Her Majesty the Queen v. Nestlé Canada Inc. et al.; Hershey Canada Inc. et al., Intervenors

[Indexed as: R. v. Nestlé Canada Inc.]

Ontario Reports

Ontario Superior Court of Justice,

Nordheimer J.

February 4, 2015

124 O.R. (3d) 498 | 2015 ONSC 810

Case Summary

Criminal law — Evidence — Privilege — Accused charged with price fixing — Settlement privilege not attaching to information about alleged price fixing provided by intervenors to Competition Bureau pursuant to Immunity Program and Leniency Program — Intervenors not facing any prosecution or civil action arising from alleged price fixing — Scope of settlement privilege limited to attempts to use information in subsequent prosecution of person who provided it — Crown required to disclose information to accused even if settlement privilege applied as accused's right to make full answer and defence trumped public interest in encouraging settlement — Information subject to first party disclosure regime.

The accused were charged with price fixing contrary to the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 after an investigation by the Competition Bureau. The investigation began when one of the intervenors, Cadbury, provided information to the Competition Bureau under the bureau's Immunity Program. Cadbury was subsequently granted immunity from prosecution for the alleged price fixing. The intervenor Hershey also provided information to the bureau under the bureau's Leniency Program and entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which it was to receive lenient treatment in sentencing and its senior officers and employees were to obtain transactional immunity from prosecution. The accused sought disclosure of the information provided by the intervenors. The parties agreed that the information provided by the intervenors after the immunity agreement and the plea agreement were entered into was subject to disclosure. The Crown brought an application for a ruling about whether the information which was provided before the agreements were entered into was subject to settlement privilege. The intervenors took the position that it was, and Hershey also argued that it was subject to solicitor-client privilege.

Held, the application should be dismissed.

Solicitor-client privilege did not apply to the information. Hershey waived any solicitor-client privilege that might have attached to the information by providing the information to the Crown in the knowledge that the Crown could use it in prosecuting the accused. [page499]

The scope of settlement privilege is limited to attempts to use the information in any subsequent prosecution of the person who provided it. The intervenors were not facing any prosecution or civil action arising out of the alleged price fixing. Both intervenors knew, before their first contacts with the Competition Bureau under the Immunity Program and the Leniency Program, that any success they might achieve under those programs would be based on their ability to provide evidence that could be used against other persons. That was not an incidental aspect of the settlement negotiations; it was a critical aspect of them. Settlement privilege did not attach to the information in question.

Even if settlement privilege applied, there should be an exception to settlement privilege, so that factual information could be disclosed to the accused, on the basis of the right of the accused to make full answer and defence. An accused person's right to make full answer and defence must trump the public interest in encouraging settlement.

If settlement privilege applied and there was no exception for an accused's right to make full answer and defence, the immunity agreement and the plea agreement both contained clear waivers of the settlement privilege that would otherwise be found to attach to the information.

The information in question was subject to the first party disclosure regime. As the information was not clearly irrelevant, it should be disclosed to the accused.

R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Delorme, [2005] N.W.T.J. No. 51, 2005 NWTSC 34, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 431, 32 C.R. (6th) 128; Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., [2013] 2 S.C.R. 623, [2013] S.C.J. No. 37, 2013 SCC 37, 332 N.S.R. (2d) 1, 2013EXP-2138, J.E. 2013-1134, EYB 2013-223434, 37 C.P.C. (7th) 225, 446 N.R. 35, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 381, 22 C.L.R. (4th) 1, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 78; Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, [2014] S.C.J. No. 35, 2014 SCC 35, 457 N.R. 279, 55 C.P.C. (7th) 1, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 626, 2014EXP-1508, J.E. 2014-849, EYB 2014-236800, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 941, consd

Truscott (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 2667 (C.A.), distd

Other cases referred to

A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), 1995 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, [1995] S.C.J. No. 102, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 190 N.R. 329, J.E. 96-65, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92, 44 C.R. (4th) 91, 33 C.R.R. (2d) 87, 29 W.C.B. (2d) 154; Laudon v. Roberts, [2009] O.J. No. 1824, 2009 ONCA 383, 249 O.A.C. 72, 77 M.V.R. (5th) 165, 308 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 207, 178 A.C.W.S. (3d) 135; Ohl v. Cannito, 1972 CanLII 698 (ON SC), [1972] 2 O.R. 763, [1972] O.J. No. 1794, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 556 (H.C.J.); R. v. Egger, 1993 CanLII 98 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451, [1993] S.C.J. No. 66, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 678, 153 N.R. 272, 141 A.R. 81, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 21 C.R. (4th) 186, 15 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 45 M.V.R. (2d) 161, 19 W.C.B. (2d) 592; R. v. Hawkins (1996), 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), 30 O.R. (3d) 641, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, [1996] S.C.J. No. 117, 141 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 204 N.R. 241, 96 O.A.C. 81, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 2 C.R. (5th) 245, EYB 1996-67709, J.E. 96-2285, 32 W.C.B. (2d) 388; R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 38, 207 N.R. 145, [1997] 3 W.W.R. 457, J.E. 97-357, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 4 C.R. (5th) 259, 41 C.R.R. (2d) 266, 85 B.C.A.C. 162, 33 W.C.B. (2d) 229; R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, 2001 SCC 14, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 266 N.R. 275, J.E. 2001-564, 142 O.A.C. 201, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 40 C.R. (5th) 1, 80 C.R.R. (2d) 217, REJB 2001-22807, 48 W.C.B. (2d) 514; [page500] R. v. Mills, 1999 CanLII 637 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 248 N.R. 101, [2000] 2 W.W.R. 180, J.E. 99-2312, 75 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 244 A.R. 201, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 28 C.R. (5th) 207, 69 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 44 W.C.B. (2d) 124; R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 401 N.R. 104, 211 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 262 O.A.C. 1, EYB 2010-173421, 2010EXP-1559, J.E. 2010-852, 254 C.C.C. (3d) 469, 318 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 74 C.R. (6th) 1, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 407; R. v. O'Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235, 191 N.R. 1, [1996] 2 W.W.R. 153, J.E. 96-64, 68 B.C.A.C. 1, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 44 C.R. (4th) 1, 33 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 29 W.C.B. (2d) 152; R. v. Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97,131 N.R. 161, J.E. 92-16, 50 O.A.C. 125, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 9 C.R. (4th) 324, 8 C.R.R. (2d) 173, 14 W.C.B. (2d) 407; R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, 130 N.R. 277, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 97, 83 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 120 A.R. 161, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 8 C.R. (4th) 277, 18 C.R.R. (2d) 210, 14 W.C.B. (2d) 266; Unilever plc v. Procter & Gamble Co., [2001] 1 All E.R. 783, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2436, [2000] F.S.R. 344, [1999] 44 L.S. Gaz. R. 40, 143 Sol. Jo. L.B. 268, [1999] All E.R. (D) 1166 (C.A.)

Statutes referred to

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 11(

Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, ss. 34, 45, [as am.], (1)(b), (c), (d)

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 551.1 [as am.]

Authorities referred to

Competition Bureau Canada, Bulletin: Immunity Program under the Competition Act (Gatineau, Que.: Competition Bureau Canada, 2010)

Competition Bureau Canada, Bulletin: Leniency Program (Gatineau, Que.: Competition Bureau Canada, 2010)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Roundtables: Leniency for Subsequent Applicants (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012)

Paciocco, David M., and Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 6th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011)

APPLICATION for a ruling on whether settlement privilege applied to certain information.

C. Galligan and R. Morin, for applicant.

R. Kwinter and P. Schabas, for respondent Nestlé Canada Inc.

J. Rosen and J. Naster, for respondent Robert Leonidas.

S. Zucker and N. Tourgis, for respondent Sandra Martinez de Arévalo.

B. Greenspan, S. Forbes and N. Reid-Ellis, for respondent Mars Canada Inc.

R. Hughes, for respondent ITWAL Limited.

G. Jennings, for respondent David Glenn Stevens.

S. Maidment and N. Campbell, for intervenor Hershey Canada Inc.

C. Naudie and M. Sheeley, for intervenors Kraft Canada Inc. and Mondelez Canada Inc. [page501]

[1] NORDHEIMER J.: — The Crown brings this application by which it seeks a ruling from this court whether certain information, that is in the hands of the Crown as a result of it having been provided to the Competition Bureau by Hershey Canada Inc. and Cadbury Canada Inc. (now Kraft Canada Inc./ Mondelez Canada Inc.), in circumstances that I will come to describe, is subject to settlement privilege. If so, the applicant seeks a ruling as to the threshold or standard that is to be applied in determining whether the respondents are entitled to that information under the Crown's duty of disclosure.

[2] Given that the information in question belonged to Hershey and Cadbury, the parties consented to them being granted intervenor status on this application. Cadbury and Hershey strongly oppose any disclosure of the information. Indeed, it is much more the intervenors, not the Crown, who assert that settlement privilege applies to the information at issue and thus prohibits disclosure.

[3] I should add that I heard this application in my capacity as the case management judge for this proceeding appointed by order dated June 26, 2014, pursuant to s. 551.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

Background

[4] In order to determine the issues raised, it is necessary to set out some of the background facts that have given rise to the disclosure issue.

[5] The respondents are charged on a direct indictment preferred on June 21, 2013 with a number of counts of "price fixing" contrary to ss. 45(1)(b), 45(1)(c) and 45(1)(d) of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, following an investigation by the Competition Bureau.

[6] The investigation began on July 17, 2007, when Cadbury, through its counsel, contacted the Competition Bureau. The contact was made pursuant to the Competition Bureau's Immunity Program that is designed to encourage persons, who are involved in conduct contrary to the Competition Act, to come forward. The basic component steps of the Immunity Program are:

(a) A "marker" is granted if a party, typically through their counsel, identifies, on the basis of a limited hypothetical disclosure, the nature of the criminal offence it had committed in respect of a specified product.

(b) If the bureau provides a marker to the party, the party would then "proffer" to the bureau a detailed description of the illegal activity and disclosure of information it had. The [page502] proffer would typically be made in hypothetical terms by the applicant's legal representative. The bureau would generally require, with sufficient detail and certainty, the nature of any records the party could provide, what evidence potential witnesses could give and how probative the evidence is likely to be. In addition, the bureau could request an interview with one or more witnesses, or an opportunity to view certain documents, prior to recommending that the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada grant immunity.

(c) Subject to certain conditions, including full co-operation and disclosure, if the bureau was unaware of the offence, and the party was the first to disclose it, the commissioner would provide all of the relevant information and recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada that immunity from prosecution be granted.

[7] Cadbury's counsel advised the Competition Bureau that a preliminary, but ongoing, internal investigation had revealed what appeared to be a domestic price-fixing cartel, that had been shut down in respect of Cadbury, but might be ongoing for other parties. Cadbury's counsel indicated that interviews with Cadbury employees had started but that their internal investigation would take some time, given the electronic nature and volume of information to review and the location of witnesses. Before Cadbury approached the bureau, the bureau had no knowledge of the alleged anti-competitive conduct reported by Cadbury and was not investigating, or contemplating investigating, the chocolate confectionery industry.

[8] On August 29, 2007, a "proffer" meeting took place at the bureau during which Cadbury's counsel disclosed to the bureau details of information they had gathered during the course of their investigation. The information disclosed by Cadbury's counsel included information obtained from interviews they had conducted of various Cadbury officers and employees, who divulged statements purportedly made by the respondents Leonidas and Martinez.

[9] Following the proffer meeting of August 29, 2007, Cadbury's counsel and bureau officers, along with counsel from the Public Prosecution Services of Canada ("PPSC"), frequently and extensively communicated as Cadbury's counsel continued to provide information to the bureau regarding the ongoing investigation. Cadbury's counsel provided insight into the meaning of records they provided to the bureau, as well as information regarding meetings and communications that had occurred between Cadbury representatives and the accused. [page503]

[10] The bureau obtained search warrants and executed them against the corporate accused, along with Hershey, in November and December 2007. The first search warrants were granted upon the information to obtain ("ITO") of a bureau officer. This ITO had a confidential appendix with exhibits. The grounds for belief were based on information provided to the officer by Cadbury's counsel, bureau interviews of Cadbury employees, records received from Cadbury as part of Cadbury's application for immunity under the Immunity Program, and corporate information services and other public records.

[11] On October 19, 2007, Cadbury agreed to proceed under the Immunity Program. The Director of Public Prosecutions agreed to grant Cadbury immunity as of November 28, 2007. On May 13 and 14, 2008, an immunity agreement was executed by Cadbury and by counsel from the PPSC on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Under this agreement, Cadbury received transactional immunity from prosecution in this matter, as did its senior officers and employees.

[12] After the execution of the search warrants, on December 1, 2007, counsel for the intervenor, Hershey, spoke with the senior deputy commissioner, and head of the Criminal Matters Branch, of the bureau. Hershey's counsel was seeking a "second-in" marker for Hershey. Hershey was dealing with issues from the search and was still investigating whether it had been involved in an offence. If it had, Hershey wanted to co-operate, seek leniency and resolve the matter by way of settlement.

[13] In response to this inquiry, the senior deputy commissioner advised Hershey's counsel that the second-in status was confirmed. She described the bureau Leniency Program -- in particular that the bureau's recommendation to the Director of Public Prosecutions for leniency would be based on the timing and value of Hershey's co-operation. A further conversation regarding Hershey's intentions and the Leniency Program took place on December 4, 2007.

[14] On January 7, 2008, a proffer meeting took place at the bureau during which Hershey's counsel disclosed to the bureau details of information they had gathered during the course of their investigation of Hershey's role in this matter. The information disclosed by Hershey's counsel included information Hershey's counsel had obtained from interviews they had conducted of various Hershey officers and employees, which led them to believe that there was evidence implicating both Hershey and the accused. Following the proffer meeting, Hershey's counsel continued to provide information to the bureau. [page504]

[15] On June 11, 2010, Hershey and the PPSC concluded an agreement in principle, described as a memorandum of agreement. Subsequently, a plea sgreement was executed on February 2 and 4, 2011. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Hershey was to receive lenient treatment in sentencing and its senior officers and employees obtained transactional immunity from prosecution.

[16] Hershey pleaded guilty on June 21, 2013 to one count of price-fixing, contrary to s. 45 of the Competition Act, in connection with this matter. Hershey was fined $4 million and the court issued a prohibition order against Hershey, under s. 34 of the Competition Act. A statement of admissions and agreed facts was filed at the proceeding.

[17] Throughout its investigation, the bureau has received information about the accused's participation in anti-competitive conduct through the co-operation of Cadbury and Hershey. Cadbury's and Hershey's counsel provided information to the bureau, not only drawn from documents but also drawn from interviews that they had conducted with officers and employees of their respective clients. Cadbury and Hershey are contractually obligated to continue to co-operate throughout the prosecution of the accused, including providing the evidence of certain officers and employees, based on the agreements between the intervenors and the Crown, described above.

[18] The Crown first made disclosure to the accused pursuant to its disclosure obligations on June 19, 2013. Additional rounds of disclosure were given to the accused: September 5, 2013 (round 2), December 18, 2013 (round 3), February 24, 2014 (native files), March 20, 2014 (round 4), May 29, 2014 (round 5) and October 1, 2014 (round 6). Some of the disclosure provided was subject to editing. Some records were withheld because of various forms of privilege.

[19] During this disclosure process, the Crown realized that it had disclosed some documents over which settlement privilege ought to have been claimed, since the intervenors had not given a waiver of that privilege. On June 13, 2014, the Crown asked that the disclosed records over which there was a claim of settlement privilege be returned to the Crown, or deleted from the files of defence counsel, since the intervenors had asserted their privilege and asked that the Crown seek the immediate return or removal (or destruction) of the records from the databases of counsel for the accused.

[20] On June 18, 2014, the accused declined to return the documents or otherwise delete them. It is the position of the accused that they are entitled, not only to the material disclosed, [page505] but also to other material held back from them by the Crown also on the ground of settlement privilege.

The Immunity Program and the Leniency Program

[21] Before turning to the issues and my analysis, I should set out some of the particulars regarding the Competition Bureau's Immunity Program and Leniency Program and how they led to the agreements that were signed by Cadbury and Hershey in this case.

[22] There is no issue that both of these programs are designed to encourage persons (normally corporations) to "come clean" about anti-competitive conduct in which they have been engaged. It is well recognized that the effective prosecution of anti-competitive activities, especially cartel activities directed at price-fixing and like anti-competitive conduct, can ordinarily only be discovered, and prosecuted, if a party to the cartel comes forward and reveals both the existence of the cartel and the parties to it. It is equally well recognized that, while distasteful on one level, it is nonetheless in the public interest, in terms of combatting these illegal activities, to offer people who participate in them either immunity, or a more lenient penalty, in order to get at the other parties who have also participated. In other words, there is a practical public interest in providing incentives to parties, who have engaged in anti-competitive activities, to reveal their actions and thus permit the successful prosecution of the other participants.

[23] This rationale for these types of programs has been adopted internationally. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in its 2012 Policy Roundtables: Leniency for Subsequent Applicants (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012) described the rationale, at p. 11:

The rationale for offering immunity to a cartelist who decides to break ranks, report the cartel to the authorities and co-operate by providing help to convict the other cartel members, is that the benefits for society derived from such co-operation outweigh the public interest in punishing the co-operating corporation. These benefits include increased detection rate, destabilising effects on cartels, cost savings in investigation and prosecution as a result of the applicant providing evidence directly from within the cartel, litigation savings and so on. All these benefits combined result in greater deterrence of cartel conduct by the competition authority without the need for corresponding resource investment.

[24] As a result of these realities, the Competition Bureau developed these two programs. While I do not consider it necessary to go into great detail regarding these programs, they both start with a party approaching the bureau with information [page506] about anti-competitive activities. If the bureau is not otherwise aware of the anti-competitive activities involved, and is satisfied that the party will provide valuable information regarding those activities, the bureau will accept them into one or the other of these programs, depending at what stage the contact is made.

[25] As I referred to above, this process begins with a "proffer", that is, the providing of information from the party to the bureau regarding the activity in question. Usually, this information is provided by counsel for the party and is cloaked in "hypothetical" terms. While the hypothetical cloak may be a nice legal adornment for what is actually occurring, it is clear that the reality is that the party's counsel is engaged in providing very detailed information to the bureau about very real conduct.

[26] It is also clear that the bureau has at least two objectives in this proffer process. One is to get as much information as possible, and in as much detail as possible, respecting the activity in question. The other is to evaluate whether the information being provided is reliable and will be able to provide the foundation for a successful prosecution of the other parties involved. After all, there is no point, from the bureau's perspective, in providing immunity to a party if the result of that immunity is not going to lead to the bureau's positive ability to secure convictions for the other offenders. This point is clearly made in the bureau's information bulletin for the Immunity Program under the Competition Act (Gatineau, Que.: Competition Bureau Canada, 2010), at para. 24: "The Bureau will need to know with sufficient detail and certainty the nature of any records the applicant can provide, what evidence or testimony a potential witness can give and how probative the evidence is likely to be."

[27] As a consequence, both programs require the party seeking immunity or leniency to agree to undertake certain obligations. Two of those obligations are of particular importance. One is that the party receiving immunity or leniency must provide full, frank and truthful information including all "non-privileged evidence, information and records" in its possession or control. The other is that the party receiving immunity or leniency must use all reasonable and lawful measures for the purpose of securing the ongoing, complete, timely and truthful co-operation of any individuals who receive immunity or leniency as a consequence of the agreements entered into with that party. In this case, the agreements entered into by Cadbury and Hershey both accorded immunity to all current and former officers, directors and employees of those corporations. [page507]

The Issues

[28] The central issue is whether settlement privilege applies to the information in question. If settlement privilege does apply, then there are secondary issues to be addressed; namely, (i) has the settlement privilege been waived or (ii) is there an exception to the settlement privilege such that the accused are entitled to the otherwise privileged information. I say that this is the central issue while recognizing that there are disagreements between the Crown and the intervenors as to the proper basis upon which the information is protected from disclosure, there are disagreements between the intervenors themselves as to the privilege that attaches to the information and, of course, there are disagreements between the Crown and the intervenors, on the one hand, and the accused, on the other, about virtually every aspect of the issues raised. I will address those disagreements when I come to deal with the various positions advanced.

[29] I should make it clear that the information that is at issue is the information provided by counsel for the intervenors during the proffer process. It is the proffer process that leads to the completion of either an immunity agreement or a plea agreement depending on whether the proffer process takes place under the Immunity Program or the Leniency Program. There is no issue that any information provided subsequent to the entering into of the immunity agreement (in the case of Cadbury) or the plea agreement (in the case of Hershey) must be disclosed to the accused under the Crown's duty of disclosure.

[30] That duty of disclosure is set out in R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83. In summary, the Crown must disclose to an accused person all information in its possession, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, unless the information is "clearly irrelevant" or is protected from disclosure by privilege. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada explained why the test for relevance is a very broad one. In R. v. Egger, 1993 CanLII 98 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451, [1993] S.C.J. No. 66, Sopinka J. said, at p. 467 S.C.R.:

One measure of the relevance of information in the Crown's hands is its usefulness to the defence: if it is of some use, it is relevant and should be disclosed -- Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 345. This requires a determination by the reviewing judge that production of the information can reasonably be used by the accused either in meeting the case for the Crown, advancing a defence or otherwise in making a decision which may affect the conduct of the defence such as, for example, whether to call evidence.

[31] I should at this point outline the respective positions taken on this application: [page508]

(a) Crown: The Crown submits that settlement privilege applies to the information and should only be disclosed to the accused if it meets the appropriate test for an exception to the privilege. While the Crown initially submitted that the appropriate test for an exception is the test set out in R. v. Mills, 1999 CanLII 637 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, by the conclusion of the application, the Crown had altered its position to submit that the appropriate test is what I would say is more in line with the test set out in R. v. O'Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98.

(b) Cadbury: Cadbury also submits that settlement privilege applies to the information. However, Cadbury submits that the appropriate test for an exception from the privilege is the "innocence at stake" test set out in R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13.

(c) Hershey: Hershey submits that it is solicitor/client privilege that applies to the information and, consequently, also submits that the appropriate test is the "innocence at stake" exception that was established as the exception for that privilege by the decision in McClure.

(d) Accused respondents: Collectively, the accused submit that settlement privilege does not apply to the information. However, if it does, the accused say it must be disclosed to them, either because the privilege has been waived, or because their rights to make full answer and defence outweigh the policy reasons for the existence or application of settlement privilege. The respondents submit that none of the exceptions proposed, either by the Crown or by the intervenors, apply in this case. Rather, the respondents say that the Crown's duty of disclosure under Stinchcombe requires the disclosure of this information to the accused because the information is already in the hands of the Crown.

[32] The parties say that there are only two Superior Court (and no appellate) decisions that address this issue in the criminal context. They are R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (Gen. Div.) and R. v. Delorme, [2005] N.W.T.J. No. 51, 2005 NWTSC 34. It is said that these two decisions conflict in their approach. It is also said that considerable time has passed, and the law has developed (notably by the Supreme Court of Canada) since these decisions were reached, such that they cannot now be safely applied to determine this issue. On that latter point, particular reference is made to two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. [page509] One is Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 623, [2013] S.C.J. No. 37 and the other is Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, [2014] S.C.J. No. 35, both of which discuss settlement privilege, albeit in the context of civil proceedings.

Solicitor/client privilege

[33] Before I turn to what I have said is the central issue, namely, the application of settlement privilege, I will first address the submission of Hershey that solicitor/client privilege applies to this information. I see no merit to that submission. Even assuming that solicitor/client privilege could have attached to the information as it was gathered by Hershey's counsel, for the purpose of advising Hershey on this matter, once Hershey chose to instruct its counsel to approach the Competition Bureau, and reveal that information to the bureau for the purpose of entering into a plea agreement pursuant to the Leniency Program, Hershey must be seen as having waived any solicitor/client privilege that attached to the information.[^1]

[34] Generally speaking, a party who reveals solicitor and client information to a third party will be found to have waived the privilege that would otherwise attach to the information. That is certainly true when the information is being revealed to an adverse party, especially a prosecuting authority such as the Competition Bureau. This point was succinctly made in Bernardo, where LeSage J. said, at para. 15:

Solicitor-client privilege applies to communications between counsel and the client and to communications that are necessarily incidental to the client's representation. They would not normally apply to a situation such as this where it has been divulged to a party adverse in interest, i.e. the Crown.

[35] The only authority to which Hershey points, that it submits contradicts this conclusion, is Truscott (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 2667 (C.A.). In that case, the Kaufman report had been provided to the Court of Appeal for the limited purpose of assisting the case management of the reference that the Minister of Justice had directed to the Court of Appeal. The copy of the report, deposited with the court, had been sealed. Some parties to the reference, and some media organizations, sought access to the report on the grounds that the Minister of Justice had waived [page510] the solicitor/ client privilege, that everyone acknowledged had originally attached to the report, by delivering a copy to the court. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Minister of Justice had not waived solicitor/client privilege. The Court of Appeal said, at para. 8:

In our view, the context and circumstances under which copies of the Report were provided to the court and the parties belies the moving parties' submission that the Minister of Justice intended to and did, in fact, waive solicitor and client privilege over the Report. The strictly controlled production of the Report to the court and the parties, for the limited purposes of determining whether the Report should be made public and for case managing the Reference process, hardly attests to a clear and unequivocal intention on the Minister's part that the Report should be made available to the public at large.

[36] There is no comparison between the facts underlying the decision in Truscott and the situation that is before me. Among all of the other distinctions between the two cases, in Truscott, the privileged material was not provided to a person who was adverse in interest to the privilege holder. Rather, the report had been provided to the court and for the specific purpose I have mentioned. Hershey's reliance on this decision is simply misplaced.

[37] I would also note that, while I have assumed that solicitor/client privilege applied to this information originally, that does not mean that the privilege would continue for all purposes. It has long been held that solicitor/client privilege cannot be relied upon to refuse to disclose factual information, once the party who claims the privilege comes under a duty to disclose at, for example, an examination for discovery. Consequently, information obtained by counsel for a party, in preparation for litigation, cannot be withheld in the discovery process on the basis of solicitor/ client privilege, insofar as factual information has been conveyed to the party by a witness.[^2]

[38] In this case, of course, Hershey knew that a fundamental purpose of the Leniency Program was to obtain information from it that the Crown could use in prosecuting the accused. With that knowledge, Hersey provided this information to the Crown. That act would suggest either that Hershey did not view the information as privileged, or that it was content to waive the privilege in order to achieve its goal of receiving lenient treatment. As I have said, Hershey did so with full knowledge that the Crown would use the information provided by it in [page511] furtherance of the prosecution against the accused. Given that context, Hershey must also have provided the information with full knowledge of the Crown's general duty of disclosure that accompanies a prosecution, which I mentioned earlier. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how solicitor/client privilege has any opportunity to cling to the information that was placed into the hands of the Crown by Hershey.

Settlement privilege

[39] I turn then to the issue of settlement privilege. I begin with some basic considerations. First is a definition of settlement privilege, that I take from Union Carbide, where Wagner J. said, at para. 31:

Settlement privilege is a common law rule of evidence that protects communications exchanged by parties as they try to settle a dispute. Sometimes called the "without prejudice" rule, it enables parties to participate in settlement negotiations without fear that information they disclose will be used against them in litigation.

[40] The second consideration is the nature of the privilege, that is, whether it is a class privilege or a case-by-case privilege. There was some implication in past cases that there were only two class privileges, namely, solicitor/client privilege and informer privilege.[^3] However, spousal privilege is also treated as a class privilege: R. v. Hawkins (1996), 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), 30 O.R. (3d) 641, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, [1996] S.C.J. No. 117. This is a matter of some importance because class privileges are of a higher quality than are case-by-case privileges. Is settlement privilege, then, a class privilege?

[41] While there may have been some doubt on that issue in the past, that doubt was clearly removed by the decision in Sable Offshore, where Abella J. said, at para. 12: "Settlement privilege promotes settlements. As the weight of the jurisprudence confirms, it is a class privilege."

[42] The effect of a privilege being a class privilege is set out in R. v. National Post, supra,where Binnie J. said, at para. 42:

Once the relevant relationship is established between the confiding party and the party in whom the confidence is placed, privilege presumptively cloaks in confidentiality matters properly within its scope without regard to the particulars of the situation. [page512]

[43] A class privilege has equal effect whether the proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. As noted by L'Heureux-Dubé J. in A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), 1995 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, [1995] S.C.J. No. 102, at para. 39:

A class privilege entails a prima facie presumption that such communications are inadmissible or not subject to disclosure in criminal or civil proceedings and the onus lies on the party seeking disclosure of the information to show that an overriding interest commands disclosure.

[44] All of that said, it nonetheless appears that all class privileges are not created equal. If one reviews the various cases that speak of the different class privileges, it becomes apparent to the reader that solicitor/client privilege and informer privilege occupy a position in the hierarchy of class privileges that is considerably elevated over that occupied by either spousal privilege or settlement privilege. The nature and content of the language used to describe these various privileges reinforces that conclusion.

[45] Both solicitor/client privilege and informer privilege are described in terms of the privileges being essentially absolute and subject only to the very narrow "innocence at stake" exception -- an exception, I would add, that is very difficult to establish. Spousal privilege, on the other hand, has seen its application consistently narrowed over the past few decades. That narrowing is reflected, among other places, in R. v. Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97 and was justified by Iacobucci J. when he said, at p. 670 S.C.R.:

These cases reflect the flexible approach that this Court has taken to the development of the common law. Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared.

[46] Similarly, settlement privilege is expressed in fundamentally different terms. For one, whereas solicitor/ client privilege and informer privilege allow for only one exception -- innocence at stake -- settlement privilege has numerous exceptions. As the English Court of Appeal said, in Unilever plc v. Procter & Gamble Co., [2001] 1 All E.R. 783, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2436 (C.A.), per Walker L.J. at p. 791 All E.R.: "Nevertheless there are numerous occasions on which, despite the existence of without prejudice negotiations, the without prejudice rule does not prevent the admission into evidence of what one or both of the parties said or wrote."

[47] Another difference is that the application of the rule depends very much on the use to which the asserted privileged communication is sought to be put. The purpose of the privilege [page513] is to protect the negotiating parties from prejudice or risk. If the use of the information will not cause prejudice or risk to the party whose information it is, then the rationale for the privilege tends to disappear. This point is aptly put by Paciocco, David M. and Lee Stuesser in The Law of Evidence, 6th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), at p. 251:

On the other hand, where the communication sought is not to be used against its maker and there is little or no prejudice, then the compelling public policy purpose underlying the rule is not triggered and courts are more inclined to override the privilege.

[48] It is clear to me, therefore, that settlement privilege is not to be approached, or treated, in the same fashion as solicitor/client privilege or informer privilege. It does not occupy the highest rank of privilege in terms of its inviolate nature nor can the rationales employed to justify the very narrow "innocence at stake" exception garner the same support.

[49] The above quotation from Binnie J. in National Post leads into the first issue to be determined and that is the extent or scope of settlement privilege. The situation here is different from the situations that presented themselves in Sable Offshore and Union Carbide, both of which arose out of civil proceedings. Here, we have a criminal proceeding, where the accused have certain constitutionally guaranteed rights. One of those guaranteed rights is the right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[50] I turn then to the two cases where this issue has arisen and that I mentioned earlier, namely, Bernardo and Delorme. In Bernardo, the issue was whether the Crown had to disclose to the accused, who was charged with first degree murder, the information that had passed between the Crown and counsel for Ms. Homolka, who had reached a plea agreement with the Crown and was to be a key Crown witness against Mr. Bernardo. The Crown resisted disclosure of the information on the basis that it was irrelevant and inadmissible.

[51] LeSage J. disagreed. He found that the information, while it might not be admissible, was nonetheless relevant under the Stinchcombe standard for relevance in terms of the Crown's duty to disclose. As I earlier noted, LeSage J. rejected the argument that the information was subject to solicitor/client privilege. He then went on to consider the argument put to him by the Crown that the information was subject to "public interest" privilege. LeSage J. agreed that there should be a privilege that attaches to negotiations between the Crown and an accused over a possible plea. He specifically found that "settlement negotiation privilege ought to exist" with respect to any such discussions. [page514]

[52] Having determined that such a privilege should attach to plea negotiations, LeSage J. nonetheless found that any such privilege would not attach to the information that the Crown had received from counsel for Ms. Homolka. He found that the privilege would only attach to information that was sought to be used against the accused who reached a plea agreement and not with respect to another accused. Specifically, LeSage J. said, at para. 17 [of Bernardo]:

Although I readily accept the Crown's position that a privilege ought to exist in the sense that the information should not be used against her in a subsequent prosecution, I do not conclude that the "privilege" ought to extend when that person, i.e. Ms. Homolka, is not an accused nor is at any risk of prejudice. In this circumstance, it is intended that she testify on behalf of the Crown, putting another at penal risk.

He continued, at para. 18:

Assuming that a privilege does attach to these negotiations, that privilege ought not to extend to an agreement that requires the person to be a witness against another when, as here, she will be a witness for the Crown.

[53] It is clear, therefore, that the decision in Bernardo did not extend the scope of settlement privilege to the situation where information was provided to the Crown in furtherance of a plea agreement that was relevant to another accused person and his or her right to make full answer and defence. Rather, LeSage J. restricted the scope of the privilege to any attempt to use the information, in any subsequent prosecution against the person who provided it. I believe that it is implicit, in that finding, that the privilege would also extend to any use of the information, against the person who provided it, in another type of proceeding, such as a civil claim.

[54] Eleven years later, the issue arose again in Delorme. In that case, three co-accused had reached various plea arrangements with the Crown. Mr. Delorme was left alone as the last accused. Mr. Delorme sought production of the information that had passed between the Crown, and each of his three co-accused, as part of the negotiations for the plea bargains. One of the co-accused was to be called as a witness against Mr. Delorme, another co-accused was not going to be called as a witness, and it was uncertain whether the third co-accused would, or would not, be called.

[55] Vertes J. considered whether any of three possible privileges applied to the information -- solicitor/client privilege, work product privilege or settlement privilege. Interestingly, Vertes J. also rejected the argument that solicitor/client privilege could attach, using language very similar to that used by LeSage J. in Bernardo. He said, at para. 11 [of Delorme]: "Solicitor-client [page515] privilege is not an issue on this application. Any communications disclosed by the lawyers for the three individuals to the Crown lost the privilege since, at the time, the Crown was a party adverse in interest."

[56] Vertes J. did not specifically address work product privilege. Rather, he chose to turn to settlement privilege and determine whether it precluded disclosure of the information. In doing so, Vertes J. took a different approach to that taken by LeSage J. He began by finding that LeSage J. had "set aside" the privilege. That is not, in fact, what LeSage J. did. Rather, it is clear, from his reasons, that LeSage J. found that the privilege did not apply.

[57] Vertes J. concluded that settlement privilege (or plea negotiation privilege as he called it) applied to the information. He then considered whether an exception to the privilege would nonetheless make the information subject to disclosure. In his analysis, Vertes J. chose to apply the test from R. v. O'Connor as the appropriate test for finding an exception to the privilege. It appears that he viewed this as a middle ground between the broader Stinchcombe test for disclosure and the much narrower McClure test for disclosure. He said, at para. 47:

While the plea negotiation privilege is also based on policy reasons, it does not share the same fundamental position as does solicitor-client privilege. Thus I think there is justification for a less stringent test.

[58] Having decided on the test for an exception, Vertes J. then reviewed the actual information that was at issue. He decided that the information relating to the co-accused, who would be called as a witness, and the co-accused that might be called as a witness, should be disclosed. He decided that the information relating to the co-accused, who was not being called as a witness, would not have to be disclosed. It is worth noting, however, that in reaching that conclusion, Vertes J. found, at para. 52, that there was "nothing in them which, in my opinion, could compromise Delorme's ability to make full answer and defence".

[59] I accept that there is a conflict in the approaches taken in Bernardo and Delorme. That said, when one looks at the factual determination that Vertes J. made regarding the usefulness of the information at issue to Mr. Delorme, it is not clear to me that there is an actual conflict in the result.

[60] What then is the proper approach? Let me begin by making a couple of general comments. One is that it seems to me that the necessary first step is to determine whether the privilege applies to the information, before turning to any issue regarding exceptions that may be applicable. The other is that I believe that it is risky to simply transfer and apply the [page516] approach, analysis and results, where settlement privilege has been applied in civil cases, to criminal cases. I say so because, as I noted earlier, there are different constitutional dimensions to a criminal proceeding over a civil proceeding.

[61] In that regard, I would note that the decision in Union Carbide did not deal with the issue that is presented here, that is, the right of another person to have access to information exchanged between the parties to a settlement. Rather, Union Carbide dealt with the ability of the parties to a settlement to use that information to prove and enforce a settlement agreement. As a result, I find the decision in Union Carbide to be of very limited assistance to the determination of the issue that is before me.

[62] The decision in Sable Offshore did involve a person, outside of the settlement, seeking to have access to information that was part of the settlement. However, it was a very discrete aspect of the information that was sought. Indeed, it was a single piece of information, namely, the dollar amount of the settlement, that was in issue. It is therefore important in reading the decision in Sable Offshore, and in understanding its conclusion, to remember the very salient fact that all of the information, that the settling defendants had provided to the plaintiff, had already been turned over to the non-settling defendants. As Abella J. said, at para. 25: "The non-settling defendants have in fact received all the non-financial terms of the Pierringer Agreements. They have access to all the relevant documents and other evidence that was in the settling defendants' possession."

[63] Abella J. then went on to find that withholding the dollar amount of the settlement from the non-settling defendants did not occasion any prejudice to them. In that regard, she pointed out that the plaintiff had already agreed that it would reveal the dollar amount of the settlement to the trial judge once the issue of liability for the non-settling defendants had been determined. The non-settling defendants could not point to any other valid reason for needing this information. That conclusion is the equivalent of a finding, in the criminal context, of the information not being relevant. Consequently, none of the "full answer and defence" issues, that arise in this case, were present in Sable Offshore.

[64] In this case, the situation is reversed. The Crown admits that the information that is sought to be covered by settlement privilege is likely relevant to the accused. At the same time, neither Cadbury nor Hershey can point to any concrete or specific prejudice that would be occasioned to them from the disclosure [page517] of the core information that the accused seek. Indeed, neither Cadbury nor Hershey placed any evidence before this court of any risk or prejudice to them arising from the possible disclosure of this information. It is also relevant, as the accused pointed out, that neither Cadbury nor Hershey are currently facing any criminal prosecution elsewhere, nor are they facing any civil proceedings, arising from the events that underlie this prosecution.

[65] Another distinguishing feature of this case from the usual context of a civil proceeding, where settlement negotiations take place, is the fact that it was front and centre to both Cadbury and Hershey that the fundamental purpose, of both the Immunity Program and the Leniency Program, was to obtain evidence that would allow the Competition Bureau to prosecute other persons involved in the anti-competitive activities. In other words, both Cadbury and Hershey knew, before their first contact with the Competition Bureau under either of these programs, that any success that they might achieve under these programs would be based on their ability to deliver up evidence that could be used against other persons. This was not an incidental aspect of the settlement negotiations. It was a critical aspect of them.

[66] A consequence of this reality is that it does not lie comfortably in the mouths of Cadbury or Hershey to now complain that the disclosure of information (that was provided by them to the bureau in these circumstances and that has evidentiary value), to persons who are accused, is somehow unfair to them or is an unexpected result. Not only should Cadbury and Hershey have known, from the start, that that would be the result, they are, in fact, contractually bound to the bureau to provide such information, both in documentary and testimonial forms, for that very purpose.

[67] In that regard, the distinction that the intervenors seek to draw between information provided to the Crown before the immunity agreement or the plea agreement was signed, and the information provided to the Crown after those agreements were signed, finds no support on any principled basis. Given the acknowledgement by the intervenors that they can raise no objection to the disclosure of relevant information provided by them to the Crown, after their respective agreements were signed, there is no principled basis to which they can point for why the selfsame information, provided before those agreements were signed, should be protected.

[68] In my view, the cases that have dealt with, and applied, settlement privilege have never done so with the intention that [page518] settlement privilege would be used to deny other persons, who are part of the same proceedings, or the activities that underlie those proceedings, from access to evidence relevant to those proceedings. My conclusion, in that regard, is reinforced by the approach taken in another civil context, namely, where Mary Carter agreements are entered into.[^4] Courts have consistently rejected the efforts of settling defendants to keep Mary Carter agreements secret.[^5] The analysis undertaken by courts in ordering Mary Carter agreements to be disclosed reflects the emphasis on full disclosure of relevant evidence, in the same way that the Supreme Court of Canada stressed the fact, in Sable Offshore, that the non-settling defendants had [at para. 25] "access to all the relevant documents and other evidence that was in the settling defendants' possession".

[69] I conclude, therefore, that settlement privilege does not apply to prohibit the disclosure of factual information provided to the Crown in respect of a proposed criminal prosecution in circumstances where the person providing that information does so with the knowledge that the Crown intends to rely on some or all of that information for the purposes of that criminal prosecution. I would say that that is especially so where the person who is providing the information has committed to providing evidence, in the future, against the accused in that prosecution.

Exceptions to settlement privilege

[70] If I am wrong in that conclusion, and all such information is prima facie covered by settlement privilege, then, in the circumstances of a case such as this, where factual information provided would be potentially useful to the accused persons, I would conclude that there should be an exception to settlement privilege, so that factual information can be disclosed to the accused, on the basis of the right of the accused to make full answer and defence.

[71] It is clear that settlement privilege allows for exceptions. That point was made in Sable Offshore by Abella J., where she said, at para. 19:

There are, inevitably, exceptions to the privilege. To come within those exceptions, a defendant must show that, on balance, "a competing public interest outweighs the public interest in encouraging settlement". [page519]

[72] It is well established that there is a public interest in an accused's right to make full answer and defence. As I earlier noted, it is an interest that is constitutionally protected by s. 7 of the Charter. It is also a component of the right to a fair trial that is constitutionally protected by s. 11(d) of the Charter. Thus, it will be seen that the right to make full answer and defence is not only a public interest, it is a very important public interest. Indeed, it is established that the right to make full answer and defence can override even the most important privileges. As McLachlin J. said, in R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, at para. 24: "To the extent that rules and privileges stand in the way of an innocent person establishing his or her innocence, they must yield to the Charter guarantee of a fair trial."

[73] In my view, an accused person's right to make full answer and defence must trump the public interest in encouraging settlement. We ought not to allow for the possibility of a wrongful conviction just to reach the desirable goal of achieving resolutions, especially in situations where the right to make full answer and defence can be accomplished through the disclosure of information that will not occasion risk or prejudice to the person who has provided that information to the Crown. I note that my conclusion in this regard would appear to find support in the discussion about exceptions to settlement privilege found in Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra, at p. 252:

There is no definite list of compelling interests such as to override the privilege. Certainly in criminal cases accused persons can rely upon the need to make full answer and defence.

[74] The intervenors assert that to reach that conclusion will have the effect of making any person pause and seriously examine whether they will want to engage in either of the bureau's programs, if that is to be the price of their participation. I do not accept that such an effect will result. I begin by noting that this concern was not advanced by the Crown on behalf of the bureau. If there is such a potential negative impact on the bureau's programs that will arise from such a conclusion, I would have expected that it would have been front and centre in the Crown's submissions.

[75] I also assume that any person, who decides to participate in one of these programs, only does so after serious consideration and analysis, in any event. Even without the conclusion I have reached regarding the exception to settlement privilege, any person who participates in the Immunity Program knows that it must reveal all of its non-privileged documents and make available all of its employees as potential witnesses. Anyone who participates in the Leniency Program does so with the same [page520] knowledge, and with the additional understanding that it will be subject to some penalty. For example, in this case, Hershey paid a significant fine as part of its plea agreement. Given all of those considerations, it seems to me that the additional consequence that pre-agreement disclosure will be added to all of the post-agreement disclosure will be unlikely to materially affect a person's decision to participate, or not, in these programs.

[76] Having concluded that there should be an exception to settlement privilege for the purposes of an accused person making full answer and defence, I have also concluded that neither of the tests advanced by the intervenors, or by the Crown, is the appropriate test to apply. That is, neither the test in McClure nor the test in Mills nor, for that matter, the test in O'Connor is the appropriate test for determining what information does, and does not, have to be disclosed, pursuant to this exception. That is because all of those tests relate to third party disclosure.

[77] Here we are not dealing with third party disclosure, but with first party disclosure. The information at issue is already in the hands of the Crown. The test that applies for disclosure of information in the possession of the Crown is set out in Stinchcombe, and all of the decisions that have since considered and elaborated on that test. There is no need to define yet another test for the purposes of determining what information forms an exception to settlement privilege. The Crown is well familiar with its obligations regarding disclosure under Stinchcombe and is well able to apply it to the information that is at issue here. That said, for what additional assistance it may provide, I will make some general comments, at the end of these reasons, as to what is required, and is not required, to be disclosed.

Waiver of settlement privilege

[78] Finally, I will briefly address one other reason why, in the circumstances of this case, the pre-agreement information should be disclosed by the Crown to the accused and that is the issue of waiver. On that point, the immunity agreement signed by Cadbury contained the following provision, in para. 6:

The DPP and the Commissioner shall not disclose to any third party the identity of Cadbury or the related immunity recipient, except where:

(a) Disclosure is required by law, including:

(i) in response to an order of a Canadian court of competent jurisdiction;

(ii) to a person charged with an offence in Canada relating to the anticompetitive conduct. [page521]

The immunity agreement continues thereafter to provide:

The DPP and the Commissioner shall not disclose to any third party information obtained from Cadbury or any related immunity recipient, subject only to the exceptions listed above or where disclosure of such information is otherwise for the purpose of the administration or enforcement of the Act.

[79] In my view, the provision in para. 6(a)(ii) expressly contemplates that the Crown will, as part of its Stinchcombe disclosure obligations, be required to disclose to an accused person any of the factual information that it receives from the person who is given immunity. Assuming that settlement privilege applies, and that there is no exception for an accused's right to make full answer and defence, it is my view that this provision constitutes a clear waiver of the settlement privilege that would otherwise be found to attach to the information.

[80] A similar provision is contained in the plea agreement signed by Hershey except that the term in that agreement refers to information provided "pursuant to this agreement". Hershey contends that the provision, consequently, only applies to information provided after the agreement was signed. I do not accept that contention. For one, it is inconsistent with what the bureau agreed to in the immunity agreement. There would be no logical reason to have a broader disclosure requirement apply to Cadbury than would be the case for Hershey. For another, both the Immunity Program and the Leniency Program contain the same exceptions to the pledge of confidentiality including an exception where disclosure of information is for "the purpose of the administration or enforcement of the Act". For yet another, it is acknowledged that the information is provided, in the first place, for the purpose of achieving either an immunity agreement or a plea agreement. The information would only have to be disclosed, of course, if an agreement is reached. It follows logically that, whether the information is provided before or after the actual agreement is signed, it is all information that is being provided pursuant to the agreement.

[81] I will add that I find support for my conclusion, in this regard, in the contents of the Competition Bureau's 2010 Bulletin: Leniency Program (Gatineau, Que.: Canadian Competition Bureau, 2010) that states, in para. 38:

As part of the leniency applicant's ongoing cooperation obligations, once the plea agreement is concluded, all information provided by the leniency applicant prior and pursuant to the plea agreement may be used by the Bureau in its investigations and by the PPSC in any subsequent prosecution against other parties to the offence.

(Emphasis added) [page522]

[82] Finally, on the point of waiver, it should be noted that the information provided by Cadbury was used by the Crown to obtain search warrants. The information to obtain recounts the information that Cadbury (unnamed in the ITO), and its unnamed employees, had given to the bureau. That information, having been put into a court document filed for the purpose of obtaining a court authorization, must be disclosed to any person who is the subject of that court authorization. Cadbury says that it did not know that its information had been used in this ITO. While that may be, Cadbury did not take any steps before this, or any other court, to address that problem. It is only now, almost eight years after the search warrants were obtained and executed, that Cadbury raises the issue. In my view, it is too late for Cadbury to complain. The use of the information, and the passage of time, would also constitute a waiver of any privilege that attached to Cadbury's information.

[83] Before concluding, I should explain why I have, at various points in the course of these reasons, referred to "factual information". I have done so purposely. My conclusion that factual information, that was provided by the intervenors to the Crown, must be disclosed to the accused is intended to be exactly so restricted. Factual information, that was provided prior to the execution of the immunity agreement or the plea agreement, must be disclosed. However, other information, such as legal opinions that may have been offered, or negotiations over the precise wording of the agreements, or views expressed over the relative importance of one thing or another, do not have to be disclosed.

[84] I reach that conclusion for two reasons. One is that those types of information do not constitute facts. The other, which follows from the first, is that they are not relevant. While counsel for the accused attempted to justify disclosure of this information on the basis that it would be "useful" or "helpful", they were unable to articulate, in any substantive way, how it would be so. By way of one example only, the opinion of counsel for Cadbury, or for Hershey, that there was or was not a conspiracy, at a given point in time, or that there was or was not an agreement, at a given point in time, is of no consequence and of no relevance. Both the Crown and the defence are capable of reaching their own opinions on those matters. In any event, the only opinion that will ultimately count is that reached by the trier of fact.

[85] I attach one proviso to that conclusion. I have expressed it without the benefit of having reviewed the information that is at issue. For good reasons, it was agreed by all parties that this application would not engage a review of each of the many pieces of information that form the subject matter of this [page523] application. It was further agreed that, if the court provided general principles as to any information that had to be disclosed, the parties would hopefully be able, on their own, to decide what information then had to be disclosed and what did not. Should any disagreements arise, they would be dealt with at a later date.

[86] I allow for the possibility that some of the information that I may have suggested falls into the non-factual, and therefore not to be disclosed, category might, on a specific review, be properly categorized differently. My conclusions in this regard are, therefore, provisional and can be revisited, if the circumstances necessitate it.

Conclusion

[87] In the end result, I conclude that settlement privilege does not apply to the factual information provided by the intervenors to the Crown before the immunity agreement and plea agreement were entered into and, hence, that information must be disclosed by the Crown to the accused.

Application dismissed.

Notes

[^1]: I should note that I will, in these reasons, refer alternately to the Competition Bureau and to the Crown. For the purposes of the issues before me, in terms of to whom the information was disclosed, I do not draw any distinction between the two.

[^2]: Ohl v. Cannito, 1972 CanLII 698 (ON SC), [1972] 2 O.R. 763, [1972] O.J. No. 1794 (H.C.J.).

[^3]: See, for example, R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, at para. 42.

[^4]: Mary Carter agreements and Perringer agreements are different forms of the same basic settlement document.

[^5]: See, for example, Laudon v. Roberts, [2009] O.J. No. 1824, 2009 ONCA 383.

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