ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 47874/13
DATE: 2015-08-04

BETWEEN:

Wade Jarrod Peter Fabian
Applicant

– and –

Tina Ann Fabian
Respondent

Ronald F. B. Woynarski and Luke Szymura, for the Applicant

James Peluch, for the Respondent

HEARD: June 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, 2015

G. E. Taylor

Reasons for Judgment

Introduction

[1] The applicant and the respondent were married on June 13, 1992. They began cohabiting in October 1989. The parties separated on February 21, 2013. The applicant was born on March 2, 1969 and the respondent was born on July 30, 1969. There are two children of the relationship: Taylor Theresa Fabian who was born on June 6, 1996 and Mackenzie Wade Fabian who was born on March 3, 2000.

[2] The applicant is employed as an electrician by Harold Stecho Electric Ltd. The respondent is a self-employed hairstylist.

[3] The issues to be decided are:

a) custody of and access to Mackenzie;

b) child support;

c) spousal support;

d) Net Family Property;

e) contribution to Taylor’s university expenses

f) divorce.

Divorce

[4] The parties have been separated for more than one year without reconciliation. There is no possibility of a reconciliation. Accordingly, there will be an order that the parties be divorced effective 31 days from the release of these Reasons.

Custody of and Access to Mackenzie

[5] The respondent moved out of the matrimonial home on April 18, 2013. Since that date, Mackenzie has continued to reside with the applicant in the matrimonial home. Initially, there was very little communication between Mackenzie and the respondent. Recently, Mackenzie has begun spending more time with his mother.

[6] Counsel was appointed for Mackenzie. Counsel for the parties agreed that it was appropriate for counsel for Mackenzie to advise the court of his preferences. Counsel for Mackenzie submitted that Mackenzie’s clear and consistently stated preference is that he continue to reside with his father and visit with his mother according to his wishes.

[7] The position of the respondent is that there should be an order for joint custody of Mackenzie with his living arrangements being alternating weeks with each parent. This is unrealistic. Mackenzie will not willingly accept such an arrangement. Furthermore, there is little if any communication between the parties.

[8] Accordingly, there will be an order that the applicant have custody of Mackenzie and that the respondent have access to Mackenzie, subject to Mackenzie’s wishes, on a regular basis including overnight access. The applicant is ordered to encourage Mackenzie to spend at least one weekend each month with the respondent from Friday after school until Sunday evening. The applicant is ordered to refrain from scheduling activities for Mackenzie on Mother’s Day and the respondent’s birthday and to encourage Mackenzie to spend those days with the respondent. The respondent is also to have access to Mackenzie, subject to Mackenzie’s wishes, on holidays which will include Christmas, New Year’s, Easter and Thanksgiving. The respondent is to have access to Mackenzie’s medical and educational records and she is to be advised of Mackenzie’s extracurricular activities including a schedule.

Spousal Support

[9] The determination of this issue requires an examination of the respondent’s income and her ability to earn income. Accordingly, the determination of this issue will also impact on the issue of child support.

[10] The respondent graduated from the Career School of Hair Design in 1989. Since graduation, she has been employed as a hairstylist. Immediately following graduation, the respondent worked at Silvana’s Hairstyling in St. Catharines as an employee. She was paid minimum wage. In May 1990, the respondent purchased The Hair Affair in Guelph. She operated that business until 1996 when Taylor was born. There were four full-time stylists in addition to herself. The stylists were paid a commission of 50 percent of their earnings. The respondent testified that she closed The Hair Affair because of difficulties with her pregnancy. In examination-in-chief, the respondent said she could not remember if The Hair Affair was profitable. In cross-examination, the respondent volunteered that when she operated The Hair Affair she was the main breadwinner in the family. Sadly, this is one of many contradictions in the evidence given by the respondent which makes it difficult to determine her actual earnings and her earning capacity.

[11] According to her resume, the respondent began operating Tina’s Salon and Spa from the matrimonial home beginning in January 1996. She continued operating this business from the matrimonial home until July 2013 when she attended at the matrimonial home and removed all of the business assets. From July 1, 2013, the respondent has continued to operate Tina’s Salon and Spa from her residence at 355 Fisher Mills Road in the City of Cambridge. She works at Tina’s Salon and Spa on Mondays and Tuesdays and some evenings. In April 2013, the respondent entered into an agreement with the Dunfield Retirement Residence in Cambridge to provide hairdressing and aesthetician services to residents of the Dunfield beginning June 15, 2013. The respondent works at the Dunfield from Wednesday to Saturday between the hours of 10 AM and 4 PM.

[12] The respondent is the sole shareholder of Taylor Mackenzie Investments Inc. (“TMI”). TMI is the party who contracted with the Dunfield. The respondent testified that the income from Tina’s Spa and Salon also flows through TMI. Tammy Alpe is the respondent’s sister who is a Chartered Professional Accountant. She is responsible for preparing the income tax returns of the respondent and TMI.

[13] The following is an excerpt from an Agreed Statement of Facts which was made an exhibit at the trial:

28. The Respondent’s Statements of Business or Professional Activities attached to her personal income tax returns for the years 2009 to 2013 indicate the following:

Year

Gross Business Income

Gross Profit

Business Expenses

Net Income (Loss)

2009

$14,142.00

$14,142.00

$19,827.43

($5,685.43)

2010

$13,071.00

$7,293.45

$11,490.89

($4,187.44)

2011

$15,851.00

$15,851.00

$14,904.82

$946.18

2012

$15,128.00

$15,128.00

$13,934.73

$1,193.27

2013

$1,112.00

$0.00

$1,112.00

$0.00

29. The Corporation Notices of Assessment for Taylor Mackenzie Investments Inc. indicate:

a. Income of $0.00 for the year end January 31, 2013; and

b. Income of $0.00 for the year end January 31, 2014.

30. The Corporate Income Tax Returns for Taylor Mackenzie Investments Inc. for the year end January 31, 2013 indicate:

a. Gross business income of $14,298.00;

b. Total business expenses of $17,611.00; and

c. Income of ($3,313.00).

[14] The Corporation Income Tax Return for TMI for the year end January 31, 2015 had attached to it unaudited Financial Statements prepared by Tammy Alpe. According to those Financial Statements, the revenue was $22,218 and expenses totaled $20,207 for a net income of $2011. The same Financial Statements also show the sum of $32,043 as being owed to the respondent.

[15] The respondent’s Personal Income Tax Return for 2014 shows income of $30,454 made up of withdrawals from an RRSP and annuity payments.

[16] The respondent’s bookkeeping system is rudimentary. There is no business bank account. She accepts only cash or cheques in payment for her services. Her financial records consist of an appointment book or books in which she makes a notation as to the amount paid by a particular client. The respondent testified that she receives on average between $20 and $25 in tips each week, which are not recorded. She claimed to be unaware that tips were income to be reported for tax purposes. Incredibly, Tammy Alpe professed to be unaware that her sister received any amount whatsoever in tips.

[17] In a Financial Statement sworn July 8, 2013, the respondent reported employment income of $1732 per month and net self-employment income of $660 for a total monthly income of $2392. In cross-examination, the respondent testified that as of July 2013 her income was not $2392 per month. She testified that her then lawyer instructed her to use the monthly amount of $1732 as employment income because that is what he said she would be receiving in spousal support.

[18] In a Financial Statement sworn September 10, 2013, the respondent indicated that she was receiving employment income of $866 per month and self-employment income after expenses of $570 per month. She testified that the figure for employment income was an estimate based on what she anticipated receiving from her work at the Dunhill.

[19] In a Financial Statement sworn March 4, 2014, the respondent reported her self-employment income to be $1732 per month. In cross examination she testified that she did not actually earn that amount but it was a figure given to her by her sister, Tammy Alpe.

[20] In a Financial Statement sworn May 8, 2015, the respondent stated that her only income was from RRSP withdrawals. She reported no employment income or income from self-employment.

[21] Tammy Alpe testified that she was involved in the preparation of the July 8, 2013 Financial Statement together with her sister and her then lawyer. She explained that employment income was stated to be $1732 per month because that was the amount it was anticipated the respondent would be paid by TMI. With respect to the Financial Statement sworn September 10, 2009, Tammy Alpe explained that employment income was reduced to $866 per month because the respondent was only earning $200 per week from the Dunhill. She also testified that the income of $570 per month from self-employment was based on total revenue from the respondent’s home salon of $950 for August 2013. In cross-examination, Tammy Alpe acknowledged that the respondent’s income from the Dunhill is not employment income.

[22] The respondent sought and obtained a bank loan for the purchase of a car in May 2013. In the Applicant’s Statement, required to be signed in order to be granted that the loan, the respondent reported that she was residing at 52 Dawn Crescent in Cambridge. In fact, she had moved from this address in April 2013 and was residing with her sister in Stoney Creek. The respondent reported that she was the manager of Tsalon and Spa which she described as her employer. She stated that she was not self-employed and that she worked full time. She represented that her gross monthly income was $2916.67 or $35,000 annually.

[23] Not surprisingly, the respondent was vigorously cross-examined about her Applicant’s Statement in support of the bank loan. She testified that the document was completed with the assistance of her sister who was in phone communication with her then lawyer. The lawyer told her that she could expect to receive spousal support of $35,000 annually which is why she used the monthly income figure of $2916.67. Tammy Alpe testified that she suggested the respondent use of the monthly income amount of $2916.67 on the loan application on the basis of her estimate that she would earn $1150 monthly from self-employment and a letter from the respondents then lawyer stating that she could expect to receive the support of $1656 per month. The respondent’s former lawyer did not testify nor was any letter or other document created by him representing an amount that the respondent could expect to receive in support sought to be tendered as an exhibit in the trial.

[24] The respondent also admitted that she financed a furniture purchase of $6300 from the Brick. She acknowledged making an application for that loan in which she also stated that her annual income was $35,000.

[25] In her Financial Statement sworn May 8, 2015, the respondent listed a debt to her parents in the total amount of $110,000. As evidence of this indebtedness, the respondent produced two promissory notes executed by her in favour of her parents. One of the promissory notes was in the amount of $60,000 and was dated June 14, 2013. The other promissory note was for $23,000 and was executed on October 14, 2013. The respondent testified that the difference between the total amount of the debt and the total of the two promissory notes was money loaned it to her by her parents for legal fees.

[26] There was no debt shown as owing to the respondent’s parents in her Financial Statement sworn July 8, 2013 even though funds in the amount of $60,000 had been advanced and the promissory note executed by that date. The respondent explained that omission because she was heavily medicated at the time. In the Financial Statement dated September 10, 2013 there was no mention of any amount being owed to her parents.

[27] In her Financial Statement sworn March 4, 2014, the respondent set out a debt owing to her parents in the amount of $25,000 secured by way of a promissory note. The Financial Statement also showed that the same amount was owing at the date of separation. The respondent explained that it was a misprint in the Financial Statement to show that the debt to her parents was $25,000 instead of $23,000. She then attempted to explain the discrepancy by saying there was difficulty obtaining documentation from her original lawyer when she retained new counsel. She did however testify that copies of the two promissory notes to her parents were in the possession of her new lawyer when the March 2014 Financial Statement was sworn.

[28] The respondent was cross examined about the amount of $32,043 owing to her by TMI as at January 31, 2015. In none of the Financial Statements sworn by the respondent did she disclose any amount being owed to her by TMI. It is to be noted also that, according to the balance sheet of TMI as at January 31, 2015, the amount owing to the respondent was shown to be $43,452 as at January 31, 2014. When Tammy Alpe was questioned about this omission, she testified that she did not know that a shareholder’s loan had to be reported as an asset on the respondent’s Financial Statements filed in this proceeding.

[29] Since the end of June, 2013, the respondent has resided at 355 at Fisher Mills Road. She testified that the loan of $60,000 from her parents which is evidenced by the June 14, 2013 promissory note was for the purpose of the down payment for the purchase of the Fisher Mills Road property. However, title to that property was registered in the name of Tammy Alpe. The respondent acknowledged in cross-examination that she has an interest in the Fisher Mills Road property as she hopes that title will be transferred into her name when the mortgage comes due. The respondent failed to disclose in any Financial Statement in this proceeding that she had an interest in the Fisher Mills Road property.

[30] In cross-examination, Tammy Alpe initially stated that the Fisher Mills Road property was not disclosed on any of the respondent’s Financial Statements because it was not an asset owned by the respondent. She also testified that although the respondent does not have an ownership interest in that property she nevertheless owes her parents $60,000 which funds were advanced for the purpose of the down payment. Somewhat reluctantly, Tammy Alpe eventually agreed that she was holding the Fisher Mills Road property in trust for the respondent.

[31] Tammy Alpe agreed that she was involved in the preparation of the July 8, 2013 Financial Statement. She testified that the respondent’s interest in the Fisher Mills Road property was not disclosed because she was not the owner. She explained that the $60,000 debt was not disclosed because of an un-written agreement pursuant to which she will assume responsibility for the amount owing to her parents unless the respondent is financially able to make the mortgage payments when the mortgage comes due. Tammy Alpe then attempted to justify the inclusion of the amount owing to her parents by the respondent on her most recent Financial Statement on the basis that an equalization payment in excess of $60,000 is to be received by the respondent as soon as the divorce is finalized which will then allow the respondent to repay the debt.

[32] I do not believe that the respondent has provided accurate information about her true income. She and her sister were prepared to go to extreme lengths to obfuscate the true facts. In my view, it is not coincidental that the respondent reports a significantly greater income in a loan application for the purchase of a new vehicle than she did in any other document. There were obvious untruths in the loan application in which the respondent was attempting to convey the impression that she was employed as a manager of a hair salon earning a regular salary. Sadly, she was supported in this deceitful endeavour by her sister who is a Certified Professional Accountant.

[33] There is evidence that the respondent negotiated to be paid remuneration of $50 an hour to work for a hair and beauty salon by the name of Glow. The respondent admitted that she is described in material published by the Dunfield as “master hairstylist, master manicurist and master pedicurist”. She acknowledged that she has credentials to teach hairstyling. She agreed that she has the qualifications to manage a hairdressing salon. The respondent testified that she greatly enjoys being a hairstylist and has no plans to change her occupation.

[34] In each of her Financial Statements, the respondent has consistently listed expenses of approximately $60,000 annually. Based on my review of her Financial Statements it appears that she has funded a deficit of approximately $30,000 annually by utilizing credit card debt, encroaching upon RRSP assets and borrowing from her parents.

[35] Taking into consideration all of the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that the respondent has not been forthcoming about her income or her ability to earn income. She is a highly skilled hairstylist with more than 20 years experience. In my view, she is earning or has the capacity to earn an income of at least $36,000 annually.

[36] The applicant’s income as set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts has ranged between $71,000 and $79,000 annually from 2010 to 2013.

[37] Section 15.2 (6) of the Divorce Act specifies that the objectives of a spousal support order include the relief of economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the marriage and the promotion of economic self-sufficiency. Even though I have come to the conclusion that the respondent has not been truthful in her evidence about her income as a hairstylist, it nevertheless appears to me that she has suffered some economic hardship as a result of the breakdown of the marriage by reason of the loss of contribution to her expenses from the applicant’s greater income. The respondent has eroded her capital and increased her debt load since the date of the separation. The applicant has maintained his assets and has not increased his indebtedness since the separation.

[38] I have come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to award the respondent a modest amount of spousal support. In setting the amount of support, I take into consideration the objective of the promotion of self-sufficiency. I seek to encourage the respondent to make efforts to improve the profitability of her hairstyling business. In my view, an appropriate amount of spousal support is the sum of $1000 monthly.

[39] I normally I would not make an award of spousal support time-limited. However, in this case, I have no confidence that the information that the respondent would provide to a reviewing court would be any more accurate than the evidence presented in this case. I have therefore decided to limit the order of spousal support for a period of five years commencing July 1, 2015.

Child-support

[40] As stated above, and based on all of the evidence, I conservatively estimate that the respondent is earning or is capable of earning at least $36,000 annually. This is the amount I propose to use for the purpose of determining her child support obligation.

[41] The respondent has failed to pay any child support to date. Nevertheless, I do not propose to make the commencement date for the start of paying child support retroactive to before the date of the trial. The respondent is therefore ordered to pay child support for Mackenzie in the amount of $315 monthly commencing July 1, 2015 and continue paying that support for as long as Mackenzie remains a child of the marriage as defined by the Divorce Act and he continues to reside with the applicant.

[42] The applicant requests that the respondent contribute to expenses in relation to Mackenzie’s cell phone and hockey. These expenses are relatively modest. The definition of extraordinary expenses in section 7 (1.1) of the Child Support Guidelines is “expenses that exceed those of the parent or spouse requesting amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover…”. The applicant’s income is in excess of $70,000 annually. I conclude that the expenses for which he claims contribution are those that he can reasonably cover without contribution from the respondent. Therefore, there will be no order that the respondent contribute to the section 7 expenses claimed for Mackenzie.

Net Family Property

[43] By the time of the final submissions, the values of most of the components of the Net Family Property calculation had been agreed. It is necessary that I deal with a few outstanding issues in the determination of the parties’ Net Family Properties.

[44] The parties agree that the jointly owned matrimonial home be transferred to the applicant at a market value of $338,250. In return, the applicant will obtain a release in favour of the respondent for any liability on the outstanding mortgage and lines of credit. The parties have been unable to agree as to whether the costs of disposition that will be incurred by the applicant when the property is eventually sold should be factored into the value for the purpose of calculating Net Family Property.

[45] The applicant testified that he intends to continue to reside in the matrimonial until Mackenzie completes high school at which time he will list the property for sale. The position of the applicant at the commencement of the trial was that the value of the matrimonial home should be reduced by six percent to account for the notional costs of disposition. During the course of submissions, counsel for the applicant advised that it would be appropriate to use a figure of two and a half to three percent on account of disposition costs. The respondent’s position is that there should be no deduction from the value as agreed upon.

[46] The applicant will ultimately sell the matrimonial home. In all likelihood he will incur disposition costs. However, those costs are not at present imminent. Therefore, in my view a reasonable allowance for the costs of disposition is approximately three percent of the agreed upon value or $10,000.

[47] The position of the applicant is that the respondent possessed jewelry with a value of $14,520 at the date of the separation. The applicant testified that he last saw the jewelry box where the respondent kept her jewelry in April 2013 just before she vacated the matrimonial home.

[48] The respondent testified that she took her costume jewelry with her when she moved out but she left her more valuable jewelry behind. She has not seen it since. In November 2013 the respondent submitted an insurance claim alleging the theft of her jewelry on April 18, 2013. In the Proof of Loss in support of her claim she reported the value of the missing jewelry to be $12,850 net of HST. However, the limit of insurance was only $5000 which was paid to the respondent. The respondent’s position that her jewelry ought to be valued for equalization purposes at the amount received in the insurance settlement.

[49] At the date of the separation, there is no dispute that the respondent owned jewelry with a value of $12,850. In my view, it is of no moment if that jewelry was stolen after the date of separation. The value remains the same. Similarly, in my view, the amount at which the missing jewelry was insured is not determinative of the value of that jewelry as of the date of separation. It is obvious that the respondent thought the jewelry was worth considerably more than $5000.

[50] I therefore find that the value of the respondent’s jewelry at the date of separation was $12,850.

[51] The assets owned by the applicant at the date of separation included a Citation travel trailer permanently located in a trailer park. At the date of separation, the parties believed the trailer was jointly owned and they agreed to list it for sale at between $30,000 and $35,000. The sale price of the trailer was reduced from time to time and was eventually sold just before the trial commenced for $15,000. The applicant’s position is that the trailer ought to be valued for equalization purposes at the amount of the sale proceeds less sales commission and less carrying costs since the date of the separation. The respondent’s position is that the trailer ought to be valued at $35,000 which she says was the list price agreed upon by she and the applicant at the time the separation.

[52] Neither party obtained a professional evaluation of the value of the trailer at the date of the separation. In my view, the value of the trailer for equalization purposes is neither the amount for which the parties originally agreed to list the trailer for sale nor the actual sale price almost two and a half years post separation. In a Financial Statement sworn by the applicant on May 29, 2015 he estimated of the value of the trailer at the date of separation to be $25,000. In a Comparison of Net Family Property Statements prepared by counsel for the applicant and filed as an exhibit at the trial, the applicant placed a value on the trailer at the date of separation of $20,000. I have concluded that the midway point between these two estimated values, taking into consideration the actual sale price, is a reasonable estimate of the trailer’s value at the date of separation. Accordingly the trailer will be included in the Net Family Property of the applicant with the value of $22,500. According to the sale documentation the sales commission was 6.5 percent which I find to be a reasonable cost of disposition. Finally, I see no reason why the respondent should be responsible for carrying costs subsequent to the date of separation in relation to an asset which she did not own.

[53] In October 1999, the applicant was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. In February 2003 the applicant’s claim for damages for personal injuries arising out of the motor vehicle accident was settled. The total amount of the settlement was approximately $450,000 which included $65,000 for pain and suffering and $11,550 for interest on pain and suffering. The applicant submits that the portion of the settlement from the motor vehicle accident which was designated as pain and suffering and interest on pain and suffering ought to be excluded from his Net Family Property.

[54] Section 4 (2) of the Family Law Act provides that that “excluded property” does not form part of a spouse’s Net Family Property which includes:

Damages or a right to damages for personal injuries, nervous shock, mental distress or loss of guidance, care and companionship, or the part of a settlement that represents those damages.

[55] The applicant testified that a net of approximately $385,000 was received from the settlement. From the settlement amount, household bills were paid, the mortgage on the matrimonial home was paid down, some improvements were made to the matrimonial home and a loan to a relative was repaid. A truck was purchased at a total cost of approximately $46,000. The balance of the settlement of $160,000 was invested in an account with United Financial. In March 2007, approximately $149,000 was then transferred to another account at United Financial. In December 2010, $65,268 was transferred from the account at United Financial into an account at CI Investments. At the date of separation the balance in that account at CI Investments was $60,819. The applicant claims that this amount should be excluded from his Net Family Property.

[56] The applicant also testified that the sum of $28,767 in two other accounts with CI Investments were also from the motor vehicle accident settlement. No documentation was produced showing how the funds flowed from the initial deposit of $160,000 to the United Financial account into the two CI Investment accounts at the date of separation.

[57] The applicant also seeks an exclusion for the truck purchased with the motor vehicle accident settlement funds. He continued to own that truck at the date of separation and the parties agree that it was worth $8000 at that time.

[58] I see a fundamental problem with the applicant’s position with respect to the claim of excluded property. The applicant made clear his position that it is only the damages for pain and suffering and interest on those damages for which an exclusion is sought. He then seeks to justify that exclusion by relying on evidence of a deposit into an account at United Financial of $160,000 and the purchase of the truck for $46,000. These two amounts are more than double the amount for which the applicant seeks an exclusion.

[59] I find that the onus is on the applicant to trace the personal injury damages to an asset in existence at the date of separation. That onus has been met with respect to the sum of $60,819 in the nonregistered CI Investment at the data the separation. I find that the onus has not been met with respect to the other two CI Investment accounts and the truck. It seems to me that it would have been possible to trace the disbursement of the settlement funds with more precision than was done in the evidence in this case. For example, the paper trail clearly establishes the flow of funds from the original deposit of $160,000 into the nonregistered CI Investment account. I assume similar evidence could have been produced to follow the funds into the other investment accounts and into an account or accounts from which the truck was purchased. This evidence is lacking. With respect to the truck, there is evidence that it was used for family purposes and in particular that it was driven by Taylor. On this basis the exclusion would be lost (Belgiorgio v. Belgiorgio, 2000 22733).

[60] I therefore conclude that the applicant is entitled to exclude from his Net Family Property the sum of $60,819 in the non-registered CI Investment account but he is not entitled to an exclusion for the other two CI Investment accounts or the truck.

[61] The applicant asserted that the respondent owed him $922 for cell phone usage for the first six months post separation. In cross-examination, the respondent agreed that this amount was owing. The respondent took the position that she should be entitled to share in the applicant’s income tax refund of $1200 which she said was created by claiming her as a dependent. This claim was not vigorously pursued. However, I note that the applicant’s Notice of Assessment for the tax year 2012 which is dated April 9, 2013 shows that the applicant was entitled to a tax refund of approximately $1800. In my view this could be considered an asset of the applicant at the date of the separation. However, because that claim was not asserted by the respondent, and the amount of the income tax refund for which she sought credit was only $1200, I propose to offset the amount admitted to be owing for cell phone usage against the income tax refund.

[62] Attached as Schedule 1 to these Reasons is a Net Family Property Calculation utilizing the asset values as agreed upon or as determined by me in the absence of agreement.

Taylor’s University Expenses

[63] The applicant seeks contribution from the respondent for a modest amount of expenses for Taylor’s first year at university. From the evidence presented at trial, it appears to me that Taylor is virtually funding her own university education. The respondent testified that she, like the applicant has provided modest amounts of money and nonmonetary contributions to Taylor to assist with her living expenses. In my view, it is not appropriate to require a contribution by the respondent to the modest amount contributed by the applicant to Taylor’s university expenses.

Summary and Conclusion

[64] There will be a judgment as follows:

a) the parties are divorced with an effective date of 31 days from the date of release of these Reasons;

b) the applicant will have custody of Mackenzie with access to the respondent, subject to Mackenzie’s wishes, on a regular basis including overnight access. The applicant is ordered to encourage Mackenzie to spend at least one weekend each month with the respondent from Friday after school until Sunday evening. The applicant is ordered to refrain from scheduling activities for Mackenzie on Mother’s Day and the respondent’s birthday and to encourage Mackenzie to spend those days with the respondent. The respondent is also to have access to Mackenzie, subject to Mackenzie’s wishes, on holidays which will include Christmas, New Year’s, Easter and Thanksgiving. The respondent is to have access to Mackenzie’s medical and educational records and she is to be advised of Mackenzie’s extracurricular activities including a schedule;

c) the respondent shall pay to the applicant as support for Mackenzie the sum of $315 per month, based on an imputed income of $36,000 annually, commencing July 1, 2015 and continuing for as long as Mackenzie remains a child of the marriage as defined in the Divorce Act and he continues to reside with the applicant;

d) the applicant shall pay to the respondent as spousal support the sum of $1000 per month commencing July 1, 2015 for a period of five years;

e) the applicant shall pay to the respondent for the purpose of the equalizing Net Family Property the sum of $45,472.50;

f) the respondent shall convey to the applicant all of her right title and interest to and in the matrimonial home located at 52 Dawn Crescent, Cambridge and the applicant shall obtain releases in favour of the respondent and hold the respondent harmless from any and all liability in connection with the mortgage, lines of credit and taxes in connection with the matrimonial home;

g) there will be no or order for contribution by the respondent to section 7 expenses of Mackenzie or university expenses of Taylor.

Costs

[65] If counsel are unable to agree on the appropriate disposition as to costs they may make written submissions. The written submissions on behalf of a party seeking costs are to be delivered to my office within 14 days of the release of these Reasons, not to exceed three pages in length exclusive of a Bill of Costs and Costs Outline. Responding submissions are to be delivered to my office within 28 days of the release of this these Reasons, not to exceed three pages in length. Counsel are directed to file electronic copies of their cost submissions at Kitchener.Superior.Court@ontario.ca to my attention.

G. E. Taylor

Released: August 4, 2015

Schedule 1

Husband
Wife

Assets

52 Dawn Cr.
$ 338,250.00

Contents
Divided
Divided

2004 Toyota Sienna
$ 4,000.00

2003 Dodge Ram 1500
$ 8,000.00

ATV
$ 4,000.00

Jewellry
$ 2,050.00
$ 12,850.00

2004 Citation trailer
$ 22,500.00

CI # 9416486 (RRSP)
$ 27,663.00

CI # 78768353
$ 60,819.00

CI # 59954610
$ 1,104.00

CI # 94164795 (LIRA)
$ 21,572.00

Manulife pension
$ 18,632.00

TD # 131 519694
-$ 1,431.00

TD # 88 801506124
$ 375.00

TD # 6223743
-$ 1,457.00

RRSP # 1151455
$ 187.00

RRSP # 84553750
$ 3,057.00

RRSP # 52430162
$ 54,787.00

RRSP # 52247699
$ 7,933.00

London Life # 9230439-5
$ 3,700.00

Tina's Salon
$ 1,100.00

2013 Income Tax Refund

Total Assets
$ 507,234.00
$ 82,457.00

Debts

Mortgage
$ 234,389.00

Secured LOC
$ 3,722.00

Unsecured LOC
$ 19,977.00

Sears Mastercard
$ 446.00

Amex
$ 368.00

Can. Tire Mastercard
$ 8.00

Tax on CI # 9416486
$ 5,533.00

Tax on CI # 94164795
$ 4,314.00

Tax on Pension
$ 3,726.00

Tax on 1151455
$ 37.00

Tax on 84553750
$ 611.00

Tax on #52430162
$ 10,957.00

Tax on # 52247699
$ 1,587.00

Disposition costs of 52 Dawn
$ 10,000.00

Disposition costs of trailer
$ 1,450.00

Total Debts
$ 283,119.00
$ 14,006.00

Assets at Marriage

Hair Affair
$ 100.00

Total Assets at Marriage
$ 100.00

Excluded Property

PI Settlement
$ 60,819.00

2003 Dodge Ram 1500

ATV
$ 4,000.00

Total Excluded Property
$ 64,819.00

Net Family Property
$ 159,296.00
$ 68,351.00

Equalization Payment
-$ 45,472.50
$ 45,472.50

$ 113,823.50
$ 113,823.50