COURT FILE NO.: ES-1234-14 and ES-95-15
DATE: 2015/11/17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY KELLER and ROBERT HILTON, as Attorneys for MARGARET ISABELLE KAUFMAN and as Executors and Trustees of her Last Will and Testament dated July 14, 2006
Applicants
– and –
ROSS ALEXANDER WILSON, JENNIFER (“LAND”) DUNN, JILLIAN REDFERN, BLAIN REDFERN, LINZI MURRAY, CALLUM MURRAY, ERIN MURRAY, JAMIESON MURRAY, THE CANADIAN NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE BLIND (ONTARIO DIVISION), THE KITCHENER-WATERLOO COMMUNITY FOUNDATION
Respondents
James H. Bennett, for the Applicants
Timothy M. Fleming, for the Respondent ROSS ALEXANDER WILSON
AND BETWEEN:
ROSS ALEXANDER WILSON and HAJRA WILSON
Applicants
– and –
ANTHONY KELLER and ROBERT HILTON, as Attorneys for MARGARET ISABELLE KAUFMAN and as Executors and Trustees of her Last Will and Testament dated July 14, 2006
Respondents
Timothy M. Fleming, for the Applicants
James H. Bennett, for the Respondents
HEARD: September 25, 2015
The Honourable justice d.a.broad
Nature of the Applications
[1] The applicants in file ES-1234-14, Anthony T. Keller and Robert Hilton (the “Attorneys”), are the attorneys for property of Margaret Isabelle Kaufman. The Power of Attorney appointing Messrs. Keller and Hilton as attorneys for property was made by Mrs. Kaufman on May 6, 2010. Mr. Keller has been Mrs. Kaufman’s personal lawyer for many years. Mr. Hilton is Mrs. Kaufman’s son-in-law. Mrs. Kaufman is 91 years of age and currently suffers from advanced dementia. Mrs. Kaufman also named Messrs. Keller and Hilton as estate trustees in her will made July 14, 2006 (the “Will”). The title of proceedings in file ES-1234-14 indicates that Messrs. Keller and Hilton are making application both as attorneys for Mrs. Kaufman and as “executors and trustees” under the Will.
[2] The respondent Ross Alexander Wilson in file ES-1234-14 is the son of Mrs. Kaufman and the sole surviving residuary beneficiary of Mrs. Kaufman’s estate under the Will. The remaining respondents in file ES-1234-14, with the exception of The Canadian National Institute for the Blind (Ontario Division) (“CNIB”) and The Kitchener-Waterloo Community Foundation (the “Community Foundation”), are named legatees under the Will. CNIB and the Community Foundation, along with The Hospital for Sick Children are named as the residuary beneficiaries of Mrs. Kaufman’s estate in the Will in the event of Mr. Wilson predeceasing her. Aside from the filing of Submissions of Rights by the charitable beneficiaries, the remaining beneficiaries did not otherwise respond to the application or participate in the argument.
[3] The Attorneys make application for the opinion, advice and direction of the Court as to “whether the requests for money from the Estate of Margaret Isabelle Kaufman by Ross Alexander Wilson are to be honoured by the Estate of Margaret Isabelle Kaufman” and whether Mr. Wilson is a dependant of Mrs. Kaufman. Two other heads of relief in the notice of application namely for the opinion, advice and direction of the Court as to whether the property owned by Mrs. Kaufman known as “Hillhead” should be listed for sale and sold and if monies may be paid from the proceeds of sale to Mr. Wilson for his use and benefit were not referred to in the Attorneys’ Factum nor pursued in argument.
[4] The Notice of Application in ES-1234-14 does not set forth any specific grounds for the application other than to cite Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and sections of 39 and 37(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 S.O. 1992, c.30. However, the affidavit of Mr. Keller filed in support of the application deposed that that for many years, Mr. Wilson has been pursuing Mrs. Kaufman, both in litigation and directly, to obtain money and property from her prior to her death. Mr. Keller also deposed that Mr. Wilson has threatened litigation against him and Mr. Hilton in their capacities both as estate trustees and as attorneys for property.
[5] Mr. Wilson along with his spouse, Hajra Wilson, have brought an application in file ES-95-15 against Messrs. Keller and Hilton as attorneys for Mrs. Kaufman and as “executors and trustees” under the Will for an order that they pass their accounts as attorneys, that they be removed as attorneys for property and as attorneys for personal care of Mrs. Kaufman and that they also be removed as “executors and trustees” under the Will.
[6] The Notice of Application in file ES-95-15 similarly does not set forth any specific grounds for the application other than to recite rules 38.03(4), 74.16, 74.17 and 74.18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, sections 32, 39, 42, 66 and the subsections 35.1(1), 35.1(3) and 37(3) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, sections 5 and 7 of the Trustee Act, subsection 21(2) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and section 9 of the Estates Act. However, in his affidavit filed in support of the application, Mr. Wilson deposed that there are voluminous documents relating to matters in dispute between the Attorneys and himself and his wife dating back to 2002 which demonstrate a continuing antagonistic, adversarial and improper attitude on the part of the attorneys towards him and his wife. He expressed his view that Messrs. Keller and Hilton have no standing to bring the application in file ES-1234-14 as “executors and trustees” of the Will, as Mrs. Kaufman is still alive, and that they did so solely to serve the other contingent beneficiaries in order to embarrass him and his wife. He deposed further that Messrs. Keller and Hilton brought their application at a time when he has no funds to properly respond and that their application was made for the improper purpose of protecting themselves from personal liability at the expense of the inter vivos estate of Mrs. Kaufman and it was therefore brought for a cynical, bad faith and improper purpose.
[7] The parties agreed that the evidence on each application would constitute evidence on both. The affidavit material, filed in respect of both applications, consists of the following:
(a) the affidavit of Mr. Keller sworn December 22, 2014 in file ES-1234-14;
(b) the affidavit of Mr. Wilson sworn January 27, 2015 in file ES-95-15;
(c) the affidavit of Mr. Hilton sworn February 13, 2015 in file ES-95-15;
(d) the affidavit of Shirley Jeanette McKee sworn February 12, 2015 in file ES-95-15;
(e) the affidavit of Mr. Wilson sworn June 30, 2015 in file ES-1234-14; and
(f) the affidavit of Mr. Wilson sworn July 8, 2015 in file ES-1234-14.
[8] Mr. and Mrs. Wilson were each cross-examined on June 24, 2015 and the transcripts of their examinations are included in the Supplemental Application Record of the applicants in file ES-1234-14.
Application of the Attorneys in file ES-1234-14
[9] The legal framework to the application of the Attorneys can be summarized as follows. They apply pursuant to section 39(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (the “SDA”) which provides that if an incapable person has a guardian of property or an attorney under a continuing power of attorney, the court may give directions on any question arising in connection with the guardianship or power of attorney. Subsection 39(4) of the SDA provides that, on an application for directions, the court may, by order, give such directions as it considers to be for the benefit of the person and his or her dependants and consistent with this Act.
[10] Subsection 37(1) of the SDA prescribes the nature of the expenditures from the incapable person’s property that guardians (deemed to include attorneys under a continuing power of attorney for property of an incapable person pursuant to subsection 38(1) of the SDA) are required to make, namely expenditures that are reasonably necessary for the person’s support, education and care, expenditures that are reasonably necessary for the support, education and care of the person’s dependants, and expenditures that are necessary to satisfy the person’s other legal obligations.
[11] Subsection 37(3) provides that a guardian may make gifts or loans to the person's friends and relatives and may make charitable gifts.
[12] Subsection 37(4) sets forth rules governing the making of gifts or loans to friends or relatives and of charitable gifts. Para. 1 provides that gifts or loans to friends or relatives and charitable gifts may only be made if the property is and will remain sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subsection (1). This is not in issue in the present case.
[13] Paragraph 2 of subsection 37(4) provides that gifts or loans to friends or relatives may be made only if there is reason to believe, based on intentions the person expressed before becoming incapable, that he or she would make them if capable and para. 5 provides that a gift or loan to a friend or relative shall not be made if the incapable person expressed a wish to the contrary.
[14] S, 32(1) of the SDA provides that a guardian of property is a fiduciary whose powers and duties shall be exercised and performed diligently, with honesty and integrity and in good faith, for the incapable person's benefit.
[15] Subsection 37(6) of the SDA provides that expenditures made under section 37 shall be deemed to be for the incapable person's benefit. This would therefore include gifts or loans to the incapable person’s friends or relatives made in accordance with the rules in subsection (4).
[16] The affidavit material, Factum and oral submissions of the Attorneys indicate that they are of the belief, or they are at least concerned, that the applicable rules in subsection 37(4) prevent gifts or loans to be made to Mr. Wilson based upon the available evidence. In this respect they point to the following factors:
(a) Mrs. Kaufman expressed to her lawyers that she did not want to support Mr. Wilson with an allowance and did not want him to have an interest in her real property, Hillhead;
(b) that one of Mrs. Kaufman’s caregivers, Shirley McKee, overheard a telephone conversation between Mrs. Kaufman and Mr. Wilson in which Mr. Wilson was reported to have said “you always said you would never do to me what your father did to you, so I hope you die”. The reference to Mrs. Kaufman’s father relates to a dispute that she and her sister had over ownership in Hillhead which was originally their father’s property;
(c) that Mr. Wilson and Mrs. Kaufman have had a difficult relationship and that Mrs. Kaufman has refused to provide him with financial assistance;
(d) that in 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson commenced an application, which was subsequently discontinued, against Mrs. Kaufman in which they sought an interest in Hillhead and related relief. Mrs. Kaufman was upset by this lawsuit having been brought against her.
[17] In my view, it is not necessary to make findings of disputed facts, nor to make findings as to whether the evidence establishes that the making by the Attorneys of gifts or loans to Mr. Wilson from the property of Mrs. Kaufman would breach one or more of the rules in subsection 37(4) of the SDA, as there is a threshold impediment to the Attorneys’ application, rendering it inappropriate for the Court to give the directions which they seek.
[18] In the case of Re Fulford (1913), 1913 CanLII 515 (ON SC), 29 O.L.R. 375 (H.C.) it was held that the court is not authorized give directions to trustees on whether or how to exercise their discretion. Middleton, J. stated as follows at paras. 21 and 22:
The question is then raised as to the duty of the executors to realise. I do not for one moment suggest that these stocks should be hastily and improvidently thrown upon the market. The executors are intrusted by the testator with a discretion as to realisation, and they must exercise that discretion, realising as best they can upon the stocks which they are not authorised to hold.
It is suggested that some scheme should be devised by which the Court should approve of realisation in each particular case, taking the opinion of some advisory committee, if necessary, upon each particular transaction. I do not think that any such scheme can be authorised. The executors are protected from all liability if they honestly and with due care exercise the discretion vested in them. But the responsibility is theirs, and cannot be shifted upon the Court. The executors cannot come to the Court and ask whether the present is a good time or a bad time to sell stock or anything else, or ask whether a price offered is sufficient or insufficient. The advice which the Court is authorised to give is not of that type or kind; it is advice as to legal matters or legal difficulties arising in the discharge of the duties of the executors, not advice with regard to matters concerning which the executors' judgment and discretion must govern.
[19] Re Fulford was followed in the case of Re Wright 1976 CanLII 812 (ON SC), [1976] O.J. No. 2367 9H.C.J.) in which an estate trustee applied to the court for an order approving the sale of shares comprising just over half the value of the estate. In dismissing the application, Craig, J. adopted the language of Middleton, J. in Re Fulford as well as the principle in Tempest v. Lord Camoys (1882), 21 Ch. D. 571 (a case cited by counsel for Mr. and Mrs. Wilson in his Factum this case) that the court has no power, save in the case of male fides or a refusal to discharge the duty undertaken, to put a control on the exercise of the discretion which the testator has left to the trustees.
[20] More recently Justice D.M. Brown, as he then was, in the case of Re Kaptyn Estate (2009) 2009 CanLII 19933 (ON SC), 48 E.T.R. (3d) 278 (S.C.J.), applied the principle in Re Fulford, and adopted in Re Wright, to a case where an estate trustee brought an application to the court pursuant to section 60(1) of the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23 for directions on whether an action should be commenced on behalf of the estate. Section 60(1) of the Trustee Act provides as follows:
A trustee, guardian or personal representative may, without the institution of an action, apply to the Superior Court of Justice for the opinion, advice or direction of the court on any question respecting the management or administration of the trust property or the assets of a ward or a testator or intestate.
[21] Justice Brown, at paragraph 31 of Re Kaptyn Estate, observed that “it is the obligation of the executors, not the courts, to decide whether an action should be commenced for the benefit of the estate and how to do so. Any risks associated with a decision about whether or not to sue should rest squarely on the shoulders of the executors.”
[22] Justice Brown made similar observations in the case of Re Primo Poloniato Grandchildren’s Trust (2009) 46 E.T.R. (3d) 310 (S.C.J.) at paras. 13-15, being a case involving an application by the trustee of an inter vivos trust for the opinion, advice or direction of the Court on a question dealing with payments to income beneficiaries and a question as to whether the solvency provisions in the relevant corporate statute permitted the trustee to continue to declare dividends to fund the payments to the income beneficiaries.
[23] Counsel for the Attorneys in the present case argued that the principle in Re Fulford has no application because subsection 39(1) of the SDA specifically authorizes them to bring an application for directions and subsection 39(4) authorizes the court to give such directions as it considers to be for the benefit of the person and his or her dependants and consistent with this Act. Essentially the Attorneys argue that the enactment of 39(1) had the effect of overriding the principle in Re Fulford.
[24] In my view, the enactment of subsection 39(1) of the SDA did not have the effect of overriding or neutralizing the principle in Re Fulford. As exemplified in the Re Kaptyn Estate and Re Primo Poloniato Grandchildren’s Trust cases, the ability of trustees of testamentary or inter vivos trusts to apply for the opinion, advice or direction of the court on a question respecting the management or administration of the trust property derives from Section 60(1) of the Trustee Act.
[25] The fact that trustees are expressly permitted by the Trustee Act to apply for the opinion advice or direction of the Court does not authorize the court to exercise discretionary powers on behalf of trustees, thereby shifting responsibility from the trustees, on whom the settlor of the trust placed such responsibility, to the court. This is so even though subsection 60(2) of the Trustee Act provides a specific indemnification to trustees who act upon the opinion, advice or direction of the court.
[26] In my view, there is no functional difference, for the purposes of the Attorneys’ application in this case and the application of the principle in Re Fulford, between subsection 60(1) of the Trustee Act and subsection 39(1) of the SDA, which reads as follows:
If an incapable person has a guardian of property or an attorney under a continuing power of attorney, the court may give directions on any question arising in connection with the guardianship or power of attorney.
[27] As indicated above, section 32(1) of the SDA provides that the powers and duties of guardians, including Attorneys for property, shall be exercised and performed diligently, with honesty and integrity and in good faith, for the incapable person's benefit. The power to make gifts or loans from the incapable person’s property to friends or relatives is permissive only and is discretionary to the Attorneys. It is for the Attorneys to determine, in their discretion, whether gifts or loans should be made to Mr. Wilson and, in particular, whether any such gifts or loans would be prohibited by application of the rules in subsection 37(4) of the SDA.
[28] It is evident that the Attorneys’ purpose in bringing the application for directions is, at least to a significant degree, to seek to insulate themselves from liability to Mr. Wilson for refusing or declining to make gifts or loans to him from Mrs. Kaufman’s property, or conversely, to the other beneficiaries under Mrs. Kaufman’s Will should they, in their discretion, decide to make such gifts or loans. At paragraph 58 of their Factum, the Attorneys respond to the suggestion that the application was not brought in good faith by stating that they “must properly carry out their duties as attorneys, and may be liable if they do not do so. Herein they merely seek advice and direction in that regard.” Mr. Keller, in his affidavit in support of the application, noted that Mr. Wilson has threatened litigation against him and Mr. Hilton, in their capacities both as executors and as powers of attorney for property. The Attorneys are therefore evidently of the view that Mr. Wilson’s threat of litigation is relevant to their application.
[29] As indicated in the passage from Re Fulford set forth above, the attorneys “are protected from all liability if they honestly and with due care exercise the discretion vested in them,” or put another way, if they, in the exercise of their discretion, discharge their duties under section 32(1) of the SDA. On the authorities cited above, it is not appropriate for the Attorneys to attempt to shift their responsibility in that regard to the Court by means of an application for directions on how to exercise their discretion.
[30] As indicated above, the application also seeks the opinion, advice and direction of the Court as to whether Mr. Wilson is a dependant of Mrs. Kaufman. At para. 57 of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson’s Factum it is stated that Mr. Wilson has never asserted that he is a dependant of Mrs. Kaufman, and also that it is clear from the language of the relevant statutes (the SDA, the Succession Law Reform Act and The Family Law Act) that he is not a statutory dependant. Given that Mr. Wilson does not claim that he is a dependant of Mrs. Kaufman, it is not necessary for me to determine this question.
[31] For the reasons set forth above, the application of the Attorneys in file ES-1234-14 must therefore be dismissed.
Application of Ross Alexander Wilson and Hajra Wilson in File ES-95-15
[32] As indicated above, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, in their Notice of Application, seek orders requiring the Attorneys to pass their accounts, removing the attorneys for property and replacing them with such person or persons as the court might order, removing Messrs. Keller and Hilton as attorneys for personal care for Mrs. Kaufman and replacing them with Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, and removing Messrs. Keller and Hilton as “executors and trustees” under the Will of Mrs. Kaufman and replacing them with such person or persons as the court might order.
[33] The application for removal of Messrs. Keller and Hilton as attorneys for personal care was not pursued in Mr. and Mrs. Wilson’s Factum, nor in argument. There was no evidence led in support of this prayer for relief. Similarly, the application for removal of Messrs. Keller and Hilton as “executors and trustees” under the Will was not pursued in the applicants’ Factum nor an argument and no evidence was led in relation to this claim. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an application for removal of estate trustees under a Will succeeding prior to the testator’s death.
[34] This leaves the application for orders requiring the Attorneys to pass their accounts and that they be removed and replaced as attorneys for property for Mrs. Kaufman.
[35] Subsection 32(6) of the SDA requires a guardian, in accordance with the regulations, to keep accounts of all transactions involving the property. However, an attorney is not required to pass his or her accounts, but rather, pursuant to subsection 42(1) of the SDA, the court may, on application, order that all or a specified part of the accounts of an attorney be passed. Pursuant to subsection 42(2) of the SDA, an attorney, the grantor or any of the persons listed in subsection 42(4) may apply to pass the attorney’s accounts. Pursuant to para. 6 of subsection 42(4), Mr. Wilson, as “any other person” may only apply for an order that the Attorneys pass their accounts with leave of the court. It is noted that Mr. and Mrs. Wilson made no application for leave in their Notice of Application or otherwise.
[36] Justice Pattillo in the case of Overbury v. Meynell , 2014 ONSC 7034 observed, at para. 3, that the granting of leave pursuant to s. 42(4) para. 6 is discretionary and that in determining whether leave should be granted, the court must be satisfied that the applicant has a genuine interest in the grantor's welfare and that it is reasonable to believe that a court hearing the matter may order the attorney to pass his or her accounts.
[37] Mr. and Mrs. Wilson led no evidence that Mrs. Kaufman’s welfare was in any way being compromised by the decision-making of, or management of her property by, the Attorneys, nor did they make any allegations of malfeasance or wrongdoing, apart from the bringing of the application in file ES-1234-14. Given the dearth of evidence, even if Mr. and Mrs. Wilson had applied for leave to bring an application for an order that the Attorneys pass their accounts, they have failed to show that it is reasonable to believe that a court hearing the matter would order a passing of accounts. The application requiring the Attorneys to pass their accounts is therefore dismissed.
[38] In support of their application for removal and replacement of the Attorneys as attorneys for property for Mrs. Kaufman, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson rely largely upon the bringing of the application in file ES-1234-14, arguing that it was an abuse of process and a breach of the duties of the attorneys under subsection 32(1) of the SDA to exercise and perform their powers diligently, with honesty and integrity and in good faith, for Mrs. Kaufman’s benefit.
[39] Mr. & Mrs. Wilson point to the case of Chu v. Chang 2010 ONSC 1816 (S.C.J.) in which Justice D.M. Brown stated as follows, at para. 13:
It is a breach of a guardian's fiduciary duties to attempt to advance a position before the court in proceedings under the SDA which is not motivated solely by a concern, objectively-based, for the best interests of the incapable person but, instead, to initiate proceedings under the SDA, including proceedings for directions, which reflect merely an effort by one side of a family to lever the court process to obtain some tactical advantage against another side.
[40] A review of the facts in Chu v. Chang as recited that by Justice Brown discloses that that case is readily distinguishable from the present case. The actions of the applicant in Chu v. Chang were extreme and reprehensible. Although I have determined that the application of the Attorneys for directions was not well-founded for the reasons set forth above, I would not characterize it as being an attempt to lever the court process to obtain some tactical advantage against the other side in the manner described by Justice Brown in the Chu v. Chang case.
[41] In addition to the court’s power to give directions on any question arising in connection with a power of attorney under subsection 39(1) of the SDA, pursuant to subsection 42(7) of the SDA, if there is an application to pass accounts, the court may, if there is a motion or on its own initiative, appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee or another person to act as guardian of property and/or order that the power of attorney be terminated.
[42] Justice Fragomeni, in the case of Teffer v. Schaefers [2008] O.J. No. 3618 (S,C.J.) observed, at paras. 24-25, that “there must be strong and compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect on the part of the attorney before a court could ignore the clear wishes of the donor” and that the court must consider whether the best interests of the incapable person are being served by the attorney.
[43] Aside from the expense to Mrs. Kaufman’s property associated with the bringing of the application in file ES-1234-14, the focus of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson in their evidence and submissions largely related to the impact on them of the bringing of the Attorneys’ application rather than on any adverse impact on Mrs. Kaufman’s best interests.
[44] In my view, the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson falls well short of strong and compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect on the part of the Attorneys. They have not established a basis for the Court to ignore the clear wishes of Mrs. Kaufman in appointing Messrs. Keller and Hilton as her attorneys for property. Moreover, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson have not presented a management plan which is a precondition to the replacement of the Attorneys by a guardianship order (see Sly v. Curran, 2008 CarswellOnt 4301 (S.C.J.) at para. 15.)
[45] Accordingly, the application of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson to remove Messrs. Keller and Hilton as attorneys for property for Mrs. Kaufman must also be dismissed.
Disposition
[46] On the basis of the foregoing, the applications in files ES-1234-14 and ES-95-15 are each dismissed.
Costs
[47] If any party wishes to claim costs and if the parties cannot agree on the question of costs, the parties may make written submissions as to costs within 21 days of the release of these Reasons for Decision. All such written submissions are to be forwarded to me at my chambers at 85 Frederick Street, 7th Floor, Kitchener, Ontario, N2H 0A7 and should not exceed three double-spaced pages, exclusive of Bills of Costs and authorities. Each party has 10 days after receipt of the submissions of the other to deliver responding submissions, not to exceed two-double-spaced pages. If no submissions are received within this timeframe, the parties will be deemed to have settled the issue of costs as between themselves.
D.A. Broad
Released: November 17, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: ES-1234-14 and ES-95-15
DATE: 2015/11/17
ANTHONY KELLER and ROBERT HILTON, as Attorneys for MARGARET ISABELLE KAUFMAN and as Executors and Trustees of her Last Will and Testament dated July 14, 2006
Applicants
– and –
ROSS ALEXANDER WILSON, JENNIFER (“LAND”) DUNN, JILLIAN REDFERN, BLAIN REDFERN, LINZI MURRAY, CALLUM MURRAY, ERIN MURRAY, JAMIESON MURRAY, THE CANADIAN NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE BLIND (ONTARIO DIVISION), THE KITCHENER-WATERLOO COMMUNITY FOUNDATION
Respondents
AND BETWEEN:
ROSS ALEXANDER WILSON and HAJRA WILSON
Applicants
– and –
ANTHONY KELLER and ROBERT HILTON, as Attorneys for MARGARET ISABELLE KAUFMAN and as Executors and Trustees of her Last Will and Testament dated July 14, 2006
Respondents
Released: November 17, 2015