[Editor’s note: Corrigendum released on February 11, 2015. Original judgment has been corrected with text of corrigendum appended.
CITATION: K.L.P. v. T[…] District School Board, 2015 ONSC 636
COURT FILE NO.: 1467/10
DATE: 2015/01/30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
K.L.P., T.L.R., K.L.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., C.R.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., J.R.R. and L.H.R.
N. Loewith, for the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
- and -
T[…] District School Board and S.S.
D. Miller, for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: January 16, 2015
Grace J.:
A. Introduction
[1] The plaintiffs seek and the defendant[1] opposes the granting of judgment in accordance with the verdict of the jury returned on December 2, 2014.
B. Background
[2] K.L.P. and S.S. were classmates at C[…] Secondary School. Both were in a class designed to benefit students with special needs.
[3] On June 20, 2009 and shortly after dismissal, K.L.P. was sexually assaulted by S.S. in a school washroom.
[4] K.L.P. and various members of her family commenced this action against the T[…] District School Board (“T[…]”).
[5] It was tried with a jury.
[6] The plaintiffs took the position that the T[…] failed to properly supervise S.S. and K.L.P. in the areas of the school they travelled resulting in the sexual assault. The plaintiffs also alleged that the T[...]’s post-incident acts and omissions also adversely affected K.L.P. and her family in various ways. In short, the plaintiffs alleged the T[…] failed to meet the required standard of care in relation to K.L.P. and that damage was occasioned to her and various members of her family.
[7] On the third day of the trial, counsel for the parties were asked if they had agreed on the jury questions. The plaintiff had prepared a draft. The defendant had not done so.
[8] Defendant’s counsel indicated he was content with the plaintiffs’ version with one exception. He asked that the jury be required to provide a written explanation if the T[…] was found to have breached the standard of care.[2]
[9] Despite its initial position, the T[…] submitted a list of jury questions of its own two days later. It proposed additional amendments beyond those first discussed.
[10] A final version was settled. The plaintiffs agreed to the inclusion of a question requiring a brief narrative if there was a finding that T[…] had failed to meet the applicable standard of care. The first two questions dealt with that issue. They read as follows:
- Have the plaintiffs satisfied you, on a balance of probabilities, that the T[…] District School Board, failed to meet the standard of care in relation to K.L.P.?
____ Yes
____ No
- If the answer to Question 1 is yes, please set forth in words the way or ways in which the T[…] District School Board failed to meet the standard of care.
[11] With the questions finalized, a draft charge was prepared and sent to counsel electronically on November 30, 2014 (Exhibit J-4). A draft of the judicial summary of the evidence was not sent to counsel until after their closings were complete.
[12] Comments on the draft charge were made by counsel early on December 1, 2014. The amendments requested by the plaintiffs were set forth in a tracked version marked as exhibit J-5. They reflected the plaintiffs’ request that the standard of care issue include consideration of T[…]’s conduct pre and post-incident. T[…] agreed that amendments of that kind were appropriate.
[13] Some revisions were made after the closings and a second draft was circulated electronically. No comments were made on that version.
[14] The questions were read to the jury during the December 1, 2014 closings and when the jury was charged the following day.
[15] The instructions to the jury concerning question one included the following:
Your task is to determine what a careful and prudent parent would have done in the circumstances that existed on June 22, 2009 and in the aftermath of the incident and then decide, based on the facts as you find them, whether the school board met the standard of care by applying the legal principles I have just described.
[16] Some of the evidence that related to the standard of care issue was then summarized. It included a reference to that portion of the T[…] Safe Schools Procedure (“Procedure”) that stated that schools should ensure that pupils were supervised in, among other places, corridors and washrooms.
[17] The summary also mentioned some of the events that occurred after K.L.P. was sexually assaulted: the discovery of K.L.P. and S.S. in the washroom; educational assistant Ms. S.’s discussion with K.L.P. and her mother; department head Mr. M.R.’s discussion with the police, S.S., K.L.P.’s mother and principal C.M.; and the videotaped and transcribed interviews of K.L.P. and later S.S. conducted shortly after the incident by Detective Cassidy of the London Police Service. The summary did not, however, mention the Procedure again or the T[…] Safe Schools Policy (“Policy”) at all.
[18] A few paragraphs later, the charge turned to question two. After reading the question the jury was instructed in these terms:
In answering question 2, please try to explain briefly, but clearly, what the school board did or did not do which caused you to answer the first question affirmatively.
Please do not use vague or indefinite answers such as, ‘The school board should have been more careful’. That answer would be meaningless. If this question is applicable, please try to explain the way or ways in which the school board failed to act as a careful or prudent parent in similar circumstances.
[19] Counsel were invited to make submissions after completion of the charge. The plaintiffs submitted that the failure to mention the Procedure or Policy in the post-incident context was a deficiency the court needed to address with the jury. T[…] disagreed. Its counsel submitted that there was no reason to provide any further instruction to the jury. For brief reasons given orally, the jury was not recalled.
[20] The jury returned its verdict on December 2, 2014. It found that the T[…] had failed to meet the standard of care in relation to K.L.P.. As asked, the jury answered question 2. These are the words the jury used:
In their duty to meet the standard of care after the incident of June 22, 2009, specifically:
Safe Schools Policy 2.6
Safe Schools Procedure, Section 12.
[21] The jury awarded damages to K.L.P., K.L.P.’s mother and grandmother aggregating $156,000. No damages were awarded to K.L.P.’s brothers or grandfather.
[22] The jury was excused briefly after the answers were read. Counsel for the plaintiff sought judgment in accordance with the verdict pursuant to section 108(5) (b) of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 52.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). T[…] opposed that request. In fact, it opposed the discharge of the jury, maintaining that the jurors had misunderstood and failed to comply with the court’s instructions.
[23] Nonetheless, the jury was discharged. I was of the view that the jury had returned answers which were clear and understandable and that its task was complete. I did not agree that a request for elaboration or explanation was necessary or appropriate.
[24] T[…] asked for and was given time to formulate submissions concerning the plaintiffs’ request for judgment.
C. Defendant’s position
[25] The defendant submits that the jury verdict cannot stand because:
a) there was no evidence the T[…] failed to comply with section 2.6 of the Policy; and
b) while there was evidence that could support a finding the T[…] breached section 12 of the Procedure, there was no evidence that the breach caused any damage, loss or injury.
D. Analysis and Decision
[26] The legal principles are not in dispute. At common law, a judge may only disregard a jury’s verdict or answers in two situations. They are:
a) first, if there is no evidence to support the jury’s findings, or
b) second, if the jury’s answers cannot, in law, provide a foundation for a judgment: Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1992), 1992 7516 (ON SC), 7 O.R. (3d) 489 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 26; McLean v. Knox, 2013 ONCA 357 at para. 20.
[27] T[…] submits this case fits within the first category.
[28] Rule 52.08(1) of the Rules addresses the issue as well. It outlines three situations where a trial judge may direct that an action be re-tried with another jury. The concluding lines of the sub-rule contemplate a fourth possibility. They read as follows:
…where there is no evidence on which a judgment for the plaintiff could be based or where for any other reason the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment, the judge shall dismiss the action.
[29] The defendant also argues that this case fits within those words.
[30] In Stilwell v. World Kitchen Inc., 2014 ONCA 770, the defendant sought to overturn an adverse jury award on various grounds. It argued that the jury’s liability finding should be set aside because it was not supported by the evidence the jury referenced in its narrative.
[31] The Court of Appeal referred to two well-settled principles of law relating to civil jury verdicts: first, the standard of review is exceptionally high and second, a jury’s verdict should be broadly interpreted. At paragraphs 33-36, Hourigan J.A. offered this helpful explanation. In part he wrote:
…the standard of review of civil jury verdicts is exceptionally high. A civil jury’s verdict should be set aside only where it is so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have arrived at the verdict: Boucher v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2014 ONCA 419…Goodwin (Litigation Guardian of) v. Olupona, 2013 ONCA 259…
Second, a jury’s verdict is entitled to a fair and liberal interpretation in light of the evidence and of the circumstances: Malone v. Trans-Canada Airlines, 1942 115 (ON CA), [1942] O.R. 453, at para. 25 (C.A.). Answers by a jury should be given the fullest possible effect and supported, if possible, by any reasonable construction…
This approach to the review of the jury answers is entirely justified on policy grounds. Our courts recognize that civil juries are made up of laypeople who are untrained in the law, and that allowances for this lack of training must be made in considering their answers to questions. It is also important to remember that civil juries are instructed not to give reasons for their decisions, so their answers must be read in this context.
The appropriate degree of judicial deference to be applied in the consideration of jury answers and verdicts was described by Laskin C.J.C. in his dissent in Wade v. C.N.R., 1977 194 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1064, at pp. 1069-1070:
Appeal Courts do not fine-comb jury answers but accord them the respect of a common sense interpretation even where there may be some ambiguity in the answers… It is always timely to be reminded that juries do not write reasons for judgment, and their answers must be taken against the background of the evidence from which they are entitled to select, without manifesting their selection, what is credible, what is significant, what is persuasive to them. It is very often easy for an appellate Court, in the leisurely scrutiny of the transcript, to find significance in pieces of evidence to contradict jury findings, and in so doing to usurp the jury’s function. What an appellate Court may believe from a reading of the transcript may be the very things which a jury disbelieved or believed in part only. It is one thing to interfere with a jury’s verdict where there is simply no evidence to support its findings or to support a critical one; it is a different thing, and not to be encouraged, to interfere with its findings where there is evidence, however slight, on which they may be based, but where because of offsetting evidence a question of credit and weight arises. These are matters for the jury alone.
[32] Those cautionary words are important ones for trial judges to bear in mind.
[33] That does not mean that a jury’s verdict will always result in a judgment in accordance with its terms. Salter v. Hirst, 2010 ONSC 3440, [2010] O.J. No. 2522 (S.C.J.) is a case in point. The trial judge refused to grant judgment against one physician despite the jury’s finding that the doctor had breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the patient’s paraplegia.
[34] The trial judge concluded there was no evidence to support a finding of causation. That decision was affirmed on appeal.[^3] The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not allow the trier of fact to know whether the prolonged delay in referring the patient to another facility caused or contributed to his ultimate condition. The trial judge’s decision to dismiss that portion of the claim pursuant to rule 52.08 was an appropriate one.
[35] In Stilwell, supra the jury’s liability verdict was not set aside.
[36] The Court of Appeal started its analysis by giving the jury verdict context. The court considered all of the evidence introduced at trial, not simply the portions mentioned in the jury.
[37] The Court of Appeal then gave the jury’s answers “a fair and liberal reading”. It concluded there was direct evidence that supported some aspects of the jury’s verdict and that other portions were founded upon inferences the jury had appropriately drawn.
[38] At paragraph 51, Hourigan J. A., wrote:
In my view, there was an evidentiary basis for the conclusion reached by the jury. While a different jury, or a judge sitting alone, may have drawn different inferences and reached different conclusions, I am not satisfied that the verdict is plainly unreasonable and unjust or that, in reaching it, the jury was not acting judicially.
[39] I return to this case.
[40] As mentioned the jury questions were finalized before a draft of the charge was circulated for the parties’ review. The jury was asked one standard of care question (followed by a second question requiring a narrative if the first question was answered in the affirmative), one causation and one damages question. The charge dealt with each question in turn.
[41] With respect to the standard of care question, the first draft focused on the pre-incident conduct of the T[…].
[42] Submissions were made with respect to that version. The plaintiffs asked that the instruction be broadened to include the post-incident period because they alleged that the T[…] had responded inadequately to the sexual assault. They maintained that the unsatisfactory response resulted in, among other things, an extreme reaction by K.L.P. to a variety of “triggers” including the mere sight or mention of C[…] Secondary School.
[43] While not agreeing with the plaintiffs’ theory, the defendant agreed that an amendment of the kind proposed should be made.
[44] The parties’ closings followed.
[45] In his closing, counsel for the T[…] grouped the liability questions. He dealt with them collectively. They were questions 1 (standard of care), 2 (the explanation if there was a finding of breach) and 3 (whether the breach caused damages to one, some or all of the plaintiffs).
[46] Pre and post-incident conduct was mentioned. The jury’s attention was drawn to items found in the Policy and Procedure.
[47] In the pre-incident context, T[…] referred to the same section of the Procedure that was mentioned in the charge.
[48] He also referred to post-incident conduct in the context of the plaintiffs’ allegation that the T[…] had failed to follow its own policies and procedures. Eight alleged failures of the T[…] were mentioned:
a) a failure to obtain witness statements;
b) a failure to properly investigate the incident;
c) a failure to advise S.S. that his conduct violated the Policy;
d) a failure to inform the T[…]’s Superintendent of the incident;
e) a failure to inform other teachers of the incident;
f) allowing S.S. to participate in the graduation ceremony that occurred within days of the incident;
g) a failure to arrange counselling for K.L.P.; and
h) a failure to facilitate and promote K.L.P.’s return to C[…].
[49] The jury was told why T[…] maintained those items did not warrant a finding that T[…] had fallen below the required standard of care. The jury was also briefly told why damages were not sustained even if that finding was made.
[50] T[...]’s counsel encouraged the jury to avoid examining isolated pieces of evidence. He urged the jurors to “look at all of the evidence” and the “entire pie” instead.
[51] He then turned to the “much more straightforward” issue of damages. T[…] acknowledged that the sexual assault had serious consequences for K.L.P. and, to a lesser extent, her mother.
[52] In the submissions that followed, T[...]’s counsel suggested that the jury consider an award within a certain range in relation to the sexual assault. He also raised the possibility of an additional, albeit, small award in favour of K.L.P. if the jury concluded that the post-incident conduct of the T[…] fell below the required standard of care.
[53] That portion of T[...]’s closing was surprising because neither the settled form of jury questions nor draft charge contemplated a separate liability, causation or damage analysis with respect to pre and post-incident conduct.
[54] However, that was not an isolated approach. The plaintiffs adopted and expanded upon it. Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed the jury questions twice: initially with respect to T[...]’s pre and later with respect to T[...]’s post-incident conduct.
[55] Plaintiffs’ counsel described the things the T[…] could and should have done in the circumstances pre-incident which would have prevented the sexual assault from occurring.
[56] Primarily by reference to the Policy and Procedure, plaintiffs’ counsel also described the things the T[…] could and should have done post-incident to help minimize the effects of the sexual assault on K.L.P. and her family.
[57] I had two concerns with the approach and its execution.
[58] First and as already mentioned, they did not seem to be contemplated by the jury questions. Second, comments concerning post-incident conduct seemed to go too far. T[...]’s subsequent conduct was relevant to the extent it related to the plaintiffs’ allegation that K.L.P. continues to be fearful by the sight or mention of C[…] Secondary School and had to enroll in and complete alternative, but less attractive, programs offered by Community Living London. However, portions of the plaintiffs’ closing seemed to invite the jury to consider systemic issues that had implications for persons other than the plaintiffs (i.e. other students, parents, teachers and schools).
[59] Plaintiffs’ counsel approached the damage issue in a similar way. The jury was told that damages are classified as a whole but that it was necessary to deal with the damages flowing from the sexual assault separately from the post-incident conduct.
[60] I questioned that approach. There was only one damage question. It did not contemplate being visited twice. To my mind, post-incident conduct was relevant in determining the measure of damages which flowed from the sexual assault. It did not warrant an entirely independent analysis. The plaintiffs’ closing effectively turned one set of questions into two.
[61] Post-closing objections were anticipated from the T[…]. None were forthcoming.
[62] Based on the earlier submissions of counsel, modest amendments were made to the first draft of the charge. A few more resulted from the closings.
[63] A blacklined version of the revised charge was circulated the afternoon of December 1. As noted, the revised draft told the jury that its task was to determine “what a careful and prudent parent would have done in the circumstances that existed on June 22, 2009 and in the aftermath of the incident”.
[64] A draft evidence summary was provided to counsel that evening.
[65] On December 2, 2014, counsel returned before the jury was recalled. Comments were made with respect to the evidence summary and a few revisions were made. No objection was made to the revised charge.
[66] The jury was recalled and charged. As noted earlier, the plaintiffs’ post-charge request to provide additional instructions to the jury concerning the Policy and Procedure in the context of T[...]’s post-incident conduct was declined.
[67] The jury retired with the numbered exhibits, including the Policy and the Procedure.
[68] The jury returned its verdict on December 4, 2014. Question 1 was answered in the affirmative. The jury was satisfied that the plaintiffs had proven that the T[…] had failed to meet the standard of care in relation to K.L.P..
[69] The way or ways in which the T[…] failed to meet the standard of care was explained in about two dozen words. Once again they were:
In their duty to meet the standard of care after the incident of June 22, 2009, specifically:
Safe Schools Policy 2.6
Safe Schools Procedure, Section 12.
[70] As can be seen, the jury described a time period (“after the incident of June 22, 2009”) and specific parts of two documents.
[71] Portions of the Policy and Procedure had been drawn to the attention of some of the witnesses. However, I do not remember any witness being referred to the specific sections mentioned by the jury in its answer.
[72] Section 12 of the Procedure covers more than five pages.
[73] Under the heading “Reference Policy and Procedures”, the section is divided into the following parts:
12.1 Procedures for Reporting Violent Incidents to the Police;
12.2 Record Keeping of Violent Incidents Leading to Suspension/Expulsion and Report to the Police. This section referenced a Violent Incident Form which was attached. The blank form was referred to during the trial. Department head M.R. acknowledged that a Violent Incident Form was not completed following the sexual assault;
12.3 T[…] Policy: Suspension of Students. Readers were referred to the T[…] internet website for the text; and
12.4 T[…] Policy: Expulsion of Students. Once again, readers were referred to the T[…] internet website for the text.
[74] Section 12 of the Procedure also referred to a three page summary of legislative and regulatory provisions which was attached as Appendix B.
[75] The jury identified and relied upon a section of the Procedure that outlined steps the T[…] was required to but did not take. A Violent Incident Form was to be completed. It was not. Among other things, the form was to be used to describe the incident and outline the disciplinary action taken by the school. In fact, no disciplinary action was taken. S.S. graduated and received awards.
[76] The incident was to be reported to the Ministry of Education and Training for, it appears, statistical purposes. It was not.
[77] Section 2.6 of the Policy is only a few lines long. It provides as follows:
The Board commits to ensuring that:
procedures are in place for dealing with the range of violent incidents that could occur in the school environment, and that these procedures are applicable to all students, staff and visitors and that they are expected to help to prevent occurrences, thus making the school safer.
[78] The defendant submitted there was no evidence that section 2.6 of the Policy was breached, because the Procedure was the very thing the Policy required the T[…] to create.
[79] However, I do not read the jury’s answers the same way. The law requires a generous and liberal meaning.
[80] Further, the answers must be considered in light of the instruction given. This jury was asked to explain the way or ways in which the T[…] failed to act as a careful and prudent parent in similar circumstances “briefly but clearly”. In Kamyab v. Bruce (2000), 2 C.P.C. (5th) 136 (Ont. S.C.J.), the jury was asked to provide its explanation “fully and clearly”. In this case, the court made another and lesser request.
[81] From the jury’s answers, it appears that the jury considered the T[...]’s conduct and accepted at least one of the theories advanced by the plaintiffs: namely, that the T[…] inadequately responded to the incident and that the response caused damage to K.L.P., her mother and grandmother because of what occurred when trust in the school system T[…] administers was irretrievably broken.
[82] The evidence supported the finding that the T[…] did not comply with section 12 of the Procedure. Although that section had not been referred to during the trial, some of its elements were mentioned. Furthermore, T[...]’s counsel expressly addressed post-incident conduct and its consequences in his closing.
[83] Section 2.6 of the Policy sets forth T[...]’s commitment to putting “procedures…in place…dealing with the range of violent incidents that could occur in the school environment” and the expectation that the procedures would “help to prevent recurrence, thus making the school safer”.
[84] In its submissions, the T[…] focused on the physical existence of such a procedure. To my mind, the jury’s focus was on its substance. While procedures were written, the jury seems to have concluded that nothing was done to prevent recurrence of a sexual assault or to make the school safer and hence, K.L.P. and some members of her family suffered damage.
[85] As mentioned, K.L.P. did not return to the specialized program C[…] offered. In fact, there was evidence she reacted negatively even when driven by the school. The effects of the sexual assault and its aftermath on K.L.P. were described succinctly by her grandmother. She said that before the incident K.L.P.’s “life was rosy” but afterward “it wasn’t rosy anymore”. The jury agreed.
[86] The jury was given the task of reviewing the evidence including the Policy and Procedure. It identified, considered, interpreted and applied the provisions it mentioned. I do not think it is for me to usurp the jury’s role.
[87] Nor am I in a position to “weigh the reasonableness of the evidence” the jury identified in its answer to question 2.[^4] A trial judge’s jurisdiction to disregard a jury’s verdict is limited both at common law and by the Rules to a situation where there is “no evidence” to support the verdict.
[88] In Lang v. McKenna, [2000] O.J. No. 2983, at para. 24, Osborne A.C.J.O. stated the principle in these terms:
If there is some evidence to support the jury’s verdict (as distinct from no evidence), it is still open to the successful party to contend on appeal that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence. However, as I have said, the unreasonable or perverse verdict issue is an appellate court issue, not an issue to be dealt with by the trial judge under Rule 52.08(1) (c).[^5]
[89] Had I answered question 1 in the affirmative, I have no doubt I would have relied on different evidence and would have offered a different explanation. However, that is not the test. As outlined in Stilwell, supra, at para. 51, the fact that I may have reached different conclusions or drawn different inferences from the evidence than the jury is immaterial.
[90] The T[…] also questioned the jury’s answer to the causation question (question 3) and the quantum of the damage award (question 4) given the jury’s focus on conduct after the incident. I reiterate there was only one causation and one damage question. They did not mention, let alone compartmentalize, any time period.
[91] In any event, the T[…] did not dispute that K.L.P. was sexually assaulted, that the incident occurred where, when and at the instance of the person alleged or that the sexual assault had, at least initially, a significant impact on K.L.P.. The T[…] accepted that the incident affected K.L.P.’s mother and perhaps her grandmother.
[92] However, T[…] denied that any of the plaintiffs suffered for as long or to the extent alleged. The jury disagreed.
E. Conclusion
[93] Evidence existed which provided a foundation for the jury’s affirmative answer to questions 1 and 3 and for the damages awarded in question 4. The jury’s explanation in question 2 does not place me in a position to disregard the jury’s verdict at common law or pursuant to rule 52.08(1) of the Rules.
[94] Judgment is granted in accordance with the jury verdict as follows:
a) T[…] shall pay to K.L.P. the principal sum of $80,000;
b) T[…] shall pay to T.L.R. the principal sum of $68,000; and
c) T[…] shall pay to J.R.R. the principal sum of $8,000.
[95] I am confident that the parties can agree on the commencement date and rate of prejudgment interest. If I am wrong, the parties can address that issue as well as the issue of costs by written submissions according to the following time schedule:
a) The written submissions of the plaintiffs shall be delivered on or before February 20, 2015;
b) Responding submissions of T[…] shall be provided on or before the March 9, 2015; and
c) Reply submissions, if any, shall be provided on or before March 16, 2015.
[96] Initial submissions shall not exceed six and reply submissions two typed pages.
Justice A. D. Grace
Date: January 30, 2015
CITATION: K.L.P. v. T[…] District School Board, 2015 ONSC 636
COURT FILE NO.: 1467/10
DATE: 2015/01/
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
K.L.P., T.L.R.,
K.L.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., C.R.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R.,
J.R.R. and L.H.R.
Plaintiffs
- and -
T[…] District School Board and S.S.
Defendants
Reasons for judgment
Grace J.
Released: January 30, 2015
CITATION: K.L.P. v. T[…] District School Board, 2015 ONSC 636
COURT FILE NO.: 1467/10
DATE: 2015/02/11
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
K.L.P., T.L.R., K.L.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., C.R.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., J.R.R. and L.H.R.
N. Loewith and I. MacLeod, for the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
- and -
T[…] District School Board and S.S.
D. Miller, for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: January 16, 2015
Grace J.:
Corrigendum and ADDENDUM
[97] In paras. 1, 20 and 68 of my reasons released January 30, 2015, the date the jury returned its verdict should read December 2, 2014.
[98] In addition, while Mr. MacLeod was unable to attend on January 16, 2015, he appeared throughout the trial. His name should have appeared as co-counsel for the plaintiffs.
[99] Subsequent to the release of my reasons, the parties reminded me that they had settled T.L.R.’s loss of income claim at $5,510.54. The judgment in her favour should be and is hereby increased by that amount.
Justice A. D. Grace
Date: February 11, 2015
CITATION: K.L.P. v. T[…] District School Board, 2015 ONSC 636
COURT FILE NO.: 1467/10
DATE: 2015/02/11
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
K.L.P., T.L.R., K.L.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., C.R.R., by his Litigation Guardian, T.L.R., J.R.R. and L.H.R.
Plaintiffs
- and -
T[…] District School Board and S.S.
Defendants
Corrigendum and addendum
Grace J.
Released: February 11, 2015
[^1]: The action was discontinued against S.S. prior to the trial.
[^2]: There was an initial discussion about the practice that seems to have developed in negligence cases of asking juries to provide some explanation despite the modest and permissive language of s. 108(9) of the Courts of Justice Act.
[^3]: 2011 ONCA 609.
[^4]: Olszynko v. Larocque, [1998] O.J. No. 5281 (Gen. Div.) at para. 21.
[^5]: Leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 539. See, too, McLean v. Knox, 2013 ONCA 357 at para. 30