COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-76-0 DATE: 2019/02/12 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MAHA IBRAHIM A. ALKHUDAIR Applicant – and – ABDULHAKEEM MOHAMMED S. ALOBAID Respondent

No one appearing for the Applicant Pam MacEachern, for the Respondent

HEARD: May 14, 2018

REASONS FOR decision D. SUMMERS J.

Nature of the Proceeding

[1] The central issue in this case is custody of the parties’ 8 year old son. The applicant mother commenced this proceeding in 2016 seeking orders for a divorce, sole custody, primary residence, specified access to the respondent father, child support, permission to travel with the child to Saudi Arabia without the respondent father’s consent and permission to relocate the child’s permanent residence to Saudi Arabia. She subsequently amended her application to include a claim for spousal support.

[2] The father opposed the relief sought with the exception of the mother’s claim for a divorce and child support. He brought his own claim seeking orders for joint custody and equal parenting time with the child or, in the alternative, sole custody with equal parenting time. He also sought to prohibit the mother from removing the child from the country without his permission.

[3] In August 2017, the mother took the child and left Canada for Saudi Arabia. She has not returned with the child or participated in these proceedings since then. The mother did not appear at the trial or provide any evidence.

[4] At the opening of trial, the father moved for an order to strike the mother’s application or, in the alternative, to dismiss it. I dismissed her application and the matter proceeded as a trial of the father’s counterclaims. In addition to the claims made in his pleadings, the father sought orders at trial for contempt, the immediate return of the child, police enforcement and a warrant for the mother’s arrest.

Background

[5] The parties married on June 18, 2008 and separated not quite 5 years later on January 20, 2013. Theirs’ was an arranged marriage.

[6] The mother and father are both citizens of Saudi Arabia by birth and came to Canada to study. They each received scholarships from the Saudi Government. Both parties became permanent residents of Canada in 2010.

[7] The father became a Canadian citizen. In 2015, the mother renewed her permanent resident status for another 5 years.

[8] The parties’ only child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, was born in Canada on September 24, 2010. Because the child was born to Saudi parents, he is a citizen of Saudi Arabia as well as Canada.

[9] Faris was 3 years old when his parents separated. He is now 8 years of age.

[10] The father is a surgeon. He works at two different hospitals – one in Ottawa and one in Hearst, Ontario. The mother was a PhD student in education at the University of Ottawa.

[11] In August 2017, without giving notice to the father, the mother took the child and left Canada for Saudi Arabia. The father learned of her departure after the fact when he received a letter from her lawyer.

[12] The father has had only minimal contact with his son since August 2017.

The Litigation History

[13] When the mother commenced this proceeding she also prepared an emergency motion for permission to travel with the child to Saudi Arabia for a month. She claimed the need to return to Saudi Arabia to gather research data for her thesis. The father consented and she abandoned her motion.

[14] In April 2016, the father served his answer contesting the relief sought by the mother. She replied with various allegations against the father.

[15] On April 25, 2016, Justice Doyle ordered that the child’s Canadian and Saudi Arabian passports be deposited with the father’s counsel and not be released without the express written consent of both parties or court order. Among other things, she also made an access order in favour of the father.

[16] The litigation quickly became high conflict.

[17] In May, 2016, the Children’s Aid Society (CAS) became involved with the family after receiving an anonymous call reporting child safety concerns in the father’s home. The CAS investigated and did not verify the allegations.

[18] In June, 2016, the mother contacted the police alleging that the father was sexually abusing the child. Once again, the CAS investigated and did not verify the safety concerns.

[19] The mother brought a motion to vary the access terms of Doyle J.’s order dated April 25, 2016. She sought to have access supervised. The motion was resolved on consent. The order of Justice Sheard dated July 5, 2016 includes a term that access continue as ordered by Doyle J., and that there be a custody and access assessment.

[20] At no time did the court make an interim custody order.

[21] In March, 2017, the custody and access assessment was completed and released to the parties. The assessor recommended joint custody and alternating weekly residency.

[22] On July 27, 2017, the mother sought leave to bring an urgent motion for permission to travel abroad with the child. Justice J. Audet dismissed the motion and ordered the mother to pay costs to the father of $3,000.

[23] Not long after Audet J.’s order, the mother took the child and moved him to Saudi Arabia without notice to the father. On August 18, 2017, the father came to court on a motion seeking an order for the return of the child. The mother’s counsel was present and she attended the motion by telephone until the connection was lost. Justice Engelking ordered the mother to return the child to Ottawa immediately, either personally or by delivering the child to the respondent’s brother. Engelking J. also ordered the mother to pay costs of $6,000 to the father.

[24] On September 7, 2017, an order was granted removing the mother’s counsel from the record.

[25] When the mother did not comply with the order of Engelking J., the father returned to court. On September 12, 2017, Justice C. MacLeod found the mother to be in contempt of the order of Engelking J. and gave her the opportunity to purge her contempt by returning the child to Canada or by delivering the child to the respondent father’s brother for return to Canada. In addition to finding the mother in contempt, MacLeod J. further ordered the mother to return the child to Canada or deliver him to the father’s brother or make the necessary arrangements with the father’s counsel for the immediate return of the child to Ottawa. Costs of $5,000 were ordered in favour of the father.

Dismissing the Mother’s Application

[26] The father brought a pre-trial motion to strike the mother’s pleadings or, in the alternative, for an order dismissing her application. As previously stated, the mother did not appear at the trial. The evidence satisfies me that she had proper notice. Both the court and the father’s counsel wrote to her a number of times about the trial and confirmed that it was scheduled to proceed in May, 2018. All communication with the mother was via email. That was the only available method of contacting her. By order dated September 7, 2017, Master Fortier authorized service by email. The mother did not answer the communications sent to her nor did she alert counsel or the court that she would not be attending the trial or providing any evidence.

[27] Just three days before trial, the applicant mother’s father sent an email to the court and to opposing counsel on behalf of his daughter. The email confirmed knowledge of the trial later in May, 2018, however, the purpose of the email was to tell the court what the author thought the judge should know and consider about the respondent father before rendering a decision. The respondent father entered the email into evidence as further proof that the mother had received notice of the trial. He otherwise denied the allegations that he was using the court system in Ontario to harass the mother.

[28] I allowed the father’s motion and dismissed the mother’s application.

[29] In addition to the mother’s failure to attend the trial, I also rely on rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (FLR’s). That rule states that when a person fails to obey orders made by the court in the case or a related case, the court has the authority to make the order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter. The list of possible orders under the rule includes an order to strike pleadings and an order dismissing a party’s claim. The judge has discretion whether to make an order, or not.

[30] Before the court exercises its discretion under r. 1(8) to strike pleadings or dismiss a party’s case for non-compliance, there is a three-step test to be applied; see Ciarlariello v. Iuele-Ciarlariello, 2012 ONSC 6636, (para. 52) that adopts the reasoning in Ferguson v. Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1, 2008 CarswellOnt 667 (Ont. C.J.). The first step is to determine whether a triggering event has occurred to engage the rule. Here, the answer is yes. By the time the matter reached trial, the mother was in breach of three orders made in this proceeding: the costs order of Audet J. dated July 27, 2017; the order of Engelking J. dated August 18, 2017 requiring her to return the child and pay costs; and the order of MacLeod J. dated September 12, 2017 also ordering her to return the child and pay costs.

[31] The second step for the court is to determine whether it should exercise its discretion in favour of the party in breach and not make an order under r. 1(8). This determination should include consideration of the relevant litigation history, specifically, the conduct of the party in breach. Only in exceptional circumstances will the non-complying party receive the benefit of the court’s discretion; see Ciarlariello.

[32] In the present case, I choose not to exercise my discretion in favour of the mother. I find no exceptional circumstances to warrant it. The mother took matters into her own hands and left with the child within days of the court denying her request for leave to bring an urgent motion for permission to travel. By her actions, she signals disregard for the authority of the court, the rights of the child and the rights of the father. The issues of where and with whom the child will live go to the very heart of this case. Since leaving, the mother has ignored two orders of this court requiring her to return the child to Ottawa – either by travelling with him or by arranging for him to travel with others. This conduct does not and cannot beget the benefit of the court’s discretion.

[33] When the court declines to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party, the third step is to determine the appropriate remedy. At this stage, the court has broad discretion under r. 1(8) to fashion the order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter. Considering that the mother was not present to tender any evidence to the court together with the facts as noted above, I find dismissing the mother’s claim to be a just result. Her disregard for court orders and refusal to obey them requires nothing less.

Jurisdiction to Decide Custody and Access

[34] After moving the child to Saudi Arabia, the mother started custody proceedings there. The father has defended those proceedings.

[35] It is his position that Ontario is the proper jurisdiction to decide custody of Faris. He relies on the provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 and denies the mother’s contention that he gave her permission to relocate the child to Saudi Arabia.

[36] This court’s jurisdiction to decide custody under the Divorce Act, 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) was lost when the mother obtained a divorce in Saudi Arabia. The Ontario Court of Appeal has been clear that the court in this province loses its jurisdiction to determine corollary relief claims under the Divorce Act, in the face of a valid foreign divorce. For relief to be corollary, it must be corollary to a divorce granted in Canada: see Okmyansky v. Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427. However, the Court of Appeal has been equally clear that if the foreign divorce order is silent on the issues of custody and child support, the court in Ontario can make orders for that relief under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Family Law Act: see Cheng v. Liu, 2017 ONCA 104.

[37] The divorce order granted to the parties by the Saudi court did not deal with custody and access and the pleadings before this court include claims for that relief under the Children’s Law Reform Act. Section 22 of the Act sets out the jurisdictional requirements for this court to determine a custody claim. It states:

s. 22 (1) A court shall only exercise its jurisdiction to make an order for custody of or access to a child where,

(a) the child is habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order;

(b) although the child is not habitually resident in Ontario, the court is satisfied,

(i) that the child is physically present in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order,

(ii) that substantial evidence concerning the best interests of the child is available in Ontario,

(iii) that no application for custody of or access to the child is pending before an extra-provincial tribunal in another place where the child is habitually resident,

(iv) that no extra-provincial order in respect of custody of or access to the child has been recognized by a court in Ontario,

(v) that the child has a real and substantial connection with Ontario, and

(vi) that, on the balance of convenience, it is appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised in Ontario.

(2) A child is habitually resident in the place where he or she resided,

(a) with both parents;

(b) where the parents are living separate and apart, with one parent under a separation agreement or with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other or under a court order; or

(c) with a person other than a parent on a permanent basis for a significant period of time,

whichever last occurred.

(3) The removal or withholding of a child without the consent of the person having custody of the child does not alter the habitual residence of the child unless there has been acquiescence or undue delay in commencing due process by the person from whom the child is removed or withheld.

[38] In the present case, the child, Faris, was born in Ottawa and lived here with his parents. After separation, he lived primarily with his mother and had another home with his father. Ottawa was the child’s only home. His school, his friends and his activities were here. His first language was English; his second was French. His health care professionals were here. His life was here. I find that Faris’ habitual residence was here in Ottawa when the mother started this application.

[39] The remaining question is whether the father gave his permission to change the child’s residence to Saudi Arabia as the mother contends. At the motion before Engelking J. on August 18, 2017, the mother relied on a document from the Saudi Arabian Embassy bearing the father’s signature and dated May 2, 2017. This document was before the court at trial. The certified translation reads:

Your Excellency, Ambassador of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to Canada,

I would like to inform Your Excellency that I have no objection to the travel of my son, Faris, with his mother to reside in Saudi Arabia, as I myself also want to return to my homeland where I was raised and enjoyed its many blessings. It is now time for me to return part of the favour to my beloved country. This has been what I wanted from the beginning before the other party sought the Canadian courts.

Abdulhakeem Mohamed Suliman AlObaid

Bearing the signature of Abdulhakeem Mohamed Suliman AlObaid on May 2, 2017.à

Bearing the seal of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Ottawa.

[40] The father does not deny signing the document but says he did not do so voluntarily. He says that the mother’s allegations and conduct worsen after the release of the custody and access assessment and on May 2, 2017, he was summoned to the Embassy and pressured by officials to sign the document as an indication of his loyalty to Saudi Arabia. He claims the Embassy assured him that the document would only be used to reassure the Home Office of his allegiance to country and would not be released to any other person for any other purpose. According to the father, the Saudi officials were aware of the court proceedings in Canada and had received copies of the pleadings from the mother. He says he was summoned to the Embassy again in June and and again in July, 2017. Then on July 21, 2017, he received an email from the Embassy expressing the hope that he would release the child’s Saudi passport and allow him to travel with the mother.

[41] The events following May 2, 2017 are consistent with the father’s position that he did not consent to the mother removing the child and she knew it. In particular, the father points to the motion before Audet J. on July 27, 2017, when he opposed the mother’s request to travel with the child in addition to what had been his ongoing efforts to establish a more generous access schedule. Moreover, I find the mother’s failure to ask for the child’s passports or notify the father that she was leaving to be in complete contradiction to her alleged belief that she had the father’s permission to leave with the child. It was not until his counsel contacted the mother’s lawyer to discuss possible dates for an access motion that the father learned that she was gone. He then took immediate steps ito obtain an order for the child’s return. He did not acquiesce or delay.

[42] For these reasons, I find that the mother did not have the father’s consent when she removed the child, therefore, her removal and withholding does not alter his habitual residence. Accordingly, s. 22(1)(a) and s.22(2)(a) of the Children’s Law Reform Act apply to give this court the jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody.

[43] Under s. 25 of this Act, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction to determine custody if of the opinion that it is more appropriate for custody to be determined outside Ontario. I hold no such opinion. I have not received any evidence to persuade me that it is more appropriate for custody to be decided in Saudi Arabia. Ottawa was Faris’ home for the first 7 years of his life. He is now only 8 years old. This is where he went to school, enjoyed his activities, made friends, and received his health care. This is where he was raised and parented by both his mother and father. There is no jurisdiction with which he has a more intimate connection than Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The mother cannot sever the connection by acting unilaterally to further her own goals of living with the child in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, I am mindful of the purposes of Part III of the Children’s Law Reform Act as set out under s.19. They are:

(a) to ensure that applications to the courts in respect of custody of, incidents of custody of, access to and guardianship for children will be determined on the basis of the best interests of the children;

(b) to recognize that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by judicial tribunals of more than one province, territory or state in respect of the custody of the same child ought to be avoided, and to make provision so that the courts of Ontario will, unless there are exceptional circumstances, refrain from exercising or decline jurisdiction in cases where it is more appropriate for the matter to be determined by a tribunal having jurisdiction in another place with which the child has a closer connection;

(c) to discourage the abduction of children as an alternative to the determination of custody rights by due process; and

(d) to provide for the more effective enforcement of custody and access orders and for the recognition and enforcement of custody and access orders made outside Ontario.

Custody

[44] At trial, the father pursued an order for sole custody of the child and an order for his immediate return to Ottawa. He says if the mother returns with the child, he remains amenable to the child spending equal amounts of time with each of them on a week about basis. The father contends that he and the mother were equal parents to their son in all respects during the marriage and for some time after separation. He says each was a loving, involved parent with much to offer Faris. In 2015, things began to change and increasingly the mother demonstrated her inability to put the child’s interests ahead of her own. She began resisting access requests and making decisions for the child on her own without involving him. When the father opposed her request to move the child’s permanent residence to Saudi Arabia as contrary to the child’s best interests, she embarked on a campaign of false allegations against him and withheld access. Unlike the mother, the father says he believes it is important for the child have a full and meaningful relationship with both of them.

[45] I consider the mother’s position only as set out in her pleading filed in reply and answer to the father’s counterclaims. There, she contends that the father is not a fit or involved parent. According to the mother, he was not interested in having a fixed and consistent parenting schedule until she brought the matter to court. She accuses him of abusing various substances, of abusing those substances while responsible for the child’s care, and of sexually inappropriate behaviour with the child. She says that they never intended to remain in Canada and as Saudi parents, they taught Faris the values of the Saudi Arabian culture.

[46] Section 20 of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that parents are equally entitled to custody of the child. Under s. 24, the merits of an application to court in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best interests of the child. When making that determination, s.24(2) states that the court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including,

(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,

(i) each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,

(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;

(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;

(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;

(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;

(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and

(h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application.

[47] In the years immediately following separation, the parties parented together largely without incident or need for an agreement or court order. For a time, they lived in the same apartment building although in separate apartments. The father says this arrangement made it possible to have regular if not daily contact with his son and extended overnight parenting time. These ad hoc measures worked for the parties until sometime in 2015 when the mother moved from their building and began to restrict access.

[48] When the father defended the mother’s claim to move the child’s permanent residence to Saudi Arabia, the matter quickly descended into high conflict litigation. There were frequent court appearances between April 26, 2016 and September 12, 2017.

[49] In the spring and summer of 2016, there were two CAS investigations. The first followed an anonymous report of safety concerns in the father’s home including drug and alcohol abuse. The second followed the mother’s report to the police that the father was sexually abusing the child. The CAS did not verify the concerns in either instance and the files were closed. The child protection worker’s notes reveal no concerns with the father’s abilities as a parent and state that the child was receiving excellent care. The notes further indicate concern for the risk of emotional harm to the child should additional allegations be made in the context of the parent’s custody and access dispute.

[50] Immediately after the mother made allegations of drug abuse, the father voluntarily arranged and submitted to drug testing for opiates, amphetamines, phencyclidine, cocaine and marijuana. The results were all negative but, nevertheless, the mother continued to withhold access and brought a motion for supervised access. The motion was resolved on consent and resulted in the order of Justice Sheard that continued the access order of Doyle J. dated April 25, 2016. Justice Doyle’s order did not require supervision.

[51] The child’s only known home was Ottawa. His first language was English. French was his second. He spoke only a few words of Arabic when he was removed by his mother.

[52] No order for interim custody was ever made.

[53] The custody and access assessment of Dr. Frances Smyth recommended joint custody and that the child live with each parent in alternate weeks. It was Dr. Smyth’s opinion that the father was a fit parent. She also strongly recommended against the mother having sole custody. She said that in her opinion, the mother would not facilitate a relationship between the father and the child considering her unfounded hostility toward him. This has been proven true by the mother’s unilateral conduct in removing the child to Saudi Arabia. Having regard to that conduct, I find it necessary to award the father sole custody as a means to protect his relationship with his son.

Contempt

[54] The father seeks an order finding contempt against the mother for her failure to return the child to Ottawa. On September 12, 2017, Justice MacLeod found the mother to be in contempt of Justice Engelking’s order dated August 18, 2017. Her order stated, “The Applicant, Maha Ibrahim A. Alkhudair, shall immediately return the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born September 24, 2010, to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.” He found that she was aware of the orders of this court and had chosen to ignore them. Justice MacLeod’s order further provided the mother with the opportunity to purge her contempt by returning the child to Canada as ordered by Engelking J. or by delivering the child to the father’s brother, Majeed Alobaid, for return to Canada. The mother has not complied and continues to be in contempt of Justice Engelking’s order. A finding of contempt is a final order; see R. v. Mershenesky, 2007 ONCA 679, [2007] O.J. No. 3777 (Ont.C.A.).

[55] I now consider whether the mother is also in contempt of Justice MacLeod’s order. In addition to the terms noted above, he further ordered:

3. The Applicant, Maha Ibrahim A. Alkhudair, shall return to Canada with the child, Faris Alobaid, born September 24, 2010, or deliver the child, Faris Alobaid, to Majeed Alobaid for return to Canada, or make arrangements with the Respondent through his counsel for the return of the child, Faris Alobaid. The child, Faris Alobaid, is to be returned to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada immediately.
4. The Canadian and Saudi Arabian passports of the child, Faris Alobaid, currently held by the lawyer for the Respondent, may be released to the Respondent or his brother, Majed Alobaid, in order to facilitate the child’s return to Canada.

[56] To determine whether a party is in contempt, the court must apply a three-part test: (i) the order that was breached must clearly and unequivocally state what should and should not be done; (ii) the party’s disobedience of the order must be deliberate and wilful; and (iii) the evidence must show contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubt must be resolved in favour of the alleged contemnor; see Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. G. (N.), 2006 ONCA 81792.

[57] A judge on a contempt motion generally retains some discretion to decline to make such a finding. An affirmative answer to each branch of the three-part test does not inevitably lead to a finding of contempt: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17. Contempt is a remedy to be used with great restraint. It is a remedy of last resort to enforce orders – especially in family law proceedings. It should be granted only where other enforcement options have failed; see Hefkey v. Hefkey, 2014 ONCA 44.

[58] I am satisfied that Justice MacLeod’s order clearly and unequivocally stated what was required of the mother to comply with Justice Engelking’s order as well as his own. She was to return the child to Canada herself and do so immediately. If she did not wish to travel to Canada herself, she was required to deliver the child to Majeed Alobaid for return to Canada. A further alternative was to make arrangements with the father’s counsel for the return of the child. I am satisfied on the evidence that the mother received a copy of the order and understood it. She is highly educated and more that capable of understanding the clear concise language of Justice MacLeod’s order. Once again, she chose to ignore an order of this court.

[59] I further find that the mother’s failure to return the child to the father to be deliberate and wilful. She did not provide the court with any evidence or reliable explanation to indicate otherwise. Her non-compliance is no accident. The email sent by her father just prior to trial includes assertions that the mother is unable to return to Canada. Even if true, they do not justify the mother’s failure to return the child. Both Justice Engelking’s order and Justice MacLeod’s order specifically allowed her to make alternative arrangements for the child’s return. I find that once again, the mother has chosen not to comply with the orders made by this court. I have no reasonable doubt of this and find the mother to be in contempt of Justice MacLeod’s order dated September 12, 2017.

Child Support

[60] Having found the father is entitled to sole custody of the child, Faris, the mother should pay child support to him. The only evidence that I have of her income relates to the non-taxable $66,000 annual scholarship that she received from the Saudi Government while she was a student here. Now that she is in Saudi Arabia, I have no evidence of income upon which to make an order for child support. The child support order currently in effect is the interim order of Doyle J. dated April 25, 2016 that requires the father to pay child support to the mother of $1,812 each month. In July 2017, that amount payable was increased on consent to $2,222 per month. That interim order ends with this final order.

My Order

[61] For the reasons given, this is my order:

1. Effective May 18, 2018, the respondent father, Abdulhakeem Mohammed S. Alobaid, shall have sole custody of the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born September 24, 2010 under s. 21 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. The child shall reside with his father in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
2. The applicant mother, Maha Ibrahim A. Alkhudair, shall immediately return the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born September 24, 2010 to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. In the alternative, she shall deliver the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, to the respondent father’s brother, Majeed Alobaid, for return to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, or make arrangements with the respondent through his Ottawa counsel for the immediate return of the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid.
3. The child’s passports currently held by the offices of the respondent’s counsel shall immediately be released to the respondent, Abdulhakeem Mohammed S. Alobaid. He shall maintain control of the child’s passports and all other legal documents, such as his birth certificate and health card and he shall be solely responsible for renewing these documents.
4. The applicant shall, at her own cost, immediately take all necessary steps required to lift any travel ban that may have been imposed by the court in Saudi Arabia, or any other restrictions, that may prevent the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born September 24, 2010, from returning to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
5. The applicant shall not be permitted to travel with the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born on September 24, 2010, outside of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, without the written consent of the respondent as witnessed by a third party.
6. The applicant, Maha Ibrahim A. Alkhudair, continues to be in contempt of the Order of Justice Engelking, dated August 18, 2017, and is hereby found to be in contempt of the Order of Justice MacLeod dated September 12, 2017. The sentencing is adjourned until the Applicant returns to this jurisdiction.
7. A warrant for the arrest of the applicant, Maha Ibrahim A. Alkhudair, shall issue and she shall be brought before this Court to answer for her contempt under rule 31(5) of the Family Law Rules, O.Reg 114/99.
8. The Ontario Provincial Police, Ottawa Police Services, RCMP, sheriff's officers and any other police force having jurisdiction where the child, Faris Abdulhakeem Alobaid, born September 24, 2010, is present, shall locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the Respondent, Abdulhakeem Mohammed S. Alobaid. For this purpose, either the original court order or a certified copy of the order, shall be provided to the police force pursuant to section 36 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
9. For the purpose of locating and apprehending the child, a member of a police force may enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the child may be, with such assistance and such force as are reasonable in the circumstances and such entry or search may be made at any time.
10. Effective May 18, 2018, the interim child support payable by the Respondent father to the Applicant mother shall terminate. Any arrears of child support owing by the Respondent father shall be set off against the costs owing by the Applicant mother. If there is an amount of child support owing after the set off against costs, enforcement of that amount shall be stayed pending the mother’s return with the child.
11. The father is entitled to his costs. I will deal with that issue separately.

Madam Justice D. Summers Released: February 12, 2019