SCJ 2015

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

In a criminal prosecution for robbery, the Crown brought a voir dire application seeking to admit recognition evidence from two civilian witnesses who identified the accused in surveillance video.

The defence conceded the admissibility of one witness but objected to the other on the basis that the probative value was low and the prejudicial effect outweighed it.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test articulated in Berhe and Brown, the court found the witness had sufficient prior familiarity with the accused from frequent interactions as a store customer.

The court concluded the witness was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused on the video and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice.

The recognition evidence was admitted on a threshold basis, with issues of reliability left for the jury’s assessment of weight.

Following a 16‑day family law trial in which the applicant was successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award after 15 years of litigation.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs exceeding $777,000, arguing the respondent engaged in bad faith conduct and unreasonable litigation behaviour, including misleading evidence about property ownership and income.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court found the respondent acted in bad faith and repeatedly frustrated the litigation process.

The court held that full recovery costs were appropriate and rejected arguments based on proportionality and inability to pay.

Costs were fixed at $716,711.11 in favour of the applicant.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on firearms offences, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence of knowledge and control.

The underlying evidence included a submachine gun and ammunition concealed in a barrel in a bedroom, along with documents bearing the accused’s name and the address of the residence.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the accused on a drug trafficking charge but committed him on the firearms offences.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the limited weighing approach required for circumstantial cases and correctly assessed whether the evidence was capable of supporting the Crown’s inferences.

There was some evidence linking the accused to the bedroom and residence sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, facing drug trafficking charges, brought a Garofoli application alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter and seeking to quash a wiretap authorization.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that police were grossly negligent or deliberately misleading in their presentation of a police agent's reliability and information.

The court reviewed the ITO, excising inappropriate material and amplifying it with evidence from the hearing.

The court found that the police agent was not a confidential informant at the time the ITO was considered, and his information, corroborated by other sources, provided sufficient grounds for the authorization.

The court concluded there was no police misconduct or gross negligence, and the ITO was facially valid.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and failed to make the breath demand as soon as practicable.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by requiring the facts to be exclusively consistent with alcohol impairment to form reasonable grounds, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the timeline of the breath demand.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, acting as litigation guardian for the deceased's two children, brought an application to remove the respondent as the estate trustee.

The respondent, who was the deceased's former common-law partner, had continued to occupy the deceased's home, used estate assets, and improperly claimed pension survivor benefits despite having separated from the deceased prior to her death.

The court found that the totality of the respondent's actions, including his hostility toward the beneficiaries and potential conflicts of interest regarding estate debts, raised real concerns about his ability to carry out his fiduciary duties.

The application was granted, the respondent was removed, and the alternate trustees named in the will were appointed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to provide a breath sample, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The alleged deficiencies were counsel’s abandonment of a Charter s. 11(b) delay application and the failure to call medical expert evidence supporting the defence that anxiety prevented the appellant from providing a breath sample.

Applying the test from R. v. G.D.B., the court held the appellant failed to establish either unreasonable professional conduct or resulting prejudice.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant’s factual account, meaning any expert opinion based on that account would not have altered the outcome.

The court dismissed the appeal and lifted the stay of the driving prohibition.

The court addressed disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of Minutes of Settlement in estate litigation between family members and an estate trustee during litigation.

Following earlier endorsements clarifying settlement terms, the judge directed the parties to submit competing draft orders reflecting the intended disposition.

The principal issues concerned the timing of a payment obligation tied to a $500,000 amount from an estate interest and whether provisions addressing the estate trustee’s role should appear in the final order.

Applying a “final offer selection” approach, the court concluded that the draft orders proposed by the estate trustee most accurately reflected the settlement and prior endorsements.

The court therefore signed and entered those orders.

The defendant moved for an order compelling the plaintiff, who resides in British Columbia, to post security for costs in an action alleging historical abuse.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis of impecuniosity.

The court found that the plaintiff had made full and frank disclosure of her financial circumstances, establishing that she was impecunious.

The court also found that the plaintiff's claim, which would largely turn on credibility, was not plainly devoid of merit.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed, with costs of $5,000 awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants in a securities class action brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Windsor to Toronto.

The plaintiffs opposed the transfer.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the plaintiffs' choice of venue was found to be reasonable, the court concluded that the defendants established that Toronto was a significantly better venue, given that a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was located there, and it was more convenient for the parties, witnesses, and counsel.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

A proposed purchaser under an agreement of purchase and sale sought leave to intervene in a mortgage enforcement proceeding where the defendants had brought a motion to stay a power of sale and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court considered Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing intervention by added parties.

The proposed intervenor demonstrated a real interest in the litigation because the outcome could affect his contractual right to complete the purchase of the property and his submissions would assist the court in assessing issues including fair market value.

The court found that at least one of the disjunctive criteria under Rule 13.01(1) was met and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings.

Leave to intervene as an added party on the defendants’ motion was granted.

The defendant, Romandale Farms Limited, brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of defence, add third parties, consolidate actions, and dissolve a 2007 interlocutory injunction in a complex commercial real estate dispute.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments, arguing prejudice, res judicata, and withdrawal of an admission.

The court granted leave to amend, finding no non-compensable prejudice and that the proposed defences were tenable and responsive to the plaintiff's amended claims regarding a partial settlement agreement.

The court also joined one third party for limited purposes to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and dissolved the 2007 injunction, as the plaintiff no longer claimed a proprietary interest in the land.

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the statement of claim alleging conspiracy, misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and interference with economic relations arising from alleged diversion of employees and business from a technology company.

The court held that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action against one defendant spouse because no material facts supporting any claim were pleaded against her, and struck the relevant paragraph and dismissed the action against her with leave to amend.

The court found that allegations supporting fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and civil conspiracy were adequately pleaded when the statement of claim was read as a whole.

However, the pleading failed to properly plead the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

That claim was struck with leave to amend within 30 days.

The moving defendants sought leave to appeal orders refusing to compel production of agreements between the plaintiffs and their content providers in satellite signal piracy litigation.

The defendants argued that documents showing programming acquisition costs were relevant to calculating the plaintiffs’ lost profit damages.

The court applied the tests under r. 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found no conflict with the cited Quebec decision and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s ruling.

Evidence indicated that any recovered amounts would flow through to content providers or SOCAN, making the requested documents irrelevant to the damages calculation.

The issues were fact‑specific and not of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

The parties separated after a 12-year marriage.

The applicant owned the matrimonial home prior to marriage.

The respondent claimed a constructive or resulting trust interest in the home due to its significant post-separation increase in value.

The court found that while there was a joint family venture resulting in unjust enrichment, a monetary award through the statutory equalization process was sufficient to remedy it.

The respondent's trust and occupation rent claims were dismissed.

The court also determined the value of a mortgage held by the applicant's father and calculated retroactive child support.

The applicant was ordered to pay a net equalization payment of $199,281.32.

The defendants sought costs following the plaintiff’s agreement to vacate certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) that had been obtained ex parte against their properties.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when obtaining the CPLs and that the defendants were therefore entitled to costs of the motion to vacate.

While the defendants requested full indemnity costs exceeding $74,000, the court held that the plaintiff’s conduct did not reach the egregious level required for full indemnity and instead justified substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and the indemnity principle, the court fixed reasonable fees at $35,000 plus HST and disbursements.

Costs were ordered payable within 30 days.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) seeking exclusion of drugs and other items seized following his arrest for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and that the subsequent searches of his person, vehicle, and backpack were unlawful, breaching ss. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances including confidential informant tips, corroborating surveillance, and the observation of a distinctive backpack linked to drug trafficking, the arresting officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds.

Even if a Charter breach had been established, the court concluded that the Grant factors would favour admission of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

An electrical subcontractor brought a construction lien action seeking payment for overtime and premium labour charges and other alleged extras arising from work performed during the construction of an automotive assembly plant.

The subcontract was a stipulated price agreement under the CCA1 standard form, requiring written notice of claims for adjustments to the subcontract price.

The court held that labour performed during premium shifts was within the scope of the subcontracted work and did not constitute “extra work.” The subcontractor also failed to comply with the contractual notice provisions, which operated as a condition precedent to recovery.

Most additional claims were dismissed for the same reason, although the defendant’s counterclaim for a back charge was also dismissed because the evidence did not establish that the subcontractor’s scope included the high-voltage work in question.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine discovered during a strip search following a traffic stop.

Police stopped a vehicle with mismatched licence plates and briefly questioned the passenger, who voluntarily provided identification that revealed he was bound by a probation order prohibiting association with persons with criminal records.

After learning the driver had a criminal record, police arrested the accused for breach of probation and discovered a hard object during a pat‑down search, leading to a strip search at the station that revealed cocaine.

The court held that the passenger was not detained during the initial roadside questioning and that brief requests for identification and relationship to the driver did not constitute detention or an unreasonable search under ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter.

The arrest and subsequent strip search were lawful and Charter‑compliant.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.