CITATION: Dumont v. Lucescu, 2015 ONSC 494

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-13-43048-00

DATE: 20150123

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MIREILLE DUMONT

Applicant

– and –

STEVE LUCESCU

Respondent

Patrick D. Schmidt/Melanie A. Larock, for the Applicant

Doug LaFramboise, for the Respondent

HEARD: January 14, 2015

REASONS FOR DECISION ON MOTION

DOUGLAS J.

[1] The Applicant moves for relief regarding distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the parties’ jointly owned property (to which I will refer hereafter as “Boucherville”) and for an order striking the Respondent’s pleadings for failing to comply with my order of September 22, 2014. The Applicant also seeks a determination of the costs of two 14(b) motions advanced by the Applicant resulting in orders dated November 25, 2014 and December 15, 2014 in respect of which costs were reserved.

[2] The Boucherville property sold on October 24, 2014. Net proceeds of sale in the amount of $166,686.20 remain in trust with the Quebec Notary awaiting payment into court to the credit of this proceeding in accordance with an earlier order of this court.

[3] From the proceeds of sale of Boucherville the Applicant proposes that she receive one-half, being $83,343.10 and from the remaining half the following amounts to be paid:

(a) The amount of $55,380.31 to the Applicant in complete satisfaction of the amounts owed to the Applicant by the Respondent pursuant to paras. 3(d) and 5 of the order of Justice Douglas dated September 22, 2014;

(b) the amount of $2,820 to the Applicant as reimbursement for payment of the Respondent’s Royal Bank of Canada Visa credit card account number ending 8797; and

(c) the amount of $23,088.91 to the Applicant to pay the balance outstanding on the Respondent’s Royal Bank of Canada Visa credit card account number ending #8797.

[4] The Applicant further proposes that the balance of the net proceeds of sale continue to be held to the credit of this proceeding pending further agreement between the parties or court order.

[5] The Applicant further seeks an order striking the Respondent’s pleadings for failure to comply with the following terms of the order of Justice Douglas dated September 22, 2014 and specifically:

(a) Failure to comply with para. 1 of the order by failing to produce specified disclosure.

(b) Failure to pay the children’s private school expenses by October 24, 2014 contrary to para. 3(d) of the order of September 22, 2014.

(c) Failure to bring himself into compliance with his obligations under the consent orders dated June 4, 2013, September 25, 2013 and March 5, 2014 by October 17, 2014 as required by para. 5 of the September 22, 2014 order.

[6] At the time of argument of this motion it was conceded that the Respondent had provided proof of his having retained an income valuator referred to in the order of September 22, 2014.

[7] The Applicant mother, after delivering her motion materials, received additional disclosure from the Respondent. In consideration of that additional disclosure, the remaining items of disclosure to which the Applicant is allegedly entitled pursuant to the order of September 22, 2014 are as follows (corresponding to the items referenced in para. 14 of the affidavit of Marie Romano sworn January 12, 2015):

(i) Records for all pay for work assignments through Actra the Respondent, or any entity providing his services, has had for the period from January 1, 2013 to September 22, 2014;

(ii) (This basis for complaint was withdrawn during argument by the Applicant);

(iii) Statement for BMO US chequeing #24334506197 for the period from January 25, 2013 to the date of closure;

(iv) (This basis for complaint was withdrawn during argument by the Applicant);

(v) Statements for BMO MasterCard ending 6937 for the period from March 11, 2009 to the date of closure;

(vi) Statements for BMO mortgage number 2433-5-01269 for the period from January 1, 2013 to September 22, 2014;

(vii) Statements for BMO Personal Line of Credit account 22035236176 for the period from August 12, 2013 to September 10, 2013 and from January 11, 2014 to the date of the account closure in February 2014;

(viii) Statements for BMO Line of Credit account 22039714825 for a period from January 1, 2013 to April 9, 2013 and from August 10, 2014 to September 22, 2014;

(ix) Statements for BMO Home Owner Readiline Account (primary account number 22047211574) from July 22, 2013 to May 11, 2014;

(x) Statements for BMO account number 22094959294 from January 1, 2013 to September 22, 2014;

(xi) Statements for primary credit card for Royal Bank Visa account number ending 8797 for the period from July 27, 2013 to the date of closure;

(xii) Notices of Assessment for Zero Hour Industries Inc. for 2010 through 2013;

(xiii) An accounting of all monies received by the Respondent, whether taxable or not, from January 1, 2013 to September 22, 2014;

(xiv) An accounting of the application of all funds drawn by the Respondent against the mortgages, lines of credit or other loans set out in part 4 of his Financial Statement sworn February 26, 2014 and his Financial Statement sworn August 20, 2014 retroactive to February 18, 2013.

[8] In addition to ordering that the above disclosure be produced, the order of September 22, 2014 included specified deadlines. Those deadlines were established on the basis of the Respondent counsel’s concessions that each deadline was reasonable in relation to the item of disclosure to which that deadline related.

[9] The order of September 22, 2014 also includes the following:

If the disclosure required to be produced by the Respondent pursuant to para. 1 of this order is not available despite best efforts, or does not exist, the Respondent shall provide an Affidavit to the Applicant within the same time frame set out in para. 1 describing the Respondent’s efforts to comply, where applicable.

[10] The evidence in respect of the enumerated items of outstanding disclosure outlined in para. 7 above, and my analysis of each, is as follows (organized by way of correspondingly enumerated sub-paragraphs):

(i) According to the Applicant, the Respondent, under cover of letter dated October 3, 2014 provided statements from the Actra Fraternal Benefit Society setting out contributions to the Respondent’s RRSP with the Society. By letter dated December 12, 2014 the Applicant’s counsel advised Respondent’s counsel that the Applicant could not accept the information provided as being in compliance with his rather fulfilment of his obligations with respect to disclosure in this regard. The Respondent’s affidavit on this issue states simply as follows: “I have already provided all information with respect to Actra and the Applicant continues to re-request the same information”. In my view, the Respondent has failed to comply with his obligations pursuant to my order with respect to this item of disclosure. A bald statement to the effect that he has already provided the information is insufficient. He should produce evidence that he has complied. He has failed to do so.

(ii) The Applicant says these statements remain outstanding. The Respondent’s evidence is as follows: “I have no access to the statements for this account.” In my view, once again, the Respondent has failed to comply with his obligations. Not only has he not provided the documents ordered, he has also failed to provide evidence of his best efforts as required by para. 2 of the order of September 22, 2014. A bald statement to the effect that he has no access to the accounts is insufficient without explanation as to why he does not have access to the accounts and without details of his efforts to access the accounts.

(v) The Applicant alleges these documents remain outstanding. The Respondent deposes: “This account has been closed by BMO and I no longer have access to the statements.” Again, this is insufficient for the reasons outlined above. The Respondent has provided no explanation as to why the closure of an account results in his no longer having access to statements relating to transactions before closure of the account. He has not provided evidence of his best efforts to comply with his obligations with respect to this component of the disclosure order.

(vi) The Applicant says these documents remain outstanding. Again, the Respondent simply deposes: “I have no access to the statements for this account.” Again, this is not sufficient.

(vii) The Applicant says these documents have not been produced. The Respondent in his evidence does not refer to the account statement for the period from August 12, 2013 to September 10, 2013 and thus it may be inferred that he concedes that that document has not been produced. He says however that he has produced statements for the period from September 11, 2013 to February 11, 2014. As proof he refers to a cover letter dated September 17, 2014 which he says enclosed the documents in question. Unfortunately, he has not produced the documents in question. In the affidavit of Ms. Ramono sworn January 12, 2015, Exhibit D, does attach the documents in question and this disclosure serves to confirm that the statements relating to the period August to September 2013 and January to February 2014 are missing. The Respondent appears therefore not to have complied with his obligations to produce disclosure in this regard.

(viii) The Respondent does not deny the Applicant’s evidence that the statements for the period from January 1, 2013 to April 9, 2013 are missing. He also does not deny that the statement for the period August 10, 2014 to September 22, 2014 is missing. I can only conclude therefore that he has not produced those statements. He also has not provided evidence explaining his efforts to secure copies of these statements and provide same to the Applicant. He has failed to comply with his obligations in this regard.

(ix) The Respondent deposes that he produced statements for the period May 12, 2014 to August 11, 2014 and that he did so under cover letter dated September 17, 2014. He produces a copy of the letter but not copies of the documents. The Applicant alleges that statements for the period July 22, 2013 to May 11, 2014 remain outstanding. The Respondent’s evidence does not deny this. Again, I can only conclude that the Respondent has not complied with his obligation in this regard. Further, he has not provided any evidence that he has utilized best efforts to produce the missing disclosure.

(x) The Respondent simply deposes: “I have no access to the statements for this account.” Again, this is insufficient for the reasons outlined above. This disclosure remains outstanding without adequate explanation.

(xi) The Respondent’s evidence on this is as follows:

As explained in my affidavit sworn October 2, 2014, this is a joint account between me and the Applicant. The Applicant is a joint primary card holder for the account. The account has been closed and I cannot access it.

[11] Ownership of this account is in dispute. The Respondent was ordered to produce the statements or an affidavit outlining his best efforts to comply with his obligation in this regard. In my view, the brief evidence outlined above falls short of complying with his obligation in this regard. The fact that the Respondent alleges that the account is joint in nature does not absolve him of his responsibility to comply with my order of September 22, 2014. Similarly, he has again failed to explain why an account being closed prevents access to prior account statements. He has not described his efforts to comply with his obligations in this regard.

(xii) The Respondent deposes as follows in this regard: “I am in the process of obtaining the 2010 to 2012 Notices of Assessment from my old accountant. As the 2013 income tax return has just been filed, I am waiting to obtain the Notice of Assessment.” The Respondent’s evidence does not confirm what efforts he has expended in attempting to secure the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Notices of Assessment from his “old accountant”. He does not tell us when he made the request, if in fact he has made a request of his old accountant. This is not sufficient to discharge his obligations pursuant to my order. It would also have been useful for the Respondent to confirm when he filed his 2013 income tax return and offer an explanation as to the delay in filing same. Again, his evidence falls short of his obligations in this regard.

(xiii) The Respondent deposes in this regard as follows: “As explained in my affidavit sworn October 21, 2014, attached to this affidavit at exhibit F, I do not possess an accounting of all monies received by me, whether taxable or not, from January 1, 2013 to date. It does not exist therefore I am unable to provide the same.” In submissions counsel for the Respondent submitted that there may have been a misunderstanding on the part of the Respondent as to his obligations in this regard. There was certainly no protest from the Respondent on September 22, 2014 to the effect that he would not be able to comply with this order because there was no such accounting already in existence. Clearly the objective of this order is that the Respondent account for the monies referred to in this order. He has not complied and he has not produced evidence of his best efforts to comply.

(xiv) The Respondent’s evidence is as follows: “As deposed in my affidavit sworn October 21, 2014, I provided to the Applicant’s lawyer an expenditure breakdown of the over $150,000 second mortgage against the Boucherville property. I am still working on the other breakdowns and will provide it when completed.” The evidence before me suggests partial compliance by the Respondent with his obligations pursuant to component of the September 22, 2014 order. His simple statement to the effect that he is “still working on the other breakdowns and will provide it when completed” is insufficient in my view to comply with his obligation to provide evidence detailing his best efforts to bring himself into compliance. For example, he has not explained why he was unable to comply with the deadline which had been accepted by counsel on his behalf. Furthermore, he has not defined when he anticipates he will be in a position to provide the ordered disclosure. The Respondent has not complied with his obligation pursuant to this component of the September 22, 2014 order.

Costs of the September 22, 2014 motion.

[12] On November 12, 2014 I released my decision on costs in relation to the September 22, 2014 motions. I awarded costs to the Applicant mother fixed in the amount of $35,000 including HST and disbursements, payable at the rate of $5,000 per month and collectible as support.

[13] It is common ground that there have been no payments made pursuant to this order.

[14] Although I failed to specify a starting date for commencement of payments of the $5,000 per month, it has now been over 60 days since the order was made and thus at least two payments of $5,000 for a total of $10,000 ought to have been made by today’s date.

[15] The Respondent has therefore failed to comply with the order of November 12, 2014 in this regard. His affidavit evidence does not address the issue except to acknowledge that the costs award of $35,000 “must be paid”.

Support Arrears

[16] The order of September 22, 2014 imposed a child support obligation upon the Respondent of $2,012 per month and spousal support of $2,960 per month. It is conceded by the Respondent that these payments are in default for the month of January 2015.

Previous orders

[17] Paragraph 5 of my order of September 22, 2014 provides as follows:

The Respondent shall fully comply with his obligations pursuant to the order of Justice Kaufman dated June 4, 2013, the order of Justice Nelson dated September 25, 2013 and the order of Justice Douglas dated March 5, 2014 by October 17, 2014.

[18] The Respondent concedes the following amounts are owing by him under the prior orders:

(a) $3,804.54 representing reimbursement for expenses paid by the Applicant for the parties’ Kleinburg property for the period from June 2014 to September 2014;

(b) $805.51 on account of the outstanding balance for the home insurance in relation to Boucherville;

(c) $12,531 being the annual insurance premium for the Kleinburg property;

(d) $90.26 on account of the outstanding Hydro Quebec bill in relation to Boucherville.

TOTAL $17,231.31

[19] The Respondent’s affidavit does not dispute the Applicant’s evidence with respect to these breaches of his payment obligations.

Tuition Fees

[20] My order of September 22, 2014 directed that commencing October 1, 2014 and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Respondent would be solely responsible for payment of the children’s private school expenses that have accrued to date. The Respondent was to pay the amount of private school expenses owing to date net of available tuition assistance on or before October 24, 2014.

[21] It is common ground that no payments have been made.

[22] The Respondent deposes as follows in this regard:

31. With respect to the children’s private school expenses, the amount I am ordered to pay is to be net of available tuition assistance. The Applicant’s lawyer advised on November 7, 2014 that the Applicant is in the process of finalizing her tuition assistance application and that she will advise my lawyer if and when the Applicant for any tuition assistance at all.

32. In the Applicant’s affidavit sworn November 26, 2014, the Applicant deposes that she delivered the tuition assistance application on November 24, 2014 and that the application will be processed within two weeks.

33. As I did not hear anything back from the Applicant’s lawyer, my lawyer wrote to the Applicant’s lawyer on December 30, 2014 to find out if the Applicant received any tuition assistance, as this affects the amount owing. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit P is a true copy of this letter dated December 30, 2014. My lawyer has not yet received a response.

34. It should be noted that the Honourable Justice Kaufman advised the Applicant and her counsel at the June 2013 case conference that the children should not be registered any further into the Villa Nova School as it is too expensive. The Applicant ignored the judge and registered both children for the 2014/2015 school year, without consulting me or obtaining my approval.

35. For this reason I believe that the Applicant should contribute one-half of the school fees that are outstanding as it was her unilateral decision. I cannot afford it. Also she has proceeds from the sale of the Boucherville furniture that she can pay half of the schooling with as well.

[23] The order of September 22, 2014 is not subject to any appeal or motion for leave to appeal of which I am aware. It is presumed correct. There is no relevance to any comments made by the court or the parties during the case conference as suggested by the Respondent. His obligation is defined in the order of September 22, 2014.

[24] The Applicant deposes that the sum of $38,145 is the quantum of the children’s private school expenses accrued to the date of the order of September 22, 2014. This quantum is not disputed by the Respondent, subject to his position that his obligation is only to be responsible for the net expense after deduction of available tuition assistance.

[25] It is clear on the evidence before me that the issue of available tuition assistance remains unresolved. It is therefore not possible for me to determine precisely what the Respondent’s obligation to pay tuition is at this point. While it would have been more reasonable for him to have estimated his obligation in light of the expected tuition assistance and remitted same in the estimated amount, I do not fault him in the uncertain circumstances surrounding this particular issue in my consideration of the motion to strike his pleadings.

Costs of 14(b) Motions

[26] The Applicant seeks costs of $5,000 for each of the two 14(b) motions referred to above.

[27] On November 25, 2014 Justice McDermot addressed a 14(b) motion brought by the Applicant for an order that the net proceeds of sale of Boucherville be paid into court to the credit of this proceeding and for costs of the motion. The motion was served together with the supporting affidavit which is four pages in length not including attached exhibits. The affidavit confirmed that the Applicant’s counsel sought the Respondent’s consent. The Respondent would not consent and instead took a position that the proceeds of sale should be equally divided between the parties.

[28] The consent order of September 25, 2013 already included the clause that provided that the net proceeds of sale of Boucherville be held in trust by the real estate lawyer acting on the sale pending further agreement between the parties or ordered. The evidence filed on the motion confirmed that the Quebec Notary was not prepared to hold the net proceeds of sale in her trust account for any length of time, thus necessitating the order sought.

[29] After service of the motion no opposition was communicated to the court. Justice McDermot expressed his concern about the “lack of consent forthcoming from the Respondent’s solicitor”. Costs of the motion were reserved.

[30] A further 14(b) motion was brought and dealt with by me on December 15, 2014. In this motion the Applicant sought an order dispensing with the Respondent’s consent and signature on all documents in relation to the listing for sale of the parties’ Kleinburg property and other issues addressing the parameters of sale of the Kleinburg property.

[31] Again, this motion and supporting affidavit was served on the Respondent. The supporting affidavit was six pages long, exclusive of attached exhibits. The affidavit confirmed the Respondent’s actions in delaying the listing of the Kleinburg property and the Respondent’s failure to communicate meaningfully with the listing agent to effect the sale contemplated by the September 25, 2013 consent order. There was evidence of the Applicant’s efforts to secure the Respondent’s co-operation, without success.

[32] Again, after service of the motion, there was no opposition material filed by the Respondent.

[33] The orders sought were granted with the issue of costs reserved to the court addressing the motion scheduled for January 14, 2015.

[34] As indicated, the Applicant seeks costs of $5,000 for each of these two motions. She relies upon a Bill of Costs for the first motion totalling $4,220 and for the second motion totalling $6,216. The first motion involved total expenditure of lawyers’ time of 10.2 hours and a second motion involved a total expenditure of lawyers’ time of 14.7 hours.

[35] The lawyers’ rates are not unreasonable being $750 per hour for Mr. Schmidt (called 1979) and Ms. Larock $350 per hour (called 2011).

[36] The expenditure of time by Ms. Larock is probably a bit more than one would normally associate with preparation of fairly straight-forward motion materials.

[37] The Respondent’s position is that total costs for both motions might be $2,800.

[38] I consider Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules in respect of costs. Amongst the factors to be considered is the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any position taken by a party. Given the evidence that the Applicant sought the Respondent’s consent, it was not forthcoming and then the Respondent did not oppose the motions, I conclude that the Respondent conducted unreasonably with respect to these motions with the effect of unnecessarily driving up costs to the Applicant.

[39] Full indemnity costs is not warranted in the circumstances; however, costs of $3,000 for each of the two motions is appropriate.

The Law regarding Striking Pleadings

[40] Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules provides as follows:

If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers it necessary for a just determination of the matter, including

(a) an order for costs;

(b) an order dismissing the claim;

(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit or any other document filed by a party;

(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;

(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;

(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and

(g) on motion, a contempt order.

[41] In Ferguson v. Charlton 2008 ONCJ 1, [2008] O.J. No. 486 (O.C.J.) the court described a three step process when considering a motion to strike under a predecessor to rule 1(8):

1. The court must ask whether there is a triggering event that would allow it to consider the wording of rule 1(8). That triggering event is non-compliance with a court order.

2. If the triggering event exists, the court should then ask whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party by not sanctioning that party under subrule 1(8), or by ordering that subrule 1(8) does not apply. This discretion is only granted in exceptional circumstances.

3. In the event the court determined that it will not exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party, it is then left with a very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy pursuant to the provisions of subrule 1(8).

[42] The onus is on the offending party to show, on a balance of probabilities, that subrule 1(8) is not applicable (see Ferguson v. Charlton and Gordon v. Star 2007 35527 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 3264 (ONSC)).

[43] It is trite to say that an order is not a suggestion and that compliance is not optional. Further, non-compliance must have consequences. Protection of the integrity of the administration of justice is at stake if a litigant willfully disobeys a court order (see Ferguson v. Charleton, Gordon v. Star, and Hughes v. Hughes, 2007 10905 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 1282 (ONSC)).

[44] In Kovachis v. Kovachis 2013 ONCA 663 the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized a well-established principle that a party’s pleading should only be struck in exceptional circumstances where no other remedy would suffice. The court identified the rationale for the principle:

Without one side’s participation in the trial, there is a risk the court will not have either enough information or accurate information to reach a just result.

[45] The Court of Appeal was specifically dealing in Kovachis with allegations of failure to comply with disclosure orders. The court directed that consideration be given to the importance or materiality of the items of disclosure not produced. At para. 34 the court indicates as follows:

Although full and frank disclosure is a necessary component of family law litigation, exhaustive disclosure may not always be appropriate. Courts and parties should consider the burden that disclosure requests bring on the disclosing party, the relevance of the requested disclosure to the issues at hand, and the costs and time to obtain the disclosure compared to its importance.

[46] In the case before me there could be no doubt that the Respondent is in breach of his obligations pursuant to the disclosure components of my order of September 22, 2014 as outlined above.

[47] It is also clear that the Respondent is in breach of his obligation to make the payments outlined above pursuant to the prior orders and as reiterated in para. 5 of my order of September 22, 2014.

[48] I have already found that the Respondent was in deliberate breach of his obligations under the March 5, 2014 order (see my endorsement dated September 18, 2014 in this regard). I declined to strike the Respondent’s pleadings at that time indicating that I preferred to have his participation in achieving a viable resolution.

[49] No one has disputed the relevance of the disclosure sought by the Applicant; however, its materiality does not appear, on a superficial analysis, to be that great. The primary concern is that the information sought appears to be within the control of the Respondent to provide but he continues to fail to address these issues with the kind of attention that they deserve and the consequence is a driving up of costs to the Applicant and delayed progress in resolving the outstanding issues.

Consequences

[50] The Applicant describes in her evidence the Respondent’s ongoing default in payment of his RBC Visa account number ending in “5961” for which he is the primary card holder and she is the supplementary card holder. She indicates that she never used the primary Visa card and only used the supplementary card. She indicated further that she paid all the charges on the supplementary card as and when due. She deposed that in November 2014 the RBC withdrew all the funds held in her personal chequeing account in the amount of $1,420 on account of default in payment on the Respondent’s Visa. As a result, she was unable to pay bills and was charged NSF fees. Further, RBC froze her use of the supplementary Visa card and put constraints on her banking relationship. Ultimately she paid the total of $2,820 towards the Respondent’s Visa account. She deposed that the outstanding balance of the Respondent’s Visa account was $23,088.91. She sought reimbursement of $2,820 and that the Respondent’s Visa outstanding balance be paid in full from his share of the proceeds of sale.

[51] The Respondent says little about this account in his affidavit apart from describing it as a joint account “ in the approximate amount of $27,000” and in submissions he took the position that it ought to be paid out of the joint proceeds of sale before division between the parties.

[52] In my view, I must draw an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to produce evidence, as ordered, with respect to this account. There is some confusion as to whether it is in the party’s joint names or solely in the name of the Respondent. This information is within the control of the Respondent to produce and he has been ordered to produce it. He has failed to produce it without adequate explanation.

[53] Given the impact that his failure to pay this account is having upon the Applicant, it is appropriate that it be paid now, subject to any accounting adjustments that might necessarily result in the event it is established that the account is in fact joint in nature.

[54] This represents the second motion for order striking the Respondent’s pleadings. There are funds available from which much of his obligations can be satisfied in the immediate future. Given the admonition from our Court of Appeal regarding the exceptional nature of circumstances in which pleadings might be struck, the availability of other remedies at this time, and the preference that the issues be addressed on their merits with the active participation of both parties, I decline at this time to strike the Respondent’s pleadings. He should be aware however that this is likely the last time he will be extended such consideration. Both this motion and the one prior had merit in that each was based upon clear breaches of the Respondent’s ordered obligations.

[55] Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, I order as follows:

(1) The proceeds of sale of the Boucherville property in the amount of $166,686.20 will be distributed as follows:

a. To the Applicant the sum of $83,343.10

b. From the remaining half of the net proceeds,

i. $35,000 representing the Applicant’s costs of the motion of September 22, 2014 pursuant to my order of November 12, 2014 shall be payable to the Applicant;

ii. $17,235.31 representing the Respondent’s obligation pursuant to the prior orders of the court (without prejudice to either party’s position that a different sum is payable in this regard);

iii. The sum of $6,000 representing costs of the two 14(b) motions;

iv. The amount of $2,820 payable to the Applicant as reimbursement for payment of the Respondent’s Royal Bank of Canada Visa credit card account number ending 8797;

v. The amount of $23,088.91 shall be paid directly to the Royal Bank of Canada Visa credit card account to pay the outstanding balance;

c. Any remaining net proceeds of sale shall continue to be held by the accountant of this court to the credit of this proceeding, pending further agreement between the parties in writing, or court order.

[56] The Applicant’s motion to strike the Respondent’s pleadings is dismissed without prejudice.

[57] The parties shall make brief written submissions on costs (limited to three pages) as follows:

(a) Applicant mother within two weeks of the date of the release of these reasons;

(b) Respondent father within three weeks of the date of the release of these reasons;

(c) Applicant mother, in reply, if desired, within four weeks of the date of the release of these reasons.

DOUGLAS J.

Released: January 23, 2015