COURT FILE AND PARTIES

COURT FILE NO.: 173-2015

DATE: 2015/11/24

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

RE: Amanda Christine Josephine Bell (Applicant)

AND:

Daniel Douglas Ferguson (Respondent)

BEFORE: Justice I.F. Leach

COUNSEL: Elli M. Cohen, for the Applicant

David A. Reid, for the Respondent

HEARD: November 18, 2015

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Before me are two competing motions relating to custody of the parties’ only child: three-year-old Annabelle (“Bella”) Ferguson.

[2] The interim relief currently sought by the Applicant mother is fully outlined and particularized at Tab 6 of the Continuing Record. However, her primary request is for an interim order granting her sole custody of Bella, coupled with ancillary orders providing access to the Respondent father, (e.g., on alternating week-ends, one mid-week visit each week, and further agreed access), and confirming the Respondent’s obligation to pay both “table” and “section 7” child support. She also asks for an order inviting involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, to investigate and report to the court on matters relating to custody, access, support and education, as far as Bella is concerned.

[3] The interim relief sought by the Respondent father is outlined and particularized in his notice of cross-motion found at Tab 12 of the Continuing Record. However, his primary request is for an interim order granting the parties shared custody of Bella, (and effective preservation of the current “week about” residential arrangements that have been in place for approximately the past five months).

Background

[4] The underlying facts are addressed in great detail in the considerable motion material, (which includes numerous lengthy affidavits from the parties, relatives and others), but for present purposes generally may be summarized as follows:

• The Applicant is currently in her mid-twenties, and for the past several years has worked with a floral event and design business based in Exeter, Ontario. The Respondent is currently in his early thirties, and at all relevant times has worked at a feed mill in Hensall, Ontario.

• In early 2011, the parties were not living together, but were in a relationship that led to Bella’s conception. In November of 2011, the parties acquired a shared residence in Hensall, in anticipation of Bella’s birth approximately one month later.

• The Applicant says, and the Respondent does not really dispute, that the relationship of the parties was always “rocky”, suffering from frequent and escalating quarrels. It also apparently is not denied that there were occasional periods of separation, (during which Bella would remain with the Applicant), followed by successive attempts at reconciliation.

• Responsibility for the quarrels and their level of severity is disputed. In particular, the Applicant contends that the Respondent had anger management and fidelity issues, and generally was unwilling to subordinate his active social and extra-curricular life to the needs of his wife and child; e.g., leaving the Applicant almost entirely responsible for Bella’s ongoing care and upbringing. The Respondent generally denies such accusations, or says they are greatly exaggerated, and asserts that he was a devoted and engaged father who participated actively in Bella’s care.

• Despite ongoing difficulties, the relationship generally continued for a number of years, with the parties moving from rented accommodation into a jointly owned matrimonial home, in Hensall, in October of 2013.

• In June of 2015, (approximately five months ago), the relationship ended with no prospect of reconciliation.

• To date, there has been no formal agreement about the ongoing care, custody and residence of Bella, or access to her parents. Moreover, the court has never been asked, until now, to make any type of formal order in that regard.

• Initially, however, the parties informally embarked on an arrangement whereby Bella effectively would be allowed to remain in the jointly owned matrimonial home on a constant basis, while the parties alternated their occupation of that home and care of Bella on a “week about” basis. In particular, while one party was in the matrimonial home with Bella during a particular week, the other party would relocate during that week to the home of that other party’s parents.

• However, in late September of 2015, (i.e., approximately two months ago and shortly after Bella started junior kindergarten), there were further changes when formal ownership of the matrimonial home was transferred completely to the Applicant. At that point, the Respondent relocated permanently to the two bedroom home of his parents, and the “week about” care of Bella was continued by Bella physically relocating between the two homes on a weekly basis.

Party Positions

[5] In broad terms, the Applicant, (through detailed affidavit evidence supplied by herself, her sister, her mother, her friends and employer), argues strenuously that the existing arrangements are having a severely detrimental impact on Bella’s happiness and well-being, which needs to be addressed and corrected as soon as possible.

[6] Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the considerable evidence supplied by the Applicant includes indications that:

• Bella is not adjusting at all well to the repeated and extended deprivation of the primary care previously supplied by the Applicant, which formed the basic nucleus and structure of Bella’s life up until five months ago. To the contrary, Bella is openly and consistently missing her mother, and generally expressing very marked separation anxiety. For related reasons, Bella is extremely reluctant to leave for time with her father, and the necessary exchanges are extraordinarily stressful and difficult for her, (e.g., with Bella crying, and refusing to get dressed or otherwise co-operate in preparing for such transfers).

• While the Respondent admittedly loves Bella, he generally lacks coping skills and experience in addressing Bella’s daily needs, and still has not made consistent, appropriate and attentive care for Bella his priority. To the contrary, he is said to have continued in an unchanged manner with his various social relationships and extra-curricular pursuits, (e.g., including various athletic pursuits, active membership in a service club, and regular training as a volunteer firefighter), while maintaining his pattern of effectively leaving much of Bella’s care to others, and the Respondent’s mother in particular.

• Questions and concerns are raised about whether Bella truly has a room of her own at the home of the Respondents’ parents, and/or about whether the Respondent is truly residing there on a regular and permanent basis, given that it is a two bedroom home and the Respondent has been seen spending a good deal of time, including apparent overnight stays, at the residence of his new partner.

• Other concerns have been raised about the apparent haste with which the Respondent has introduced Bella to the Respondent’s new partner and his new partner’s child; e.g., to the extent of the two girls being bathed together. (The Applicant also has a new partner, but has he has not been introduced to Bella as anything but a friend of her mother.)

• The challenges of the situation also are made much worse by ongoing tension between the parties. In particular, numerous examples are given of the Respondent regularly calling the Applicant names, and saying hurtful things about the Applicant, in Bella’s presence. A further incident is described of conflict between the Applicant and the Respondent’s mother, witnessed by Bella. Others attest to the Respondent’s inability to communicate with the Applicant in a mature and civil manner.

• In the result, Bella has been struggling emotionally, in a significant way, as a result of the “failed nesting experiment”. In recent months, she has lost much of her previous happy and easy going nature. She now is sad and stressed most of the time. She has regressed to heavy reliance on pacifiers and other objects and items which she clings to for security. She acts out more often. She has been talking about adult issues, and the conflict between her parents. She has been given easily to crying and sobbing uncontrollably, on a regular basis, and has been distraught to the point where arrangements have been made to have her seen by her family physician and a counsellor. She says she loves her “daddy”, but does not want to have “sleeps” with him.

[7] In similarly broad terms, the Respondent says the criticisms and concerns raised in the Applicant’s motion material are unfair and/or overblown, that the existing arrangements are working fine, and that those arrangements should be confirmed by way of a formal order of the court.

[8] Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the evidence supplied by the Respondent, (with some supporting affidavit evidence from the Respondent’s mother), includes indications that:

• The Respondent played an active role in Bella’s care prior to the parties’ separation. He acknowledges that he receives some assistance from his parents, but emphasizes that he continues to be actively engaged with Bella during the time she spends in his care.

• The home of the Respondent’s parents is a “perfectly fine” home for Bella and the Respondent, and Bella “loves staying with her grandparents”.

• Bella admittedly “has had some adjustment” to her parents’ separation, and has been “more sensitive that she generally is”. (The Respondent’s mother confirms that Bella has, in particular, “been more sensitive in the last 2 months”.) However, the Respondent feels she is still a happy and healthy child who loves spending time with both of her parents. The Respondent also says the trauma of separation and access exchanges is not a one-way street, as Bella often gets upset, clingy and emotional when she leaves the Respondent’s care as well. He believes that Bella’s behaviour is “normal in these circumstances”, and that the parties “should expect an adjustment period” for Bella as a result of the parties’ separation. Moreover, he attributes much of the anxiety and difficulty associated with exchanges to behaviour of the Applicant, which “heightens and prolongs the emotions”. Generally, the Respondent emphasizes that, “while the changeover times result in some emotion, it is simply something she [Bella] needs to adjust to”.

• The Respondent believes Bella has been exposed to the animosity between the parties, but suggests this results from the ongoing criticism and negative views being expressed about him by the Applicant and her family.

• The Respondent generally is critical of the Applicant’s attempt to “resile” from the agreement made at the time of separation, whereby the parties would “share custody of Bella and spend time with her on a 50/50 basis”. He believes strongly that it is in Bella’s best interest to spend equal time with both of her parents.

Analysis

[9] In this case, the parties were never married, and the matter accordingly is governed primarily by the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, (“the CLRA”).

[10] In that regard, s.21 of the CLRA provides that a parent or “any other person” may apply for an order respecting custody of or access to a child.

[11] Pursuant to s.24(1) of the CLRA, the merits of such an application are to be determined on the basis of “the best interests of the child”, which has an expanded legislative definition set forth in s.24(2) of the CLRA. Those provisions outline eight broad categories of a child’s “needs and circumstances”, consideration of which should be included in determining the best interests of a child.

[12] Before turning to an overall assessment of what may currently be in Bella’s best interests, (with a particular focus on what currently might be best for her in terms of custody, residence and access issues, along with corresponding child support obligations or lack thereof), I pause to acknowledge the inherently imperfect nature of making such determinations in a context such as this, where the available evidence is confined to paper affidavits that contain allegations and denials, and perceptions and positions that are entirely contradictory.

[13] I do not have the benefit of any cross-examination on affidavit material, let alone the opportunity to assess the credibility and reliability of witnesses that comes in the context of a trial.

[14] Nor do I have the benefit of the more objective views of witnesses who are not expressly or implicitly aligned with one party or the other. In particular, I do not have the sort of objective insight frequently offered by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, which would be extremely helpful in this case.

[15] Despite these challenges, a determination must be made based on the available evidence, and in that regard I generally am inclined to accept more of the evidence and assertions offered by the Applicant and her supporters, in relation to matters where the available evidence is conflicting. My reasons for doing so include the following:

• Both quantitatively and qualitatively, even making allowances for the partisan nature of each side’s affiants, the material filed by the Applicant seems more persuasive. In particular, that material is not only more detailed, but the details seem quite consistent, and consistent among many more witnesses. While the Respondent suggests this simply reflects a deliberate effort to collaborate and put forward a disparaging view of the Respondent, while painting a scenario that furthers the Applicant’s goals, that simply is not my impression. The same general observations and themes emerge from different perspectives that are sometimes but not always overlapping.

• In contrast, I am struck by the Respondent’s broad failure to address many of the assertions and allegations put forward in the Applicant’s material, on the basis that he simply did not have the time to do so. The Respondent’s initial affidavit was filed on October 19, 2015, but the matter was not argued before me until almost a month later. I am left with the impression that, if there were serious things to be said in opposition to many of the assertions and concerns put forward by the Applicant, they could and would have been addressed in more detail.

• As highlighted by counsel for the Applicant, there are a number of disputed matters in respect of which the Applicant was able to offer more objective evidence, (by the way of text messages and photographs), lending support to suggestions that the Respondent’s evidence contains demonstrable inaccuracies and/or gives rise to concerns about the Respondent’s candour. Some of those particular matters, (such as the extent of the Respondent’s infidelity prior to separation), frankly have little or no substantive importance in terms of the custody, residential and access issues now before the court, but do support more general concerns about the Respondent’s credibility. In other cases, (e.g., demonstrably inaccurate accounts of particular incidents relating to arrangements for Bella’s care), the evidence has more substantive relevance, but is important more for the sake of showing that the Respondent’s recollection of certain matters may not be reliable.

• I also am struck by the apparent inclination of the Respondent and his mother to minimize or downplay the adjustment anxieties being experienced by Bella. To be sure, I think there also is a legitimate concern that the Applicant and her family may have a natural inclination to over-state the nature and extent of those anxieties. On balance, however, I am inclined to think that the accounts and assessments of the Applicant and her supporters, in terms of describing Bella’s difficulties and behaviours, are likely to be more realistic and accurate. This three-year-old girl currently is facing simultaneous challenges that far older, mature and more stoic children almost certainly would find daunting. In particular, in addition to dealing with her parents’ separation and ongoing conflict, introduction to her father’s new partner,starting formal schooling for the first time at an extremely young age and dealing with that additional brand new environment filled with change and unfamiliar people, Bella now simultaneously finds herself regularly removed, on a weekly basis, from the matrimonial home which almost certainly would have been the only home she realistically would be able to remember. (Again, up until two months ago, Bella’s parents were rotating residences on a “week about” basis, but Bella was not.) Given such realities, it would be remarkable to me if Bella was not experiencing severe problems with anxiety, stress and feelings of insecurity.

[16] On the whole, had I been asked to address custody, residence and access proposals at the outset of the parties’ separation, or at the point where ownership of the matrimonial home was transferred such that the parties could cease to rotate around Bella rather than vice-versa, I would not have been inclined to force a “week about” arrangement on a child of Bella’s tender years, against a background of such additional changes and conflict. It would have been difficult to persuade me that such significant and weekly disruption and dislocation to Bella’s existence would have been in her “best interests”.

[17] Certainly, that impression is reinforced by the substantial evidence that Bella has not been coping well with the attempted arrangement, now that it has been in place for a number of months, and made more challenging by her now having to rotate her residence on a weekly basis at the same time as her introduction to schooling.

[18] In my view, such a preliminary conclusion is buttressed, or at least not contradicted, by consideration of the factors outlined in s.24(2) of the CLRA. I turn to those now, in succession, under the following indicated headings.

a. Love, affection and emotional ties

In my view, this consideration favours the Applicant’s position, at this point in Bella’s life. In that regard, I have no doubt that Bella loves both of her parents. Indeed, the Applicant’s material confirms this. However, I also am persuaded that, given the history and patterns of child care that developed on a sustained basis prior to the parties’ separation, Bella naturally would feel closer to her mother and traditional primary caregiver for the time being.

b. Child views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained

Bella is a child of tender years, and obviously cannot consider, form and articulate her views and preferences in the same way as an older and more mature child. For the time being, however, I accept the evidence of various effective indications by Bella that she currently would like to spend more time in the former matrimonial home with her mother, and fewer “sleeps” with her father.

I nevertheless think that, in any event, and for the additional reasons outlined above, it would be helpful and appropriate to make an order inviting the assistance of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to assist in gleaning more objective evidence of what Bella prefers, and whether that is in her best interests.

c. Length of time child has lived in a stable home environment

This consideration addresses the court’s understandable reluctance to uproot a child from familiar surroundings, with simultaneous exposure to considerable change and inherent instability through the need for important adjustments. Such changes must not be undertaken lightly.

In this case, the consideration also militates in favour of the Applicant’s position.

Again, as noted above, up until two months ago, Bella’s home life was centred not just primarily but entirely around the parties’ previous matrimonial home, now owned and occupied by the Applicant. There was conflict there prior to the parties’ separation last summer, but it was a generally stable primary home environment for Bella. It remains available to Bella, but for the past two months inherently has not been the scene of much conflict owing to the parties’ initial “week about” arrangements and the Applicant’s subsequent exclusive possession, all of which has meant that both parties generally have not been present in that environment to instigate or perpetuate such conflict.

In contrast, while the home of the Respondent’s parents may be stable, Bella has spent far less time there. Moreover, I share concerns about how stable the arrangement at that home may seem to Bella. There is no dispute that the home in question has only two bedrooms. Presumably, one is occupied by the Respondent’s parents. If Bella also has her own bedroom in that house, (as the Respondent contends), then Bella must regularly see her father sleeping in some other area of the house, in what must inherently seem to be a somewhat temporary arrangement.

d. Ability and willingness of each person applying for custody to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child

I see this as an entirely neutral factor in this case. There was no suggestion that either parent was incapable of addressing Bella’s needs, particularly when each parent’s extended support network is taken into consideration.

e. Plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing

As noted above, the Respondent’s proposal generally contemplates a continuation and extension of the current arrangement, which seems to be problematic and not in Bella’s best interests, at least for the time being. In my view, the Applicant’s proposal, (with sole custody and primary residence of Bella granted to Bella’s mother on an interim basis), is more conducive to Bella’s care and upbringing for the time being. She will continue to have contact with both of her parents, through liberal and regular access arrangements, but she will have the enhanced security of knowing where “home” is until further order of the court.

f. Permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live

In my view, this factor lends some degree of additional support to the Applicant’s position.

In particular, while there is no suggestion that the home of the Respondent’s parents lacks stability, there are indications that the “family unit” presented the Respondent living with his parents may not have permanence and stability comparable to that of the Applicant continuing to live in the former matrimonial home.

In that regard, I have in mind considerations such as the Respondent’s lack of his own bedroom in his parent’s house, (addressed above), his lack of an ownership interest in his parents’ home, the reality that a grown man is unlikely to cohabit with his parents forever, and the Respondent’s acknowledged overnight stays with Bella at the residence of his new partner and his partner’s new child. All of this suggests to me that there is a strong possibility, if not probability, that the Respondent and Bella would not be residing with the Respondent’s parents on a long term basis.

In contrast, the Applicant made arrangements to purchase the Respondent’s interest in the former matrimonial home instead of “moving on”, which to me indicates and demonstrates a settled intention to make that Bella’s continued home for the foreseeable future. Moreover, while the Applicant acknowledges that she too has a new partner, it also has been emphasized, as noted above, that the new partner in question has been introduced to Bella simply as a “friend” and not a “boyfriend” of the Applicant. To me, this reflects an intention to introduce further changes into Bella’s life in a manner consistent with concern for Bella’s sensitivity to change, which reinforces my impression that the Applicant’s home is likely to offer more permanence and stability in the foreseeable future.

g. Ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent

In my view, this factor also weighs in favour of the Applicant’s proposal.

In that regard, I think each party has an equal capacity to love Bella. However, for the reasons outlined above, I accept that the Applicant has more demonstrated experience when it comes to active parenting in all its forms.

Moreover, the evidence before me suggests that the Applicant has more job flexibility, which will enable her to be more available to Bella as required. Her employer has expressly confirmed that to be so, whereas the available evidence strongly suggests that the Respondent is obliged to engage in shift work for an employer with whom he does not have a personal relationship comparable to that which the Applicant shares with her employer.

h. Relationship by blood or through an adoption order

In my view, this is a somewhat neutral consideration in this case. Certainly, Bella stands in equal proximity to each of her parents. However, to the extent that the support network on the Applicant’s side seems to contain a greater number of relatives actively involved in Bella’s life, that too tilts the balance in favour of the Applicant’s proposal.

[19] On the whole, I think a review of the individual considerations set forth above therefore reinforces my preliminary conclusion that the existing “week about” arrangements should come to an end, in favour of an arrangement where interim sole custody is granted to the Applicant, with whom Bella primarily will reside, while the Respondent enjoys liberal access pursuant to the arrangements proposed by the Applicant in her notice of motion.

[20] In making a final determination of the appropriate interim relief to grant in this case, I am very mindful of what has been referred to variously as a “working rule” or “principle”, relied upon to some extent by the Respondent in this case, that a “status quo” generally should not be disrupted or altered on an interim basis, where child custody arrangements are concerned, unless there are good and compelling reasons for the change.

[21] Such concerns have been articulated by the courts in various ways.

[22] For example, in Papp v. Papp, 1969 219 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.), Laskin, as he then was, said the following:

It may be taken as a working rule that evidence to warrant an order for interim custody must more cogently support disturbance of the de facto situation than evidence to support an order for custody after trial on the merits. But, as in custody after trial so in respect of interim custody, the welfare of the children is the paramount consideration.

[23] More recently, Justice Blishen made the following observation in Samson v. Samson, 2006 42645 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 5108 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 24:

It is generally accepted that the status quo should not be changed on an interim basis in the absence of evidence that the existing arrangement is harmful to the children. Maintaining the status quo may not always be in the best interests of the child but there should be some significant evidence to justify a change.

[24] In my view, however, such comments must be kept in perspective for a number of reasons, which include the following.

[25] First, as emphasized in Holt v. Anderson, 2005 3226 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 449 (Div.Ct.), at paragraphs 9-10, and as I indicated in Peet v. Zolob, [2014] O.J. No. 4652 (S.C.J.), cases turning on preservation of the status quo actually reflect exercise of the discretion by motion judges in the circumstances of the cases actually before them, and do not elevate the maintenance of status quo into “an immutable principle”. As demonstrated in the articulations of the status quo concern noted above, courts usually qualify their comments; e.g., by emphasizing that the overall concern is for a child’s best interests, and changes to the status quo may be justified. Moreover, concerns about stability, (reflected in concerns for disruption about the status quo), are already factored into the considerations suggested by s.24(2) of the CLRA, but must be weighed against competing considerations. In that regard, I agree with the editors of the Mamo and McLeod Annual Review of Family Law, at p.209, that “preservation of the status quo on an interim motion … should not be seen as a goal in and of itself”.

[26] Second, as I also indicated in Peet v. Zolob, supra, it seems to me that concerns about disturbing status quo have more force when that status quo is reasonably clear, and especially when it has been clearly defined by previous party agreement or a court order. Such arguments have less resonance in circumstances, such as the one before me, where there is a dispute as to how long the existing arrangement was intended to last, (e.g., extending beyond the summer or the transfer of ownership in the matrimonial home), and where continuation of the arrangement has been the subject of ongoing disagreement for much of its duration, without any prior court determination of what arrangement might be in the best interests of a child.

[27] Third, as emphasized in authorities such as Holt v. Anderson, supra, not each and every proposed change, and corresponding alteration in the status quo, will be of equal magnitude and concern. Indeed, I am struck by Justice Lane’s principled rejection of a proposed “new” status quo that would have entailed “bouncing a small and bewildered child back and forth between parents”, with significant disruptions to an infant’s surroundings. In my view, such concerns apply in this case to the existing arrangements.

[28] Fourth, determination of the relevant “status quo” should be examined and approached with care, in cases where the arrangement in place at the time of a hearing actually may not reflect the stable situation contemplated by that term, at least from the child’s perspective. For example, in this case, it seems to me that the existing arrangement, particularly insofar as it now involves Bella rotating between two residences, has been in place for a relatively short time; i.e., approximately eight weeks. In my view, from Bella’s perspective, the real “status quo” would involve continuation of her primary residence in the former matrimonial home, with the Applicant as her primary caregiver. She had both up until five months ago. She then had both every other week. As of eight weeks ago, she now has neither every other week. In short, changes made over the past five months have been moving Bella away from the status quo that previously dominated her young life.

[29] To the extent “evidence that the existing arrangement is harmful to the children” or “significant evidence to justify a change” is required to alter the suggested status quo, I think that is sufficiently provided in this case by the substantial evidence, provided by the Applicant and her other witnesses, that Bella is not coping at all well with the current “week about” arrangement.

[30] It may be that Bella’s ability in that regard will change over time, as Bella grows older and develops greater awareness and coping skills.

[31] For now, I think, there is persuasive evidence that she is just not ready for such an arrangement.

Conclusion

[32] In the result, an order shall go, albeit only on an interim basis, granting the relief requested in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 of the Applicant’s notice of motion at Tab 6 of the Continuing Record.

[33] This includes a grant of interim sole custody of Bella to the Applicant, the implementation of interim access arrangements for the Respondent, and the introduction of interim child support obligations payable by the Respondent. It also includes an order inviting the assistance of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, to investigate and provide assistance to the court in relation to this ongoing litigation. It nevertheless does not include an order relating to access over the Christmas holidays, as I was informed that this was the subject of agreement between the parties.

[34] The Respondent’s cross-motion at Tab 12 of the Continuing Record must be formally dismissed.

[35] At the close of submissions, counsel agreed that costs of the two motions should follow the event, (i.e., with costs awarded to whichever of the parents was successful in advancing his or her motion, or resisting the other party’s motion), with costs of the two motions collectively fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.00. The Respondent therefore shall pay the Applicant her costs of her motion and the Respondent’s cross-motion, collectively fixed at $5,000.00, payable within 30 days.

[36] Finally, on consent of the parties, (and primarily for the benefit of non-parties who require such an indication), I confirm that no spousal or child support is payable by the Applicant to the Respondent under any known or proposed scenario. Such relief has not been sought in the litigation, and would not be granted in the circumstances.

“Justice Ian Leach”

Justice I.F. Leach

Date: November 24, 2015