CITATION: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 3611

COURT FILE NO.: 00-CV-192059

DATE:20150604

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LARRY PHILIP FONTAINE in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Executor of the estate of Agnes Mary Fontaine, deceased, MICHELLINE AMMAQ, PERCY ARCHIE, CHARLES BAXTER SR., ELIJAH BAXTER, EVELYN BAXTER, DONALD BELCOURT, NORA BERNARD, JOHN BOSUM, JANET BREWSTER, RHONDA BUFFALO, ERNESTINE CAIBAIOSAI-GIDMARK, MICHAEL CARPAN, BRENDA CYR, DEANNA CYR, MALCOLM DAWSON, ANN DENE, BENNY DOCTOR, LUCY DOCTOR, JAMES FONTAINE in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Executor of the Estate of Agnes Mary Fontaine, deceased, VINCENT BRADLEY FONTAINE, DANA EVA MARIE FRANCEY, PEGGY GOOD, FRED KELLY, ROSEMARIE KUPTANA, ELIZABETH KUSIAK, THERESA LAROCQUE, JANE McCULLUM, CORNELIUS McCOMBER, VERONICA MARTEN, STANLEY THOMAS NEPETAYPO, FLORA NORTHWEST, NORMAN PAUCHEY, CAMBLE QUATELL, ALVIN BARNEY SAULTEAUX, CHRISTINE SEMPLE, DENNIS SMOKEYDAY, KENNETH SPARVIER, EDWARD TAPIATIC, HELEN WINDERMAN and ADRIAN YELLOWKNEE

Plaintiffs

• and -

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN CANADA, THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH OF CANADA, THE UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA, THE BOARD OF HOME MISSIONS OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA, THE WOMEN’S MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, THE BAPTIST CHURCH IN CANADA, BOARD OF HOME MISSIONS AND SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN BAY, THE CANADA IMPACT NORTH MINISTRIES OF THE COMPANY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL IN NEW ENGLAND (also known as THE NEW ENGLAND COMPANY), THE DIOCESE OF SASKATCHEWAN, THE DIOCESE OF THE SYNOD OF CARIBOO, THE FOREIGN MISSION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN CANADA, THE INCORPORATED SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF HURON, THE METHODIST CHURCH OF CANADA, THE MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH OF CANADA, THE MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF THE METHODIST CHURCH OF CANADA (ALSO KNOWN AS THE METHODIST MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF CANADA), THE INCORPORATED SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF ALGOMA, THE SYNOD OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH OF THE DIOCESE OF QUEBEC, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF ATHBASCA, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF BRANDON, THE ANGLICAN SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF CALGARY, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF KEEWATIN, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF QU’APPELLE, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF NEW WESTMINISTER, THE SYNOD OF THE DIOCESE OF YUKON, THE TRUSTEE BOARD OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN CANADA, THE BOARD OF HOME MISSIONS AND SOCIAL SERVICE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF CANADA, THE WOMEN’S MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA, SISTERS OF CHARITY, A BODY CORPORATE ALSO KNOWN AS SISTERS OF CHARITY OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, HALIFAX, ALSO KNOWN AS SISTERS OF CHARITY HALIFAX, ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF HALIFAX, LES SOEURS DE NOTRE DAME-AUXILIATRICE, LES SOEURS DE ST. FRANCOIS D’ASSISE, INSITUT DES SOEURS DU BON CONSEIL, LES SOEURS DE SAINT-JOSEPH DE SAINT-HYANCITHE, LES SOEURS DE JESUS-MARIE, LES SOEURS DE L’ASSOMPTION DE LA SAINTE VIERGE, LES SOEURS DE L’ASSOMPTION DE LA SAINT VIERGE DE L’ALBERTA, LES SOEURS DE LA CHARITE DE ST.-HYACINTHE, LES OEUVRES OBLATES DE L’ONTARIO, LES RESIDENCES OBLATES DU QUEBEC, LA CORPORATION EPISCOPALE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE DE LA BAIE JAMES (THE ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF JAMES BAY), THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF MOOSONEE, SOEURS GRISES DE MONTRéAL/GREY NUNS OF MONTREAL, SISTERS OF CHARITY (GREY NUNS) OF ALBERTA, LES SOEURS DE LA CHARITé DES T.N.O., HOTEL-DIEU DE NICOLET, THE GREY NUNS OF MANITOBA INC.-LES SOEURS GRISES DU MANITOBA INC., LA CORPORATION EPISCOPALE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE DE LA BAIE D’HUDSON – THE ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF HUDSON’S BAY, MISSIONARY OBLATES – GRANDIN PROVINCE, LES OBLATS DE MARIE IMMACULEE DU MANITOBA, THE ARCHIEPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF REGINA, THE SISTERS OF THE PRESENTATION, THE SISTERS OF ST. JOSEPH OF SAULT ST. MARIE, SISTERS OF CHARITY OF OTTAWA, OBLATES OF MARY IMMACULATE –ST. PETER’S PROVINCE, THE SISTERS OF SAINT ANN, SISTERS OF INSTRUCTION OF THE CHILD JESUS, THE BENEDICTINE SISTERS OF MT. ANGEL OREGON, LES PERES MONTFORTAINS, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KAMLOOPS CORPORATION SOLE, THE BISHOP OF VICTORIA, CORPORATION SOLE, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NELSON, CORPORATION SOLE, ORDER OF THE OBLATES OF MARY IMMACULATE IN THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE SISTERS OF CHARITY OF PROVIDENCE OF WESTERN CANADA, LA CORPORATION EPISCOPALE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE DE GROUARD, ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF KEEWATIN, LA CORPORATION ARCHIéPISCOPALE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE DE ST. BONIFACE, LES MISSIONNAIRES OBLATES SISTERS DE ST. BONIFACE-THE MISSIONARY OBLATES SISTERS OF ST. BONIFACE, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHIEPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF WINNIPEG, LA CORPORATION EPISCOPALE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE DE PRINCE ALBERT, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF THUNDER BAY, IMMACULATE HEART COMMUNITY OF LOS ANGELES CA, ARCHDIOCESE OF VANCOUVER – THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF VANCOUVER, ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF WHITEHORSE, THE CATHOLIC EPISCOPALE CORPORATION OF MACKENZIE-FORT SMITH, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF PRINCE RUPERT, EPISCOPAL CORPORATION OF SASKATOON, OMI LACOMBE CANADA INC. and MT. ANGEL ABBEY INC.

Defendants

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

COUNSEL:

• Fay Brunning for the Applicants

• Catherine A. Coughlan and Brent Thompson for the Attorney General of Canada

• Tina Hobday for the Chief Adjudicator of the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat (Canada)

• Stuart Wuttke for the Assembly of First Nations

• Ted Frankel for the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada

HEARING DATE: May 20, 2015

PERELL, J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

[1] The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (“IRSSA”) is a contract. It was signed on April 24, 2006 after extensive negotiations with the Defendants and with the representatives of the survivors of the Indian Residential Schools, which included Inuit groups and the Assembly of First Nations (“AFN”). The IRSSA settled numerous class action and individual lawsuits against Canada, which established the Indian Residential Schools policy, and against the numerous Anglican, Baptist, Episcopal, Methodist Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and United churches, charities, and missionary societies that operated the schools and whose teachers, sisters, and brothers committed the atrocities that occurred at the schools, for which the Prime Minister of Canada has apologized.

[2] Nine Applicants, some of whom have settled their claims for compensation under the IRSSA, bring a Request for Directions (“RFD”). Their RFD seeks the court’s advice about whether Canada has complied with its disclosure obligations under the contract. Those obligations are in Schedule D, Appendix VIII “Government Document Disclosure,” set out below.

[3] There are four major components to the IRSSA:

• First, Canada placed $1.9 billion into a trust fund to fund payments of the “Common Experience Payment” (“CEP”) to Class Members who resided at an Indian Residential School during the class period. Based on residence eligibility, a Class Member receives $10,000.00 for the first year and $3,000.00 for each additional year at any acknowledged Indian Residential School.

• Second, the IRSSA established the Independent Assessment Process (“IAP”) under which Class Members who suffered physical or sexual abuse at an Indian Residential School may claim compensation commensurate with the seriousness of their injuries. Schedule “D” to the IRSSA provides that an individual IAP claimant may receive compensation of up to $525,000.00; a maximum of $275,000.00 in relation to sexual and physical assaults and other wrongful acts, and up to a further $250,000.00 for “proven actual income loss”. Canada’s liability to fund the IAP is uncapped.

• Third, the IRSSA established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) with a mandate to create an historical record of the residential school system to be preserved and made accessible to the public for future study.

• The fourth component is that the Class Members released their legal claims in exchange for the benefits of the IRSSA. The releases extended to Canada and the Church Entities who were the named Defendants. The releases also extended to the Defendants’ employees, agents, officers, directors, shareholders, partners, principals, members, attorneys, insurers, subrogees, representatives, executors, administrators, predecessors, successors, heirs, transferees and assigns.

[4] The Applicants bring their RFD because of their lawyer’s discovery of a problem about one of Canada’s disclosure obligations under the IRSSA. One of Canada’s obligations for the IAP part of the contract is to provide reports known as Narratives. The Narratives are designed to facilitate the IAP. Under the IRSSA, Narratives summarize information about: each Indian Residential School; documents mentioning sexual abuse at the particular school; and alleged perpetrators of assaults who are called POIs (“Persons of Interest”).

[5] The Narratives and the POI Reports are prepared by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (“AANDC”), the department of Canada with responsibility for policies relating to Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The Narrative prepared by Canada for the Bishop Horden Indian Residential School (“Bishop Horden IRS”) is silent about an alleged incident involving an assault in the girl’s dorm that led to criminal charges and the dismissal and replacement of the supervisors at the school.

[6] The Applicants allege that Canada has breached its disclosure obligations with respect to the Narrative for the Bishop Horden IRS, which was located in Moose Factory, Ontario.

[7] The Applicants seek a very broad remedial order from this Court to correct the alleged breach of contract. In their RFD, the Applicants seek, among other things, directions: (1) compelling Canada to answer the questions its representative refused to answer during cross-examinations for this RFD; (2) compelling Canada to conduct additional searches of various governmental departments for documents relevant to abuses at Bishop Horden IRS; (3) requiring Canada to produce any additional documents relevant to the IAP process that it may have in its possession; and (4) requiring the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat (“Secretariat”) to establish a “witness-matching” program.

[8] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283, I found that through its RFD jurisdiction, this Court can scrutinize whether Canada has honoured its obligations under the IRSSA to “disclose relevant documents and whether the IAP is advancing in accordance with the requirements of the IRSSA.” This RFD engages the Court in precisely the same exercise.

[9] For the reasons that follow, I grant the Applicants’ RFD in part.

[10] I grant the request that Canada be compelled to conduct additional searches with the RCMP for documents relevant to the alleged assault in the girl’s dorm. I dismiss the requests: (1) that Canada be compelled to answer the refused questions; (2) that Canada produce any additional documents relevant to the IAP process that it may have in its possession; and (3) that the Secretariat establish a witness-matching program.

[11] I agree with the Applicants that Canada has breached its document collection obligations under the IRSSA - but not for the reasons advanced by the Applicants. Whether or not Canada has breached its contractual obligations is a matter of contract interpretation, and my own conclusion is that there has been a breach. My conclusion is mainly, but not exclusively, based on the interpretative arguments of the AFN, whose counsel made the most helpful of the arguments at the hearing of the RFD.

[12] I do not agree with Canada’s interpretation of its disclosure obligations, but I do not agree with the Applicants’ version either. It is to oversimplify, but Canada’s version of how the IAP operates understates Canada’s production and disclosure obligations and the Applicants version much overstates Canada’s obligations, which are much narrower than the Applicants would have them to be.

[13] As I shall discuss below, the IRSSA is about doing justice, but it is a settlement agreement, and settlements are by their nature compromises. A settlement never achieves perfect justice. While reconciliation is an ultimate purpose of the IRSSA, the IAP portion of it is a sui generis adjudication program that is the product of adversarial arms-length contract negotiations in the context of adversarial class actions and numerous individual proceedings and a court approved settlement. The IAP is not the truth and reconciliation portion of the IRSSA.

[14] Unfortunately, the parties’ non-mutual mistakes about the meaning of the IRSSA has been a festering sore of suspicion, animosity, distrust, and shared resentment. The Applicants expressly accuse Canada of acting in breach of the IRSSA and of acting in bad faith. Canada does not bite its tongue in arguing that the Applicants are overreaching, and it seems that it resents and is indignant about the Applicants’ accusations.

[15] I do foreclose the possibility that some trust and respect can be restored, but I shall be so bold as to explain to both parties that for different reasons, they both misinterpret the IRSSA. The AFN comes closest to the true interpretation, but it too overstates Canada’s contractual obligations.

[16] As I shall explain below, in the circumstances of this RFD, I interpret the IRSSA to require no more than that Canada perform additional searches with the RCMP detachment that was responsible for policing Moose Factory, Ontario, where the Bishop Horden IRS was located. These additional compelled searches are for the purpose of collecting documents, if any, relevant to the alleged assault in the girl’s dorm.

[17] Under the IRSSA, Canada is entitled to resist being asked to do more that it bargained for, but it is not entitled to resist to do less than it bargained for, which is my conclusion for this RFD. That said, what Canada is obligated to do is less than the Applicants contend, and while I conclude that Canada has breached its disclosure obligations and while I shall fashion a remedy for that breach, I do not conclude that Canada’s breach was a manifestation of bad faith.

[18] In order to explain my Reasons for Decision, I shall first describe the circumstances that led to this RFD, including what was learned after the RFD was initiated about how Canada went about collecting documents for the IAP. Then, I will set out the provisions of the IRSSA that are most pertinent to this RFD. (Contract interpretation involves understanding the whole agreement, but I shall just set out the provisions crucial to my decision.) Next, I will undertake the exercise of contract interpretation and explain my conclusions. Here, I will first discuss the issue of whether Canada has breached its contractual obligations to collect documents and second, I will discuss whether as a matter of contract interpretation, the IRSSA admits of requiring the Secretariat to establish a witness-matching program. Finally, I will address several arguments or concerns of the parties that emerged because of the bringing of this RFD.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[19] The nine Applicants were former students at Bishop Horden IRS. They have made or are making claims for compensation pursuant to the IAP. They each allege that they were victims of physical and sexual abuse at Bishop Horden IRS. The nine Applicants are represented by Fay Brunning, a lawyer with considerable experience in advancing IAP claims.

[20] Ms. Brunning was retained by Claimant Q-10111, and in response to her Application, Canada disclosed in a POI Report that Ernest Constant, a supervisor at Bishop Horden IRS from 1965 to 1966 was convicted for abuse of students at Dauphin (MacKay) IRS, a school in Manitoba. This abuse occurred between 1967 and 1969. The Bishop Horden IRS Narrative, however, stated: “To date, we are unaware of any convictions for abuse at Moose Fort [Bishop Horden] IRS or of any convicted abusers present at the school.” Ms. Brunning became suspicious that the Bishop Horden IRS Narrative was not accurate.

[21] In August 2014, Ms. Brunning, who was also acting for Claimant S-11816, asked Canada if there was any further documentary disclosure forthcoming about Bishop Horden IRS, and in particular about the termination of supervisors and about criminal charges and convictions. Her client, Claimant S-11816, asserted that she witnessed the severe beating of a child and that numerous employees and/or supervisors at Bishop Horden IRS were subsequently fired and/or criminally charged. Claimant S-11816 sought aggravated damages for having witnessed the beating. The Bishop Horden IRS Narrative, however, did not make reference to this incident.

[22] Canada did not produce any new disclosure about termination of staff and/or criminal convictions of staff in response to Ms. Brunning’s inquiry, but it updated the Bishop Horden IRS Narrative and added an addendum to it. The addendum includes information about Mr. Constant’s convictions.

[23] On behalf of Claimants Q-10111 and S-11816 and seven other claimants, Ms. Brunning concluded that Canada’s response was inadequate and confirmed her suspicions that the Narrative for Bishop Horden IRS was incomplete.

[24] Of Ms. Brunning’s seven other clients, four Claimants, F-12921, F-10547, L-11068, and M-17743, stated that Bishop Horden IRS staff had been either dismissed or arrested as a result of abuse at the school. Two Claimants, S-18348 and K-14990 said they witnessed incidents of abuse at the school, and Claimant M-18635 described an incident involving a Ms. W that may have caused Ms. W to quit the school.

[25] Because the Applicants regarded Canada’s response as inadequate, in November 2014, the Applicants filed their RFD. They filed an Amended RFD in April 2015 that abandoned some of the relief originally requested. The Applicants’ amended RFD no longer sought disclosure from the General Synod of the Anglican Church, and the amended RFD specified that the disclosure sought from Canada was to be in respect of their own cases and not at large.

[26] The Amended RFD requested the following relief:

(1) A Direction that the Deputy Attorney General of Canada attend in public Court to answer under oath the refusals given to questions put to the federal government as per the list attached as Schedule 1, and any other questions of the Administrative Judges of the IRSSA. The Court, as ultimate supervisor and enforcer of the IRSSA, can then determine what additional orders are necessary, and/or can directly review the operations of the Secretariat and IAP documentary process, to ensure compliance with the terms and spirit of the IRSSA, including re-hearing processes and legal representation of IAP claimants prejudiced by the documentary non-disclosure.

(2) A Direction that for these Applicants, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada undertake to oversee and to ultimately certify a search for possible documents due under the IRSSA, at least from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Health Canada and Department of Justice, that pertain to abuse of IRS children by supervisors at Bishop Horden in the 1960s. Documents properly subject to solicitor and client privilege and/or contained in individual medical health records are agreed to be exempt from search and production.

(3) A Direction to the Secretariat that if one IAP claimant (student #1) pleaded that he/she saw another student (student #2) being abused:

(a) That if student #2 is also an IAP claimant, the Secretariat shall communicate with student #1 in writing to ask if the contact details for student #1 can be given to student #1, for the purpose of student #1 offering to testify at the IAP hearing of student #2; student #2 shall still have sole power to determine whether or not to call student #1 to testify at the IAP hearing of student #2.

(b) That POI reports shall be filed by EDI by the federal government for each perpetrator whom the witness IAP claimant (student #1) has pleaded to have committed compensable abuse to another student at the IRS.

[27] In response to the RFD, Canada delivered an affidavit from Eric Guimond, who, since 2013, has been the Director of National Research and Analysis at AANDC. He had been with AANDC since 2000 but not in matters related to the IRSSA until September 2013. Mr. Guimond was cross-examined on his affidavit. He admitted that Canada’s Department of Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada oversaw the collection of documents for the IAP between 2005 and 2007.

[28] The Department’s collecting of documents largely focused on searching and retrieving documents from numerous government ministries and departments after those documents had been archived at Library and Archives Canada (“LAC”). Direct inquires of the government ministries and departments were not performed. Consultants were used to make additional searches outside of LAC.

[29] In answers to undertakings, Mr. Guimond described how Canada had gathered documents for the IRSSA. He stated:

In 2005-2007 the Department of Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada was responsible for managing the collection of historical documents in anticipation of the implementation of the Settlement Agreement. The Department had contracts in place with several research consultancy firms, and used these firms to conduct the file review and collection. Each firm was assigned a province, and was instructed to focus on collecting information for the schools in that province. The research consultants swept national, provincial, church, band and other repositories for documents pertaining to the Indian Residential Schools (IRSs). Departmental staff tracked their progress, and recommended further avenues of inquiry, as required.

Research consultants were instructed to collect any and all documents that wholly or partially confirmed the residence of a pupil at an IRS. The collection of these documents was considered a high priority, as this information would be central to the validation of future claims. Documents pertaining to the residential schools, their staff, and any incidents (alleged or confirmed) that occurred at the schools were also considered high-value documents, and consultants were instructed to search for and gather them.

[30] Canada relies on its collecting of documents as described by Mr. Guimond as satisfactory performance of Canada’s obligations under Appendix VIII to Schedule D. Mr. Guimond, however, admitted during his cross-examination that Canada did not specifically request documents relating to child abuse at Bishop Horden IRS from the RCMP, Department of Justice, or Health Canada. He admitted that the Department of Justice and AANDC had not asked the RCMP if it had documents concerning criminal charges against supervisors at Bishop Horden IRS.

[31] Mr. Guimond conceded that it was possible that there are relevant documents held by the RCMP or by the Department of Justice that may relate to criminal convictions or abuse at Indian Residential Schools that have not been collected by AANDC.

C. THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE IRSSA

[32] With this background, the issue to be determined on the RFD is whether Canada has or has not complied with its disclosure obligations under the IRSSA. That determination requires an exercise of contractual interpretation. For those purposes, in my opinion, the following provisions of the IRSSA are most pertinent.

[33] The IRSSA contains two principles of construction and interpretation. Article 1.04 states that the contra proferentem rule does not apply, and Article 18.06 provides that the Settlement Agreement is the entire agreement between the parties.

[34] In my opinion, the fact that the IRSSA involves the release or discharge of claims is pertinent to my interpretative task. Under the IRSSA, Canada and the other Defendants obtained releases. The contract provides at Article 4.06 (g) as follows:

[...] that the obligations assumed by the defendants under this Agreement are in full and final satisfaction of all claims arising from or in relation to an Indian Residential School or the operation of Indian Residential Schools of the Class Members and that the Approval Orders are the sole recourse on account of any and all claims referred to therein.

[35] The ambit of the release is very broad.

[36] In their practical effect, the delivery of releases re-directed the survivors to resort to the CEP and the IAP as the recourse for their individual compensatory claims for their experiences at the Indian Residential Schools and it directed the survivors to the TRC and the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation for their collective claims and grievances that would be memorialized in the historical account of their experiences.

[37] The IAP is established by the IRSSA through Article 6. The details of the IAP are set out in Schedule D to the IRSSA. The IAP provides a customized adjudicative procedure for the resolution of claims of serious physical abuse, sexual abuse or other wrongful acts suffered while attending an Indian Residential School. The IAP is designed for the advancement of individual claims that must be proven by the individual survivors. There is no automatic entitlement to compensation.

[38] The IAP is inquisitorial in nature and the process is designed to minimize further harm to Claimants. The adjudicator has full advance disclosure of all the documents, and the adjudicator determines the questions to be asked of the Claimant. During the hearing there is no questioning by counsel for Canada. Counsel for the Claimant and Canada caucus with the adjudicator to propose questions or lines or inquiry and make brief oral submissions but do not control the questioning.

[39] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 839 at paras. 29-30, Justice Brown of the British Columbia Supreme Court described the IAP as follows:

29. The purpose of the IAP is to provide a modified adjudicative proceeding for the resolution of claims of serious physical or sexual abuse suffered while at a residential school. The hearings are to be inquisitorial in nature and the process is designed to minimize further harm to claimants. The adjudicator presiding over the hearing is charged with asking questions to elicit the testimony of claimants. Counsel for the parties may suggest questions or areas to explore to the adjudicator but they do not question claimants directly.

30. The hearings are meant to be considerate of the claimant's comfort and well-being but they also serve an adjudicative purpose where evidence and credibility are tested to ensure that legitimate claims are compensated and false claims are weeded out. It is strongly recommended that claimants retain legal counsel to advance their claims within the IAP.

[40] Because it is important to the interpretation of Canada’s document collection obligations, it is to be kept in mind that the IAP remains an adjudicative process but the gradient of the evidentiary and procedural burdens placed on the Applicants has been adjusted in their favour, but a claimant must still establish a legitimate claim and Canada is entitled to resist the Application in order to identify false claims. Under the IRSSA, adjudicators, claimants and their counsel are provided with the documents Canada has collected for each Indian Residential School named on a given IAP claim, and an adjudicator may use this disclosure as a basis for a finding of fact or credibility: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283.

[41] The role of the Chief Adjudicator and Secretariat in the IAP process is set out in Article III, subsections (s) and (t) of Schedule D to the IRSSA. I described the role of each in Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4585 at paras. 42-45 as follows:

42. The Chief Adjudicator, who is appointed pursuant to court Order under the IRSSA, supervises the IAP and the adjudicators that decide IAP Applications. The Chief Adjudicator’s decisions are not subject to judicial review since he is an officer of the court and is not exercising a statutory power of decision: Fontaine v. Duboff Edwards Haight & Schachter, 2012 ONCA 417.

43. The IAP is administered by the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat (the “Secretariat”). The Secretariat provides secretarial and administrative support for the Chief Adjudicator. Its mandate is to implement and administer the IAP under the direction of the Chief Adjudicator.

44. The Secretariat is a branch of AANDC, which is a department of Canada. However, save for specific financial, funding, auditing and human resource matters, the Secretariat is under the direction of the Chief Adjudicator and independent from the AANDC. The Secretariat’s employees work in separate office space with separately keyed entrances. The Secretariat does utilize AANDC’s electronic records system, but it maintains separate paper files from AANDC.

45. The Secretariat began in 2007 as a branch of The Office of Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, a government department that in 2008 integrated with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development which changed its name to AANDC in 2011.

[42] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283, I held that the IAP is a form of litigation containing many elements that denote or connote civil procedure. However, I also noted that there are significant departures from the ordinary court process including, notably, an inquisitorial dynamic and not a full-grown adversarial system.

[43] As already noted under the IRSSA, Canada is obliged to provide documents and information for the IAP. Schedule D, Appendix VIII of the IRSSA, which is the provision at the heart of this RFD, provides that:

The government will search for, collect and provide a report setting out the dates a Claimant attended a residential school. There are several kinds of documents that can confirm attendance at a residential school, and as soon as one or more are found which deal with the entire relevant period, further searches will not be undertaken.

The government will also search for, collect and provide a report about the persons named in the Application Form as having abused the Claimant, including information about those persons’ jobs at the residential school and the dates they worked or were there, as well as any allegations of physical or sexual abuse committed by such persons, where such allegations were made while the person was an employee or student. Upon request, the Claimant or their lawyer will receive copies of the documents located by the government, but information about other students or other persons named in the documents (other than alleged perpetrators of abuse) will be blacked out to protect each person’s personal information, as required by the Privacy Act.

The government will also gather documents about the residential school the Claimant attended, and will write a report summarizing those documents. The report and, upon request, the documents will be available for the Claimant or their lawyer to review.

In researching various residential schools to date, some documents have been, and may continue to be, found that mention sexual abuse by individuals other than those named in an application as having abused the Claimant. The information from these documents will be added to the residential school report. Again, the names of other students or persons at the school (other than alleged perpetrators of abuse) will be blacked out to protect their personal information.

The following documents will be given to the adjudicator who will assess a claim:

• documents confirming the Claimant’s attendance at the school(s);

• documents about the person(s) named as abusers, including those persons’ jobs at the residential school, the dates they worked or were there, and any sexual or physical abuse allegations concerning them;

• the report about the residential school(s) in question and the background documents; and,

• any documents mentioning sexual abuse at the residential school(s) in question.

With respect to student-on-student abuse allegations, the government will work with the parties to develop admissions from completed examinations for discovery, witness or alleged perpetrator interviews, or previous DR or IAP decisions relevant to the Claimant’s allegations.

[44] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283 at para. 15, I held that the opening phrase should be read to say that “Canada will search for and collect information and then provide a report.”

[45] As part of understanding the factual nexus for the interpretation of Canada’s disclosure obligations, it is significant to note that the IAP was modeled on a dispute resolution system that was in existence before the negotiation of the IRSSA; i.e., the Dispute Resolution Model for Indian Residential School Claims, dated November 6, 2003 (the “ADR Model”) and that Canada began collecting documents for the ADR Model and continued collection during the intense negotiations that led to the IRSSA. Thus, Canada’s collection of documents began before the signing of the IRSSA and continued after the signing and, as noted above, the focus of the ingathering of documents was LAC. Canada’s existing document collection practices was part of the factual nexus for the IRSSA.

[46] The ADR Model functioned for the four years preceding the signing of the IRSSA. The language of Appendix VIII to Schedule D of the IRSSA closely mirrors that of Appendix VIII in the predecessor ADR Model.

[47] Generally speaking, both for the ADR Model and for the IAP, Canada did not go directly to the federal departments, such as the RCMP, the Department of Justice, or Health Canada to ingather documents. Rather, it seems Canada relied on the various departments’ and ministries’ relationship with LAC during 2005-2007 when AANDC conducted its sweep of the LAC collections.

[48] This reliance, however, is problematic because each federal department has its own retention and disposition policies that may be amended from time to time.

D. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE IRSSA

1. Canada’s Disclosure Obligations for the IAP

[49] Turning to the interpretative exercise, the history and infrastructure of the IRSSA are discussed in more detail in previous decisions of this court, including Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283, and Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4585. For the purposes of these Reasons for Decision, I rely on the factual nexus described in those and other decisions with the Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General) style of cause.

[50] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 684, at para. 68, Justice Goudge discussed the principles of interpretation applicable to the IRSSA. He stated:

68. The principles of interpretation applicable to the Settlement Agreement are straightforward. The text of the agreement must be read as a whole. The plain meaning of the words used will be important as will the context provided by the circumstances existing at the time the Settlement Agreement was created. A consideration of both is necessary to reach a proper conclusion about the meaning of the contested provisions.

[51] In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4585 at paras. 69-70, I discussed the principles of contract interpretation applicable to the IRSSA, and stated:

69. In searching for the intent of the parties at the time when they negotiated their contract, the court should give particular consideration to the terms used by the parties, the context in which they are used and the purpose sought by the parties in using those terms: Frenette v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 64. Provisions should not be read in isolation but in harmony with the agreement as a whole: McClelland and Stewart Ltd. v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 1981 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 6; Hillis Oil and Sales Limited v. Wynn's Canada, 1986 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 57; Scanlon v. Castlepoint Dev. Corp. (1993), 1992 CanLII 7745 (ON CA), 11 O.R. (3d) 744 (C.A.)

70. Generally, words should be given their ordinary and literal meaning: Indian Molybdenum Ltd. v. The King, 1951 CanLII 378 (SCC), [1951] 3 D.L.R. 497 (S.C.C.). However, if there are alternatives, the court should reject an interpretation or a literal meaning that would make the provision or the agreement ineffective, superfluous, absurd, unjust, commercially unreasonable, or destructive of the commercial objective of the agreement: Consolidated-Bathurst Export Ltd. v. Mutual Boiler & Machinery Insurance Co. supra, Scanlon v. Castlepoint Dev. Corp., supra; Aita v. Silverstone Towers Ltd. (1978), 1978 CanLII 1405 (ON CA), 19 O.R. (2d) 681 (C.A.); Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust, 2007 ONCA 205at para. 24.

[52] The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53 is a restatement of the major principles of contract interpretation. In that case, Justice Rothstein stated at para. 50 that contractual interpretation is an exercise in which the principles of contractual interpretation are applied to the words of the written contract, considered in light of the factual matrix. Justice Rothstein explained the role of the surrounding circumstances in contractual interpretation and the nature of the evidence that can be considered when interpreting a contract. At paras. 57 to 60 of his judgment, he stated:

57. While the surrounding circumstances will be considered in interpreting the terms of a contract, they must never be allowed to overwhelm the words of that agreement …. The goal of examining such evidence is to deepen a decision-maker's understanding of the mutual and objective intentions of the parties as expressed in the words of the contract. The interpretation of a written contractual provision must always be grounded in the text and read in light of the entire contract …. While the surrounding circumstances are relied upon in the interpretive process, courts cannot use them to deviate from the text such that the court effectively creates a new agreement ….

58. The nature of the evidence that can be relied upon under the rubric of "surrounding circumstances" will necessarily vary from case to case. It does, however, have its limits. It should consist only of objective evidence of the background facts at the time of the execution of the contract … that is, knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting. Subject to these requirements and the parol evidence rule discussed below, this includes, in the words of Lord Hoffmann, "absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man" …. Whether something was or reasonably ought to have been within the common knowledge of the parties at the time of execution of the contract is a question of fact.

59. … The parol evidence rule precludes admission of evidence outside the words of the written contract that would add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict a contract that has been wholly reduced to writing …. To this end, the rule precludes, among other things, evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties ….

60. The parol evidence rule does not apply to preclude evidence of the surrounding circumstances. Such evidence is consistent with the objectives of finality and certainty because it is used as an interpretive aid for determining the meaning of the written words chosen by the parties, not to change or overrule the meaning of those words. The surrounding circumstances are facts known or facts that reasonably ought to have been known to both parties at or before the date of contracting; therefore, the concern of unreliability does not arise.

[53] To these general principles I add that the IRSSA is as important as a treaty between First Nations and Canada, and as such the honour of the Crown is an important interpretative principle for the IRSSA. Where both an honourable interpretation and a dishonourable interpretation are both available, an interpretation of the IRSSA in a way that brings honour to Canada should be selected: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4585 at paras. 89-90.

[54] In this RFD, the Applicants argue that the spirit of the IRSSA is to reveal the “truth” about Indian Residential Schools, particularly about the abuse of Indian Residential School students and they state that Canada’s documentary obligations exceed production requirements imposed in ordinary civil litigation under the Rules of Civil Procedure. They argue that lawyers for Canada have an obligation, akin to that of a lawyer in civil litigation, to ensure proper documentary search and disclosure by Canada and that Canada has failed to perform its obligations under the IRSSA.

[55] For its part, the AFN submits that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words chosen by the parties to describe Canada’s disclosure obligations demonstrates that all documents relating to abuse at Indian Residential Schools in the possession of any federal department, agency or any archived documents at LAC were intended to be included within the obligation to search for, collect and provide and gather documents.

[56] Since there may be documents at various federal departments, such as the RCMP, Department of Justice, or Health Canada that may not have been archived at LAC during the time when AANDC conducted its sweep of the LAC collections, the AFN submits that these documents must be collected now. The AFN submits that nothing in the IRSSA confers on Canada the unilateral option to limit the scope of its search, collection and reporting obligations to one sweep of archived documents.

[57] The AFN also cites paragraph 11 to Schedule N of the IRSSA (pertaining to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission), which sets out that “Canada … will provide all relevant documents in their possession or control to and for the use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission …” The AFN argues that a search limited to documents within the AANDC and LAC collections is at odds with Canada’s obligations relating to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Like the Applicants, the AFN argues that Canada’s search obligations should be consistent with or guided by the disclosure obligations of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[58] Canada rejects the AFN’s submission that a plain reading of Appendix VIII to Schedule D requires Canada to undertake its obligations under any particular timeframe or to canvass other federal departments one-by-one. It maintains that the agreement bestows discretion on how and when Canada was to complete its document collection, provided that it was prepared to submit its mandatory reports in response to the IAP claims as they would emerge.

[59] Canada claims that there is no evidence: that any of the consulted sources were deficient; that there are any better or even other viable sources of documents that were missed; or that Canada’s priorities in gathering documents were improper or misguided. It insists that the evidence rather confirms the completeness of the IRS document collection. Among other things, it cites the fact that the Bishop Horden IRS sub-collection contains records generated by the RCMP. Canada asserts that the Applicants have proffered no proof that the documents sought by the Applicants actually exist and absent this proof Canada cannot be expected to look for the documents.

[60] Canada submits that it does not have an obligation to certify the fulsomeness of disclosure to the IAP in a manner akin to an affidavit of documents. It maintains that the Applicants’ analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure fails to appreciate that the IAP is an out-of-court process operating under the framework of the ADR Model.

[61] With this background, I can now begin my own interpretative analysis of the contract. I start by rejecting the proposition that the Rules of Civil Procedure is the measure of what are Canada’s disclosure obligations under the IRSSA. See Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283 at para. 204.

[62] The Rules of Civil Procedure may sometimes be helpful in interpreting what the parties intended, but what the parties intended is determined by interpreting the IRSSA in accordance with the normative principles of contract interpretation and an analysis of the IRSSA reveals that it established a sui generis adjudicative system based on the ADR Model that already existed. The parties to the IRSSA did not include language mandating Canada to search for documents in a manner analogous to the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[63] Schedule D, Appendix VIII of the IRSSA imposes two discrete document collection and disclosure obligations on Canada.

[64] The first obligation is to:

search for, collect and provide a report setting out the dates a Claimant attended a residential school.

[65] The second obligation is to:

search for, collect and provide a report about the persons named in the Application Form as having abused the Claimant, including information about those persons’ jobs at the residential school and the dates they worked or were there, as well as any allegations of physical or sexual abuse committed by such persons, where such allegations were made while the person was an employee or student.

[66] It is to be noted that the first obligation is qualified or reduced by the stipulation that as soon as a document is found to confirm attendance for the entire relevant period, further searches will not be undertaken.

[67] The second collection obligation - and it is the one most pertinent for present purposes -has no similar qualification to reduce or preclude further searches being made.

[68] Schedule D, Appendix VIII does not specify the extent or scope of the second collection and report obligation. The Applicants and the AFN, relying on the more extensive production obligations associated with the work of the TRC and the so-called spirit of the IRSSA to reveal the truth of the survivor’s horrific experiences at the Indian Residential Schools, submit that comprehensive searches are required.

[69] In my opinion, this submission is not correct. Reading the totality of the IRSSA and recalling the factual matrix in which it was negotiated reveals that the IRSSA is a multipurpose agreement and some of those purposes are at cross-purposes or at least are intended to operate independently. Canada’s collection and document disclosure responsibilities for the TRC and for the IAP are separate obligations meant to serve separate and different purposes. As noted above, the IAP remains adversarial and the IAP’s search for truth is for the purposes of adjudication not for the purposes of reconciliation.

[70] Schedule D, Appendix VIII should accordingly be interpreted having regard to its own purposes in a factual nexus that reveals that the parties knew about the ADR Model and the nature of the archival and collection work that was underway. It appears that the parties intended to ease but not remove the evidentiary burden on the Applicants.

[71] Generally speaking, Schedule D to the IRSSA privileges the Applicants’ oral testimony as the means of proof over reliance on documents. The details for the IAP hearings emphasize oral rather than documentary evidence, and it is the adjudicator that controls the questioning after discussions with the Applicants’ counsel and with counsel for Canada. Given the more limited role played by documentary evidence, the Applicants much overstate the impact of an absence of documents on their credibility.

[72] A review of the IAP indicates that it is designed to screen illegitimate claims but the IAP is designed not to be sceptical of genuine claims. It appears from the language of the IAP that the parties intended that Canada collect documents for the preparation of Narratives and POI Reports to facilitate, not obstruct, the Claimants in their pursuit of compensation. The design of the IAP, however, does send a mixed or clouded message because Canada plays so many roles, some conflicting, and one of those roles gives it the right to challenge the Applicants.

[73] How then to determine the scope of Canada’s second obligation to collect documents? In my opinion, one interpretative clue comes from the feature of Schedule D, Appendix VIII that the Claimant or his or her lawyer will receive copies of the documents located by the government – upon request. This suggests to me two things. First, that the parties to the IRSSA were satisfied with the Narratives and POI Reports and the standard of collection used for the ADR Model and second, that much less mandatory disclosure would be required than in a full-fledged adversarial model.

[74] A similar interpretative inference emerges from the feature of Schedule D, Appendix VIII that:

The government will also gather documents about the residential school the Claimant attended, and will write a report summarizing those documents. The report and, upon request, the documents will be available for the Claimant or their lawyer to review.

Here again are the ideas that a summary of information and not comprehensive collection and disclosure will be satisfactory for the purposes of the IAP and that the documents will be available on request.

[75] More interpretative clues comes from the language of Schedule D, Appendix VIII that states:

In researching various residential schools to date, some documents have been, and may continue to be found that mention sexual abuse by individuals other than those named in an application as having abused the Claimant. The information from these documents will be added to the residential school report. [emphasis added]

[76] The words “to date” suggest that the parties were referring to the collection process of the ADR Model as being satisfactory with the caveat that documents “may continue to be found” and will be added to the reports.

[77] These interpretative clues and the factual matrix of the negotiations of the IRSSA lead me to the penultimate conclusion that with a qualification for requested documents and for documents that may be found that mention abuse, the parties to the IRSSA intended to adopt the collection standards of the ADR Model for the IAP.

[78] My ultimate interpretative conclusion is that where an Applicant in his or her Application identifies the approximate time and place of a particular incident of abuse with sufficient particularity to allow document searches to be made, then Canada is obliged to respond to the Applicant’s request for the documents that may provide information about the incident of abuse.

[79] Applying that interpretation to the circumstances of the immediate case and given that Canada admitted that it had not directly collected documents from the RCMP detachment at Moose Factory, Canada breached its obligations under Schedule D, Appendix VIII.

[80] The remedy for this breach of contract is obvious. I grant the request that Canada be compelled to conduct additional searches with the RCMP for documents relevant to the alleged assault in the girl’s dorm at Bishop Horden IRS.

[81] The other related requests are dismissed. They overreach Canada’s obligations under the IAP.

[82] Before moving on, I note that there may be other circumstances where Canada has ongoing collection obligations but each case will have to be decided on its own merits. Unfortunately, as noted above, the IRSSA is not precise or comprehensive in its treatment of Canada’s obligations under Schedule D, Appendix VIII.

2. The Applicants’ Request for a Witness-Matching Program

[83] I turn now to the Applicants’ request that the Secretariat establish a witness-matching program. The Applicants request the Court to grant the Secretariat new powers and establish new procedures to administer the production of documentary evidence for the IAP. The proposed witness-matching program would require the Secretariat to search out potential witnesses and provide their contact information to IAP claimants.

[84] Canada opposes the request, as does the Chief Adjudicator, under whose direction the Secretariat implements and administers the IAP. The Anglican Church and the AFN have not filed submissions in respect of this aspect of the RFD.

[85] The Applicants argue that IAP claimants are not aware of each other’s IAP claims and may not know or have the ability to contact any other former student who remembers a particular incident. Witness statements from other claimants would or could corroborate the severity of physical abuse and could lead to admissions by the Defendants and an expedited process, leading to short form decisions in favour of claimants. The Applicants urge that the confidentiality provisions of the IAP process should not prevent material and relevant evidence from being introduced at IAP hearings.

[86] Canada submits that there is nothing in the IRSSA to support the proposed witness-matching program. It submits that to introduce this program would constitute an unauthorized amendment to the IRSSA. Canada points to the provision in Schedule D for multiple IAP claims to proceed together (the “Group IAP Claim Process”) as the mechanism by which parties to the IRSSA intended to address the issue of multiple claims with overlapping subject-matters.

[87] The Chief Adjudicator submits that the Secretariat does not have the power to implement the proposed witness-matching program, and that doing so would require new powers that would fundamentally alter the IAP and the nature of the responsibilities of all involved. Moreover, the proposed witness-matching program would violate the confidentiality provisions of the IRSSA that establish the confidentiality of IAP documents and IAP procedures.

[88] I agree with the submissions of Canada and the Chief Adjudicator. The Applicants’ proposal falls outside the administrative function set out at Schedule D of the IRSSA and would require an amendment to the IRSSA.

[89] The proposed program would fundamentally alter the responsibilities and function of the Secretariat, and amounts to a request to vary or amend substantive terms of the IRSSA, something that cannot occur without the agreement of all parties. See: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 283 at paras. 159-160 and 246; Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4024 at paras. 29-31; and Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 4585 at para. 35.

[90] Further, I agree that the proposed witness-matching program would contravene the IRSSA’s confidentiality and privacy provisions.

[91] For the foregoing reasons, the Applicants’ request to compel the Secretariat to establish a witness-matching program is denied.

E. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

[92] Let me move toward the conclusion with brief comments about two matters of concern raised in the factums and during the argument of the RFD that should be dealt with openly and not remain sub rosa.

[93] One matter of concern was the prospect that if the Court found that Canada had breached its obligations under Schedule D, Appendix VIII “Government Document Disclosure,” there was the risk that thousands of adjudicated claims could be reopened. I do not think that there is any such risk, but if there was such a risk, it would not justify a departure from the normal rules of contract interpretation.

[94] Another related matter of concern was the Applicants’ apprehension that truth and justice under the IRSSA had not been achieved and could not be achieved without a comprehensive collection of documents by Canada.

[95] This concern, however, is not made out if one gives the parties that negotiated the IRSSA, whose company include competent, brave, and resilient representatives of the survivors, credit for designing a system that, generally speaking, facilitates and assists legitimate claimants in making claims before unbiased and competent independent adjudicators and if one recalls that the IRSSA is a settlement and that settlements are inherently less than perfect justice.

[96] It is the Court’s responsibility to hold the parties to their negotiated bargain, no more, no less.

F. CONCLUSION

[97] For the above reasons, I grant the Applicants’ RFD in part.

[98] If the parties cannot agree about the matter of costs, they may make submissions in writing beginning with the Applicants’ and AFN’s submissions within 20 days of the release of these Reasons for Decision followed by Canada’s submissions within a further 20 days.

Perell, J.

Released: June 4, 2015

CITATION: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 3611

COURT FILE NO.: 00-CV-192059

DATE: 20150604

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LARRY PHILIP FONTAINE in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Executor of the estate of Agnes Mary Fontaine, deceased, et al.

Plaintiffs

‑ and ‑

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA et al.

Defendants

REASONS FOR DECISION

Perell, J.

Released: June 4, 2015