ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-30000168-00BR
DATE: 20150717
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
GREGORY GOODRIDGE
Applicant
Jon McGrath, for the Crown
Gregory Goodridge, self-represented
HEARD: July 13, 2015 at Toronto,
Ontario
Reasons for Judgment Re: Detention Order Review
M. G. Quigley, J.
Introduction
[1] This is an inmate application for a judicial interim release detention review brought by the accused, Gregory Goodridge. He is 52 years old. He has a lengthy criminal record. He lived at a rooming house in Scarborough before this current detention that commenced at the beginning of June. He is not presently employed. He lives off of his savings. He is self-represented.
[2] Over the past two years Mr. Goodridge has been charged in four separate incidents and presently still has those 4 sets of outstanding charges against him. Starting first in April 2013, he was charged in Scarborough with having uttered a threat against his landlord and having failed to comply with a term of a prior probation. He was arrested on April 11, 2013. His next court date is August 4, 2015 for trial. It is understood he was granted bail on that matter.
[3] Second, he was charged with assault in respect of an altercation that took place on the subway. He was arrested on September 11, 2013. That matter is being heard at College Park and it is understood that Mr. Goodridge was granted bail. His next court date is August 27, 2015 for trial.
[4] Third, Mr. Goodridge was charged on April 12, 2015 for having uttered a threat to stab a TTC ticket collector on November 12, 2014 when the TTC refused to grant him access to the subway with an expired transfer. Since he fled that location at the time of the alleged offence, he could not be apprehended and was only arrested after being identified on TTC video surveillance footage early in 2015. At the time of his arrest, it appears he was also granted bail on that matter.
[5] That offence is being resolved on July 16, 2015 by way of an appearance at Old City Hall where it is understood that the Crown has asked for and Mr. Goodridge will provide a peace bond under section 810 of the Criminal Code. One of the things that will necessarily happen in the course of that resolution is that Mr. Goodridge will be required to admit to the essential facts of the assault against the TTC worker, and that the worker feared for her life. So in one sense, Mr. Goodridge is correct when he indicates that the matter is being resolved in his favour since he is not being required to go through a trial and does not face the prospect of imprisonment with respect to that offence, but rather is being released on a peace bond. However, it is not favourable to him insofar as that resolution effectively acknowledges his culpability and the essential elements of the offence.
[6] Finally, and most recently, there is the threat that Mr. Goodridge uttered on June 5, 2015 against a fellow member of the rooming house where he resides. It is claimed that a knife was brandished at that time. Another member of the rooming house called 911. Police officers came and arrested Mr. Goodridge. A show cause hearing was held in that matter on June 9, 2015 before His Worship, Justice of the Peace Peltzer. Mr. Brienza represented the Crown and duty counsel, Mr. J. Burns, represented the accused on that day.
[7] That is the key date relative to this proceeding for bail review, because it was on that date that the Crown sought a revocation under s. 524 of the three prior bails granted to Mr. Goodridge. Obviously, it was of great importance then, as it is on this review, that at the time that the most recent offence was allegedly committed, Mr. Goodridge was already released on bail on three other matters. When he was arrested on this last charge of uttering a threat, the Crown sought to have his bail on the earlier charges revoked and was successful, and it then fell to J.P. Peltzer to consider whether or not he should be granted bail globally on all of those earlier charges and the latest charge of uttering a threat against the other resident of the rooming house.
Justice of the Peace Peltzer’s Decision
[8] The hearing before J.P. Peltzer was a reverse onus hearing. The onus was on Mr. Goodridge to show that he ought to be released because of the allegation that he had committed a further indictable offense while he was already on judicial interim release.
[9] Not surprisingly, J.P. Peltzer accepted that the threshold in section 524 of the Code was met so Mr. Goodridge’s underlying releases were cancelled pursuant to that section. That left the Justice to consider whether or not Mr. Goodridge could be released globally on one bail, given the allegations before the court, the presence of his record, and having regard to the proposed plan of release that was put forward by Mr. Goodridge and duty counsel at that time. At page 37 of the transcript, close to the beginning of his ruling, JP Peltzer stated as follows:
Having the onus reversed, sir, the onus falls to you. Normally, there's a presumption that you are release – although you are presumed innocent of these charges, the onus falls to you to show, on the balance of probabilities, that if you are released you will attend court as required and, as well, that if you are released pursuant to this plan, that you don't pose a risk to public safety, that you won't interfere with the victim or witness to an offence, that there is not a substantial likelihood that you would re-offend or interfere with the administration of justice. Those are the two things that I am looking at.
[10] The Justice of the Peace went on to recount the series of allegations from the different dates going back to 2013, and reviewed Mr. Goodridge’s extensive criminal record. While there are time gaps in that record, what the Justice of the Peace observed was that the record consistently shows issues of anger, assaultive behavior, possessing and assaulting with a weapon; noting that as matters on which the accused was convicted, there is no presumption of innocence relative to those past occurrences.
[11] The Justice of the Peace then reviewed the alleged facts pertaining to the still outstanding matters, and while acknowledging that nothing was proven, observed that the essential similarity between the facts in those earlier instances and the most recent charge was that they all involved aggressive behavior, threatening behavior towards other members of the public, either in a public place, or in the case of the most recent alleged offence, in the rooming house where Mr. Goodridge resided with others.
[12] Nevertheless, and importantly, the court would have been prepared to release Mr. Goodridge on the primary ground. His prior history of consistently and regularly attending court for the most part to deal with his matters as required, his compliance with the Toronto Bail Program and in particular its reporting requirements, albeit that it does not in any way address issues relating to the secondary ground, caused J.P. Peltzer to have no concern relative to the primary ground.
[13] Moving to the secondary ground, the Justice of the Peace acknowledged that the outstanding cases alleged against Mr. Goodridge may not be the most serious of threatening or assault cases, even though they do include the most recent instance of allegedly brandishing a weapon. Taking them as a whole, however, the Justice found them to be quite problematic and troubling. Again, the Justice of the Peace acknowledged the presumption of innocence and that it lies in the Crown’s bailiwick to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, but observed that in order to release Mr. Goodridge on the secondary ground, he had to be satisfied that there was no substantial likelihood that Mr. Goodridge would re-offend if released.
[14] However, J.P. Peltzer concluded that he had no choice but to require that Mr. Goodridge continue to be detained in custody. The Justice of the Peace found that Mr. Goodridge's behavior since 2013 has been menacing; whenever there was any friction, whether it was with a stranger or someone with whom Mr. Goodridge shared space, things would seem to escalate towards violence and get out of hand. For J.P. Peltzer, that inevitably raised the likelihood of re-offending. His concern was that if he were to be released, and someone in the community upset Mr. Goodridge in some way without someone being there to supervise him, Mr. Goodridge would have a substantial likelihood of re-offending and ending up back where he is, in custody.
[15] At pages 47 and 48, Justice of the Peace Peltzer concluded his ruling as follows:
Sir, you are here before the Court today. The issue is there is an allegation that you waved a knife around other roommate in your boardinghouse, that you threatened your superintendent on an elevator, that you threatened a stranger on the TTC for standing up for young lady that you were verbally harassing, that you uttered a threat against the ticket collector when they didn't permit you to use your transfer, that you failed to comply with the probation. The challenge is that you are releasable. You are clearly releasable. My issue is the Bail Program is not sufficient in this context.
You have had the option of counseling in the past. For whatever reason you have not availed yourself of that. It is not being required of you by the Bail Program even though it was a condition in your bail.
That being said, sir, there are some – I have lingering concerns on the secondary grounds and notwithstanding the plan, looking at the pattern of behavior in the last two years, sir, with the multiple releases, for very similar allegations, I think there is still a substantial likelihood that you would reoffend if you were released to the Bail Program, as indicated.
That being said, sir, you will be detained in custody until the conclusion of these proceedings and I must also note that it is primarily based on your record, as well as being mindful of the series of releases you have been on, It is essentially a proposal to be released on the same plan, and according to what I have heard today, it has not been successful in the past.
[16] The Crown opposes this application and contends that the accused needs to continue to be detained in custody pending his trial on two grounds. First, the Crown contends that there is no material change in circumstances that could cause me to re-visit J.P. Peltzer’s determination. In any event, he argues that that there is no evident error of fact or law on the record that could cause the review to proceed, and that there is no new plan of supervision, or any plan of supervision beyond the Toronto Bail Program, put forward by the accused to provide comfort that the accused will not have a substantial likelihood of re-offending were he to be released.
The Governing Legal Principles
[17] Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code spells out the only statutory grounds for the pre-trial detention of an accused. It states:
For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including: (i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case; (ii) the gravity of the offence; (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
[18] I understand as the Supreme Court of Canada instructed in R. v. Morales that bail is not to be denied for individuals who pose a risk of committing an offence or interfering with the administration of justice while on bail. Rather, it is to be denied only for those who pose a "substantial likelihood" of committing an offence, and only where that substantial likelihood endangers the protection of the safety of the public: see R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R.711 at para. 39. The question is whether there exists a reasonably manageable risk that if the accused is released into the community under the proposed plan, that the likelihood of re-offending is not substantial: see R. v. Walton, [2005] O.J. No. 48 at para. 11 (S.C.J.).
The Application for Review — Analysis
[19] Mr. Goodridge's handwritten application for review of his detention, dated July 5, 2015, requests this court to reinstate his bail that was withdrawn pursuant to those s. 524 proceedings at Scarborough court on June 9, 2015.
[20] Mr. Goodridge argues that there are two grounds upon which his bail should be reinstated:
(i) First, one of the matters that was put before J.P. Peltzer concerned the threat to a TTC worker. In Mr. Goodridge's view, however, that charge did not actually exist and he claimed that it was improperly before the court at that time. In his view, this created bias towards him and perpetrated a fraud before the courts. He claimed that the Justice of the Peace relied upon that improper and fraudulent evidence as a basis for denying him release. He also claimed that that he had never been charged by the police or arraigned in any court at any time on the charge of having threatened a TTC worker. As he stated it, "this perpetrated an illegal fraud in presenting this charge as if it was properly before the courts, when in fact it was not, but simply dishonestly inserting it in the documents before the court, when in fact there was no signed information before the courts for this charge, resulting in no jurisdiction for the courts to proceed.” In rescinding his bail on the other matters, under section 524. Mr. Goodridge claimed that this was illegal and the product of malicious and criminal conduct by the Crown, for which the only appropriate and possible remedy would be for this court to rescind all of the charges presently outstanding against him; and
(ii) Secondly, Mr. Goodridge claims not only a material change but an extreme change of circumstances. The essence of this position is that since he appeared before J.P. Peltzer on June 9, 2015, the threat against the TTC worker has been resolved by the issuance of a peace bond and the fail to comply charge has been withdrawn. Further, Mr. Goodridge claims that there is no likelihood of conviction on the subway assault matter because it only involves two men pushing each other, so it is equivocal. Finally, with respect to the June 5 uttering of a threat against the other roommate of the rooming house, Mr. Goodridge says that the complainant’s evidence cannot be accepted or believed due to the complainant’s longer criminal record than Mr. Goodridge’s, and as such, the likelihood of conviction on those other matters is exceedingly low. In his view, these conclusions that he draws constitute an extreme change in circumstances and should form the foundation for a conclusion by the court that notwithstanding the findings of J.P. Peltzer on June 9, the alleged absence of several of those underlying matters necessarily causes Mr. Goodridge to be less threatening or less of a concern when his release into the public domain is considered. Moreover, he takes the position that even if he was to be convicted of any of those matters, the amount of dead time that he has already spent in custody would more than exceed any sentence that could be imposed upon him without violating the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. So, in his view, all of these matters in aggregate amount to a material change in circumstances which should cause me to grant him his request to be released on bail pending his trial in 13 days, on July 27, 2015, on the uttering threats charge in respect of which his prior releases were revoked and his detention ordered on June 9.
[21] Relative to the first ground, there is no foundation whatsoever for any of these allegations made by Mr. Goodridge. I will not recite the entire history of my dealings with Mr. Goodridge over three separate hearings, but it is important to note that the court took specific steps to expedite and make sure that it had the transcript of what had happened on the earlier locations so that it could evaluate the allegations being raised by Mr. Goodridge. I took specific steps to expedite the production of transcripts and to expedite Mr. Goodridge's return to court so that his complaint and request for review of the revocation of bail could be heard at the earliest possible opportunity.
[22] In the result there was no merit to the allegations being raised by Mr. Goodridge. I specifically requested that Crown counsel come today in possession of the information relating to the TTC employee threat occurence, which Mr. Goodridge claimed to be fraudulent. But contrary to his allegations, and as the Crown proferred before the court, and as was entered as an exhibit on this bail review hearing, there was a proper information before the court relating to the TTC matter on which Mr. Goodridge was arraigned, as there was for the other three matters that underlie the outstanding charges that remain against him. That information, and the documents for those other matters were before J.P. Peltzer on June 9 when he decided not to grant further judicial interim release to Mr. Goodridge on the secondary ground.
[23] In my view, J.P. Peltzer’s ruling is thorough, articulate, factually complete and exhibits no legal error. It includes specific mention of each of the matters that were before him and underlying the question of whether Mr. Goodridge could be released, and that were then properly taken into account by J.P. Peltzer in determining whether Mr. Goodridge could be released on the secondary ground. He has no concern on the primary ground. He correctly articulates the test on the secondary ground but determines, on the record in front of him, that that he could not be satisfied any more than I would have been, that Mr. Goodridge could be released into the community solely under the Bail Program when the facts show so plainly that the Bail Program is incapable of providing the court with any assurance relative to the risk he presents, based on prior history, of a substantial likelihood that the accused will re-offend if released.
[24] Moreover, I note that it would not have lied in my jurisdiction to “rescind” any of the charges against Mr. Goodridge, even if there had been any substance to his spurious and baseless allegation.
[25] Turning to the second ground, notwithstanding his allegation of material change, I would observe that Mr. Goodridge does not come before the court today with any new plan of release. Indeed, Crown counsel facilitated him receiving an updated letter of today's date from the Toronto Bail Program confirming that they would take him in as a member of their program if the court were to grant him release. That of course is helpful, but as noted, the primary ground was never a concern relative to Justice Peltzer's decision, and indeed the Toronto Bail Program itself acknowledges the limitations of what it can offer:
The Toronto Bail Program's decision to offer bail supervision to an accused, is based on the primary grounds of the apparent likelihood of the accused fulfilling his/her reporting responsibilities. Bail supervision utilizing appropriate community resources, may reduce the risk of an accused committing criminal offenses. Our program, however, is not taking a position concerning the secondary grounds. (my emphasis)
[26] So while material change is alleged, and while the onus is on the accused to not only establish the existence of a material change before a corrective order is possible, absent legal error, but to also put together a plan of release which alleviates any and all concerns that the court might have with respect to release of this accused into the community, I note that there is simply no change proposed here. The plan is still simply to release him into the Toronto Bail Program, and once again, when specifically asked, Mr. Goodridge confirms that there is no person he knows who would or could be willing to act as a surety for him.
[27] In these circumstances, where the accused bears the onus of having to “show cause” justifying his release, the accused must satisfy the court that his detention is not justified. In relation to the secondary ground, more particularly, the accused must establish that his detention is not necessary for the protection or safety of the public, and that there is no substantial likelihood that, if released from custody, the accused will commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice. The release plan devised by the accused must persuasively address these issues.
[28] First, however, the accused must satisfy me that there has been a material change in circumstances. In the absence of factual or legal error, or a material change in circumstances, there is no legal foundation for me to decide to agree with Mr. Goodridge and substitute some other decision for that of J.P. Peltzer. In order to re-open the decision and have the matter determined anew, there must have been a material change in circumstances. As Justice Hill observes in R. v. Ferguson, [2002] O.J. No. 1969 (S.C.J.) at para. 13, ordinarily, an error in principle or law or jurisdiction, or a material change in circumstances, is necessary to find interventionist scrutiny. He continues in part at paragraph 14:
On the other hand, while the party disappointed by the result in a show cause hearing cannot simply invoke review to acquire a fresh exercise of discretion or redetermination of factual findings, the "material change of circumstances" paradigm is not to be so narrowly applied to foreclose any periodic review of the detention status.
[29] In that case, as in this case, the notice of application pleads that the applicant’s circumstances have changed. However, none of the matters that Mr. Goodridge claims to be materially different circumstances qualify. In the past, no surety has been offered despite the court’s notation that he could be released if a surety could be found. There is no surety offered here. Mr. Goodridge’s personal opinions about the likely success of the Crown’s case in each of the four matters does not provide principled foundation to grant him release. Neither do Mr. Goodridge’s personal opinions on whether he can be sentenced to serve any more time if he were to be convicted of any of the remaining three offences provide a principled foundation to grant him release.
[30] In my view, not only do I find there to be no material change, but also the accused has not shown cause as to why his detention is not justified on the secondary ground. I share the discomfort expressed by J.P. Peltzer in denying release, that given his prior history, given the similar nature of the offences that remain outstanding and given the absence of a surety, the opportunity for him to re-offend presents a substantial risk given his prior conduct, and given his prior disrespect and failure to abide by the terms of earlier court orders. Thus, he has still not shown cause as to why his detention order should now be vacated. In my opinion, his detention remains justified on the secondary ground.
Michael G. Quigley, J.
Released: July 17, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-30000168-00BR
DATE: 20150717
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
GREGORY GOODRIDGE
Applicant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Re: Detention Order Review
Michael G. Quigley, J.
Released: July 17, 2015