANCA TREZZI, ACROSS CANADA CONSTRUCTION LTD., and ALBERTO TREZZI SR., Respondents

BEFORE: Mr. Justice H.J. Wilton-Siegel

COUNSEL: Danielle Joel and Ewa Krajewska, for the Applicant, Gina Trezzi Symon Zucker, for the Respondent, Albert Trezzi Nancy Tourgis, for the Respondent, Alberto Trezzi Sr. Craig Ross, Ori Rubin and Krystyne Rusek, for the Respondents, Bianca Trezzi and Emily Trezzi

HEARD: In Writing

Costs Endorsement

[1] The Court heard motions in respect of four matters pertaining to the administration of this estate. The Court rendered endorsements dated August 2, 2018, August 2, 2018 and September 4, 2018 (collectively, the “Endorsements”). Terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Endorsements. The motions were brought pursuant to a Notice of Application of Gina Trezzi dated December 21, 2017, a Notice of Cross-Application of Albert Trezzi dated January 5, 2018, and a Notice of Application of Alberto Trezzi Sr. dated January 5, 2018.

Applicable Law

[2] The principles governing an award of costs in estate litigation were reviewed by Gilese J.A. in Sawdon Estate v. Water Tower Bible and Tract Society of Canada, 2014 ONCA 101, 119 O.R. (3d) 81 (“Sawdon Estate”) at paras. 84-86:

The historical approach to costs in estate litigation created the danger that estates would be unreasonably depleted because of unwarranted or needlessly protracted litigation. Consequently, it has been displaced by the modern approach set out by this court in McDougald Estate v. Gooderham, [2005] O.J. No. 2432, 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (C.A.), at paras. 78-80: the court is to carefully scrutinize the litigation and, unless it finds that one or more of the relevant public policy considerations apply, it shall follow the costs rules that apply in civil litigation. That is, the starting point is that estate litigation, like any other form of civil litigation, operates subject to the general civil litigation costs regime established by s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, except in those limited circumstances where public policy considerations apply.

The public policy considerations at play in estate litigation are primarily of two sorts: (1) the need to give effect to valid wills that reflect the intention of competent testators; and (2) the need to ensure that estates are properly administered. In terms of the latter consideration, because the testator is no longer alive to rectify any difficulties or ambiguities created by his or her actions, it is desirable that the matter be resolved by the courts. Indeed, resort to the courts may be the only method to ensure that the estate is properly administered.

In any event, where the problems giving rise to the litigation were caused by the testator, it is appropriate that the testator, through his or her estate, bear the cost of their resolution. In such situations, it ought not to fall to the estate trustee to pay the costs associated with having the court resolve the problems. As Kruzick J. observed in Penney Estate v. Resetar, [2011] O.J. No. 490, 2011 ONSC 575, 64 E.T.R. (3d) 316 (S.C.J.), at para. 19, if estate trustees were required to bear their legal costs in such situations, they might decline to accept appointments or be reluctant to bring the necessary legal proceedings to ensure the due administration of the estate.

Analysis and Conclusions Regarding the Costs Sought by the Parties

[3] At the request of the Court, the parties provided separate costs submissions in respect of each of the four motions heard by the Court. I will deal with each of these matters in turn as well as two additional submissions of Gina.

18 Boyle Drive

[4] There are four costs submissions in respect of the motion regarding the ownership of Boyle Drive.

Alberto Trezzi Sr.

[5] Alberto Sr. asserted a right to occupy the home on a rent-free basis by way of a life interest in the property or a constructive trust. He seeks the costs of his motion in the amount of approximately $23,000 notwithstanding that his claim was denied.

[6] In his costs submissions, Alberto Sr. says that he believed that he was entitled to remain in the house and that the deceased, Peter Trezzi (the “Deceased”), assured him that this would be the case. He also believes that the Deceased would not have wanted him to have to leave the house after his death or to have the property sold. However, none of this was established in this proceeding. While his beliefs may explain why he asserted a claim to remain in the house, they are not a basis for an award of costs. He was unable to identify any legal basis for his alleged beliefs. Further, while Alberto Sr. is elderly, there is no suggestion that he is impecunious.

[7] Accordingly, Alberto Sr. should bear his own costs of this motion.

Gina Trezzi

[8] The central issue on this motion was the ownership of the property, which had been transferred with Gina’s consent to the Deceased’s mother, Emilia, and remained registered in her name at the time of his death. In addition, as mentioned, Alberto Sr. claimed a life interest in the property or a constructive trust that, in either case, entitled him to continue to live in the property for the rest of his life. The Court held that the property was an asset of the estate of the Deceased (the “Estate”), dismissed the claim of Alberto Sr., and ordered the property sold.

[9] Gina was entirely successful in terms of the relief sought. She is therefore entitled to her costs of this motion. She seeks all-inclusive costs of $133,000 on a substantial indemnity basis or $106,000 on a blended basis described below.

[10] Gina submits that substantial indemnity costs are appropriate because she says Albert and Alberto Sr. deliberately stalled the progress of the hearing, sought to have it adjourned, and conducted unnecessary cross-examinations. It does appear that these parties were slow to arranging the cross-examinations of Mr. Zeppieri, Gina, Emily, and Bianca, and unsuccessfully sought an adjournment of the hearing date. It also appears that the cross-examinations of Gina, Emily and Bianca were not used on the hearing of this motion. However, none of these actions, however frustrating to counsel, rises to the level of the egregious conduct that attracts substantial indemnity costs. Moreover, the motion proceeded on April 30, 2018 despite the motion for adjournment brought by Albert and Alberto Sr. The additional costs of their unsuccessful motion for adjournment is not material and are included in the costs being awarded.

[11] Gina also suggests that substantial indemnity costs are warranted because Albert and Alberto Sr. should have admitted that the property was an asset of the Estate well before the delivery of Albert’s factum four days before the hearing of this motion. Gina’s position is, essentially, that unnecessary costs were incurred because Alberto Sr. and Albert did not agree with her position from the outset. However, the Deceased’s actions left the issue of the ownership of the property in question. It was not self-evident where the ownership resided. It was perhaps unfortunate but not unexpected that Alberto Sr. and Albert would not advise of their own positions until after Gina’s counsel had undertaken considerable research to support her position.

[12] Accordingly, I am not persuaded that Gina is entitled to costs on a substantial indemnity basis. Gina’s blended costs are calculated on a partial indemnity basis but with substantial indemnity rates for the time associated with the cross-examinations of Gina, Bianca, and Emily, the requested adjournment, and the costs of preparing her factum to address Alberto Sr.’s constructive trust claim, which he did not pursue to any extent at the hearing.

[13] I also do not find that Gina is entitled to costs on this blended basis. For the reason discussed above, the first two matters do not justify elevated costs. With respect to the third matter, it is not possible to determine how much of the time spent on the preparation of Gina’s factum would have been reduced if Alberto Sr. had advised that he was not actively pursuing his constructive trust claim. In any event, I do not think that it would have been material given the other issues that also had to be addressed and that are included in the costs outline in respect of the factum. More importantly, while this claim was clearly misguided, I cannot conclude that Alberto Sr. asserted it in bad faith.

[14] Accordingly, I conclude that Gina is entitled to her costs of this motion on a partial indemnity basis. Her costs outline calculates this amount to be $89,206 on an all-inclusive basis. I have adjusted this amount to include the costs associated with orders obtained by Gina respecting production of two files of Mr. Zeppieri. This matter is discussed below. I am of the view that the resulting total amount of $92,542 is fair and reasonable given the nature of the motion.

[15] Based on the foregoing, Gina is entitled to costs of $92,542 on an all-inclusive basis in respect of this motion.

[16] Gina also seeks an order that such costs be paid by Albert and Alberto Sr. I do not think that this is appropriate for two reasons.

[17] First, as discussed above, I have rejected Gina’s submission that she should be entitled to substantial indemnity costs based on certain actions of these parties. In the absence of a finding that their actions justified an award on such scale, I do not think an award against them personally would be appropriate.

[18] Second, and more importantly, both the ownership of the property and Alberto Sr.’s claim arose as a result of the Deceased’s actions. In respect of the former, he registered the property in the name of Emilia and left no indication of his intentions in this regard. The executors therefore required a determination of the ownership of the property. In respect of the latter, he invited his parents to reside in the house, which was the matrimonial home of the Deceased and Gina, without any written agreement or indication of his intentions regarding their continued residence after his death. Accordingly, I conclude that Gina’s costs of this motion are properly characterized as arising as a result of the Deceased’s actions and were incurred in connection with the administration of the Estate.

[19] I therefore conclude that Gina’s costs of this motion should be payable by the Estate.

Emily Trezzi and Bianca Trezzi

[20] Emily and Bianca Trezzi supported the position of Gina on this motion. They had an interest in the proceeding insofar as they were each 25% residuary beneficiaries under the Will. They seek costs of approximately $50,000.

[21] This proceeding was commenced by an application of Gina who had the main role in respect of this motion. Emily and Bianca were entitled to participate. However, their involvement largely duplicated the actions of Gina. In particular, Emily and Bianca did not assert any legal right, or make any submission, that was not asserted or made by Gina. Their contribution to this motion consisted principally of their affidavit evidence, which was relevant to the issue of the sale of the property.

[22] Accordingly, I consider that the quantum of their fees is excessive. In my view, fair and reasonable costs of their participation on this motion are $20,000 on an all-inclusive basis.

[23] Emily and Bianca also argue that their costs should be payable by Alberto Sr. on the basis that there are no public policy considerations that should displace the modern approach to costs of estate litigation as confirmed by Gillese J.A. in Sawdon Estate. I disagree for the reasons set out above in respect of Gina’s costs of this motion, which reasons are equally applicable to the costs of Emily and Bianca.

[24] Accordingly, I conclude that the costs of Emily and Bianca should also be payable out of the Estate.

Albert Trezzi

[25] Albert seeks his costs of this motion of approximately $24,000 from the Estate, Gina, Emily, and Bianca. Albert supported the position of Alberto Sr. who, as mentioned, had no legal basis for his claim. Albert’s involvement in this motion was limited to the filing of a brief factum in support of Alberto Sr., which did not address any legal issue, and responding materials setting out his views regarding the acrimonious relationship among the parties living in the home.

[26] Albert participated in this motion as a beneficiary rather than as an executor. His participation did not benefit the Estate in any respect nor did it assist the Court. Accordingly, I conclude that Albert is not entitled to any costs of this motion.

The Extension of Gina Trezzi’s Rights Under the Family Law Act

[27] Gina was successful on this motion. She seeks costs of approximately $43,000 on a substantial indemnity basis. This includes $17,805 in respect of costs incurred in respect of the application prior to January 31, 2018.

[28] Gina is entitled to her reasonable costs on a substantial indemnity basis for this motion. There was no legal basis for Albert’s opposition to this motion. On the other hand, this was a discrete issue that does not justify the fees sought. In particular, I do not see how any of the costs incurred before January 31, 2018 pertain to this issue, apart from a relatively small amount on account of the short references to this intended claim in her Notice of Application and in her affidavit and apart from some legal research regarding an extension.

[29] Accordingly, costs of this motion are awarded in the amount of $18,000 on an all-inclusive basis. Such costs should be payable by the Estate as they arise because Gina cannot make an election until the matters addressed in the other three motions, which involve the administration of the Estate, have been determined, among other things.

[30] Albert opposes any cost award in favour of Gina and seeks his own costs of approximately $25,000. While he does not specify against whom he seeks costs, I see no basis for awarding costs against Gina as she was the successful party. I have however considered whether Albert is entitled to an award of costs payable by the Estate.

[31] Given that Albert’s counsel’s involvement on this issue was limited to preparation of his factum and authorities, his actual costs should be modest. More significantly, I do not think that either of his submissions regarding an award of costs in his favour has merit.

[32] Essentially, Albert’s costs submissions on this matter reproduced his unsuccessful arguments on the motion. These were addressed in the Court’s Endorsement dated August 2, 2018 and will not be repeated here. Moreover, Albert was aware of this requested relief from Gina’s Notice of Application. He indicated his intention to oppose the relief in his Notice of Cross-Application. His opposition was based entirely on speculation that Gina had received advice earlier than she indicated from another law firm, for which he never had any evidence. Albert should have consented to the relief sought on this motion, particularly as there was no prejudice to him in the conduct of the proceedings between the parties. Further, given the foregoing, I reject any suggestion that, in opposing this relief, Albert was acting in his capacity as an executor for the benefit of the Estate. Instead, he opposed the motion in his capacity as a beneficiary with a view to preventing a further delay in the distribution of the assets of the Estate.

[33] Based on the foregoing, I see no basis for any reimbursement of his expenses by the Estate. Accordingly, Albert’s request for these costs is denied.

Corporate Assets

[34] Gina brought a motion seeking a declaration that the gift of certain assets under the Will to Albert failed with the result that the assets were residual assets of the Estate. These assets were owned by Trezzi Construction Ltd. (“Trezzi Construction”) at the time of the Deceased’s death. The motion was opposed by Albert.

[35] Gina was unsuccessful on this motion. Albert is therefore entitled to his costs. He seeks costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $44,625 and on a partial indemnity basis of $30,325. Gina submits that Albert should be limited to costs of $9,255, being the amount of her own costs of preparation for and attendance at the hearing of the motion. Gina also seeks her own costs of this motion in the amount of $39,954 on a substantial indemnity basis or $27,000 on a partial indemnity basis, in each case from the Estate on the basis that this matter involved the administration of the Estate.

[36] This issue arose as a result of the Deceased and his counsel apparently failing to take into account the corporate structure of the Deceased’s business when drafting the Will. It is undisputed that the law in this area is not clear and is fact-specific. I agree with Gina that this was a matter that involved the administration of the Estate. Given the ownership of the assets, it was necessary for the executors of the Estate to obtain the advice and directions of the court regarding the operation of the Will and, in particular, regarding the validity of the gift of these assets. For these reasons, I find that both Albert and Gina are entitled to their costs on a substantial indemnity basis from the Estate.

[37] However, such costs must still be reasonably related to the motion. In my view, the costs of each of the parties with respect to this matter are excessive for the reason that this motion was almost entirely a matter of legal argument. The affidavits of the parties contained little factual evidence that bears directly on this issue. In any event, the Court did not rely on any particular evidence of either Gina or Albert in reaching its determination of this motion.

[38] In considering a fair and reasonable quantum of costs, I have had regard to the nature and complexity of the issue, the actual work of counsel that was necessary to address this issue, being principally legal research and the preparation of a factum and book of authorities, the importance of the issue to the parties, and the relative seniority of counsel. I have also considered the reasonable expectations of the parties, as evidenced by their respective costs outlines which are relatively similar in amount. This suggests that, at a minimum, the parties would reasonably expect that the costs awarded to each of Gina and Albert would be similar if not the same. In this regard, I see no reason for restricting Albert’s costs in the manner suggested by Gina as the work of his counsel would have largely reflected the work of Gina’s counsel.

[39] Based on the foregoing, I find fair and reasonable costs of each of Gina and Albert to be $22,500 on an all-inclusive basis, in each case to be payable by the Estate.

Share Ownership of ACC

[40] Gina brought a motion seeking a determination that she is the owner of 50% of the outstanding shares of Across Canada Construction Ltd. (“ACC”) (the “ACC shares”). The application was opposed by Albert. The Court denied Gina’s application. In addition, prior to the hearing of this motion, Albert brought motions for an adjournment and an order granting leave to amend his Notice of Cross-Application. These motions were dealt with at the opening of the hearing as discussed below. I will deal with each of these matters separately.

The Motion Regarding the Ownership of the Shares of ACC

[41] It is unclear whether Albert participated in the hearing as a trustee of the Estate or as a beneficiary for the reason that the ownership of the ACC shares was not determined on the motion. However, he is entitled to his substantial indemnity costs in either event as the successful party in opposition to Gina’s motion. Albert seeks costs of approximately $81,500 on a substantial indemnity basis.

[42] The fact that Gina’s claim delayed the distribution to Albert of the assets in the Estate is not a basis for such an award in the absence of evidence of bad faith. In this case, I have no doubt that Gina believed that she was entitled to the ACC shares even though the Court dismissed her claim. This submission is principally relevant to Albert’s argument that Gina should bear his costs, which is addressed further below. The fact that Albert decided to commence a professional negligence claim as a result of Gina’s claim is also irrelevant. That was entirely his decision, based presumably on his own assessment of the merits of Gina’s claim.

[43] However, this matter was occasioned by the actions of the Deceased as discussed further below. It involved the administration of the Estate insofar as the Deceased’s actions required a determination of the Court regarding the ownership of the ACC shares. Accordingly, I consider that Albert’s participation in this proceeding was necessary for the administration of the Estate. I therefore think Albert is entitled to his costs of this proceeding on a substantial indemnity basis.

[44] In assessing the quantum of costs reasonably related to this motion, I have had regard to the importance of the matter to the parties as well as the following specific factors.

[45] First, the issues raised by Gina were factual and highly detailed. They involved an extensive record of the corporate history of ACC as well as the evidence of ACC’s corporate solicitor at the time of its revival. This has resulted in substantial costs to Albert.

[46] Second, Gina’s own costs outline in respect of this matter shows costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $57,410. I consider that this amount should reflect her reasonable expectations as well as the relative amount of time required by each counsel on this matter.

[47] Third, Gina has identified certain issues respecting Albert’s costs submissions that she suggests indicate that his costs in respect of this matter may not have totaled the amount claimed. In particular, she has identified approximately $13,000 on a substantial indemnity basis relating to Albert’s professional negligence action. I believe Albert included this time on the basis that, in his mind, Gina’s claim required that he commence this action and therefore Gina’s claim caused him to incur these additional expenses. I have deducted this amount from Albert’s costs as they cannot be tied to Gina’s claim in this manner and are, in any event, unrelated to the motion. Gina has also identified certain matters that she suggests involve inflated time or billing rates, although the quantum involved is not material. Lastly, she suggests Albert is seeking double recovery reflected in the reproduction of certain dockets in his costs submissions in respect of each of the four motions, although Gina also did the same for the period to January 31, 2018 for the same reason – the need to allocate costs among the four proceedings.

[48] The Court is not in a position to evaluate all of these submissions, or their materiality. I have, however, approached the determination of fair and reasonable costs of this motion based on my assessment of the actual work reasonably required based on a review of the file, the materials before the Court the seniority of counsel and the importance of the issue to the parties, particularly Albert.

[49] Based on the foregoing, I find fair and reasonable costs of Albert in respect of this motion to be $55,000 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate.

[50] Albert seeks an order that these costs are to be payable by Gina personally. Although Gina was unsuccessful and the evidentiary basis for her claim was weak, I do not think that such an order would be appropriate for the following reasons.

[51] Albert’s argument that Gina should bear his costs of this proceeding is based on alleged bad faith on Gina’s part in the assertion of this claim. Albert suggests that Gina’s motive in asserting this claim was to drive up his costs. There is, however, no evidence that Gina was acting in bad faith in bringing this motion. Moreover, the record suggests that her delay in asserting this claim had to do with a change in her legal counsel, rather than any desire to delay the administration of the Estate as Albert suggests. More significantly, Gina had at least some reason to believe that she was the owner of the shares, based on a copy of the Shareholders Register provided to her by Mr. Crupi’s office. In addition, this issue arose essentially because the Deceased failed to attend to the corporate organization of ACC, thereby leaving a potential claim of Gina based on her view of her relationship with the Deceased. It was therefore not totally unreasonable for her to assert a claim to the ACC shares.

[52] Gina seeks costs of $22,362 from the Estate, representing a portion of her costs, for the preparation of the initial application record and for bringing this issue to a hearing. She says there should be no award of costs for the balance of the hearing as, in her view, neither party was successful on the relief sought.

[53] It is not clear how Gina arrived at the amount she claims for costs. In any event, I do not see any legal basis for an award of a portion of her costs. In addition, in her case, while she was entitled to assert her claim, the evidentiary basis was weak and she was the unsuccessful party. While I do not think that there is basis for awarding costs against her, I also do not think that there is any basis for a partial award of costs in her favour at the expense of the beneficiaries of the Estate, given the relative merits of her claim.

[54] I also see no reason to defer fixing the costs until the ownership of the ACC shares is determined. As discussed above, the only remaining issue is whether the owner is Albert or the Estate. Under either scenario, Gina is the unsuccessful party. There is therefore no reason to defer addressing the costs in respect of her.

[55] Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Albert’s fair and reasonable costs of this motion are fixed at $55,000 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate and Gina’s request for an award of costs in her favour is denied.

The Motions for an Adjournment and Leave to Amend

[56] Gina seeks costs of approximately $15,500 on a substantial indemnity basis from Albert as costs of an adjournment motion that Albert withdrew at the start of the hearing of the motion on the ownership of the ACC shares. She also seeks costs of $5,000 on an all-inclusive basis in respect of Albert’s motion for leave to amend his Amended Notice of Cross-Application to seek declaratory relief regarding the application to Gina’s claim of ownership of the ACC shares of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c.24, Sch. B. I will address each submission in turn.

[57] As mentioned, Albert’s motion for an adjournment was withdrawn at the hearing. At the same time, Gina consented to Albert’s filing of a supplemental affidavit and a supplementary factum to which she had previously objected on the grounds that Albert was out of time. Albert either had, or had access to, the documents upon which he based his request for an adjournment. Further, the correspondence in the supplementary responding record filed by Gina indicates that there was no basis for the allegations that prompted Albert’s motion for an adjournment. Consequently, the motion would have been denied had it been heard by the Court.

[58] In these circumstances, Gina is entitled to her costs of the withdrawn motion against Albert. I am not persuaded however that Albert’s actions in bringing the motion for an adjournment are so egregious that they warrant costs on a substantial indemnity basis. They suggest a lack of organization and preparedness in respect of a very important issue for both parties, rather than an abusive effort to avoid the hearing of the motion. On the other hand, I see no basis for an order that the Estate bear these costs for the reason that the motion did not further the administration of the Estate in any respect.

[59] Accordingly, I find that Gina is entitled to her costs of the withdrawn motion on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $10,500 on an all-inclusive basis payable by Albert.

[60] Albert’s motion for leave to amend his Amended Notice of Cross-Application was adjourned on consent. It is therefore inappropriate to award any costs in respect of this motion at this time. Costs are remitted to the motion judge hearing this motion.

Gina’s Claim for Costs of Obtaining Certain Production Orders

[61] Gina also seeks costs of $8,300 representing the costs on a substantial indemnity basis of obtaining two court orders for the production of Mr. Zeppieri’s estate administration file and his estate planning file. She says she did not receive the benefit of the estate administration file as it was produced only to Alberto Sr.

[62] None of the parties has opposed this request. Accordingly, Gina’s costs in this amount are payable by the Estate. However, as noted in a footnote to her costs outline, this amount is included in the costs that Gina claims in respect of the motion regarding 18 Boyle Drive. As indicated above, I have made an adjustment to the costs in respect of that motion to include the amount of these costs on a substantial indemnity basis. Accordingly, no further award is necessary to reflect these costs.

Consent Orders

[63] Lastly, Gina seeks her costs arising in respect of the negotiation and settlement of two consent orders of Dunphy J. dated January 30, 2018. These orders provided, among other things, for the appointment of an estate trustee during litigation and a manager of ACC and Trezzi Construction.

[64] In his Notice of Cross-Application, Albert also sought the appointment of a third party professional estate trustee and a monitor or receiver/manager in respect of these corporations. Gina says that, nevertheless, considerable activity was required on her part, including but not limited to, extensive negotiations with Albert regarding the content of these orders.

[65] As there were no motions brought to obtain these orders, it cannot be said that Gina was the successful party. Gina submits however that she should be entitled to her costs out of the assets of the Estate as her actions benefitted the Estate. Albert opposes the payment of these costs. He says these issues were resolved between the parties without any motion and with the involvement of both parties who should therefore both be entitled to their costs if any costs are awarded to Gina. In addition, Albert argues that Gina’s costs outline in respect of these costs does not permit an assessment of her reasonable costs in relation to the negotiation of these orders.

[66] The Court had no involvement in the settlement of these orders. It is not in a position to assess the reasonableness of Gina’s claim for costs in respect of these orders based on her submission and her costs outline. In any event, the appropriate time to have addressed her claim for costs in respect of these orders, or a procedure for determining her entitlement to costs, was the hearing before Dunphy J. on January 30, 2018.

[67] Accordingly, this claim for costs is denied.

Conclusion

[68] In summary, the following costs are payable with respect to the motions and related matters:

• 18 Boyle Drive:
  • Gina is entitled to costs of $92,542 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate; and
  • Emily and Bianca are entitled to costs of $20,000 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate.
• Extension of Gina Trezzi’s Rights under the Family Law Act:
  • Gina is entitled to costs of $18,000 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate.
• Corporate Assets:
  • Gina is entitled to costs of $22,500 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate; and
  • Albert is entitled to costs of $22,500 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate.
• Share Ownership of ACC:
  • Albert is entitled to $55,000 on an all-inclusive basis payable by the Estate for the motion regarding the ownership of the shares of ACC; and
  • Gina is entitled to $10,500 on an all-inclusive basis payable by Albert for the withdrawn motion for an adjournment.

Wilton-Siegel J. Released: June 6, 2019