CITATION: Unimac – United Management Corp. v. Cobra Power Inc. 2013 ONSC 3827
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-00513288-0000
DATE: June 11, 2015
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Unimac-United Management Corp. (plaintiff) v. Cobra Power Inc. (defendant),
AND RE: Cobra Power Inc. (plaintiff by counterclaim) v. Unimac-United Management Corp., Leon Hui, Charles Daley, Ronald Chan, Keith Ly and Wing Kin Tsui (defendants by counterclaim);
BEFORE: MASTER C. WIEBE
COUNSEL: Grenier, G, and Brazil, L, for Cobra Power Inc. (The moving party); Baichoo, J. P., for Unimac-United Management Corp. and Wing Kin Tsui (The responding parties);
HEARD: January 12, 2015 (reference motion);
DECISION: January 16, 2015 (decision of Justice Carole J. Brown);
DECISION: June 11, 2015 (costs).
COSTS DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On January 16, 2015, Justice Carole J. Brown issued her Endorsement on the motion by Cobra Power Inc. (“Cobra”) to have this action referred to me for case management and trial. She granted the order and directed that I determine the costs of this motion. At the trial management conference before me on February 5, 2015, I set a schedule for the exchange of written submissions concerning costs.
[2] On February 13, 2015, counsel for Cobra, Glenn Grenier and Laura Brazil, filed the 10 page written costs submissions of Cobra. Cobra seeks the following costs awards. It is not clear from the submission whether these figures are tax included. Therefore, I will treat them as tax included, particularly as the disbursement figures claimed are clearly tax included:
a) Costs to settle my transfer order: $1,696 (substantial indemnity) or $1,130 (partial indemnity);
b) Costs of the reference motion: $18,940 (substantial indemnity) or $12,912.90 (partial indemnity);
c) Costs of the stay motion: $9,465.45 (full indemnity) or $6,212.18 (substantial indemnity) or $4,141.45 (partial indemnity).
[3] On March 2, 2015, counsel for Unimac-United Management Corp. (“Unimac”), Justin Baichoo, filed the 28 page written costs submissions of Unimac. Unimac seeks a full indemnity costs award of $28,955.80 (inclusive of tax) in favour of Unimac, presumably only for the reference motion, although that is not clear from the submission. On March 5, 2015, Ms. Brazil delivered a 15 page written reply to these submissions. I have now found the time to make my ruling.
II. ISSUES
[4] In reviewing the written submissions, it appears that the following issues (stemming from Rule 57.01) need to be addressed:
a) What was the result of the reference motion?
b) Did either party unnecessarily lengthen the motion proceeding? This issue breaks down into the following sub-issues:
Did either party delay or cause unnecessary costs in settling my transfer order?
Did Cobra delay in transferring the action to Toronto?
Did Unimac delay in bringing its stay motion?
Did Unimac delay in settling Justice Brown’s order?
c) Did the successful party, Cobra, misconduct itself in this proceeding, thereby entitling Unimac to costs? This issue breaks down into the following sub-issues:
Did Cobra mislead Justice Brown about the state of pleadings?
Did Cobra mislead me as to the delay by Unimac in delivering defences?
Did Cobra misrepresent the counterclaim to Justice Brown?
Did Cobra breach the court-ordered timetable for the motion?
Did Cobra misrepresent the Unimac appeal of my transfer order?
Did Cobra fail to advise Unimac of the file transfer to Toronto?
Did Cobra fail to advise the Newmarket court of the Unimac appeal?
d) What is the effect of Unimac’s failure to proceed with its stay motion?
e) What scale of costs should be applied?
f) What is the reasonable quantum of costs to be ordered?
III. ANALYSIS
a) What was the result of the motion?
[5] There were two motions that had been originally scheduled by Justice F. L Myers on December 15, 2014 to take place on January 12, 2015: one was the Cobra motion referring this action to me for case management and trial; and the other was the Unimac motion to stay my order transferring this action from Newmarket to Toronto.
[6] The within action, to be called the “Cobra Action,” was originally brought by Unimac in Newmarket. Cobra moved before me on November 18, 2013 for an order transferring the Cobra Action to Toronto and referring it to me to be heard by me together with the other actions concerning the relevant project (“the Willowbrook Project”) that had been referred to me. On December 20, 2013 I granted only the transfer motion.
[7] Unimac appealed my ruling, and threatened to stay my transfer order pending the appeal. It did not take steps to do so for 11 months. In the meantime, Cobra got the action transferred from Newmarket to Toronto, and took steps to get a judge’s order referring the action referred to me. Justice Myers ordered that both the reference and stay motions be heard on January 12, 2015. The stay motion was abandoned before it was heard. Justice Brown heard the reference motion on January 12, 2015 and rendered her ruling on January 16, 2015.
[8] In light of Justice Brown’s ruling of January 16, 2015 on the reference motion, there is no doubt that Cobra was entirely successful on that motion. She granted the motion. As such, Cobra has a prima facie entitlement to the costs of that motion.
[9] Concerning the stay motion, Justice Myers ordered that Unimac deliver its motion material before December 25, 2014. It chose not to do so. It abandoned the motion. Mr. Baichoo states in his submissions that this was done to “preserve judicial resources.” He also blamed Cobra for “prejudicing” the Unimac stay motion. More on this later. As it relates to the result, however, Cobra resisted the stay motion and was successful in bringing it to an end. This needs to be considered.
b.1) Did either party delay or cause unnecessary costs in settling my transfer order?
[10] As stated above, I issued my transfer order on December 20, 2013. I issued my decision as to the costs of the transfer motion on February 10, 2014. It took about 3 ½ months, namely until May 28, 2014, for Ms. Brazil to send Mr. Baichoo a draft form of order for review and approval. I find this 3 ½ month delay to be inordinate, particularly since the whole purpose of my transfer order was to facilitate a timely reference of the Cobra Action to me to be managed with the Willowbrook lien proceedings, which were well underway by that point. No explanation was given for that delay. However, I also note that Mr. Baichoo himself made no effort to draft and circulate a form of order, something one would have thought he would have done if he was being prejudiced by this delay. Both sides are to blame for this delay.
[11] As to the costs of settling the order, I find that both sides are responsible for the unnecessary costs that were incurred in this process. Ms. Brazil sent three letters to Mr. Baichoo on May 28 and June 3 and 24, 2014 seeking his approval of the form of the order, all to no avail. The order was not complicated. Mr. Baichoo was apparently not in the office in June, 2014, and therefore could not respond to the June, 2014 correspondence. Ms. Brazil eventually had to arrange a telephone conference with me to settle the order, which conference call took place on July 9, 2014. Written submissions were made. I recall that telephone call. In my view, it was entirely unnecessary. Counsel should have agreed upon a form of order quickly at the end of May, 2014 before Mr. Baichoo left the office.
b.2 Did Cobra delay in transferring the action to Toronto?
[12] I am satisfied that Cobra did not cause any further delay in transferring the Cobra Action to Toronto. As soon as my transfer order was settled, issued and entered, Ms. Brazil requisitioned the Newmarket Court to get the file transferred. It took the court 2 ½ months to complete the transfer. When a Toronto number was assigned to the file on October 6, 2014, Ms. Brazil immediately booked the first available time before a judge for a reference motion. That date was December 2, 2014.
b.3) Did Unimac delay in bringing its stay motion?
[13] The materials indicate that Unimac waited until November, 2014 to take steps to stay my transfer order pending the Unimac appeal. In his submissions, Mr. Baichoo blamed this delay on the delay in the settlement of my transfer order and on Cobra’s “failure” to notify him of the administrative transfer of the file to Toronto. I simply do not understand these positions. The settlement of the transfer order and the administrative transfer of the file did not affect Unimac’s right, indeed obligation, to bring its stay motion in a timely way. The need for a timely stay motion was made more pressing by the ongoing Willowbrook lien proceedings. Instead Unimac chose to wait to bring the motion forward for almost a year.
[14] Justice Myers stated this in paragraph 23 of his December 15, 2014 ruling: “Not a thing turns on when the physical file moved. The plaintiff remains as able today to bring its stay motion as it was a year ago. I have no idea why the motion was not brought in the 11 months between the time that the Master made his decision and the time Civil Practice Court started this past November.” I agree entirely with this statement. If anything prejudiced the outcome of the stay motion, it was this inordinate delay by Unimac.
b.4) Did Unimac delay in settling the Brown order?
[15] Mr. Baichoo apparently refused to settle the form of the order of Justice Brown, as the form provided to him by Ms. Brazil did not state that sections 58(1) and 67(1), (2) and (3) of the Construction Lien Act (“CLA”) were grounds on which Cobra relied for its motion. Ms. Brazil in her submissions stated that the only reason these sections were referred to in the Cobra notice of motion was to give the motions judge an understanding of my reference powers under the CLA so that the motions judge could give similar powers in her reference order concerning the Cobra Action. This explanation is imminently reasonable.
[16] In any event, I fail to see how the inclusion of the indicated CLA sections in the form of the Brown order should in any way stand in the way of settling that order, as the Cobra Action is not a lien action. Unimac’s position here is quite unreasonable. I note that Ms. Brazil had to write to Justice Brown on January 29, 2015 in order to get her to settle the order.
c.1) Did Cobra mislead Justice Brown about the state of the pleadings?
[17] In his written submissions, Mr. Baichoo made several, very serious, allegations against Cobra and its counsel. In effect, he stated that Cobra and its counsel had been dishonest and had misled the court, that their conduct had brought the administration of justice into disrepute, and that Cobra counsel should be reported to the Law Society of Upper Canada. Given the gravity of these allegations, I have carefully reviewed the evidence proffered in support of them.
[18] The first of these allegations was that Cobra misled Justice Brown about the state of the pleadings. In particular, the objection appears to be that Cobra counsel was not forthright in its evidence and submissions about the service of the Cobra Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on Leon Hui. Mr. Grenier apparently stated in his affidavit in the transfer motion that service of the Cobra Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on Mr. Hui had been “unsuccessful.” Cobra argued later before Justice Brown that the time for service on Mr. Hui had expired thereby rendering CLA section 58(1) of no effect on the motion. CLA section 58(1) specifies that a reference motion under that statute can be brought only after the time for the delivery of defences “has expired.” Mr. Baichoo relied upon that section to argue that the pleadings were not closed and that the motion was premature. Justice Brown concluded in paragraph 26 of her decision that she was satisfied that section 58(1) was no bar to the reference order as the time for service of the Cobra pleading on Mr. Hui had expired.
[19] Mr. Baichoo pointed out in his submissions to me that subsequently, on January 26, 201, Mr. Grenier made a demand on Mr. Hui for the delivery of a defence, taking the position that Mr. Hui had in fact been served in September, 2013 by an alternative to personal service. Mr. Baichoo then called the Cobra position on this point before Justice Brown a deliberate misrepresentation to gain success on the reference motion.
[20] I do not agree with this argument. First, I am satisfied that Mr. Grenier’s statements in his affidavit were not a deliberate misrepresentation, as he honestly believed at the time of his swearing of the affidavit that service on Mr. Hui had not taken place. As indicated in the reply submission, the affidavit of service concerning the alternative to personal service came to Mr. Grenier’s attention after the reference motion. Mr. Grenier advised Mr. Baichoo of this in his covering letter of January 26, 2015. Second, even with the inadvertent misstatement of facts in the Grenier affidavit, I am not convinced that the Cobra argument was wrong about section 58(1). An inability to serve a defendant who is evading service should not hold up a lien reference. Third, since service on Mr. Hui had taken place in September, 2013, CLA section 58(1) was not in fact a bar to any lien reference. The time for the delivery of his defence had expired. Fourth, the inadvertent misstatement of the facts in the Grenier affidavit introduced an issue that adversely affected Cobra’s position on the motion, not Unimac’s. Introducing an unnecessary issue that undercuts one’s own position is hardly the stuff of deliberate misrepresentation, which is the accusation. Fifth, I am not satisfied that this point was critical to Justice Brown’s decision. At several points in her reasons, Her Honour makes reference to Rules 54.02 and Rule 6.01. These are the rules that govern the references and hearing together of non-lien actions, such as the Cobra Action. These rules do not require that such motions take place after the close of pleadings. It seems clear that Her Honour was relying on these rules, not CLA section 58(1), in reaching her decision.
[21] I find that Cobra did not deliberately misrepresent the state of the pleadings to Justice Brown. Any misstatement of the service of pleadings on Mr. Hui was inadvertent and in any event beneficial to Unimac’s position.
c.2) Did Cobra mislead me as to the delay by Unimac in delivering defences?
[22] Mr. Baichoo argued that, in its costs submissions, Cobra misrepresented to me the facts about the delay in the delivery of defences to the Cobra counterclaim. Mr. Baichoo argued that this delay was caused by Cobra’s failure to respond to a demand for particulars in a timely way. He stated that he delivered in good faith a Demand for Particulars on October 9, 2013, and that Cobra did not respond until June 10, 2014. In its costs submissions, Cobra stated that this step was but a tactic in support of Unimac’s eventual position on the reference motion that the reference order should not be given because the pleadings were not closed.
[23] I do not have enough evidence to make a determination as to whether the Demand for Particulars was improper or not. That would be the subject matter of another motion. I do note though in reviewing the Demand for Particulars that the demanded particulars are sweeping in scope, and contain points that are usually raised at discovery. I note also that Cobra answered only 2 of the 15 demands, and that the defendants to the counterclaim have pleaded. All I will say here is that there is, in my view, a real issue as to whether the demanded particulars were necessary for pleading. I make no finding as to whether Cobra has misled me on this matter as a result.
c.3) Did Cobra misrepresent its counterclaim to Justice Brown?
[24] In his submissions, Mr. Baichoo accused Cobra of misleading Justice Brown about the Cobra counterclaim. He stated that Cobra alleged in its factum that its counterclaim was “interwoven” with the claims in the lien, trust and bond claims that are a part of Willowbrook reference before me. He argued this was a misrepresentation as, according to him, the Cobra counterclaim was no more than a breach of contract and breach of trust action, and not one for a claim for lien and bond proceeds.
[25] I find this submission mystifying. It betrays a profound confusion between factual issues and remedies. Cobra’s counterclaim is indeed no more than an action for damages for breaches of contract and trust and for an accounting of trust funds. The factual issues that pertain to those claimed remedies will overlap with the factual issues that pertain to the claims for lien and bond claims in the Willowbrook reference. For instance, holdback monies are not only the subject of lien claims, they are also the subject of trust claims (which attach to accounts receivable). Also, labour and material payment bond entitlement will turn on whether the principal of the bond, Unimac, is liable to its subtrades for breach of contract. The major allegation of breach of contract against Unimac is that it delayed its subtrades, a factual issue that usually involves all of a contractor’s trades. I note that Cobra argued in its factum before Justice Brown that the issues “of fact or fact and law” in its counterclaim were “interwoven” with the issues in the Willowbrook reference. I also note that Justice Brown made no finding that the Cobra counterclaim included a claim for lien and a bond claim.
[26] There was no misrepresentation by Cobra here.
c.4) Did Cobra breach the court-ordered timetable for the motion?
[27] Mr. Baichoo argued that Cobra breached the court-ordered timetable for the motion by delivering a Supplementary Motion Record on January 5, 2015 containing the endorsement of Justice Myers and a one-page affidavit of lawyer, Lindsay Lorimer, setting out the state of the examinations for discovery. Justice Myers had ordered that Cobra deliver “its responding material” by the end of 2014. It is not clear whether this refers to the Unimac stay motion or to any reply material in the Cobra reference motion. The Lorimer affidavit was in response to the Unimac position that the Willowbrook reference was on the verge of being scheduled for trial.
[28] This issue was raised by Unimac before Justice Brown and was argued extensively. Her Honour allowed the Supplementary Motion Record to be considered, but placed minimal reliance at best on the Lorimer affidavit. If there was a breach of the Myers timetable by Cobra, which is not clear, I find that it was inconsequential. Indeed, the material was delivered in time for the dates that Justice Myers had scheduled for cross-examinations. This conduct does not attract cost consequences.
c.5) Did Cobra misrepresent the Unimac appeal of my transfer order?
[29] Mr. Baichoo argued that Cobra misrepresented to me the basis for the delay in the Unimac appeal of my transfer order. Unimac obtained two 2014 dates in Newmarket for this appeal - June 24, 2014 and November 13, 2014. He argued that Cobra misrepresented to me in its costs submissions that Unimac was at fault in some way for the cancellation of those two dates and the delay of the appeal. He argued that there was no such fault.
[30] The facts are not that clear. Based on the letter to Mr. Baichoo from Metrolinx counsel, Jonathan Goode, dated June 5, 2014, I note that the first date, June 24, 2014, was cancelled because Mr. Baichoo had not arranged a mutually convenient date for the appeal with Metrolinx counsel. Mr. Baichoo cancelled that appeal date as a result. Concerning the November 13, 2014 date, that was cancelled in part due to a death in Mr. Baichoo’s family. However, based on the endorsement of Justice Vallee of that day, I note that there was also an issue concerning Mr. Baichoo’s failure to consult with counsel in arranging the appeal. It is highly unlikely that the appeal would have proceeded on November 13, 2014 in any event as a result.
[31] I am therefore driven to the conclusion that there was in fact some level of culpability on the part of Unimac for the delay in the appeal. If Unimac was serious about this appeal, it should have made careful arrangements for the hearing dates. It did not do so. I do not find that Cobra has misled me as to the delay of the appeal of the transfer order.
c.6) Did Cobra fail to advise Unimac of the file transfer to Toronto?
[32] Mr. Baichoo argued that Cobra counsel should have provided him with a copy of the issued and entered transfer order sooner than it did, which was on September 4, 2014. Ms. Brazil replied that Mr. Baichoo did not ask for the issued and entered order prior to that date. While it may have been courteous on the part of Cobra counsel to provide Mr. Baichoo with an unsolicited copy of the issued and entered order sooner, I am not sure that anything turns on this. The transfer order had been settled and signed by me on July 9, 2014, a fact which Mr. Baichoo knew. He argued that this delay in the delivery of the issued and entered transfer order prejudiced Unimac’s stay motion. I do not agree. The stay motion could have been brought at any time.
[33] Mr. Baichoo then argued that Cobra counsel failed to advise him of their steps in getting the file transferred to Toronto. I am not aware of any obligation on the part of Cobra to notify Unimac of the steps Cobra was taking to enforce my transfer order. Mr. Baichoo knew that I had signed the transfer order, and that there was no stay. A stay motion could have been brought at any time.
c.7) Did Cobra fail to advise the Newmarket court about the Unimac appeal?
[34] Mr. Baichoo argued that Cobra should have notified the Newmarket court about the Unimac appeal of the transfer order, and did not. He argued that such notification would have stopped the transfer of the file to Toronto. I was given no authority for this proposition. Notifying the Newmarket court of the Unimac appeal would not have stopped the transfer. Without a stay order, the transfer order remained in full force and effect. Consequently, there was no obligation on Cobra to notify the Newmarket court of the Unimac appeal. What would have stopped the transfer was an order staying the transfer order, which Mr. Baichoo failed to get.
d) What is the effect of Unimac’s failure to proceed with the stay motion?
[35] Mr. Baichoo argued that Cobra should be denied its costs of the stay motion because it was “reckless” of them to prepare material in advance of receiving the Unimac motion record. Ms. Brazil’s response is that Justice Myers imposed a very tight schedule for the preparation and exchange of material. He required that Unimac deliver its motion material by December 25, 2014 and that Cobra deliver its responding motion material by December 31, 2014. Therefore, Cobra was faced with the prospect of preparing responding material during the holiday period with limited resources. As a result, it decided to prepare motion material in advance of the anticipated receipt of the stay motion material, and delivered it on December 18, 2014. As stated earlier, Unimac decided not to proceed with the stay motion “to preserve judicial resources.” The materials did not indicate that this decision was ever formally communicated to Cobra counsel.
[36] Rule 37.09(3) specifies that where a motion is abandoned, the responding party is entitled to its costs of the motion. The rule specifies, however, that the notice of motion must be “served.” Nevertheless, there is clear authority for the proposition that once a schedule has been set by the court for the hearing of the motion and the issues are clear, and the moving party abandons the motion before serving it, the court can and will extend the boundaries of Rule 37.09(3) to achieve a just result and award costs in favour of the responding party for the work it reasonably performs in anticipation of the motion; see Beatrice Leaseholds Ltd. v. Shainhouse [2013] O.J. 4074 (Ont. Master).
[37] I apply that proposition to this case. The stay motion had been threatened for 11 months, and the issues concerning that motion were understood. The Myers’ order imposed a tight schedule that required Cobra to prepare materials over the holiday period. I do not find Cobra’s decision to prepare materials in advance of receiving the motion to be unreasonable. In fact, it would be unfair not to award Cobra costs of this motion in the circumstances.
e) What scale of costs should be applied?
[38] As stated earlier, Cobra should be awarded costs in the reference motion, as it succeeded entirely in that motion. Also Cobra should be awarded costs of the stay motion for the reasons stated above. The next issue is the scale of costs to be imposed.
[39] In reviewing all of these issues, I have come to the conclusion that the scale must be substantial indemnity for the reference motion and full indemnity for the stay motion. I realize that such an award is quite unusual and must be reserved for cases in which the conduct of one of the parties merits such a punitive award. This is such a case. The following are my reasons:
• Once the transfer order was issued, in my view, the reference order should have proceeded as a matter of course. The whole purpose of the transfer order was to facilitate the reference of the Cobra Action to be managed and heard by me together with the other actions in the Willowbrook reference. I would have given that order back on December 20, 2013 had I had the jurisdiction to do so. The arguments raised by Unimac were dismissed by Justice Brown. I found them to be without merit. The CLA section 58(1) point was clearly not applicable to this case, as this is not a lien action. Furthermore, there are clearly significant factual issues in this action that overlap with the issues in the other actions that are before me. Unimac’s resistance to the reference motion was quite unreasonable.
• The material that I have seen indicates that the Unimac stay motion was nothing but a tactic to delay the reference motion. Unimac did nothing to bring that motion forward for 11 months. All of the explanations Mr. Baichoo gave to me for this delay were groundless. The motion was in the end brought forward only when Cobra had completed the transfer of the file and scheduled a reference motion. Then, when the reference was finally scheduled under a firm court-ordered timetable, the stay motion was withdrawn, ostensibly to “preserve judicial resources.” This kind of delaying tactic that cynically undermines the proper and efficient conduct of court proceedings needs to be strongly sanctioned.
• The accusations raised by Mr. Baichoo in his costs submissions about the conduct of Cobra and its lawyers were surprisingly shrill. He described them as being guilty of dishonesty, misrepresentation to the court and reportable misconduct. At one point he described their conduct as “disgusting.” He wanted full indemnity costs of the reference motion in favour of Unimac on account of this alleged misconduct, in an amount of almost $29,000. When I examined Mr. Baichoo’s allegations in detail, on the other hand, I found them to be, with a few minor exceptions, groundless. I have gone through them in detail in my analysis above. Making groundless allegations of misconduct against another lawyer and party is conduct of its own that must be discouraged strongly with stiff sanctions.
[40] I have, therefore, concluded that there must be an award of substantial indemnity costs of the reference motions as against Unimac, and an award of full indemnity costs of the stay motion as against Unimac.
[41] Concerning the costs of settling the transfer order, I award Cobra half of its partial indemnity costs for this matter, given what I view to be the contribution of both parties to that issue, as described above.
f) What is the reasonable quantum of costs to be ordered?
[42] Within these scales of costs, I must determine whether any of the costs claimed by Cobra are entirely unreasonable.
[43] Concerning the substantial indemnity costs claimed by Cobra for the reference motion, Mr. Baichoo made no comment. The Colbra claim is less than what Unimac claimed in its own costs outline for substantial indemnity costs of the motion. The substantial indemnity hourly rates are appropriate for the level of experience of counsel. The quantum of the claimed time and the claimed disbursements are also not unreasonable. I do not have the benefit of seeing the motion material that was filed by the parties for this motion, but I note that Justice Brown described the material as “voluminous.”
[44] I, therefore, rule that Unimac pay Cobra $18,940.60 in substantial indemnity costs for the reference motion.
[45] Concerning the stay motion, Mr. Baichoo argued that the 16 hours of time claimed by Cobra for this motion is unreasonable. He stated the three appearances before Justice Myers were each no more than 15 to 20 minutes in length. He attached the motion record that was delivered on December 18, 2014, which consisted only of the endorsement of Justice Myers. Again, I do not have the benefit of seeing what was filed with Justice Myers. What is clear from reading His Honour’s Endorsement of December 15, 2014 is that the proceedings before him were hotly contested. He stated in paragraph that “it was clear to me . . . that counsel were not able to get along and that scheduling had become bogged down.” Usually, such hotly contested matters generate considerable additional time in preparation for court attendances. I do not find the time to be excessive. No disbursements were claimed. Again, the claimed rates were reasonable in light of the experience of counsel.
[46] I, therefore, rule that Unimac pay Cobra $9,465.45 in full indemnity costs for the stay motion.
[47] Concerning the costs for settling the transfer order, Cobra claims 4.5 hours of time. This is not unreasonable given the correspondence that was exchanged, the written submissions and the telephone conference. I rule that Unimac pay Cobra half of its claim of partial indemnity costs of $1,130, namely $565.
IV. CONCLUSION
[48] I make the following awards of costs in favour of Cobra, with the following figures being inclusive of tax:
• Unimac must pay Cobra substantial indemnity costs of the reference motion in the amount of $18,940;
• Unimac must pay Cobra full indemnity costs of the stay motion in the amount of $9,465;
• Unimac must pay Cobra $565 for settling the transfer order.
[49] The total amount to be paid by Unimac to Cobra is $28,970. This must be paid within 30 days from the date of this order.
DATE: June 11, 2015 __________________________
MASTER C. WIEBE