ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: C-2835-13

DATE: 2015/07/14

BETWEEN:

S.F.

Plaintiff

– and –

THE GREATER SUDBURY POLICE SERVICE, THE SUDBURY POLICE SERVICES BOARD AND SUDBURY POLICE ASSOCIATION, M. PAQUETTE, CRAIG MAKI, ROBIN TIPLAY, M. JEFFERY, DAVID BECK, CRAIG MOXAM, TODD BIGNOCOLLO, DAN ZULIANNI, JEFF KUHN, SUSAN LEYS, TIM BURTT, J. ROBERTSON, L. MCLOSKY, T. MARASSATO, P. SMYTH, ELAINA GROVES, SANDRA DICAIRE, PAUL MCGEE, MEAGAN O’MALLEY, JACK SIVAZLIAN, DUNCAN EPP, M. ROBINSON, GREG BERGERON, FRANK ELSNER, CONST. ELDEAMA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ONTARIO, JOHN LUCZAK, KENDRICK ABBOTT, MERIEL ANDERSON, SUSAN BRUCE, MARC HUNEAULT, JOHN HOLLAND, LEILA MEHKERI, RUBY BECK, MICHEL J. MOREAU, MICHAEL G. KITLAR, SUSAN STOTHART, LEONARD KIM, DIANNE LAFLUER, ANDREA BEAL, RIA BIGNOCOLLO, HELENE BRYDGES, PIERRE BRADLEY LAW OFFICE, CHILDREN’S AID’S SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICTS OF SUDBURY AND MANITOULIN, JEAN JACQUES PAQUETTE, REJEAN PARISE, COLLETTE PREVOST, NORA DOUGAN, LINDA CULLAIN, JEAN O’CONNER, DARLENE WILSON, MICHELLE GLOVER, DONALD KINGSLEY, CANDICE POULIN, KAREN FAGEN, CHRISTY CROTEAU, DEBBIE LACELLE, LAURA FOX, JODY MARCOTTE, MS. BISAILLON, LOUISE BRENDA BEAUVAIS, JOSH NEGUSANTI, PATRICIA L. MEEHAN, MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S LAWYER, SHEILA MILNE M.D., BRENDA PETRYNA, HEALTH PROFESSIONS APPEAL AND REVIEW BOARD, THE CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE GILBERT and MR. OLIVER, OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR GERRY MCNEILLY, SUSAN DUNN-LUNDY, KIM MCDONALD, BERNIE MUILLER, TERESA PIRUZZA MINISTRY OF CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES, DEB MATHEWS MINISTRY OF HEALTH, RICK BARTOLUCCI MPP FOR SUDBURY ONTARIO, VICE CHAIR STANDING COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Defendants

S.F., Unrepresented

Carole G. Jenkins, for the Defendants, Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin, Collette Prevost, Nora Dougan, Linda Cullain, Jean O’Connor, Darlene Wilson, Michelle Glover, Donald Kingsley, Candice Poulin, Karen Fagen, Christy Croteau, Debbie Lacelle, Laura Fox, Jody Marcotte, Louise Beauvais, Brenda Beauvais and Josh Negusanti, and

C. Kirk Boggs, for the Defendants, THE GREATER SUDBURY POLICE SERVICE, THE SUDBURY POLICE SERVICES BOARD, M. PAQUETTE, CRAIG MAKI, ROBIN TIPLAY, M. JEFFERY, DAVID BECK, CRAIG MOXAM, TODD BIGNOCOLLO, DAN ZULIANNI, JEFF KUHN, SUSAN LEYS, TIM BURTT, J. ROBERTSON, L. MCCLOSKY, T. MARASSATO, P. SMYTH, SANDRA DICAIRE, PAUL MCGHEE, ELAINA GROVES, MEAGAN O’MALLEY, JACK SIVAZLIAN, DUNCAN EPP, M. ROBINSON, FRANK ELSNER, CONST. ELDEAMA, and

Meagan Williams and Baaba Forson, for the Defendants, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, JOHN LUCZAK, KENRICK ABBOTT, MURIEL ANDERSON, SUSAN BRUCE, MARC HUNEAULT, JOHN HOLLAND, LEILA MEHKERI, RUBY BECK, DIANE LAFLEUR, MICHEL J. MOREAU, MICHAEL G. KITLAR, SUSAN STOTHART, LEONARD KIM, ANGELLA BEAL, RIA BIGNUCOLO, HELEN BRYDGES, THE CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE GILBERT, OLIVER URCUYO, OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR, GERRY MCNEILLY, SUSAN DUNN-LUNDY, KIM MCDONALD, BERNIE MUILLER, TERESA PIRUZZA, DEB MATTHEWS, RICK BARTOLUCCI, MINISTRY OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL – OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S LAWYER, and

G.E. McAndrew, for the Defendants, PIERRE BRADLEY LAW OFFICE, JEAN JACQUES PAQUETTE, and PATRICIA L. MEEHAN, REJEAN PARISE, and

Michael C. Birnie, for the Defendant, SUDBURY POLICE ASSOCIATION, and

Phuong T.V. Ngo and Madeline Hall, for the Defendant, Sheila Milne M.D., and

David P. Jacobs and Steven G. Bosnick, for the Defendants, Brenda Petryna, and Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, and

ms. Bisaillon and GREG BERGERON, unrepresented Defendants

HEARD: January 6, 2015

REASONS FOR DECISION

SUDBURY POLICE ASSOCIATION

Kane J.

RELIEF SOUGHT

[1] The Sudbury Police Association (the “Association”) by motion seeks:

(a) An Order that this proceeding be dismissed against it because it is statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002;

(b) In the alternative, an Order striking out the Statement of Claim against it, without leave to amend, because the Statement of Claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action against this Defendant.

(c) In the further alternative, an Order striking out the Statement of Claim against this Defendant in its entirety, without leave to amend, because the Statement of Claim as against this Defendant is frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of this Court.

POSITION OF THE MOVING PARTY

[2] The Association submits that:

(a) It is an association as defined in the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15, s. 2(1), namely:

S. 2 (1) “Association’ means an association whose members belong to one police force and whose objects include the improvement of their working conditions and remuneration.” and does not have the legal capacity to be sued;

(a) The Association is not a law enforcement agent or agency with powers to engage in law enforcement pursuant to the Police Services Act, R.S.0.1990, c. P. I5, as am.

(b) The Association owed no duty of care to the Plaintiff;

(c) This proceeding against the Association is statute barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, 2002, S.0. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, (the “Limitations Act”).

(d) The Statement of Claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the Association;

(e) This proceeding against the Association is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of this Court.

BACKGROUND AS TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

[3] Subject to the prohibition as to evidence in R. 21.01(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O.1990, Reg. 194, paragraphs 2 to 13 of this court’s decision of the motion of the Defendants Messrs. Paquette, Parise, Bradley and Ms. Meehan (the “Lawyers Decision”) are incorporated by reference and repeated herein as to such background, including the defined terms therein.

[4] Subject to the same prohibition, the Court incorporates by reference the Disposition Chart of criminal charges, convictions and allegations by the Plaintiff as contained in paragraph 38 to 42 of its summary judgment decision dismissing this proceeding against the Sudbury Police Force and members (“Police Defendants”).

STATEMENT OF CLAIM GENERALLY

[5] Subject to the prohibition as to evidence in R. 21.01(2)(b), paras. 14 to 22 and 37 of the Lawyers Decision as to this Statement of Claim are incorporated by reference and repeated herein, including the defined terms therein.

CLAIMS AGAINST SUDBURY POLICE ASSOCIATION

[6] The Statement of Claim lists the Association among the Police Defendants, namely together with the Greater Sudbury Police Service, the Sudbury Police Services Board and specific Police Officers M. Paquette, Craig Maki, Robin Tiplay, M. Jeffery (collectively the “Police Defendants”).

[7] The claims against the Association and the Police Defendants are for:

(a) false arrest;

(b) negligent investigation;

(c) false imprisonment;

(d) Malicious prosecution;

(e) Conspiracy;

(f) misfeasance in public office;

(g) abuse of process;

(h) trespass;

(i) invasion of privacy;

(j) Negligence;

(k) Conspiracy;

(l) tortious interference of the Plaintiff;

(m) breach of s. 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, and s. 24 (1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter Of Rights and Freedoms based on the above allegations;

(n) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

(o) defamation of character;

(p) special damages for s loss of time, interruption in employment and routine of life and for expenses to obtain release from custody; and

(q) Aggravated and punitive damages.

[8] The general allegations against the Police Defendants are that they, without justification, maliciously and repeatedly arrested, detained and charged the Plaintiff with criminal offences which had no merit and were merely intended to harass and intimidate him. Specific Police Officers are named in these repeated instances of arrest, detention and the laying of criminal charges.

[9] The Police Defendants obtained summary judgment dismissing the above claims against them.

[10] Inclusion of the Association as a Defendant in this proceeding as to police misconduct in the laying and prosecuting of criminal charges and child protection proceedings is puzzling.

[11] The explanation for its inclusion and the cause of action against the Association, like any other Defendant, must be found in the allegations against such party in the Statement of Claim as required under R. 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Compliance thereto is critically important where a plaintiff elects in the same proceeding to sue some 78 Defendants regarding conduct across several fields of activity involving a period of 16 years.

[12] The Plaintiff in relation to the many individual occurrences complained of names the specific Police Officers, Crown Attorneys and CAS staff members involved. Police Officer Defendants for example are not included in the allegations against the CAS and its named staff members regarding the apprehension by CAS of the child and supervision of access visits with the child. In comparison, legal counsel for the CAS is frequently named among the named Police Officers in the allegations against the Police Defendants involving the arrest and the laying of criminal charges against the Plaintiff.

[13] Defendants like the Association need only meet the case alleged against it.

[14] The only allegations specifically against the Association are that:

(a) The Association was employed by the Sudbury Police Services Board between November 23, 2000 and September 29, 2009, at paras. 15 and 157;

(b) The Association, together with MPP R. Bartolucci, the Sudbury Mental Health Association, the Children’s Aid Society and its legal counsel and several named Crown Attorneys, had a history with M.V., the Plaintiff’s common law partner, at para. 29;

(c) after MV repeated reported false allegations of being assaulted by the Plaintiff to police in the years 1997 to 1999, MV asked the Police Defendants how she should “take care of her situation” and MV then “became an ““extended”” member of the Sudbury Police Association to which extended members receive perks and bonus from the other Defendants”, at para. 34;

(d) The Association and others sponsored and staffed the Sudbury RCA Cadets. A staff member of the RCA Cadets accused the Plaintiff of causing a disturbance and insisted that the Plaintiff and his dog leave the RCA building on May 2, 2012, failing which, police would be summoned. The plaintiff was in the RCA building at the request of his child to watch this child precipitate in a practice. In response to this demand, the plaintiff left the RCA building. Police Officers entered the building with their dog; at para. 132

(e) As to the above, “the Defendants’ conduct was a deliberate and baseless exercise of public function intended to harass the Plaintiff on behalf of the other Defendants, including but not limited to “ legal counsel of the CAS, named Crown Attorneys, named Police Officers “and the other Defendants”, which thereby subjected the Plaintiff and his child to “harassment, discrimination, emotional abuse, psychological trauma, including anxiety, terrorizing, isolating, corrupting/exploiting and parental alienation.”; para. 132.

(f) The Plaintiff on May 15, 2012, was served with a Notice of Trespass and was thereafter required to obtain RCA permission to enter this building. That permission requirement was intended to prevent the Plaintiff from attending the RCA building to watch his child practice; at paras. 132 and 133.

(g) The Association, together with legal counsel of the CAS, the Police Defendants and “the other Defendants”, had “ultimate control over government policies” which they exercised during their employment, and “ failed to uphold the public’s standard of morals and deferred his values consensus of self-interest policy in favour of the other Defendants …”, at para. 147.

(h) The Police Defendants in June 2013 had reasonable grounds to arrest MV for harassment of the Plaintiff and their failure to do so, was a “deliberate and unlawful exercise of public function with the intent to injure the Plaintiff and promote members of the” Association, was discriminatory and thereby “resulted in a deliberate infringement of his Charter of Rights and Freedoms”; at para 238.

LIMITATION PERIOD

[15] This proceeding was commenced on October 3, 2013.

[16] Many of the actions complained of as to the Plaintiff’s arrest, detention, the laying of criminal charges and the prosecution thereof against the Plaintiff, as well as the involvement of the CAS and the CPP proceedings, are barred by the 2-year limitation in s. 4 of the Limitations Act 2002, S.O. 2002, C. 24 (the “Limitation Act”) .

[17] The Plaintiff incorrectly submits that the appropriate limitation period pursuant to the Limitations Act is 15 years.

[18] The relevant provisions of the Limitations Act are summarized as follows:

Basic limitation period

4. Unless this Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered.

Discovery

5. (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of;

(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,

(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,

(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,

(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and

(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and

(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).

Presumption

(2) A person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1)(a) on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved.

Ultimate limitation periods

15. (1) and (2) Even if the limitation period established by any other section of this Act regarding a claim has not expired, no proceeding as to the claim shall be commenced after 15 years from the day the act or omission took place.

Transition

24. (1) In this section, “former limitation period" means the limitation period that applied in respect of the claim before January 1, 2004.

Application

(2) This section applies to claims based on acts or omissions that took place before January 1, 2004 and in respect of which no proceeding has been commenced before that date. 2002,

Former limitation period expired

(3) If the former limitation period expired before January 1, 2004, no proceeding shall be commenced in respect of the claim.

(5) If the former limitation period did not expire before January 1, 2004 and if a limitation period under this Act would apply were the claim based on an act or omission that took place on or after that date, the following rules apply:

1. If the claim was not discovered before January 1, 2004, this Act applies as if the act or omission had taken place on that date.

2. If the claim was discovered before January 1, 2004, the former limitation period applies.

[19] There are no allegations or evidence on this motion establishing discoverability subsequent to the dates of the alleged events.

[20] As to the causes of actions claimed, the relevant limitations under the former Limitations Act, R.S.O 1990, c. L.15, s. 45(l)(g) and related statutes are:

a) Imprisonment – 4 years (s. 45(1)(j));

b) Crown (Ontario) – 60 days notice required (Proceedings against Crown Act, s. 7);

c) Written Defamation – 3 months including 6 weeks notice requirement (ss 5 and 6);

d) Verbal Defamation – 2 years (Libel and Slander Act (s. 45(1)(i));

e) Health Profession Negligence – 1 year from discover ability (Regulated Health Professions Act, (s. 89);

f) Lawyers Neglicence or Breach of Contract – 6 years (s. 4)

g) Police Complaints – 6 months unless Board or Commission directs otherwise (Police Services Act, (s. 69(18));

h) Public Authorities – 6 months after cause of action arose (Public Authorities Protection Act, (s. 7))

i) Other Tort Actions – 6 years (s. 45(1)(g).

[21] Pursuant to the transitional provision in s. 24(5), the tort claims which arose before January 1, 2004 are subject to a 6-year limitation period which would have expired no later than December 31, 2009. Otherwise, the claims herein under the Limitations Act are subject to the general 2-year limitation period from the date of the occurrence.

[22] Under the Limitations Act, the Plaintiff has the evidentiary burden to prove the claim was issued within the limitation period: Findlay v. Holmes, 1998 5488 (ONCA), at para. 25; McSween v. Louis, 2000 5744 (ONCA), at para. 37 and Liu, para. 10.

[23] Limitation periods of general application will apply to claims made under s. 24(1) of the Charter brought by an individual for a personal remedy. Limitations periods are applicable to Charter claims brought for remedies by individuals: Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, and Alexis v. Toronto Police Service Board, 2009 ONCA 847, 100 O.R. (3d) 232, paras. 18 and 22.

[24] Section 15 of the Limitation Act creates a maximum limitation period of 15 years regardless of when the claim was discovered. Section 15 does not however lengthen the specified limitation periods in the Limitations Act, such as the s. 4 two year limitation period.

[25] The allegations against the Association cited above in paragraphs 13 to 15 as to events prior to October 4, 2011, are barred by the expiration of the s. 4 two year limitation period and cannot form the basis of a civil claim thereon and are therefore dismissed.

[26] Paragraph 14(a) above, is a statement of alleged fact as to the years 2000 and 2009. It does not allege a cause of action against the Association and therefore does not attract limitation consideration.

[27] The allegations in paragraphs 14(b), (e) and (f) above lack dates. Their nature suggests they are of an ongoing nature. Without evidence, the date of occurrence, discoverability and whether such matters are barred by the Limitations Act cannot be determined.

[28] The allegations referred to in paragraphs 14(d), (f) and (h) above, are within the 2 year limitation period and not barred by s. 4 of the Limitations Act.

[29] The subject of paragraph 14(c) above, to the extent it alleges a cause of action, is barred under s. 4 of the Limitations Act and therefore dismissed as there is no pleading or evidence of discovery thereof after 1999.

[30] Subject to the date of occurrence and paras. 27 above,, the claims listed in para. 7 are barred by s. 4 of the Limitations Act.

NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION - R. 21.01(1)(b)

[31] No evidence is admissible as to this part of the motion.

[32] A plaintiff, in alleging intentional or malicious conduct:

(a) Must plead circumstances and full particulars sufficient to infer intentional or malicious conduct, as bald pleading thereof are insufficient.

(a) May not commence a proceeding in an attempt to obtain facts to support allegations.

(b) Upon presentation of a claim with a complete absence of material facts, risks having that pleading struck as being scandalous, particularly involving allegations of intentional or malicious conduct: Dyce v. Lyons-Batstone, [2012] O.J. No. 224 (OSC), aff’d [2012] O.J. No. 3970 (C.A.), at paras. 38 and 40.

[33] The test under R. 21.01(1)(b) is whether the Plaintiff’s allegations state a legally sufficient or substantively adequate claim. Where it is plain and obvious that the alleged facts fail to disclose such a claim, it should be struck: Aristocratic Restaurants Ltd. v. Ontario, 2003 CarswellOnt 5574, at paras. 16-17 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[34] Failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action can occur if the basic elements of a recognized cause of action have not been pled or the allegations pled do not give rise to a recognized cause of action. Vague allegations that make it impossible for an opposing party to reply should be struck: Aristocratic, paras.18-19.

[35] On a motion to strike for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, allegations in the nature of assumptions and speculations are not to be taken as true: Fitzpatrick v. Durham Regional Police Services Board (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 290, 2005 63808, para. 11. (Ont. S.C.J.).

[36] Where the alleged facts in a claim clearly fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action, such claim should be struck: Aristocratic, at paras. 16-17.

[37] The failure to properly establish a cause of action will occur if:

(a) The allegations do not give rise to a recognized cause of action, or

(b) The allegations in the claim fail to plead the necessary legal elements of a recognized cause of action: Aristocrat, at para. 18.

[38] Vague allegations that make it impossible for an opposing party to reply should be struck: Aristocratic, at para. 19.

[39] As to the complaints not barred by the Limitations Act, there is no recognized legal cause of action against the Association because:

(a) MV had some prior unspecified dealings with the Association, the MPP, CAS and others listed. If such an association existed, that does not entitle the Plaintiff to a cause of action against the Association.

(b) MV became entitle to some unspecified “perks and benefits” from the Association as a result of becoming an undefined “extended member” thereof. If true, this does not entitle the Plaintiff to a cause of action against the Association.

(c) The Plaintiff was directed by a Sudbury Police Community Liaison Officer to depart with his dog from the RCA building or premises for allegedly causing a disturbance and to not thereafter re-enter without permission from an official of the Air Cadets.

(d) The allegation in paras. 15 and 157 as to the Association are that the Association, like police officers, was “employed by the Sudbury Police Services Board”. No material facts are alleged or explain how the Association is responsible for the acts of a member of that police force directing the Plaintiff to leave the premises with his dog.

[40] The above allegations do not constitute a cause of action under any of the 17 causes of action listed in para. 1 of the Statement of Claim.

[41] The Plaintiff has failed to:

(a) demonstrate a reasonable cause of action against the Association as the allegations in para 13(b), (d), (f) and (h). Such pleadings are accordingly struck.

(b) Plead the necessary legal elements of a recognized cause of action.

[42] Such pleadings are accordingly struck

FRIVOLOUS, VEXATIOUS AND ABUSE OF PROCESS – R.21.01(3)

[43] A pleading which contains a complete absence of material facts is frivolous and vexatious and should be struck as being scandalous, particularly where allegations are made of intentional or malicious conduct: Dyce, at para. 40.

[44] To the extent it is intended or implied in this claim against the Association, the plaintiff must plead circumstances and full particulars sufficient to enable a trier of fact to properly infer intentional or malicious conduct when allegations of intentional or malicious conduct are made. Bald allegations are not sufficient: Dyce, at para. 38.

[45] A plaintiff:

(a) Alleging intentional or malicious conduct, must plead circumstances and full particulars sufficient to infer intentional or malicious conduct, as bald pleading thereof are insufficient.

(b) May not commence a proceeding in an attempt to obtain facts to support allegations.

(c) Upon presentation of a claim lacking in a complete absence of material facts risks having that pleading struck as being scandalous, particularly where involving allegations of intentional or malicious conduct: Dyce at paras. 38 and 40.

[46] Inclusion of the Association in the pleadings of wrongdoing against the Police Defendants is improper as material facts are not plead as to the role of the Association and what it allegedly did or omitted to do in the activities complained of as required by R. 25.06.

[47] The complete absence of material facts to articulate the claim against the Association in paras. 13(b), (e), and (g) as indicated above in the No Reasonable Cause of Action section, results in those pleadings against the Association being struck. That conclusion is reinforced by the illogical alleged connection between the purpose and nature of this Association and the misconduct alleged against police and the CAS

LEAVE TO AMEND

[48] Leave to amend pursuant to R. 25.11 is denied given the absence of reasonable causes of action, the complete absence of material facts and the illogical nature of these claims against the Association, all of which renders a request to amend inappropriate.

COSTS

[49] Any party seeking costs shall serve and file short written submissions within 30 days of this decision. Written response thereto shall follow 20 days thereafter with any reply thereto within the following 10 days.

[50] If applicable, any Defendant seeking costs shall address the following questions:

(a) Why should a Defendant be entitled to costs for attending Court on a date after completion of their argument of their motion?

(b) Why should a Defendant be entitled to hourly rates of their counsel which exceed normal hourly rates charged by senior Sudbury counsel?

(c) Why should a Defendant be entitled to recover travel time and disbursements resulting from their selection of out of town counsel?

Kane J.

Released: July 14, 2015

COURT FILE NO.: C-2835-13

DATE: 2015/07/14

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

S.F.

Plaintiff

THE GREATER SUDBURY POLICE SERVICE et al

Defendants

REASONS – Police Association motion

Kane J.

Released: July 14, 2015