SCJ 2017

The defendant, State Farm, brought a motion for a neuropsychological examination of the plaintiff, Tie Cindy Li, by Dr. Mark Dowhaniuk.

The motion was brought under ss. 40(1) and 42(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) and, alternatively, Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff claimed catastrophic impairment due to a motor vehicle accident, alleging cognitive impairment, among other issues.

The court found the examination necessary to determine the plaintiff's entitlement to benefits and whether the impairment was catastrophic, preferring the defendant's experts' opinions over the plaintiff's.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

During a jury trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police after he called 911 regarding his roommate's medical emergency.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of the accused's s. 10 Charter rights, alleging he was psychologically detained without being cautioned.

The court found that a reasonable person in the accused's position would not have felt detained, as the police were responding to a medical emergency and had no reason to suspect foul play at the time.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The accused was found guilty of communicating with a person under 14 for the purpose of facilitating child pornography.

Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan and the Morin guidelines, finding a total delay of 47 months after deducting defence delay.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay exceeding the 30-month ceiling.

The court concluded the accused's rights were violated, quashed the conviction, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought an application under the Civil Remedies Act for the civil forfeiture of $25,610 CAD and $80 USD seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

An interested party opposed the application, claiming the funds were intended for the purchase and export of used cars to Nigeria.

The court found the interested party's evidence lacked credibility and concluded the funds were either proceeds of drug trafficking or an instrument for illegal, unlicensed car trading.

The court held the interested party failed to establish legitimate ownership and ordered the funds forfeited to the Crown.

Following a successful application regarding the ownership of a parkette, the successful municipality sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent developers argued that no costs should be awarded as the matter involved public interest and was litigated in good faith.

The court rejected the public interest argument, finding the developers were seeking a private windfall.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case and the developers' vexatious conduct during discovery, the court awarded the municipality $210,000 in costs.

The plaintiff sued the defendants, adjacent property owners, for environmental contamination allegedly caused by a former dry-cleaning tenant on the defendants' lands.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims of nuisance, negligence, and statutory liability under the Environmental Protection Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants had no knowledge of the contamination, did not authorize the nuisance, and owed no duty of care to monitor the tenant's activities.

The statutory claim failed because the defendants did not own or control the pollutant.

The accused and her son threatened their neighbour with death and threw a knife at her.

When police arrived to arrest them, a chaotic altercation ensued at the front door of their home, during which the accused struck two officers with a pot, and her son was fatally shot after stabbing an officer.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, uttering a death threat, and three counts of assault with a weapon.

The court rejected the accused's defence that the murder plot was merely a ruse to attract police attention, and found that the police were acting within their lawful authority when they attempted to arrest her son due to imminent safety concerns.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The parties separated and resolved all issues except the primary residence of their two young children.

The applicant father sought to maintain the interim week-about shared parenting arrangement, while the respondent mother sought primary residence.

The court considered the mother's history of post-partum depression and the father's active involvement in parenting, including caring for their son who has epilepsy.

Finding that the children were thriving under the status quo and that both parents provided stable, loving homes, the court ordered the continuation of the week-about shared parenting schedule and joint custody.

The Monitor brought a motion to sanction the Canadian Debtors' Plan of Compromise and Arrangement under the CCAA, which implemented a settlement allocating $7.3 billion in sale proceeds.

Two self-represented long-term disability (LTD) beneficiaries objected, arguing the Plan was unfair and violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by treating their claims pari passu with other unsecured creditors.

The court found the Plan fair and reasonable, noting it was approved by 99.7% of creditors.

The court dismissed the Charter arguments, holding that section 7 does not protect pure economic interests and that equal treatment of creditors in insolvency does not constitute discrimination under section 15.

The Plan was sanctioned.

The accused, charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his jury trial.

The accused argued that sitting in the dock would prejudice his right to a fair trial, erode the presumption of innocence, and limit his ability to instruct counsel.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security, sight-lines, and the lack of exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, applying the principles from R. v. Gervais, and found that the accused failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances necessitating a departure from the customary practice of sitting in the dock.

The Superior Court of Justice, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01, reviewed the plaintiff's action and related motions for dismissal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The action, concerning an involuntary hospitalization in 2010 and subsequent requests for inquiry in 2015, was found to be outside the applicable limitation period and lacking a discernable cause of action.

The plaintiff's submissions were deemed contemptuous and unhelpful.

The court dismissed the action and noted that two of the plaintiff's motions seeking orders compelling government investigations were also frivolous.

The father brought a motion to change seeking primary residence of the child, and the mother responded seeking sole custody.

The dispute arose after the father's new partner engaged in a criminal campaign of public mischief, creating fake social media accounts to harass the father and frame the mother, which led the mother to deny access.

The court found no material change in circumstances to justify altering the existing joint custody and primary residence arrangement.

The court restored the father's access but imposed conditions restricting the new partner's contact with the child.

The defendant solicitors requested an order dismissing the action against them under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff corporation alleged misappropriation of trust funds under the Construction Lien Act.

The court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the core allegation of misappropriation of trust funds was not plainly an abuse of process on its face, though noting the plaintiff risked adverse costs and must be represented by a lawyer.

The appellant, Anna Trubashnik, appealed her conviction for public mischief, arguing errors by the trial judge and seeking to admit fresh evidence, specifically a videotaped police interview and medical evidence.

The court applied the R. v. Palmer test for fresh evidence, relaxing the due diligence requirement for criminal cases.

It found the videotaped statement, which revealed the appellant's state of mind and doubts about the alleged robbery, to be relevant, credible, and potentially outcome-determinative.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial was ordered to allow the trial judge to consider this fresh evidence.

During a child protection trial involving allegations of sexual abuse, the parents moved for a mistrial after the presiding judge raised concerns that the Society's counsel had inadvertently undermined the credibility of the key witness, a vulnerable 17-year-old complainant, during examination-in-chief.

The judge granted the mistrial, finding that it was impossible to rule out that the witness's subsequent testimony was affected and that a reasonable apprehension of bias would arise if the trial continued, thereby compromising fairness to the parties and the integrity of the court process.

The defendant, Sun Life, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and that the proper forum was arbitration under the collective agreement.

The court reviewed the collective agreement, administrative services contract, and benefit booklet, noting contradictory language.

Applying the "essential character" test from Weber v. Hydro, the court found that the dispute, concerning entitlement to LTD benefits, arose from the interpretation, application, or administration of the collective agreement, even though the benefit plan was not explicitly incorporated.

The court concluded that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator and dismissed the action.

The moving parties, a law firm and its senior partner, were successful in a summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's action against them.

The plaintiff had alleged that the moving parties knowingly assisted in a dishonest and fraudulent act by their client, but provided no evidence to support this claim.

The court found that making such serious, unfounded allegations of fraud and dishonesty against lawyers warranted censure.

Consequently, the court awarded the moving parties their costs of the summary judgment motion on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 for fees plus disbursements.

The defendant, a former police officer convicted of dangerous driving causing death, made Facebook posts implying the deceased victim contributed to the fatal collision and criticizing her family.

The plaintiffs (the victim's family) sued for defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intrusion upon seclusion.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Facebook posts did not relate to a matter of public interest, but rather to the defendant's personal desire to shift blame and criticize private individuals.

The accused brought a pre-trial application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking to exclude drug evidence.

The police had entered a residence without a warrant after arresting the primary tenant outside, fearing the accused would destroy evidence inside.

The court dismissed the s. 8 claim regarding the search of the residence without a hearing, as the accused failed to establish a privacy interest.

The court further held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry under s. 11(7) of the CDSA, and that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused after observing him attempting to flush drugs down a toilet.

The application was dismissed.