SCJ 2015

Following earlier reasons directing that each party bear their own costs except those generated by counsel for the respondent necessitated by the applicant’s self-represented status, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The respondent filed a bill of costs seeking fees and disbursements totalling $2,767.03 including HST.

The applicant disputed certain entries and the inclusion of work allegedly outside the permitted category.

The court accepted that some interactions could not fully be attributed to costs caused by the self-represented status and reduced the claim.

Costs were fixed at $2,300.

A patent licence dispute arose concerning whether certain orthodontic brackets sold by the defendant were covered by a U.S. patent licensed to the defendant under a royalty agreement.

The plaintiff alleged the products fell within several patent claims and sought unpaid royalties and aggravated damages.

The court conducted a claim construction analysis under U.S. patent law principles and compared the patent claims with the accused products.

It held that although some claim elements were present, the products did not include the required "slidable locking shutter" operating through a sliding motion between open and closed positions.

Because a required claim element was absent, the products did not infringe the patent and were not covered by the licence agreement.

The defendant Crown filed a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking summary dismissal of a statement of claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs sought extraordinary relief including billions in damages and orders removing multiple judges from office and initiating criminal proceedings against them.

The court found the claim appeared to be a collateral attack on prior judicial decisions arising from the plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with earlier rulings.

Given the nature of the allegations and related proceedings commenced by the plaintiffs, the court concluded the action appeared frivolous and abusive on its face.

The court directed that notice be issued under Rule 2.1.01 and stayed the proceeding pending a written hearing on dismissal.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination after approximately ten years of employment within a family-run corporate group.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had been employed by two separate companies and that the earlier employer had terminated his employment prior to the transition.

The court held that the related corporations constituted a common employer due to common control, overlapping leadership, and integrated operations.

The court further found that the plaintiff had adequately mitigated his damages and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding damages for nine months’ notice plus out‑of‑pocket benefits losses.

The defendants filed requisitions under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of an action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The statement of claim alleged a wide-ranging criminal conspiracy involving financial institutions, a judge, government officials, and international figures, and sought trillions of dollars in damages.

The court noted the plaintiffs had commenced numerous similar proceedings and had previously had a claim dismissed under Rule 2.1.

Finding the pleadings facially problematic and potentially vexatious, the court initiated the Rule 2.1 process, stayed the action, and directed that the plaintiffs be given notice before a potential dismissal.

The defendants appealed an order of a Master granting leave to amend a statement of claim in a solicitor’s negligence action.

The appellants argued the amendments introduced new causes of action related to defamation and republication that were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the original pleading already contained the material facts necessary to ground the negligence claim based on the solicitor’s alleged failure to commence proceedings, including defamation claims arising from a police association news release and subsequent publications.

The amendments merely clarified and expanded on the same negligence theory rather than introducing new causes of action.

Applying the liberal amendment principles under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal.

The defendant brought an ex parte motion for default judgment on a counterclaim after the plaintiffs failed to deliver a defence to counterclaim and were noted in default.

The counterclaim alleged breach of a revenue-sharing arrangement and related misconduct concerning chiropractic services provided through a clinic, including withholding revenue, depositing insurance payments, and interference with contractual relations involving a locum practitioner.

The court accepted the pleaded allegations as true and assessed damages based on unpaid revenue, liquidated damages relating to a restrictive covenant breach, diminished income resulting from the breakdown of the business relationship, legal costs related to the counterclaim, and disbursements.

Pre-judgment interest was awarded pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

Judgment was granted in favour of the counterclaimant.

The defendants sought a stay of an action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 based on an arbitration clause in a shareholders’ agreement relating to a restaurant venture.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrepresentation inducing him to enter the agreement, breach of fiduciary duties, and oppressive conduct.

The court held that the misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims were tort-based and did not rely on the shareholders’ agreement, placing them outside the arbitration clause.

Although the oppression allegations relied on contractual obligations and fell within the clause, the court declined to order a partial stay because most claims were non-arbitrable and separation would create duplicative proceedings.

The motion for a stay was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff, a successful retail stockbroker, sued his former employer for breach of contract, alleging he was owed a 10% finder's fee on several large corporate finance transactions under an April 11, 2006 agreement.

The court found that the agreement was exclusively a retail document and did not apply to transactions involving the employer's Capital Markets group.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligent overpayment of his assistant, unjust enrichment, bad faith, and entitlement to unvested deferred stock units.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant, charged with marijuana-related offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months.

The court applied the Askov/Morin framework, attributing portions of the delay to inherent time requirements, institutional delay, the Crown, and the defence.

The court found the unjustified delay of almost 15 months fell within the Morin guidelines and that evidence of actual prejudice was weak.

The application was dismissed.

The minor plaintiff was injured when struck by a tow truck near the proposed defendants' home.

The minor's father was appointed litigation guardian and sued the tow truck owner and driver, who counterclaimed for negligent supervision and third-partied the homeowners.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs moved to add the homeowners as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the father knew the material facts on the day of the accident, and held that a litigation guardian's potential conflict of interest does not suspend the running of the limitation period.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order made by a case management judge in favour of certain defendants after the moving party had noted them in default.

The underlying dispute arose from procedural disagreements concerning the timing of a jurisdiction motion and related examinations.

The case management judge found the default tactic unreasonable and unnecessary given the defendants’ clear intention to defend and the availability of a scheduled case conference to resolve the procedural issues.

The court held there was no basis to doubt the correctness of the costs decision and that the dispute raised no issue of general importance warranting leave to appeal.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $42,469.53.

The plaintiffs opposed the costs award, arguing that special circumstances justified denying costs to the defendant.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no unreasonable conduct by the defendant.

The court reduced the claimed fees slightly due to some duplication of work and awarded the defendant $29,000 in fees, plus HST and $6,650 in disbursements, subject to clarification on a potential setoff claimed by the plaintiffs.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment for a mental disorder under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment due to delusional beliefs preventing appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication.

The court held that the Board’s finding of incapacity with respect to anti‑psychotic medication and related side‑effect medication was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the evidentiary record contained insufficient information regarding benzodiazepines and cholinergic medication.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the matter remitted to the Board for a rehearing on those medications before a differently constituted panel.

The court sentenced the offender after jury convictions for incest and sexual assault against his daughter, committed repeatedly over approximately two and a half years.

The abuse began when the victim was a teenager brought from Jamaica to Canada against her wishes, and it resulted in two pregnancies and two children, both confirmed by DNA testing.

Applying the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code and the appellate authorities on prolonged sexual abuse of children by adults in positions of trust, the court held that denunciation and deterrence were the dominant objectives and that the case fell at the high end of the sentencing range.

A sentence of 10 years for incest and 6 years for sexual assault, concurrent, was imposed, with 6 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and non-communication orders.

The defendant law firm moved under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a professional negligence and conflict of interest action for delay.

The action had been commenced in 1993 concerning legal advice provided in a 1987 building code appeal and alleged conflict arising from representation of another developer in 1990.

Over more than two decades the plaintiff repeatedly failed to move the case forward, delayed discoveries, postponed expert evidence for many years, and allowed significant periods of inactivity.

The court found the delay both inordinate and inexcusable and concluded that the presumption of prejudice to the defendant had not been rebutted.

The court also held the delay constituted an abuse of process under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The applicants sought certiorari quashing a summary conviction trial judge’s interlocutory order requiring them to personally attend their trial rather than appear only by counsel.

The underlying prosecution involved charges relating to possession and sale of unstamped cigarettes under federal and provincial tobacco legislation.

The applicants argued the trial judge fettered his discretion by relying on a local practice requiring accused persons to attend and that the order infringed Charter protections against arbitrary detention.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge exercised a broad discretion under s. 800(2) of the Criminal Code and considered both general and case‑specific factors.

No jurisdictional error was established and, in any event, the discretionary remedy of certiorari would not be granted.

Following a five-day civil trial in which the defendant obtained a complete dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the defendant sought costs of approximately $62,000 on a full indemnity basis after an unaccepted settlement offer.

The self-represented plaintiff’s submissions focused on challenging the dismissal rather than addressing the costs issue.

The court reaffirmed the general rule that costs follow the event and held that the plaintiff’s self-represented status and financial hardship did not displace that principle.

After considering the relevant factors governing costs, the court awarded a reduced amount.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $45,000 in costs inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable within 90 days if demanded.

In a child protection proceeding, the child’s father and step‑mother brought a motion seeking an order placing the child in their care and custody.

The court treated the motion as a temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act because no prior temporary care and custody hearing had been held.

Although the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm, the court found that the risk could be adequately addressed through a supervision order while the child remained with the mother and step‑father.

The court emphasized continuity of care, the stage of the proceedings, and the society’s position that supervision was appropriate.

The motion seeking placement with the father and step‑mother was dismissed.