LeClerc v. LeClerc, 2015 ONSC 2978

COURT FILE NO.: FS-11-508-00

DATE: 2015-05-07

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

GRANT P. LECLERC

Self-represented

Applicant

• and -

RUTH HANUSCH LECLERC

Self-represented

Respondent

HEARD: October 6 and 28 and November 17, 2014, at Brampton, Ontario

Price J.

Costs Endorsement

NATURE OF MOTION

[1] Mr. Leclerc and Ms. Hanusch-Leclerc separated on November 10, 2010, after a seven year marriage. Four years later, on July 15, 2014, they sold their matrimonial home. On September 30, 2014, Mr. Leclerc made the present motion for an order dividing the net proceeds of sale, amounting to $1,357,051.68, between the parties.

[2] Ms. Hanusch opposed any distribution of the net proceeds. She wanted to ensure that there were sufficient funds in trust to secure her claims against Mr. Leclerc (for support and equalization of net family property). Mr. Leclerc’s motion, and Ms. Hanusch’s position in relation to it, required the court to estimate each party’s claims against the other, for which they sought credit in the division of the net proceeds of sale.

[3] Mr. Leclerc and Ms. Hanusch are a high-conflict couple who are representing themselves. Because they do not have ready advice from counsel as to their rights and obligations, they are overly cautious and unwilling to make concessions that would facilitate an early resolution of the issues in dispute between them. They are also less able to manage their conflict and prioritize the issues that genuinely require judicial intervention. This difficulty gave rise, while Mr. Leclerc’s initial motion was still pending, in a further motion by him for directions in connection with his access, and a cross-motion by Ms. Hanusch to enforce an existing restraining order against Mr. Leclerc, or to impose a new one.

[4] On November 17, 2014, the court ordered that the proceeds of sale of the home be distributed, subject to certain holdbacks to secure the parties’ claims against each other. The court terminated Snowie J.’s restraining order, imposed on Mr. Leclerc in December 2013, and ordered Ms. Hanusch to release Makayla’s passport when Mr. Leclerc needed it to travel with the children.

[5] The court directed that if the parties were unable to resolve the issue of costs, they could make written submissions. I have now reviewed their submissions and provide these further reasons to address that issue.

ISSUES

[6] The court must determine the amount of Mr. Leclerc’s entitlement to costs from Ms. Hanusch.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

[7] Mr. Leclerc submitted the following five bills of costs, totalling $71,872.23:

a) $25,881.50 for a motion hearing December 10, 2013, and for a settlement/trial management conference on February 10, 2014;

b) $14,324.95 for a trial management conference on June 2, 2014, and a contempt motion heard May 20, 2014;

c) $14,375.86 for motion hearings May 20, 2014, and June 24, 2014;

d) $6,005.39 for a motion hearing October 6, 2014;

e) $3,278.13 for a motion hearing October 28, 2014;

f) $8,006.40 for a motion hearing November 17, 2014.

[8] Of the above, only the hearings on October 6, October 28, and November 17, 2014 relate to the motions that were before me. The costs of the earlier proceedings will be dealt with by the trial judge.

[9] With regard to the motions that were before me from October 6 to November 17, 2014, Mr. Leclerc claims the following costs:

a) For the motion heard October 6, 2014, $5,250 for “fees”, $72.89 for disbursements, and $682.50 for HST;

b) For the motion hearing on October 28, 2014, $2,850 for “fees”, $72.89 for disbursements, and $370.50 for HST;

c) For the motion hearing on November 17, 2014, $6,950 for “fees” $152.90 for disbursements, and $903.50 for HST.

[10] Ms. Hanusch did not submit written arguments disputing Mr. Leclerc’s claim for costs, but set out her own costs, which she says amounted to $280 for fees and $268 for disbursements, consisting of mileage and a car rental.

ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE

General principles

[11] Boswell J. set out the general principles governing costs assessments in George v Landels.[^1] He stated:

The award of costs is governed by section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43 and by Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 131 provides for the general discretion to fix costs. Rule 57.01 provides a measure of guidance in the exercise of that discretion by enumerating certain factors that the court may consider when assessing costs. In addition, the Court must always be mindful of the purposes that costs orders serve. As Perell J. summarized in 394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek, 2010 ONSC 7238, [2010] O.J. No. 5692 (S.C.J.), at para. 10:

Modern costs rules are designed to advance five purposes in the administration of justice: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the costs of litigation, although not necessarily completely; (2) to facilitate access to justice, including access for impecunious litigants; (3) to discourage frivolous claims and defences; (4) to discourage the sanctioning of inappropriate behaviour by litigants in their conduct of the proceedings; and (5) to encourage settlements (internal citations omitted).[^2]

[12] Ultimately, in determining an amount for costs, the overriding principles are fairness and reasonableness.[^3] In assessing what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, the Court does not engage in a mechanical exercise, but takes a contextual approach, applying the principles and factors discussed above, to settle on a figure that is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.[^4]

[13] The Court is guided by the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court may consider, among other factors, the following:

(a) The complexity of the proceeding;

(b) The importance of the issues;

(c) The conduct of any party that tended to shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding;

(d) Any offers to settle;

(e) The principle of indemnity;

(f) The concept of proportionality, which includes at least two factors:

(i) The amount claimed and the amount recovered in the proceeding; and,

(ii) The amount of costs that an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay in relation to the step in the proceeding for which costs are being fixed;

(g) Any other matter relevant to the question of costs.

Importance and complexity of the motions

[14] Mr. Leclerc’s motion for distribution of the net proceeds of sale was important to him because he required his share of the proceeds in order to secure more permanent accommodation for himself and for the children when he exercised access to them. Ms. Hanusch needed a sufficient amount retained in trust to secure her claims against Mr. Leclerc. The termination of Snowie J.’s restraining order was important to Mr. Leclerc to remove the impediments to his access to the children.

[15] The motions involved issues of minimal legal complexity and moderate factual complexity. They required the application of the statutory formulae to the parties’ property to arrive at an estimate of net family property and equalization entitlement, and the application of statutory principles applying to custody and access to the parties’ circumstances.

Reasonableness and offers to settle

[16] The general rule is that costs follow the event and will be awarded on a partial indemnity scale.[^5] In special circumstances, costs are awarded on a higher scale, but those cases are exceptional and generally involve circumstances where one party to the litigation has behaved in an abusive manner, brought proceedings wholly devoid of merit, and/or unnecessarily run up the costs of the litigation.[^6]

[17] Mr. Leclerc was justified in moving for division of the net proceeds of sale, and Ms. Hanusch was reasonable in asking that sufficient funds be reserved to secure her potential claims against Mr. Leclerc. Ms. Hanusch was unreasonable in opposing any distribution of proceeds whatever, and in seeking to preserve the restraining order made by Snowie J., but her position in these respects did not add substantially to the time that was required to determine the issues raised in Mr. Leclerc’s motion.

[18] Neither party produced offers to settle that would affect the determination of costs. Accordingly, I find that no special circumstances exist in the present case that would justify depriving Mr. Leclerc of his costs or awarding them on a substantial indemnity scale. He is entitled to recover his costs on a partial indemnity scale.

Indemnity – The outcome of the motions

[19] As I noted in my endorsement of October 6, 2014, the court initially lacked the evidence necessary to estimate the parties’ respective claims against each other. Ms. Hanusch argued that she had incurred expenses in connection with the sale of the home; Mr. Leclerc opposed her claim for a credit for these expenses in the absence of proof that she had paid them.

[20] Before the parties could calculate their respective entitlement to an equalization payment, Ms. Hanusch needed to obtain a statement of family value or valuation of her pension, and to complete her net family property statement. In order for her to obtain a statement of family value, she needed certified copies of Mr. Leclerc’s birth certificate or passport. Mr. Leclerc was unwilling to provide these documents without legal advice, which would cost him $600.

[21] I ordered Mr. McMurray, the lawyer holding the net proceeds of sale in trust, to release $1,000 to Mr. Leclerc to enable him to secure the necessary legal advice, and ordered Ms. Hanusch, upon receipt of the certified copy of Mr. Leclerc’s birth certificate or passport, to request a statement of family value for her pension. I additionally required Ms. Hanusch to deliver an affidavit setting out the expenses she needed paid from the proceeds of sale of the home, with supporting documentation.

The parenting issues

[22] While the parties were before the court, dealing with the distribution of the net proceeds of sale of their home, their conflict raised unrelated issues concerning the parenting of their children. At Mr. Leclerc’s request, the court, on October 6, expanded his interim access to the children, pending the Office of the Children’s Lawyer’s completion of its clinical assessment of the children, which the court had requested on November 18, 2013, and February 10, 2014. The court then adjourned Mr. Leclerc’s access motion to await the OCL’s report.

[23] On October 28, 2014, Mr. Leclerc sought directions from the court to implement his interim access to the children pursuant to the orders made on July 28 and October 6, 2014. He complained that Ms. Hanusch had failed to deliver the children to his mother on September 12, 2014, for his access that weekend, and on Thanksgiving weekend in October, as required by para. 6 of this court’s order dated July 28, 2014. Additionally, he sought an order requiring Ms. Hanusch to release the children’s passports to him so that he could travel with them to Florida during his Christmas access.

[24] On the return of Mr. Leclerc’s motion on October 28, 2014, Ms. Hanusch made a cross-motion for the following:

a) Contribution by Mr. Leclerc to the special and extraordinary expenses she has incurred for the children, pursuant to s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines;

b) A restraining order against Mr. Leclerc, preventing him from being present at the pick-up or drop-off of the children, and an order requiring his access to the children to be supervised;

c) An order that Mr. Leclerc undergo a psychiatric assessment;

d) An order increasing the amount of child support that Mr. Leclerc is required to pay her from the $1,922 amount ordered by Snowie J. on February 14, 2012, based on his 2011 income of $144,000;

e) Production of Mr. Leclerc’s life insurance policy naming the children as beneficiaries pursuant to Snowie J.’s order dated February 14, 2012.

[25] Ms. Leclerc alleged that Mr. Leclerc had attended at the children’s school and at their activities when she was present, and had thereby breached the restraining order that Snowie J. had made against him in December 2013. She later asserted that the parties’ daughter, Makayla, who was 9 years old, and had been hospitalized for asthma from November 4 to 8, 2014, was unfit to travel.

[26] The court ordered that pick-up and drop-off of the children would take place at a point equidistant from the parties’ residences. Having regard to the increasing complexity of the motions, the court directed Mr. McMurray to distribute a further $10,000 to each party as an advance towards their legal costs, and adjourned the balance of the motions to November 17, 2014.

[27] On November 17, 2014, Ms. Hanusch asked that Mr. Leclerc’s motion and her cross-motion be adjourned further. She filed an affidavit in which she stated that her father’s illness and Mikayla’s asthma had prevented her from preparing responding material. The court denied Ms. Hanusch’s request for a further adjournment, holding that she had had sufficient time to respond to Mr. Leclerc’s motion which he had brought a month and a half earlier.

[28] On November 17, 2014, the court ordered that the proceeding as a whole would proceed to trial as soon as the Children’s Lawyer had reported on its clinical investigation. In the meantime, the court made an interim order to maintain the status quo while making a partial distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the home, made possible by the evidence the parties had tendered since the initial return of Mr. Leclerc’s motion on October 6.

Distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the home

[29] Mr. Leclerc produced a schedule of the expenses he had incurred in connection with the sale of the home; Ms. Hanusch did not produce a similar schedule of the expenses she had paid, although she had been ordered to do so. In my reasons, I indicated that this would be reflected in the amounts to be deducted from the parties’ respective shares of the net proceeds of sale of the home, but I ordered that, for the present, an equal amount would be held back from each party’s share until the amounts are determined at trial.

[30] Having regard to Ms. Hanusch’s failure to produce evidence as to the value of the household contents, which she had also been ordered to produce, I assigned a relatively high value of $40,000 to them for the purpose of determining the amount to be held back from her share of the net proceeds of sale of the home. This increased Mr. Leclerc’s claim of equalization by $20,000.

[31] Ms. Hanusch acknowledged that Mr. Leclerc was up-to-date in his support payments, and had made the required contributions towards Myles’ private school fees directly to the school. Ms. Hanusch’s claim for contribution to the children’s past s.7 expenses was limited by Snowie J.’s Order dated February 25, 2013, which fixed the amount of such expenses as of that date at $3,200, and Ms. Hanusch acknowledged that Mr. Leclerc had paid that amount.

[32] I calculated the amount that Mr. Leclerc was obliged to contribute to the children’s s. 7 expenses incurred since Snowie J.’s order (child care, camp, and health expenses) at $7,566.09, and ordered these to be held back from the distribution of net proceeds of sale. I added a further amount to provide a margin of safety to ensure that a sufficient amount remained in trust to secure the full amount of Ms. Hanusch’s potential recovery under this heading. In the result, I ordered that $10,000 of Mr. Leclerc’s share of the net proceeds of sale be held back to secure Ms. Hanusch’s claim for s. 7 expenses.

[33] Based on the foregoing, I estimated Ms. Hanusch’s claims at trial for child support and contribution to s. 7 expenses to April 2015 at $25,823.28. From that amount, I deducted $99,565.24 which, on Ms. Hanusch’s calculations, she would owe Mr. Leclerc to equalize their net family property. On that basis, I calculated that Ms. Hanusch would owe at least $73,841.96 to Mr. Leclerc ($99,565.24-$25,723.28). I calculated Mr. Leclerc’s claims against Ms. Hanusch at $134,148.95, consisting of the expenses he had incurred to remove debris from the home, store household contents from July 2014 to April 2015, and the equalization payment that Ms. Hanusch would owe him.

[34] Based on the foregoing, I made an order for interim distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the home. I reserved $50,000 from each party’s share of the net proceeds as security for the costs of preparing the home for sale, as evidence of these costs had not yet been produced. I ordered that:

a) Mr. Leclerc’s ½ share of the net proceeds of sale of the home, amounting to $667,525.84, be distributed to him, less the holdback of $50,000 for the repair costs, and

b) Ms. Hanusch’s ½ share, amounting to $668,525.84, be distributed to her, less $134,148.95 for Mr. Leclerc’s claims and $50,000 for the repair costs.

[35] I did not hold back any amount as security for legal costs, as neither party had requested that I do so, and I found no basis, on the evidence before me, for making an order for security for costs.

The restraining order and Mr. Leclerc’s access to the children

[36] Based on the evidence before me, I found that Snowie J.’s restraining order dated December 10, 2013, was no longer necessary and that Ms. Hanusch had used it to restrict Mr. Leclerc’s access to the children and marginalize him from their lives, by excluding him from their school and extracurricular activities. I found that the restriction was neither necessary nor in the children’s best interests and therefore terminated the restraining order.

[37] With regard to Makayla’s passport, I found that Mr. Leclerc was as capable as Ms. Hanusch to determine whether Makayla was medically fit to travel and therefore declined to impose conditions on my order that Ms. Hanusch release the passport to Mr. Leclerc when he needed it to travel with Makayla during his periods of access to her.

[38] Based on the foregoing, Mr. Leclerc was substantially successful in the motions, having secured the order he sought for interim distribution of the net proceeds of sale of the home, as well as an order terminating the restraining order against him and directing Ms. Hanusch to release Makayla’s passport to him when he needed it for the purpose of his travel with the children.

Indemnity - The hourly rates charged

[39] Mr. Leclerc claims his time at $200 per hour. Ms. Hanusch claims her time at $20 per hour. Mr. Leclerc claims 24 years of experience, but does not provide any particulars or evidence that would support a finding that he has the training, experience, or qualifications that entitle him to claim an hourly rate that a lawyer would be entitled to claim. He also does not provide evidence that he has incurred an actual cost by consulting a lawyer for assistance in preparing his motion material, or foregone income himself from a profession or occupation by reason of the time he spent performing work for the motions that would normally be performed by a lawyer.

[40] The motions in the present case were not complex and did not require skills beyond those that would be possessed by a law clerk or paralegal. At best, Mr. Leclerc is entitled to the maximum hourly rate for a law clerk or paralegal.

[41] In determining the appropriate hourly rates to be assigned to lawyers involved in a motion, the court follows the approach taken by Aitkin J. in Geographic Resources.[^7] That is, the starting point is the successor of the Costs Grid, namely, the “Information for the Profession” bulletin from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (the “Costs Bulletin”), which can be found immediately before Rule 57 in the Carthy or Watson & McGowan editions of the Rules, sets out maximum partial indemnity hourly rates for counsel of various levels of experience.

[42] The Costs Bulletin suggests maximum hourly rates (on a partial indemnity scale) of $80.00 for law clerks, $225.00 for lawyers of less than 10 years’ experience, $300.00 for lawyers of between 10 and 20 years’ experience, and $350.00 for lawyers with 20 years’ experience or more.[^8] The upper limits in the Costs Bulletin are generally intended for the most complex and important of cases.

[43] The Costs Bulletin, published in 2005, is now dated. Aitkin J. considered adjusting the Costs Subcommittee’s hourly rates for inflation, as Smith J. did in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group,[^9] but the unadjusted rates of the lawyers in her case were only slightly less than the actual fees they charged, so she elected to use their unadjusted rates. Normally, however, it is appropriate to adjust the hourly rates in the Costs Bulletin to account for inflation since 2005.

[44] Based on the Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator, available online at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/, the current (2014) equivalent of the hourly rate for law clerks in the Costs Bulletin is $93.52.

[45] In the present case, there were no lawyers charging for their time according to an hourly rate. If lawyers were involved, the actual rates charged would be relevant only as a limiting factor, in preventing the costs awarded from exceeding the actual fees charged. The Costs Subcommittee’s rates apply to all lawyers and all cases, so everyone of the same level of experience starts at the same rate. The court adjusts the hourly rate, or the resulting fees, to reflect unique features of the case, including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the other factors set out in Rule 57.01(1). If an excessive amount of time was spent, the court reduces the resulting amount of fees accordingly. I will now turn to a consideration of the time spent.

Time Spent

[46] Mr. Leclerc says that he spent the following time on the motions:

a) For the motion hearing on October 6, 2014, 16 hours for preparation, 2.5 hours for travel (2 trips at 1.25 hours each), 2 hours to serve and file his motion material, and 3 hours for attendance;

b) For the motion hearing on October 28, 2014, 8 hours for preparation, 2 ½ hours for travel, 2 hours to serve and file his motion material, and 3 hours for attendance;

c) For the motion hearing on November 17, 2014, 24 hours for preparation, 2.5 hours for travel, 2 hours to serve and file motion material, and 7.5 hours for attendance in court.

[47] In total, Mr. Leclerc claims 48 hours for preparation, 7.5 hours for travel, 6 hours to serve and file motion material, and 13.5 hours in courtroom attendance. According to the court reporters’ notes on the three days, a total of 8.5 hours were spent on these motions in the courtroom, as follows:

a) October 6, 2014: The hearing began at 2:46 p.m. and ended at 5:00 p.m., a total of 2 hours and 14 minutes;

b) October 28, 2014: The hearing began at 12:29 p.m. and ended at 12:42 p.m., a total of 13 minutes;

c) November 17, 2014: The hearing began at 10:56 and was interrupted by the luncheon recess at 12:59 p.m. The hearing resumed at 2:38 p.m. and continued until the afternoon recess at 3:28 pm., resuming at 3:32 p.m. and continuing until 5:10 p.m. Although the total time in court was 2 hours and 3 minutes in the morning and 2 hours and 28 minutes in the afternoon, I am allowing the full 6 hours from approximately 11 a.m. to approximately 5 p.m.

[48] In addition to the time spent making submissions in the courtroom, Mr. Leclerc was required to spend approximately 10 hours of waiting time (4.7 hours on October 6 (10 a.m. to 2:46 p.m.), 2.5 hours on October 28, and 1 hour on November 17th). This time is not allowed as any litigant would be required to spend that time waiting for his/her case to be dealt with and the time Mr. Leclerc spent was no greater by reason of the fact that he was representing himself.

[49] Mr. Leclerc claims 7.5 hours of travel time. As with the waiting time, Mr. Leclerc would have had to spend most of this time had he been a litigant represented by a lawyer. The portion of travel time attributed to his serving and filing motion material should be limited to the flat rate that would normally be charged by a process server for performing the same task. Mr. Leclerc says that he made three trips for this purpose and his claim in this respect is not disputed by Ms. Hanusch. I therefore allow $100 for each trip.

[50] Mr. Leclerc has given no particulars of the time he spent preparing for the motions. In the absence of such evidence, which a lawyer would normally supply in the form of his/her dockets, the fairest way to arrive at the time that would reasonably have been spent on the motions is to apply an amount of time that is proportional to the time spent in the courtroom. Applying a multiple of 2 ½ to the time spent in the courtroom to arrive at reasonable preparation time is consistent with the approach taken in the jurisprudence dealing with lawyers’ preparation time.[^10]

[51] Based on the 8.5 hours spent in court on the three dates, I allow 2 ½ times that amount of time for preparation, for a total of 21.25 hours preparation, and a total of 29.75 hours, rounded up to 30 hours, for preparation and attendances in court. Based on the law clerk’s inflation-adjusted rate of $93.52 per hour, the fees portion that will be allowed for Mr. Leclerc’s costs, for time spent preparing and arguing the motions, is $2,805.60.

[52] $300 will be added for the time he spent serving and filing motion material, for a total of $3,105.60. The travel time is disallowed on the ground that this expense would have been incurred by any litigant attending the hearing of his motion and is not attributable to Mr. Leclerc’s representing himself and doing the work normally done by a lawyer.

[53] No amount will be allowed for HST because Mr. Leclerc, representing himself, is not required to remit HST to the Government for the value of time he spent performing that work.

Disbursements

[54] Mr. Leclerc claims the following disbursements:

a) $72.89 for the motion heard October 6, 2014, for the following disbursements:

(a) $22.50 for photocopies (3 briefs of 50 pages each at $.15 per page), plus $2.93 for HST, which totals $25.43);

(b) $32.00 for mileage, (based on 4 trips of 20 kms. each, at .40 per km.), plus $4.16 for HST, which totals $36.16;

(c) $10.00 for parking at the Guelph Courthouse on October 6, 2010, plus $1.30 for HST, which totals $11.30;

b) $379.79 for the motion hearing on October 28, 2014, for the following disbursements:

(a) $10.17 for photocopies (3 briefs of 20 pages each at $.15 per page, which amounts to $9.00, plus $1.17 for HST);

(b) $64.00 for mileage (based on 8 trips of 20 kms each at .40 per km.), plus $8.32 for HST;

(c) $110 for printer ink, plus $14.30 for HST;

(d) $90.00 for Canada Post express postage on May 20 and June 12 (6 mailings at $15.00 each) plus $11.70 for HST;

(e) $10.00 for parking at the Guelph Courthouse on October 27 and 28, 2014, plus $ 1.30 for HST;

c) $152.90 (I calculate $172.78) for the motion hearing on November 17, 2014, for the following disbursements:

(a) $22.50 for photocopies (3 briefs x 50 pages at $.15 per page), plus 2.93 for HST;

(b) $86.40 for photocopies (3 briefs x 60 pages at $.48 per page), plus $11.23 for HST;

(c) $32.00 for mileage to and from the courthouse in Guelph (4 trips x 20 kms. at $.40 per km.), plus $4.16 for HST;

(d) $12.00 for parking at the Guelph courthouse on November 17, 2014, plus $1.56 for HST.

[55] Of the above disbursements of $605.58 ($72.89 + $379.79 + $152.90), I allow the charges for photocopies, with the exception of the 60 pages at $.48 per page for the November 17, 2014, court attendance. As there is no explanation for why these copies were charged at a higher rate than the others, I allow $27.00 plus $3.51 HST for these copies, a reduction of $67.12. I disallow the mileage to and from the courthouse ($144.64 including HST) and the parking at the courthouse ($36.16 including HST), because Mr. Leclerc would have incurred these charges as a litigant and they are not attributable to the work he performed representing himself. I disallow the $110 + $14.30 for printer ink, as this expense would be in the nature of overhead if incurred by lawyer, and it is not attributable solely to these motions. I therefore reduce the amount claimed for disbursements by $372.22, leaving a balance of $233.36. This amount includes the HST which Mr. Leclerc paid on the remaining items, assuming he purchased the photocopies from a commercial printing service, and paid HST on the express postage.

Proportionality and reasonable expectations of Ms. Hanusch

[56] Motions for distribution of the proceeds of sale of a home are generally uncomplicated and the costs awarded on such motions are modest. I have considered the following costs awards in such motions in the past:

a) In Chapman v. Talib, 2012 ONSC 1980, J. Mackinnon J. stated that he was inclined, subject to written arguments, if submitted, to award $1,500 costs;

b) In Christie v. Christie, 2003 1946 (ON SC), Marshman J. awarded nominal costs of $250;

c) In Piekarska v. Piekarski, 2013 ONSC 5064, Fragomeni J. awarded $10,000 costs to the wife in her motion for the release of proceeds of sale, among other issues.

d) In Wilson v. Heera-Wilson and RBC, 2012 ONSC 5411, Fregeau J. awarded costs of $550;

e) In Prikker v. Vaine, 2010 ONSC 2914, Boswell J. awarded costs of $2,500.

[57] The outcomes of similar motions should have informed Ms. Hanusch’s expectation as to the costs she might reasonably face if unsuccessful in opposing Mr. Leclerc’s motion. Based on those outcomes, I am satisfied that an award of $3,105.60 for fees and $233.36 for disbursements is proportionate to the amount involved in the present case, especially having regard to the fact that the motions involved attendances on three separate days.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

[58] Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that Ms. Hanusch pay the following amounts to Mr. Leclerc for his costs of the motions:

a) $3,105.60 for fees;

b) $233.36, inclusive of HST, for disbursements.

Price J.

Released: May 7, 2015

CITATION: LeClerc v. LeClerc, 2015 ONSC 2978

COURT FILE NO.: FS-11-508-00

DATE: 2015-05-07

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

GRANT P. LECLERC

Applicant

• and –

RUTH HANUSCH LECLERC

Respondent

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

Price J.

Released: May 7, 2015

[^1]: George v. Landles, 2012 ONSC 6608, paras. 4 to 6, citing Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. (c.o.b. Ecoflow Ontario) v. Building Materials Evaluation Commission, 2003 8279 (ON SCDC), [2003] O.J. No. 1658, at para. 17

[^2]: See also Serra v. Serra (2009), 2009 ONCA 395, 66 R.F.L. (6th) 40 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 42, citing Fong v. Chan (1999), 1999 2052 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 22.

[^3]: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.); and Moon v. Sher (2004), 2004 39005 (ON CA), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.)

[^4]: Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. (c.o.b. Ecoflow Ontario) v. Building Materials Evaluation Commission, 2003 8279 (ON SCDC), [2003] O.J. No. 1658, at para. 17

[^5]: Bell Canada v. Olympia & York Developments Limited et. al. (1994), 1994 239 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 135 (C.A.)

[^6]: Standard Life Assurance Company v. Elliott (2007), 2007 18579 (ON SC), 86 O.R. (3d) 221 (S.C.J.)

[^7]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041, paras. 7 and 11 to 16

[^8]: “Information for the Profession” bulletin (“the Costs Bulletin”) from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (that the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee issued to replace the Costs Grid, which it repealed in 2005). The Costs Bulletin has advisory status only and not statutory authority, as it was not included in the Regulation that repealed the Costs Grid.

[^9]: First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359, 2012 ONSC 1359 (S.C.J.)

[^10]: TMS Lighting v. KJS Transport, 2014 ONSC 7148, paras. 32 to 58.