ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROHIBITED FROM PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 45(8) OF THE CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT

COURT FILE NO.: C1355/02-19/20

DATE: March 13, 2015

COURT FILE NO.: C1355/02-19

BETWEEN:

Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex

Timothy G. Price for the Society

Applicant

• and -

S.B.G. and G.W.

Svetlana MacDonald and Alexandra Kirschbaum for S.B.G.

No one appearing for G.W.

Respondents

COURT FILE NO.: C1355/02-20

AND BETWEEN:

Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex

Timothy G. Price for the Society

Applicant

• and -

S.B.G. and C.A.

Svetlana MacDonald and Alexandra Kirschbaum for S.B.G.

No one appearing for C.A.

Respondents

Patricia Miller, Office of the Children’s Lawyer, appearing for all three children

HEARD: April 15, 2014; May 13, 14, 15, 16 of 2014; June 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26 of 2014; November 24, 26, 27, 28 of 2014; January 12, 13 of 2015; February 2, 2015

MITROW J.

INTRODUCTION

[1] This long trial involved four children. The trial in relation to the three eldest children proceeded by way of status review application. The trial in respect of the youngest child was a protection application. The mother has had a very lengthy history of society involvement.

[2] At the commencement of trial, the two eldest children were in the temporary care and custody of the Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex (“the Society”), and the two youngest children were in the mother’s care pursuant to an interim supervision order. As discussed below in more detail, after the trial concluded, and while the judgment was under reserve, the Society apprehended the two youngest children from the mother’s care and the trial was subsequently reopened to hear further evidence.

[3] The Society seeks an order of Crown wardship for all four children; the Children’s Lawyer, who represents the three eldest children, concurs with the Society’s request for Crown wardship for those children.

[4] The mother opposes the relief sought by the Society and requests an order that all four children be returned to her care and, if necessary, that this be pursuant to a six-month supervision order.

[5] For reasons that follow, all four children are made Crown wards, with access to mother to the two eldest children and inter-sibling access between all the children.

THE PARTIES

[6] For ease of reference in these reasons, the two applications that were tried together are sometimes referred to as follows: court file number C1355/02-19 is referred to as “record 19”; and court file number C1355/02-20 is referred to as “record 20.”

[7] The Society is the applicant in both records.

[8] Record 19 involves the youngest child, A.J.B.G., age 2 ½ (“A.J.”).

[9] Record 20 was a status review application in relation to A.D.R.G., age 12 ½ (“A.D.”), L.C.G.-A., age 11 (“L”), and X.T.C.G., age 8 (“X”).

[10] The respondent S.B.G. (“Ms. G”) is the mother of all four children and she is a respondent in both applications.

[11] In record 20 (the status reviews application) the father of all three children is the respondent C.A. (“Mr. A”). Although Mr. A filed an answer and plan of care, Mr. A did not participate in any way in the trial process despite the fact that he was given notice of the trial and was aware that the trial was proceeding.

[12] In relation to record 19 (the protection application) the respondent G.W. (“Mr. W”) is the father of the child A.J. Mr. W filed no pleadings and he did not participate in the trial process.

BACKGROUND AS TO SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT AND PAST S. 54 ASSESSMENTS

[13] As a result of Ms. G’s lengthy history with the Society, the two eldest children, A.D. and L, have endured and suffered multiple apprehensions and foster placements, interspersed with supervision orders.

[14] Dr. Louise Sas, a psychologist, did three assessments during the course of proceedings under the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.11 [as amended] (“Act”). The first assessment was dated May 28, 2008; the second assessment was dated April 14, 2010; and the third assessment, prepared for the current trial, was dated November 24, 2013 (the “current assessment”).

[15] Ms. G’s involvement with a society starts in 1998 prior to the birth (in May 1999) of her first child, (referred to as “R”). Ms. G was age 16 when she became pregnant with R. The father of R is the respondent Mr. W. R and the youngest child A.J. are full siblings.

[16] R was placed in the care of Huron-Perth Children’s Aid Society at the beginning of the year 2000. A parenting capacity assessment regarding R was done at that time (by an assessor other than Dr. Sas). A copy of this assessment was not filed at trial; but there is no dispute that the assessment was negative as to Ms. G’s ability to raise R.

[17] In November 2001, Ms. G signed a consent endorsement request agreeing to R being made a Crown ward with no access to Ms. G. A Crown wardship order was then made and R was eventually adopted.

[18] A constant theme, in all three assessments prepared by Dr. Sas, was Dr. Sas’ concern regarding Ms. G’s unresolved and complicated grieving process over her “loss” of R.

[19] The evidence demonstrates that over the many years since R was taken into care and eventually adopted, that Ms. G has not been able to accept the loss of R. She has pictures of R in her home; she knows where he currently lives and has taken her other children on a “drive-by” past his home; and she has sent correspondence for R to his home. Ms. G has also engaged in some correspondence with R’s adoptive adult sibling.

[20] Ms. G’s evidence at trial demonstrated that she believes she was tricked by the Huron-Perth Children’s Aid Society into giving up care of R. Ms. G claims that R’s adoption was not legal and that she is exploring potential litigation in that regard. It was not clear from Ms. G’s evidence as to what legal principles any such litigation would be based on.

[21] Ms. G has regularly discussed R with the other children and she has used these occasions to inculcate her children with her version of the alleged miscarriage of justice, in her view, that caused her to lose R. The effect on Ms. G’s ability to parent, caused by her unresolved grief relating to R, is discussed later in these reasons.

[22] Ms. G over many years has endured instability in her mental health. In addition Ms. G has had a highly conflictual and very toxic relationship with Mr. A. The level of acrimony between Ms. G and Mr. A was extreme, as confirmed by Dr. Sas in her first assessment.

[23] At or about the time that Ms. G consented to Crown wardship for R, she became pregnant with A.D. Although A.D. was apprehended at birth, she was soon returned to Ms. G pursuant to a supervision order. In relation to A.D., issues initially included Ms. G’s mental health; however, after some successive supervision orders, and following the birth of L in June 2004, Society involvement with Ms. G ceased in or about late 2004.

[24] However, soon thereafter in or about the fall of 2005, Ms. G, together with A.D. and L, went to a shelter.

[25] The ability of Ms. G to manage the household and care for her two children continued to deteriorate; by February 2006 there were serious issues with Ms. G’s mental health prompting the Society’s apprehension of A.D. and L, and at the same time Ms. G was taken to hospital for a psychiatric assessment.

[26] Despite their conflictual relationship, Ms. G and Mr. A reconciled, later, in 2006, and by the summer of that year Ms. G was pregnant with X.

[27] Notwithstanding the reconciliation, the situation in the home continued to destabilize. Both Ms. G and Mr. A were making allegations of physical abuse against the other; Ms. G also alleged that Mr. A was using corporal punishment against the children; each parent denied accusations levied by the other.

[28] Despite Ms. G attending for some counselling, and seeing a psychiatrist, ongoing issues continued relating to Ms. G’s mental health, the stability of the home environment and the ongoing conflict between the parents. By June 2006, Mr. A had vacated their home, and by mid-January 2007 the Society had apprehended A.D. and L.

[29] In […] of 2007 when X was born, and despite the eldest two children being in Society care, Ms. G was permitted by the Society to keep X in her care. At that time, Ms. G had made some positive progress in accessing various services, seeing a counsellor and attending parenting programs.

[30] After A.D. and L were taken into care in January 2007 they continued to have access to both Mr. A and Ms. G during visits arranged separately for each parent. Although X was seeing Mr. A, this access was somewhat limited. Dr. Sas notes complaints made by Mr. A that Ms. G was not cooperative in arranging more frequent access to X.

[31] In her first assessment, Dr. Sas recommended that all three children be placed with Mr. A pursuant to a six-month supervision order with weekly access visits to Ms. G at the Society facility. This recommendation was based on a multitude of issues regarding Ms. G, including her “serious psychological difficulties and unusual lifestyle” (page 23). In relation to X (then age one), Dr. Sas noted that her recommendation to remove X from Ms. G’s care was made notwithstanding the fact that X was attached to Ms. G. Dr. Sas opined that Ms. G’s “psychological profile is not likely to change, nor is her behaviour” (page 24). Dr. Sas acknowledged that the removal of X will be difficult for him at first, and Dr. Sas further acknowledged that her recommendations were being made with reservation.

[32] Dr. Sas was clear when noting positive gains by Mr. A, that he still had deficiencies including being prone to administering physical discipline to the children when he feels challenged and frustrated.

[33] At that time Ms. G’s position was that all three children should continue to reside in her care. One of her concerns regarding the return of the children to Mr. A was the risk of physical mistreatment of the children by him.

[34] Dr. Sas’ recommendation relating to X was not implemented; X remained in Ms. G’s care pursuant to a supervision order; however, consistent with Dr. Sas’ recommendations regarding A.D. and L, they were placed with Mr. A pursuant to a supervision order.

[35] The evidence at trial (including Dr. Sas’ second assessment) as to what transpired when A.D. and L were placed in Mr. A’s care is largely unchallenged. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that the placement of A.D. and L with Mr. A was fraught with much difficulty. Mr. A soon moved with the two children to Brantford. Mr. A was not able to manage the children; he was engaging in physical punishment of the children. In June 2009, Mr. A refused to allow A.D. to come back home from school, essentially abandoning her at school. Consequently A.D. and L were apprehended by Brant Family and Children’s Services.

[36] The turmoil that followed during placement of A.D. and L with Mr. A would have been traumatic for both children. As it turned out, the reservations expressed by Dr. Sas regarding the ability of Mr. A to care for the children manifested themselves and outweighed any positives noted by Dr. Sas when she made the recommendation, with reservation, to place the children with Mr. A.

[37] A.D. and L were not able to be placed together in the foster home they had been living in prior to their placement with their father, Mr. A. Instead they were placed in different foster homes; both children were presenting with behavioural issues and were difficult to manage. By February 2010, A.D. was moved to another foster home given her difficult-to-manage behaviour.

[38] Dr. Sas’ second assessment was more positive for Ms. G. As noted in the first assessment, Ms. G had a difficult childhood; she was a victim of abuse with resultant post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) symptoms. Ms. G had described to Dr. Sas that she was doing much better; further, Ms. G had “reconnected” with her mother and, although on a limited basis, it represented an improvement in her past estranged relationship with her mother.

[39] Although Ms. G still had issues to deal with, including her ongoing emotional turmoil regarding her desire to achieve a goal of reuniting all her children with R, Dr. Sas found that Ms. G was better able to manage her chronic PTSD; this was due in part to her involvement in PTSD group programs and her ongoing and secure relationship with her therapist.

[40] Dr. Sas noted that Ms. G was reporting fewer somatic complaints and having more energy; there was significant reduction in her inter-personal issues as she was no longer in a relationship with Mr. A; Dr. Sas described Ms. G as presenting more concrete plans to meet her children’s needs and was presenting with a capacity to better understand what the children needed; Ms. G was trying to put the children’s needs ahead of her own; and, further, Ms. G was assessed by Dr. Sas as appearing more competent and more reasonable and more willing to listen to advice.

[41] Dr. Sas further noted an improvement in Ms. G’s presentation: that she was much more grounded, calm and reasonable; that she was able to control her emotions; there was a major improvement in her appearance; Ms. G was pleasant to engage with; and Ms. G was able to acknowledge her responsibility in relation to past difficulties.

[42] The state of Ms. G’s home was showing improvement; she was more organized and making an effort at keeping her home cleaner.

[43] The foregoing is not an exhaustive summary of the improvements noted by Dr. Sas. However, Dr. Sas did warn that although Ms. G’s psychological profile had improved, that “… this does not mean that she won’t have any difficulty in the future, depending on the stressors in her life.” (Unfortunately, as detailed below, this ominous warning was an accurate prediction.)

[44] In her concluding recommendations, Dr. Sas stated (at page 23) that Ms. G “… has made significant gains which auger well for her ability to provide a stable home for A.D. and [L].”

[45] Dr. Sas recommended that A.D. and L be returned to Ms. G pursuant to a minimum six-month supervision order. By the summer of 2010, A.D. and L had returned to Ms. G’s care pursuant to a supervision order. However, in her current assessment, Dr. Sas stated that her recommendation to return the children to Ms. G had been a mistake. Dr. Sas put it this way at page 4:

Looking back on this recommendation, and with the hindsight of the recent history, it was a mistake. S was not able to maintain any gains. She needed volumes of support, and then things started to unravel.

I agree entirely with this statement.

THE EVIDENCE

A. Society Worker Lauren Pope

[46] Society witness Lauren Pope (“Ms. Pope”) was the case worker for this matter from August 2010 until approximately the latter part of October 2012.

[47] Ms. Pope testified that the Society, in July 2012, was seeking a further supervision order regarding A.D., L and X. This relief was sought by the Society in its status review application regarding the final six month supervision order made in January 2012 in respect of the three eldest children. A.J. was not yet born.

[48] It was Ms. Pope’s evidence that the reasons for a further supervision order included the Society’s ongoing concerns relating to Ms. G’s mental health, the condition of the home and Ms. G’s inability to manage the behaviours of A.D., L and X. I find that the Society’s concerns regarding the three eldest children were well founded.

[49] Ms. Pope met with Ms. G on October 19, 2012 at Ms. G’s residence. By this time, Ms. Pope was aware of the “cheesecake and duct tape incidents” (discussed later in these reasons); and also of significance was the birth of A.J. the previous month.

[50] Ms. Pope was a “front-line” worker, with significant first-hand knowledge of Ms. G, having been her worker for over two years. In the latter part of October 2012, Ms. Pope was encouraging Ms. G to agree to have A.D. and L placed in Society care voluntarily; Ms. Pope told Ms. G that this would be less traumatic for those children as opposed to an apprehension.

[51] Ms. Pope encouraged Ms. G during a meeting on October 19, 2012 to be “proactive”, and Ms. Pope told Ms. G that she did not want Ms. G to “crash” with the potential result that all four children would come into care.

[52] At that time, Ms. G should have, but did not, accept that sage advice from Ms. Pope.

[53] Although the Society had protection concerns, Ms. Pope did agree during cross-examination that there were various positives regarding Ms. G that included: Ms. Pope indicated that she viewed Ms. G as being honest and open with the Society regarding her struggles; Ms. G was good at connecting with community resources; Ms. G had no issues with substance abuse; that aside from some minor issues, the children were reasonably well clothed; that Ms. G managed her finances reasonably well; and that Ms. G had been in the same residence for a number of years. As will become apparent later, these positives, as noted by Ms. Pope, were overshadowed to a significant degree by ongoing protection issues.

[54] Ms. Pope did note during cross-examination that she had minimal “cross-over” or interaction with the new worker Christa McParlan, when Ms. Pope went on maternity leave soon after her last meeting with Ms. G on October 19, 2012.

B. Society Worker Christa McParlan

[55] Ms. McParlan described the case as being in a “state of crisis” at the time she took over as the caseworker.

[56] Ms. McParlan first met with Ms. G at her residence on November 14, 2012. Ms. McParlan gave a graphic description of the state of Ms. G’s home: there was much clutter, walls were described as grimy and filthy; areas of the home were littered with garbage and dirty laundry; the upstairs bedrooms were in disarray; the bathroom was described as filthy and covered in garbage appearing as if it had never been cleaned; A.D.’s room had a urine soaked mattress; Ms. McParlan remarked there was a strong smell “of urine and filth”; scattered throughout the home were toys, dirty diapers and broken pieces of furniture; and it was difficult to walk safely in some areas of the home because of the clutter and disarray.

[57] Ms. McParlan in her oral testimony also described the presence of mould, primarily on the second floor, describing it as “extensive.”

[58] In addition to Ms. McParlan’s observations, other evidence at trial establishes a long history of Society concerns as to Ms. G’s failure to adequately maintain her home as to minimal standards of cleanliness and free of clutter. Dr. Sas also witnessed this.

[59] With one exception relating to the presence of the mould, I accept Ms. McParlan’s description of the state of Ms. G’s residence on November 14, 2012 and I prefer her evidence over the unconvincing evidence of Ms. G to the contrary; in particular I reject Ms. G’s suggestion during cross-examination by Mr. Price, that Ms. McParlan “lied” about the state of Ms. G’s residence. As will become apparent later, Ms. G has a penchant for describing Society workers as “liars.”

[60] The health inspector, Richard Barrette, attended at Ms. G’s residence on the same day as Ms. McParlan and he too observed the mould. He was called as a witness by the Society and, on several occasions during his evidence-in-chief, Mr. Barrette described the mould as being minimal. I am more inclined to accept Mr. Barrette’s description of the extent of the mould given his experience.

[61] I am satisfied on the basis of Ms. McParlan’s evidence that on November 14, 2012 the state of Ms. G’s residence was extreme in relation to filth, clutter and lack of hygiene, and that this was an unsafe and hazardous environment for the children.

[62] Ms. McParlan continued her involvement in this case, until soon after the release of my decision dated March 22, 2013, made on a temporary care and custody motion, ordering that A.D. and L were to remain in the temporary care and custody of the Society, while X and A.J. were ordered returned to Ms. G’s care and custody pursuant to an interim supervision order and subject to numerous terms and conditions. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Sarah Kaczynski (“Ms. Kaczynski”) assumed carriage of this case.

C. Evidence of Sarah Kaczynski Prior to the Reopening of the Trial

[63] Sarah Kaczynski (“Ms. Kaczynski”) assumed carriage of this matter in March 2013 soon after X and A.J. were returned to Ms. G’s care.

[64] I found Ms. Kaczynski to be a reliable and credible witness. I accept her evidence as to the facts that she testified to (as set out below). Where there is any conflict in her evidence and the evidence of Ms. G, I prefer the evidence of Ms. Kaczynski.

[65] Ms. Kaczynski’s evidence was given in a factual and balanced manner. Ms. Kaczynski was able to observe the state of Ms. G’s residence on a number of home visits.

[66] Ms. Kaczynski routinely noted clutter in the residence when she attended; Ms. Kaczynski stated that there was an ongoing issue as to Ms. G’s ability to keep the residence clean and free of clutter.

[67] As part of Ms. G’s theme in absolving herself of any responsibility, Ms. G subjected Ms. Kaczynski to statements to the effect that “everything that is in the court papers is lies.” Ms. Kaczynski learned that Ms. G was involved in a Facebook group whose title included words to the effect “Stop the Children’s Aid from Taking Children from Good Parents.”

[68] It is important to note that Ms. G was receiving extensive access to A.D. and L pursuant to the March 2013 interim order that included a period of five hours on either Saturday or Sunday of each week at her home to be supervised by the Society or its agent or any other person suggested by Ms. G and approved by the Society.

[69] Ms. G later told Ms. Kaczynski that she would be filing a “class action law suit” against the Society explaining that the truth needed to be revealed.

[70] The evidence at trial indicated that there were minimal other persons available to supervise the visits and this resulted in the Society for a very long time having its own workers attend every weekend to supervise the access visits.

[71] Ms. Kaczynski noted, and I find this to be the case, that during access visits Ms. G frequently engaged the children in discussions about the court case. Ms. G appeared to be generally unresponsive to the Society concerns about this inappropriate conduct. In one instance Ms. G specifically referred to A.D. and told Ms. Kaczynski that A.D. understands those issues and Ms. G explained that that is why she talks about those things with A.D.

[72] It is clear that the Society’s message about refraining from adult discussions with the children was not getting through to Ms. G. As a result, Ms. Kaczynski forwarded a letter to Ms. G dated April 25, 2014; this letter clearly set out the Society’s concerns about discussing adult issues, including Ms. G, on a recent visit, speaking to the children about hating the Society and that she [Ms. G] could not wait until the children’s return home.

[73] Accordingly, the Society cancelled the one-hour access visit scheduled for April 25, 2014.

[74] On April 25, 2014, a meeting was held with Ms. G about the importance of not discussing inappropriate matters with the children and Ms. G was instructed to redirect the children if they should ask questions about adult topics.

[75] Ms. Kaczynski testified that during this meeting Ms. G had her head down, was taking notes and was non-responsive. At one point, however, Ms. G did say I will just do “bubbles.” This statement understandably confused Ms. Kaczynski as this was the use of a code word that Ms. G utilized in communications with her children.

[76] Ms. Kaczynski did confirm that the next access visit after April 25, 2014 scheduled for the weekend for five hours did occur and that there had not been any suspensions since. Ms. Kaczynski was testifying in mid-June 2014.

[77] The issue of X being chronically late for school was also canvassed by Ms. Kaczynski with Ms. G, but without any real progress being made.

[78] During her testimony Ms. Kaczynski was requested to explain the Society’s position as to why the Society was seeking crown wardship of X and A.J. given the fact that during the course of the trial those two children were in the interim care of Ms. G pursuant to an interim supervision order. In giving her evidence, Ms. Kaczynski also responded to specific questions from the court on that issue. This evidence must be viewed in context, as Ms. Kaczynski was testifying before the apprehension of X and A.J. in October 2014.

[79] Ms. Kaczynski’s response can be summarized as follows: she explained that the Society position was founded not so much on the actual physical care of X and A.J., nor the condition of the home (although the latter was a concern) but rather on the basis that Ms. G had been unable to deal with her personal mental health issues and had not been able to adequately address her obsession regarding the removal of the child R from her care. It was the Society’s concern that the chronic nature of many of Ms. G’s personal unresolved issues placed X and A.J. at risk which could only be addressed by a crown wardship order. The Society further was relying on the recommendations of Dr. Sas in her most recent assessment report that all four children be made Crown wards.

[80] The Society was also concerned about Ms. G’s ongoing position absolving herself from any blame or responsibility; that she had expressed to the Society that she had parented the children properly and that she had no understanding as to why the four children had been apprehended from her care and why the two eldest children at the time of trial remained in Society care. The Society position also was grounded in the fact that Ms. G had had Ms. Domenica Olds as a family support worker for in excess of ten years, that Ms. G had accessed many parenting programs and other services, and yet appeared to have made little, if any, progress.

[81] Based on the extensive involvement of the Society over the years with Ms. G, it was Ms. Kaczynski’s concern that “history will repeat itself with the two youngest children” and that they too will eventually end up in care similar to A.D. and L. As it turned out, this proved to be a prophetic statement.

[82] In relation to X, on one visit that Ms. Kaczynski was supervising, she noted that an argument had ensued between X and one or more of the other children while Ms. G was cooking lunch and that Ms. G had reacted by giving X a “time-out” and having him sit on the steps. Then Ms. G sent X to his room. Ms. Kaczynski noted that X had spent a lot of time in his room and he had not come down for the meal. Ms. Kaczynski suggested to Ms. G that she should check on X but Ms. G said that he is “okay” and will come down when he is ready. Instead Ms. Kaczynski went upstairs and found X in the closet crying; soon thereafter, at Ms. Kaczynski’s suggestion, X came down for the meal.

[83] I find that Ms. G’s attempt at disciplining X on that occasion was not effective. What is concerning about this incident is that it took place while Ms. Kaczynski was present. One is left to wonder how long X would have remained in the closet crying and if he would have had his meal that day if Ms. Kaczynski had not intervened.

D. Evidence of Access Supervisor, Paula Kelly

[84] Ms. Paula Kelly, an employee of the Society, was the primary access supervisor for the children. Ms. Kelly started in her role in January 2013. At this time, all four children were in Society care pending the temporary care and custody motion.

[85] After X and A.J. were returned to Ms. G’s care in mid-March 2013, Ms. Kelly’s supervision related to visits at the Society for the two oldest children.

[86] Ms. Kelly was a credible and reliable witness. I accept Ms. Kelly’s evidence as summarized below and I prefer Ms. Kelly’s evidence to the evidence of Ms. G where there is a conflict.

[87] Ms. Kelly only supervised access visits that occurred at the Society. Ms. Kelly was not involved in the supervision of access visits at Ms. G’s home pursuant to the interim supervision order made in March 2013.

[88] In relation to the supervised visits at the Society, the interim supervision order gave Ms. G the option of bringing X and A.J. with her to supervised visits for A.D. and L.

[89] Ms. Kelly testified that, during a meeting that she recalled was in April of 2014, a suggestion had been made to Ms. G not to bring the two youngest children and to focus instead on visits for the older children. Ms. Kelly testified that the access visits were becoming quite chaotic. She testified that A.J. was difficult to keep an eye on as he was quite busy.

[90] In relation to X’s behaviour Ms. Kelly observed that Ms. G was spending a lot of time having to deal with addressing X’s behaviour and having to give him time-outs; this took away from Ms. G’s ability to spend one-on-one time with A.D. and L.

[91] While there were supervised access visits which were pleasant for the children, Ms. Kelly had a number of concerns regarding Ms. G’s conduct during the supervised access visits.

[92] Early on in the supervised visits, Ms. Kelly had concerns about Ms. G’s negative tone towards A.D. and her treatment of A.D. Ms. Kelly testified that, after giving some feedback to Ms. G regarding her behaviour, Ms. G struggled with understanding the feedback and the effect of her conduct on the children.

[93] Ms. G engaged in ongoing discussions with the children about the court case, including discussing when the children would come home, and making negative statements about the Society. Ms. Kelly also heard A.D. make negative statements about the Society. When X attended visits, Ms. Kelly noticed that L would become more distracted and more physical, with both X and L engaging in physical contact with each other.

[94] During the access visits, Ms. G at times would use the code word “bubbles.” In one visit Ms. G told Ms. Kelly that when Ms. G is speaking about something she is not to talk about, then she will refer to “bubbles.”

[95] Ms. Kelly referred to a specific incident during an access visit when L had become aggressive and had flipped over a table. Ms. G was attempting to calm L. Ms. G made a comment that there are many things that she wanted to say right now but could not; Ms. G then sat on the floor and was crying and was saying “bubbles, bubbles, bubbles.” This conduct was witnessed by those of her children who were present at the visit.

[96] Ms. Kelly was also able to make a correlation to note X’s behaviour at supervised access visits while he was in care as compared to when he came to access visits after he had returned to Ms. G’s care. During the period January 2013 to mid-March of 2013 while X was in care, Ms. Kelly described X as coming to the access visits being clean, well-mannered and well behaved.

[97] After March 2013 when X was in Ms. G’s care, a number of changes were noted by Ms. Kelly: there were a lot of occasions when X would be dirty, including his face, hands and clothing, and sometimes the clothing was ill-fitting; X would “whine” when he wanted to play a certain game or engage in a certain activity; there were occasions when he has cried loudly upon hearing “no”; and there was an increase in the aggressive nature of his behaviour, including running and hiding, and an increase of aggressive conduct mainly between him and L that involved play fighting and at other times actual fighting that included kicking and hitting one another.

[98] In relation to A.J., Ms. Kelly testified that there was a noticeable change in A.J.’s appearance after he was returned home. She described him as frequently coming to visits dirty and wearing clothing that was often too big.

[99] Other concerns noted by Ms. Kelly included: Ms. G’s, at times, emotional presentation including crying in front of the children during access visits; Ms. G’s negative comments criticizing the children’s caregivers; and not feeding A.J. as directed in terms of timing and the amount of food during the access visits. The Society forwarded a letter dated January 31, 2013 to Ms. G that summarized all of these concerns (Ex. 7). This letter would have been forwarded at a time when all four children were in Society care. This letter contained, in my view, constructive and child focused suggestions to assist Ms. G in addressing the concerns that had been identified by the Society.

[100] Notwithstanding the Society’s well-founded concerns and reasonable suggestions, Ms. G continued to engage in obfuscation surrounding the issues related to her conduct at access visits. Specifically, I accept Ms. Kaczynski’s evidence that on April 8, 2014 she attended with Ms. Olds to speak with Ms. G regarding her conduct at access visits and that Ms. G was advised not to speak negatively about the Society and to keep the visits positive and not enmesh the children in adult issues concerning this court case.

[101] Rather than having some cooperation from Ms. G, Ms. Kaczynski noted that Ms. G presented as angry about the situation and stated that the children need to know about what is going on and the children need to know about the Society if they have children – that the Society cannot be trusted.

[102] On April 11, 2014, being only three days after Ms. Kaczynski and Ms. Olds had had a meeting with Ms. G, Ms. Kelly spoke with Ms. G at the beginning of the supervised access visit and advised Ms. G that the expectations that had been discussed on April 8, 2014 were in place. Ms. Kelly had received information from Ms. Kaczynski outlining the discussions on April 8, 2014.

[103] Rather than acknowledging those expectations, Ms. G, according to Ms. Kelly whose evidence I accept, told Ms. Kelly that she did not know anything about these expectations.

[104] The visit then started and A.D. had run up to Ms. G and was talking to Ms. G about some clothing that A.D.’s foster mother had purchased for her; A.D. was described as quite excited about the clothing; however, instead of treating this as a positive occurrence and sharing A.D.’s excitement, Ms. G instead began to discuss with A.D. that the foster mother would not have paid for the clothes and that it was the Society that had purchased the clothes. Ms. Kelly had to redirect the conversation.

[105] During that access visit, a board game was being played. During the game, Ms. G stopped play to inform A.D. and L that they would not be welcome at X’s birthday party. A.D. began to question why and Ms. G responded that she could not say anymore as Ms. Kelly had a list of expectations that were required to be followed and that if they were not followed that the visit would terminate.

[106] Again Ms. G had drifted into negative conversation that was unpleasant for the children and totally unnecessary. This is despite recent and multiple attempts by the Society to redirect her from that type of conduct.

[107] Ms. Kelly again was required to redirect Ms. G and ask Ms. G to step into the hallway where Ms. Kelly reiterated the Society’s expectations. Once again, remarkably, Ms. G told Ms. Kelly that she did not know what those expectations were.

[108] At this point, given that Ms. Kaczynski was not in the building, Ms. Cheryl Grant, Ms. Kaczynski’s supervisor, was summoned and, in Ms. Kelly’s presence, Ms. Grant reiterated to Ms. G that the visits were for the children, that the visits needed to remain positive, focused in the present, and not to speak about the court case or the Society.

[109] Instead of accepting the reasonable advice given by Ms. Grant, Ms. G began to argue with Ms. Grant about the expectations and why they were in place. Ms. Grant then handwrote out the expectations and that note was given to Ms. G. Ms. Kelly (who testified in mid-June 2014), when asked, noted that after this visit that Ms. G had improved regarding her conduct at access visits.

[110] When cross-examined by Ms. Miller, Ms. Kelly reiterated that the Society’s goal was to avoid Ms. G discussing specific topics with the children during access visits. Ms. Kelly testified that when Ms. G would begin to get into those topics with the children, that Ms. G would stop herself and start saying the words “bubbles.” Ms. Kelly described this as being random; that Ms. G would start to say something; then she would stop herself and say “bubbles, bubbles, bubbles.”

E. Evidence of Domenica Olds

[111] Ms. Domenica Olds (“Ms. Olds”) is a child and family support worker.

[112] There is no dispute in the evidence that Ms. Olds had worked as a child and family support worker with Ms. G and her children for a lengthy period of time starting when A.D. was two months old and thereafter on and off throughout many years.

[113] Ms. Olds had continued to work with this family until approximately April of 2014. I accept Ms. Olds’ evidence. She was a credible and reliable witness.

[114] The focus of Ms. Olds’ evidence started with the period commencing approximately February 2012. Much of Ms. Olds’ observations were summarized in her written reports that were included in the exhibits and adopted by her at trial.

[115] Ms. Olds testified that her role was to support and teach the family; each family has different needs and that would define her exact role in each case.

[116] When Ms. Olds was working with Ms. G and her family, she would come approximately once per week. Her evidence discloses the ongoing struggles that Ms. G had regarding the condition of her home.

[117] However, Ms. Olds did observe from time to time that Ms. G had made an effort to clean the home and that Ms. G’s efforts were visible. Notwithstanding that, however, the difficulty as noted by Ms. Olds was Ms. G’s inability on an ongoing basis to properly maintain and clean her home.

[118] Ms. G provided Ms. Olds with the details of the “cheesecake incident” and Ms. Olds’ evidence as to what Ms. G told her is consistent with the evidence of other witnesses. I accept Ms. Olds’ evidence that she told Ms. G that her behaviour was abusive and unacceptable and that Ms. G told Ms. Olds she was aware it was abuse but was just trying to “teach” the children a lesson (as previously indicated, this incident is discussed below).

[119] Ms. Olds testified to being told by Ms. G that she has difficulty getting up in the morning and that this has resulted in some late mornings at school for X. This information is in respect of the first month after school started in September of 2013.

[120] Ms. Olds corroborates that Ms. G perceives herself as being able to manage her children. It was Ms. Olds’ evidence that Ms. G denied having difficulty managing her children and that Ms. G regularly talked about the children having been removed for “no reason.” Ms. G, in her conversations with Ms. Olds, blamed the Society for the difficulties in managing the children. Ms. Olds also noted that Ms. G spent a great deal of time talking about her desire to reconnect with her eldest child, R. As Ms. Olds noted in her report (for the period April 4, 2013 to July 4, 2013), Ms. G “continues to fixate on her past and struggles to move forward.”

F. Evidence of Jill Pariser

[121] Jill Pariser (“Ms. Pariser”) was called as a witness by the Society. She is a child and family therapist from Vanier Children’s Services (“Vanier”). Ms. Pariser is experienced and well educated: this includes being a graduate from nursing and subsequently obtaining graduate and post-graduate degrees in social work.

[122] The involvement of Ms. Pariser was in connection with the “8-8 program” at Vanier for L. This program had a residential component; L would arrive in the morning, stay at Vanier all day, go to school there, and then he would return home after supper.

[123] L’s referral to Vanier was precipitated by his conduct: extreme temper tantrums; his anger at school; and physical aggression to the point of raising concerns regarding his safety and the safety of others.

[124] Ms. Pariser stayed involved with the family for close to one year, starting in approximately early November 2011. The involvement of Ms. Pariser consisted of sessions with Ms. G, individual play therapy sessions with L and sessions with Ms. G together with all the children, including Ms. G bringing in A.J. after he was born in […] 2012 (which would have been towards the end of Ms. Pariser’s involvement with this family).

[125] In context, Ms. Pariser’s involvement started over a year after A.D. and L were returned to Ms. G’s care after being with their father and then being apprehended by the Society. Ms. Pariser’s evidence is significant – her involvement with this family represents a microcosm as to how Ms. G functioned under the stressful environment of three children (and later four children); and, more importantly, it provides significant insight into Ms. G’s decline in being able to manage her life and the children’s lives during her steady downward spiral leading to the apprehension of all four children in November 2012, by which time she had become overwhelmed in trying to meet the children’s needs, including trying to cope with her pregnancy, and then also having to care for an infant.

[126] I accept Ms. Pariser’s evidence that her notes, filed as an exhibit, and adopted by her during her evidence, are accurate and correctly describe the events recorded. Ms. Pariser explained that, where there are quotation marks in her notes, that that represents a verbatim statement made by Ms. G or the children.

[127] I accept that all the verbatim quotations are accurately recorded in Ms. Pariser’s notes. I specifically reject the evidence of Ms. G to the contrary. Ms. Pariser’s evidence was given in a professional, factual and non-judgmental manner. Her evidence is reliable and credible; she was not shaken at all in cross-examination; where Ms. Pariser’s evidence conflicts with Ms. G’s evidence, I prefer Ms. Pariser’s evidence.

[128] On November 15, 2011, Ms. Pariser met with Ms. G, with the purpose of the session being to introduce Ms. G to the services offered by Vanier and to discuss the risks and benefits of residential treatment. Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that her 12 year old child (meaning R) was not with her and that is why she has PTSD. Ms. G also offered that she has “Asperger’s.” There was no credible evidence at trial to verify that Ms. G has Asperger’s.

[129] In relation to the state of her house (the constant theme in this court case and also in discussions with Ms. Pariser), Ms. G told Ms. Pariser on December 5, 2011: “I can’t stand cleaning the house because I have so many intrusive thoughts when I clean.”

[130] In discussing L on that same day, Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that L has always been aggressive and that he puts up his hands beside his face and shakes his fists.

[131] In the session on December 12, 2011, Ms. G described some troubling occurrences regarding her past, including telling Ms. Pariser that she was “raped” by a stranger when she was 14 years old; that she went into foster care at age 12 and she had been abused by her mother’s boyfriend and that her mother took her boyfriend’s side. On occasion, Ms. G shared with Ms. Pariser that she did not know “how to help her kids” and that her children were stealing and hoarding and that Ms. G cannot help her children when she cannot help herself. Ms. G also discussed with Ms. Pariser her hospitalization in 2006. She stated she was suicidal for a period and that she became homicidal in 2006. Ms. G advised that she was placed on various medications to assist in her mental health.

[132] The session on December 19, 2011 with Ms. Pariser included L and Ms. G. A portion of the session was to discuss L’s presenting problems. L told Ms. G he has “anger problems.” He then stated that he “throws stuff; swears and yells; pushes furniture; and pushes and hits his little brother.” Ms. G agreed with L’s description of his anger.

[133] I find this is an accurate description of L’s anger problems because Ms. G during the meeting agreed with what L had said.

[134] Ms. G also told Ms. Pariser at that session that L had been suspended from school five times the previous year. Ms. G further volunteered to Ms. Pariser that she was not sure if L is going to “make it” in a regular school.

[135] During Ms. G’s session with Ms. Pariser on January 30, 2012, Ms. G reported that she was now seven weeks pregnant (this would be with the child A.J.). Importantly, Ms. G indicated she had stopped taking her medication, Cymbalta, because of her pregnancy.

[136] In a session with Ms. Pariser on February 6, 2012, Ms. G shared that she does not know how to help L when he is “angry and out of control.” Ms. G shared that she was worried about L’s future and that she was looking for a diagnosis. Ms. G went so far as to tell Ms. Pariser that she was scared that L is “a psychopath or a sociopath and that he is going to kill someone when he is in a rage.”

[137] The topic of a clean household was discussed by Ms. G with Ms. Pariser in a session on February 21, 2012. It needs to be emphasized again that the evidence at trial, as to the state of Ms. G’s home when she seemed unable to cope with household duties, went substantially beyond just being a little dirty or cluttered. The evidence of various witnesses in this trial supports the conclusion which I draw that the state of Ms. G’s home on a number of occasions was extreme in relation to filth and the clutter.

[138] Part of the issue, and this is supported by findings by Dr. Sas, is that Ms. G simply refused to clean up the mess. For example, Ms. G told Ms. Pariser during the session on February 21, 2012 that it is her “kids’ mess,” not hers and that she was not going to clean it up. In this same session, Ms. G reported being upset with A.D., L and X because they were not picking up after themselves. Ms. G explained to Ms. Pariser she sweeps everything out of their rooms onto the hallway, and then she sweeps it down the stairs, sweeps it into a pile in the living room and then reported that the pile is “getting quite big.” Ms. G confirmed that she was getting some support from a family worker from the Society visiting her weekly to assist with issues around the house. Ms. Pariser asked Ms. G what the worker says about the pile and Ms. G responded that the worker tells Ms. G to clean it up. Ms. G then added that she was not going to clean it up because it was her “kids’ mess.”

[139] Ms. G confirmed in a session on March 1, 2012 that she continues to sweep everything from L’s room down the stairs and leaves it in a pile in the living room; that Ms. G talks to the support worker about the “pile” in her living room and Ms. G reported that, while she discusses the “pile” in the living room, that it does not get cleaned up.

[140] Ms. G attended at a session with Ms. Pariser on May 7, 2012. This time, A.D. was discussed. Ms. G reported that she was “at the end of my rope” with A.D. Ms. G claimed that she was fighting for A.D. Ms. G stated that A.D. has psychiatric and psychological problems. She referred to A.D. being age almost 10 and still wetting her bed. She said that A.D. is stealing and name calling. At the same meeting, Ms. G shared with Ms. Pariser that Ms. G ends up calling A.D. “a bitch” at least once a week, citing, as a justification, that A.D. is disrespectful and rude towards Ms. G.

[141] Ms. G’s deep-seated personal turmoil regarding R surfaced at the meeting with Ms. Pariser on May 7, 2012. Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that she was in a bad mood because she found out that the expectant baby (meaning A.J.) is a boy. Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that she was worried that, if the baby looks and acts like R, she may reject him.

[142] L was discussed also at that meeting. In relation as to how L was managing at home, Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that L expresses no emotion besides anger. She added he is not as aggressive and that he is getting silly more often. Ms. G then described X as the child who is now being aggressive and that X makes L cry. Ms. G then stated “X has learned O.D.D. from his sibs. They learned it when they were in foster care.” I find Ms. G’s opinion that X has “learned O.D.D.” is a statement that is not supported by the evidence. There is also no evidence to support that the children learned “O.D.D.” while they were in foster care. This is a clear example of Ms. G seeking to blame the Society for her children’s behaviour-related issues.

[143] At that same meeting, Ms. Pariser notes that Ms. G reported solving “one problem.” When asked about this, Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that she was tired of picking up the toys at the house, so she “got rid of most of their toys.” I find that Ms. G’s solution to the messy household, by throwing out most of the children’s toys, was not child-focused. It demonstrated that Ms. G continued to blame her children for the mess when it was her responsibility.

[144] In a session on May 29, 2012, again discussing the state of her residence, Ms. G told Ms. Pariser “Our house is always such a disaster. I didn’t make the mess, so I don’t have to clean it up. They won’t clean it up, so we can’t do anything.”

[145] On June 6, 2012, Ms. G was present with all three children in a meeting with Ms. Pariser. At this meeting, Ms. G described L as being less violent and having fewer outbursts. However, in relation to A.D., Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that A.D. “steals, lies and has a bad attitude.” Ms. G reported that X was becoming more violent and that his temper tantrums were increasing. Ms. G specifically confirmed during cross-examination that Ms. Pariser had accurately reported what Ms. G had told her during this meeting in relation to L, A.D. and X.

[146] The meeting on June 18, 2012 with Ms. Pariser involved Ms. G and all three children. During this meeting, it was noted by Ms. Pariser that there was positive communication between A.D. and Ms. G; however, the concern was that Ms. Pariser also reported that this was the first time that she had seen positive communication between A.D. and Ms. G. It was also noteworthy during this meeting that Ms. G reported being upset on learning that L was expressing a desire to stay at Vanier.

[147] The meeting with Ms. Pariser on June 26, 2012 involved Ms. G and all three children. Ms. Pariser had to terminate the meeting because A.D., during the course of the meeting, went to the sink to wash her hands, whereupon Ms. Pariser described A.D. as emptying her bladder on the floor. A.D. started to cry, stating “I am peeing on the floor.”

[148] Ms. G’s response was most concerning. Rather than being supportive, Ms. G appeared to be angry and began to scold A.D. Ms. Pariser had to take it upon herself to comfort A.D. and to give her a hug. A.D. was standing still and crying with her head down, staring at the floor. Ms. Pariser attempted to calm A.D. by telling her that this would not be a problem and that Ms. Pariser would clean the floor. Ms. Pariser had to inform Ms. G that the session was over. She asked Ms. G to take A.D. home for a bath. However, Ms. G did not appear to want to end the session. Ms. Pariser then commented quietly to Ms. G that Ms. Pariser was concerned that the odour of A.D.’s urine suggested that she be taken to a family doctor. Ms. Pariser noted that Ms. G appeared angry at this suggestion and told Ms. Pariser that A.D. “did not drink enough and that is her problem.”

[149] Ms. G was not able to deal with A.D. in a child-focused manner during this session. Instead of calming and comforting A.D., Ms. G displayed anger; this required Ms. Pariser not only to intervene and deal with A.D. in an appropriate manner, but required Ms. Pariser to take the initiative and cancel the balance of the session.

[150] Ms. G had a meeting alone with Ms. Pariser on July 9, 2012. Ms. G expressed anger towards Society worker Ms. Pope because Ms. Pope had told Ms. G that she should not vent on Facebook about the children. Ms. G told Ms. Pariser: “Why don’t they take my challenging kids and leave me with the baby. That’s the age I am best with.” Later in that meeting, Ms. G made reference to her children, calling them “three crazy kids.” Ms. Pariser attempted to reframe Ms. G’s comments about Ms. G’s description of the children, instead describing the children as having high needs. Ms. G then reported that L had been smearing stool three to four times a week and that this had increased over the past couple of weeks. During cross-examination, Ms. G agreed that L had been smearing feces (she in fact had given evidence about that earlier) but Ms. G denied that she told Ms. Pariser it was three to four times per week. I accept the evidence of Ms. Pariser as being accurate as to what Ms. G told her as to the frequency of L smearing feces.

[151] In a meeting on July 31, 2012, involving L, A.D., X and Ms. G, the discussion involved Ms. G reporting that she is continuing to have difficulty with A.D. at home. Ms. G told Ms. Pariser that she is “yelling and losing it with A.D.” In relation to L and X, Ms. G reported to Ms. Pariser that she is making the boys stay in their rooms until their rooms are clean and Ms. G admitted that she “lost it with them too and began giving their stuff away because they won’t take care of it.”

[152] During the meeting of October 10, 2012, all four children (including the infant, A.J.) and Ms. G were present. It was during this session with Ms. Pariser that Ms. G made a disclosure regarding the “cheesecake” incident that has attracted a lot of evidence at trial.

[153] Ms. G described to Ms. Pariser what she had done regarding the cheesecake incident. I accept the evidence of Ms. Pariser as a credible and reliable account of what Ms. G said she had done.

[154] Ms. G indicated she had made a cheesecake and had put it in the fridge. She later found A.D.’s and L’s fingerprints on it and later Ms. G described that she found “finger trails” digging into the cake. Ms. G cut the cake in half, put it on plates and made L and A.D. eat the cake. When the children did not get sick (meaning they did not vomit), she made the children eat ice cream sundaes. A.D. then threw up after the ice cream but L did not throw up, so Ms. G made him eat a bowl of jello and then he threw up. Ms. G further stated that she made the children throw up on the floor so they would have to clean up their vomit and that it was her intention to make the children sick to make them stop stealing.

[155] Ms. G corroborated this evidence to a substantial extent during the course of her cross-examination by the Society counsel, Mr. Price. At times during the cross-examination, Ms. G professed she could not remember some specific details, stating that it was “two years ago.” However, Ms. G’s recitation to Ms. Pariser was soon after the event. I find as a fact that Ms. G engaged in the “cheesecake incident” conduct as she described to Ms. Pariser which Ms. G also substantially confirmed during her cross-examination.

[156] Ms. G admitted, in essence, to force-feeding her children food until they vomited in a misguided attempt to teach the children some type of lesson. This was not a brief momentary lapse of judgment where a parent may act out of anger in the heat of the moment. Ms. G’s conduct was deliberate and pre-meditated. Ms. G’s own description, at trial, as to her conduct was chilling to listen to. Her behaviour towards her two special-needs children was abusive; forcing the children thereafter to clean up their own vomit imbues Ms. G’s conduct with an added element of cruelty and callousness.

[157] The evidence of Ms. Pariser confirms the chronic nature of Ms. G’s inability to parent. Ms. G regresses into name-calling and being abusive with her children. Ms. G refers to her children as “crazy.” She calls A.D. a “bitch.” Ms. G displays little empathy when her children need her support; Ms. G is overwhelmed by her children’s defiant behaviour and she lashes out at them. Ms. G admits she cannot keep her house clean and prefers to blame her children. On several occasions, Ms. G said she “lost it” with her children. This significant evidence in part supports the recommendations of Crown wardship made by Dr. Sas, as discussed below.

G. Brief Summary as to Relevant Medical History and School Attendance for A.D., L and X

[158] A.D. has been diagnosed with ADHD and ODD. At an annual examination on April 10, 2014, the medical report noted the continuing diagnosis of ADHD and also enuresis. The recommendations indicated continuation of medication, including Concerta.

[159] In relation to L, the reports from Dr. Wojakowski, consultant child psychiatrist, confirm his behaviour problems and the reports refer to outbursts of anger, frustration, yelling and throwing things. L’s medication includes Concerta.

[160] In relation to X, the medical reports confirm the diagnosis of primary generalized epilepsy for which medication was prescribed. The evidence at trial suggests that X’s medication is effective in controlling seizures.

[161] It is noteworthy that L’s report card dated November 9, 2012 (which is just prior to the time that all four children were apprehended from Ms. G’s care) noted the following: that L engages in power struggles about work and completion; he refuses to follow directions; he refuses to complete his work; he becomes frustrated with a task and will walk out of the classroom; he struggles with inappropriate behaviour and is disruptive in the classroom (see Ex. 28).

[162] L’s school records also include a safety plan dated October 18, 2013. This safety plan was developed in relation to L’s behaviour. The safety plan describes L engaging in physical aggression towards others and also causing property damage. In relation to the latter, the specifics include throwing pencils; ripping school work; throwing desks; breaking glasses; hitting chairs and desks; kicking and punching others, including staff and students and swearing at staff. L’s school records confirm he has been placed on an individual education plan for the school year commencing September 2013.

[163] During cross-examination, Ms. G testified that L has had behaviour episodes since he was a toddler in daycare.

[164] Vanier Children’s Services provided a psychological assessment report (edited version school report) that is dated October/November 2012. This assessment report, signed by a psychologist confirms that L will need ongoing psychiatric consultation for assessment, monitoring and treatment of the symptoms related to his current diagnoses that include ADHD, ODD and suspected attachment disorder.

[165] The children’s school records confirm a chronic situation as to the children being late for school.

[166] In relation to A.D., her June 2012 report card indicated that she was late 67 times for the school year. Starting the next school year, she had been late 21 times as indicated in her November 9, 2012 report card. Shortly thereafter, she came into care and her next report card in February 2013 indicated she was late for school two times.

[167] For L, his June 2012 report card indicated he was late for school 49 times; that was in respect of his attendance at C.C. Carruthers Public School, which continued up to April 2012 when L was placed in the W.D. Sutton program. In contrast, after coming into care, L’s report card dated February 8, 2013 showed that he was late two times.

[168] Late attendance at school was also an issue for X. While X was in grade one, a letter dated February 5, 2014 was forwarded to Ms. G indicating that X had been late for school 28 times. During cross-examination, Ms. G agreed that since the beginning of school in September 2013 until around the end of November 2013, that X had already been late for school 16 times.

[169] A letter from Dr. Gorodzinsky dated March 11, 2014 (part of Ex. 29) confirmed an examination of X took place on March 10, 2014. This report confirms that X, in his pre-school years, had been diagnosed with a speech delay and was enrolled in a program to assist him with that.

[170] In terms of any diagnosis, Dr. Gorodzinsky’s report states that “X’s condition is complicated by a very difficult family dynamic and/or Attention Deficit Disorder, in addition his behaviour problems may be secondary to a ‘Learning Disability.’”

[171] At trial, no issue was taken as to the accuracy of the school records and medical reports. I accept that evidence.

H. Evidence of Foster Parent V.G.

[172] Ms. V.G. (“Ms. V.G.”) is a foster parent. A.D. and L were placed in the care of Ms. V.G. and her husband after they were apprehended in November 2012.

[173] Ms. V.G., when testifying in June 2014, indicated that A.D. had been in their care for approximately seven months about four years ago. L had not been in their care at that time but Ms. V.G. had met L when he was approximately age three for several days on relief.

[174] Ms. V.G. was a credible and reliable witness and I accept Ms. V.G.’s evidence as to her description of how the children have managed while being in her foster care.

[175] Ms. V.G. had some concerns about the content of messages between Ms. G and A.D. on Facebook and some of those messages were copied by Ms. V.G. and forwarded to the Society. These messages were contained in Ex. 10 filed at trial.

[176] Ms. V.G. had expressed a concern because it appeared that Ms. G had conscripted A.D. into using “code” words in their electronic communications. The word “bubbles” was frequently interspersed in some of the electronic communications between Ms. G and A.D.

[177] Also, there is a statement made by Ms. G to A.D. referring to the “lies V has told,” coupled with Ms. G’s statement in that same message that she does not trust the foster parents anymore. Ms. G concludes her message as follows: “I don’t know what’s going to happen regarding ‘them’ when BUBBLES.”

[178] I find that this type of communication between Ms. G and A.D. is completely inappropriate and not in A.D.’s best interests. It is reflective of an attempt by Ms. G to undermine the children’s foster care placement. Ms. V.G. was referred to this conversation and she denied that she was engaging in telling lies. I accept Ms. V.G.’s evidence that she was not telling lies and I prefer it over any evidence to the contrary from Ms. G.

[179] I accept Ms. V.G.’s evidence that A.D. has transitioned well in foster care. She is described as being pleasant and this includes getting along with others at school. A.D. is doing well academically and Ms. V.G. reported seeing a lot of growth socially from A.D. She had had trouble making friends but now has a solid group of friends according to Ms. V.G.

[180] Ms. V.G. further testified that she is working with A.D. on her “attitude.” Ms. V.G. testified that food has been a big issue but Ms. V.G. did not report any hoarding of food.

[181] In relation to L, Ms. V.G. did focus on L’s defiant behaviour, including refusing to do something that he has been asked to do. This behaviour was observed by Ms. V.G. when L came into care and it continues.

[182] In terms of changes to L’s behaviour since coming into care, Ms. V.G. noted that he has more interaction with others and he makes eye contact now.

[183] Ms. V.G. described L recently hugging Ms. V.G.’s parents when they came to visit, which Ms. V.G. described represented a significant difference in L’s conduct.

[184] Ms. V.G. and her husband are hoping to have long-term foster care of A.D. and L and they would be prepared to adopt the children should the children become available for adoption.

[185] It was Ms. V.G.’s position that even if there was an access order regarding either child, that that would not be something that would impact on their desirability of having the children in their care.

[186] Further, if necessary and depending on the order that might be made by this court, Ms. V.G. testified that they would cooperate in ensuring that A.D. and L also have access with X and A.J.

[187] Ms. V.G. confirmed during cross-examination that L continued to take medication for ADHD, ODD and his anxiety disorder. A.D. continues to take Concerta for ADHD. In addition, A.D. continues to have issues with enuresis, both during the day and night.

[188] Ms. V.G., during cross-examination, expanded on what she meant by L’s behaviour when he “loses control.” She explained that his conduct will include throwing things, which can escalate to hitting people, including angry outbursts that Ms. V.G. described as usually being very short, explosive and not pleasant, including swearing and cursing.

[189] During her evidence-in-chief, Ms. V.G. was asked questions as to L’s and A.D.’s state of mind as to any preferences they had expressed as to where they would like to live.

[190] Ms. V.G. testified L has said he would like to “stay with us” and, in relation to A.D., Ms. V.G. stated that A.D. is “50/50,” meaning that A.D. has indicated she did not know what she wanted; that she wanted to live with her mother and also that she wanted to remain in foster care.

[191] Subsequent to Ms. V.G.’s testimony in June 2014, the court was told on the reopening of the trial that L was moved into residential care. That evidence is discussed in more detail below.

I. Evidence of Foster Parent M.M.

[192] Ms. M and her husband are foster parents for X and A.J.

[193] X and A.J. were placed in the M foster home in November 2012 when they were apprehended and they left the M foster home when they were returned to Ms. G’s care in mid-March 2013 pursuant to an interim supervision order.

[194] Ms. M testified at trial during June 2014. Subsequent to her testimony X and A.J. were returned to the M foster home when they were apprehended near the end of October 2014.

[195] Ms. M gave testimony about the meaning of a “view-to-adopt” foster home. The evidence at trial indicates that Ms. M and her husband would be prepared to have X and A.J. with them on a long-term basis and to adopt those children should the children become available for adoption.

[196] I found Ms. M to be a credible and reliable witness; her evidence in particular as it related to her observations of the children while in care, and other observations as detailed below, was given in a straight-forward manner and Ms. M’s evidence was not diminished during cross-examination.

[197] Ms. M described X as having difficulty with transitioning when he first came into care. Accordingly strategies were implemented to make transitioning easier for X. As an example of an issue with “transitioning” Ms. M explained that if they went to the park, for example, then leaving the park would cause X at times to have behavior issues. One of the strategies in dealing with X’s behavior at transitions was to give him a little bit of lead time and to tell him what was going to happen.

[198] On arrival into care, X’s clothes were dirty and X was dirty; he had to have a bath and it was noted that the water was dirty after his bath.

[199] Ms. M described behavior difficulties with X that also included problems with following a routine. He would at times refuse to do things, would cross his arms and say “no.” Ms. M also described X engaging in aggressive physical behavior; she stated X would kick the wall. X would engage in self-harm by hitting himself in the leg and saying “stupid, stupid.” This type of behaviour was also observed by X’s teacher, Ms. O, whose evidence is discussed below.

[200] X would try and hit his foster parents. Ms. M described his actions as swiping his hand towards them making a fist with his hand. This required the foster parents to engage in a strategy to talk to X about his behaviour and to make him understand it was not appropriate. Ms. M did indicate that in doing so, at times X became upset at his own behaviour.

[201] If X was upset, sometimes he would go to his room himself and lie on the bed and would start to kick at the wall with his heels. Ms. M described strategies in de-escalating X where she would talk to him and engage him in a conversation as to why he is upset and also tell him that it was alright to feel upset.

[202] During the time that X was in care Ms. M described that the transitioning issue went away; however his attempts at self-harm and calling himself “stupid” was conduct that proved more difficult to eliminate.

[203] In relation to A.J. Ms. M explained that A.J. struggled with eating. A.J. would scream and this required the foster parents to be carrying him a lot of the time.

[204] In relation to his crying, M testified that the crying was more like “screaming” and that A.J. could scream for hours. He would calm down if he was held but then would resume if he was put down.

[205] Ms. M also described meeting on a regular basis with the G foster parents where A.D. and L were staying. These meetings were designed to allow all four siblings to have contact with each other. Ms. M indicated that they were encouraged by the Society to maintain sibling contact.

[206] A.D. and L had stayed at the M foster home approximately four to five times after X and A.J. had been returned to Ms. G in March 2013. Accordingly they were able to establish some relationship with A.D. and L and they were an obvious choice for respite visits, including overnights.

[207] Ms. M had been present at a number of the access exchanges when Ms. G was exercising access to X and A.J. while they were in care.

[208] In relation to Ms. G’s interaction with X at access exchanges, Ms. M testified that Ms. G cried frequently and at one occasion yelled that she would get X back. Ms. G was described as often saying that she would get the children back. I accept Ms. M’s evidence as to the statements made by Ms. G and I prefer it over any evidence to the contrary given by Ms. G.

[209] Ms. M described these statements by Ms. G as being hard on X, and it was her evidence that frequently on the way home from an access that X would began hitting himself referring to himself as “stupid.”

THE REOPENING OF THE TRIAL

[210] The evidence in this trial was initially completed June 24, 2014 and oral argument was heard June 26, 2014.

[211] On June 26, 2014, when the trial decision was reserved, the Society requested that an order be made pending the release of the judgment that Ms. G not make any electronic postings about the trial or the children. Ms. G did not oppose this order.

[212] Accordingly, on June 26, 2014, an order was made, pending the release of the judgment, that Ms. G should abstain absolutely from engaging in any electronic or social media communications whatsoever involving directly or indirectly the children, this case and the Society except as may be permitted in writing by the Society and this prohibition includes electronic postings under any different name.

[213] It is fair to say, and the evidence supports this, that Ms. G demonstrated a proclivity to write about her children and this trial using electronic media; Ms. G at times would write under a different name.

[214] The Society brought a motion to reopen the trial and this motion was argued before me on September 26, 2014.

[215] The basis of the Society motion was an allegation that Ms. G had contravened the order made at the conclusion of the trial pending the release of the judgment by making postings on a Facebook forum. The postings were done under the use of a pseudonym and Ms. G agreed that she had made the postings (copies of which were attached as an exhibit to the affidavit of the Society worker, Ms. Sarah Kaczynski).

[216] The website that was used by Ms. G was an internet forum that parents and families used who were dealing with a Children's Aid Society. In the posting, Ms. G noted that she had to be “careful” and that she was under a court order not to post about specific things on any form of social media, even under assumed names.

[217] Ms. G posed questions in this forum wanting to know if she can ask for photo identification regarding a Society worker who may come to her home as part of the worker’s mandate in this case.

[218] In the posting, Ms. G does not mention the social worker’s name (although it is clear she was referring to Ms. Kaczynski). Ms. G states in the post that her worker had called Ms. G from a personal cellphone and that the caller ID was a different last name. Ms. G then states in the posting she did an “investigation” and looked at the worker’s Facebook account under the worker’s married name, and Ms. G raises some issue about the worker not changing her “credentials” to reflect her husband’s last name.

[219] The Facebook post states that Ms. G no longer wishes to work with this worker “due to her inability to tell the truth even under oath.” Ms. G claims she was looking for a “legal way” to get a change in workers.

[220] Ms. G argued that, in her view, the posting did not contravene the order.

[221] The decision on the Society motion was reserved. All of the above evidence was given at trial.

[222] While the decision on the trial remained under reserve, in addition to the Society motion remaining under reserve, a significant event took place near the end of October 2014; the children, X and A.J. were apprehended from Ms. G’s care.

[223] Following the apprehension, given the statutory provision that the matter had to be in court within five days, and due to my non-availability, the matter came on before Vogelsang J., who made an interim without prejudice order on October 31, 2014 that the children, X and A.J., remain in care with supervised access.

[224] On November 14, 2014, the temporary care and custody motion, in relation to the children, X and A.J., was before me. I invited submissions from counsel as to whether it would be proper for me to hear the motion, given that I am also the trial judge. Also, further submissions were invited from all parties on the issue of the Society’s motion to reopen the trial (which, as indicated above, was still under reserve); in particular, the parties were asked also to address the issue as to whether the recent apprehension was a fact that would justify the trial being reopened.

[225] With respect to the latter issue, all parties were now in agreement that the trial should be reopened. An order was made that the trial would continue before me with further evidence, to start November 24, 2014.

[226] Much of the jurisprudence dealing with reopening a trial (or a motion) relates to circumstances where the judgment has already been rendered. These cases indicate that until a judgment has been entered, a trial judge has a discretion to reopen a trial to adduce fresh evidence; the discretion should be guided by a two-fold test; first, that the evidence would probably have changed the result at trial, and second, that the evidence could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence: Saeglitz v. Saeglitz, 1995 CarswellOnt (U.F.C.) at page 12; Maftoun v. Zargar, 2011 ONSC 4185 (S.C.J.).

[227] The evidence as to events that unfolded subsequent to trial were material, with a potential to affect the result at trial. Accordingly, this was a proper circumstance for the court to exercise its discretion to reopen the trial.

[228] In relation to the motion for temporary care and custody, I declined to hear that motion and, instead, that motion was heard by Templeton J. on November 14, 2014 and Templeton J. released her decision on December 2, 2014, ordering X and A.J. to remain in care and ordering access to Ms. G to be supervised at the offices of the Society.

[229] The evidence at trial, as to the postings by Ms. G, that first lead to the Society motion to reopen the trial demonstrated, at the least, that Ms. G was engaging in an unwarranted vendetta against Ms. Kaczynski. I find that Ms. G did not comply with the order made on June 26, 2014.

[230] Ms. G’s actions support the conclusion that Ms. G likely would not comply with a future order of the court to refrain from writing about her children or this case, where the publication and dissemination of information and identification of the children would not be in their best interests.

[231] On the reopening of the trial, the bulk of the evidence centred on events surrounding the apprehension of X and A.J.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE APPREHENSION OF X AND A.J.

A. Events of Sunday, October 26, 2014

[232] There was much evidence regarding the attendance of Society social worker Sarah Tuszinski (“Ms. Tuszinski”) at Ms. G’s home on Sunday, October 26, 2014 as part of the five-hour supervised access visit. That day the visit started at the church where Ms. G went with the children and then continued at Ms. G’s home.

[233] Once again the state of clutter and uncleanliness in Ms. G’s home, surfaced as an issue. Ms. Tuszinski was concerned about the state of the home being unsafe for the children. I accept Ms. Tuszinski’s description of what she observed that day in Ms. G’s home, including her description of the living room. Ms. Tuszinski observed coat hangers, both clean and dirty diapers, garbage, empty disposable juice boxes, water bottles, movies, magazines and electronic devices, toys, and dirt. Ms. G attempted to explain, or to some extent minimize, what Ms. Tuszinski observed; however, I prefer Ms. Tuszinski’s evidence over Ms. G’s evidence.

[234] Ms. Tuszinski then contacted Ms. Kaczynski and received instructions to terminate the access visits for A.D. and L. However, Ms. G was not in agreement with the visit ending early. This resulted in Ms. Tuszinski calling for police assistance, and the subsequent attendance of Police Constable Jonathan Dechene.

[235] Prior to Constable Dechene’s arrival, I accept Ms. Tuszinski’s evidence as follows: that Ms. G told A.D. that the Society was breaking the court order in relation to access; Ms. G also told A.D. that she intended to sue the Society for all of their “mistakes and lies”; that Ms. G told A.D. that she did not have to listen to the Society and that she could stay for the entire five-hour access visit; that when A.D. went upstairs that Ms. G told Ms. Tuszinski that Ms. Kaczynski is a “bitch” and that she would be going to jail. Ms. G in her evidence-in-chief does agree that she referred to Ms. Kaczynski as a “bitch.” I also accept Constable Dechene’s evidence that, initially, Ms. G told A.D. that she did not have to listen to the police. I reject Ms. G’s evidence denying that she told the children not to listen to the police.

[236] These statements by Ms. G to A.D. demonstrate yet again Ms. G’s inability to shield her children from adult issues.

[237] It was also Ms. Tuszinski’s testimony that the kitchen and the bedrooms did not appear to create safety concerns. Constable Dechene’s evidence corroborates Ms. Tuszinski’s evidence as to the state of the residence.

[238] Eventually Ms. G did cooperate and A.D. and L left with Ms. Tuszinski, with the result being that the planned five-hour access visit was reduced by an hour or so.

[239] On the whole of the evidence, it is unlikely that the state of the residence had reached such a level that the removal of A.D. and L was justified given the fact that X and A.J. still remained in the residence. The evidence about A.D. cutting her foot on a piece of glass was unfortunate but, in context, was quite minor. If the state of the residence did not pose a safety hazard to the children, it was close to reaching that level.

[240] Ms. G stated during her evidence that she “snapped” when Ms. Tuszinski cancelled the visit and that Ms. G told A.D. that the Society was in contempt of court and that A.D. had a right to stay. While I agree that Ms. G may have had some justification in her belief that the visit should not have ended early, I find that the statements made to A.D. about the Society were inappropriate and designed to enmesh A.D. in adult issues.

[241] Although it may not have been appropriate to terminate the access visit, it does remain concerning and troubling that notwithstanding Ms. G’s earlier evidence at trial as to her attempts to implement a routine for cleaning her home, that there still remained significant issues with the state of her residence. Also the photographs, filed as exhibits at trial, depicting the clutter and the debris outside of her residence, including a kitchen stove, underscores the chronic nature of Ms. G’s inability to maintain her home, and surroundings, in a state suitable for her children.

[242] I find that Constable Dechene was honestly mistaken as to the name of one of the children who was removed by Ms. Tuszinski during the termination of the access visit. This does not detract from his evidence as a whole and I find that Constable Dechene was a credible witness as to his description of the events as they unfolded and his observations.

[243] As part of her evidence-in-chief, Ms. G testified that Constable Dechene, during his attendance at her home, referred to Ms. G’s explanation to him regarding the condition of the home as “fucking lies.” I reject Ms. G’s evidence that Constable Dechene used this language. There was no evidence during Constable Dechene’s evidence-in-chief and cross-examination to suggest that he had used this language; further, I take into account that Ms. G’s counsel, during the cross-examination of Constable Dechene, never put to Constable Dechene that he had made such a statement to Ms. G. I also reject Ms. G’s evidence that Constable Dechene told her he would charge her with contempt.

[244] At this point in time, no decision had been made by the Society to apprehend X and A.J. The Society was clearly concerned about the state of the residence and it was communicated to Ms. G that she needed to deal with that issue. Ms. Tuszinski testified that the removal of A.D. and L was not “an apprehension” given that those children were already in Society care, rather, it was an early termination of an access visit because of the concerns regarding the state of the residence.

[245] However, the most significant evidence on the reopening of the trial was the testimony of X’s teacher and the events leading to the apprehension of X and A.J. on October 28, 2014.

B. The Evidence of K.O.

[246] On the reopening of the trial, the Society called Ms. K.O (“Ms. O”) as a witness. Ms. O has been a teacher for over 30 years, with over 25 of those years being with the Thames Valley District School Board. She was X’s grade two teacher in school starting September 2014. For grades two and three, Ms. O had L in her class.

[247] Ms. O was an impressive witness. Her lengthy career as a teacher was obvious in her evidence; she testified in a professional, factual manner; her evidence was reliable and credible. Ms. O’s evidence was particularly cogent and relevant as to her observations of X’s conduct and behaviour. She was not shaken in cross-examination. I accept Ms. O’s evidence as summarized below.

[248] Ms. O described X, at the beginning of the school year, as being a very loving, generous boy. As the year progressed, Ms. O described X as becoming angry, oppositional-defiant and engaging in self-harm, including hitting himself with his fists and banging his head on the wall.

[249] In context, Ms. O gave her testimony near the end of November 2014, at which time X would have been in Society care for approximately a month, following his apprehension near the end of October 2014.

[250] Ms. O testified that when X would talk about going on visits, that he would seem anxious.

[251] In describing X’s oppositional-defiant behaviour, Ms. O testified that X would become upset; that he would clear everything from his desk with his arm and turn the desk upside down; he would say “shut up” or “I hate you”; these statements would be directed by X to Ms. O when Ms. O tried to speak to X about his behaviour; he would go to the back of the room and sit under a table.

[252] At times X would escalate; for example, he would throw books; Ms. O would have to engage assistance from others to calm X down and also to remove him from the room; Ms. O explained that that was not easy to do as X would not want to go.

[253] Ms. O testified that X would use his fist to hit his face and would say “stupid, stupid, stupid.” This has happened in the classroom and in the hallway. Ms. O testified on two occasions that she saw X hit his head against the wall in the hallway; although she did also add that she did not see any injuries on X as a result of that. In relation to X striking himself with his fists, Ms. O testified that this happened on two occasions.

[254] Ms. O had conversations with Ms. G about X’s conduct at home. Ms. G described very similar behaviour by X at home. Ms. O testified that throughout the course of that school year, X had shared openly with her things that happened at home. When asked as to X’s mood when he was talking to Ms. O about his home life, Ms. O explained the mood was one of “anxiety.”

[255] Ms. O was asked whether X ever spoke positively in describing his home life and she answered “no.” It was noted by Ms. O that X was frequently late for school. During cross-examination, Ms. O added that she viewed X’s lateness in coming to school as a serious impediment to his academic performance.

[256] Although the school did not have a formal breakfast program, Ms. O arranged frequently for X to have breakfast and he would eat the breakfast in his class. In explaining why she gave X breakfast, Ms. O stated that X would say that he had not had breakfast. This statement by X is not admissible for the truth of its content but solely to explain why Ms. O arranged for him to have breakfast in her classroom.

[257] Ms. O had had a conversation with X during which he made disclosures to her.

[258] Ms. O gave the following evidence as to what X told her. This evidence is admitted solely to explain why Ms. O made a report, and is not admissible for the truth of the statements made to her by X. Ms. O described X telling her the following:

a) that his mother always wants him to clean the house;

b) that A.J. keeps making a mess;

c) that he told his mother that he was not going to clean anymore and that he called her a meany;

d) that his mother got mad at him and called him a “shithead” and other swear words;

e) that she slapped him across the face and put no-tears soap in his mouth.

[259] Ms. O testified that this was told to her by X in the classroom and that she had an obligation to report this information and that she shared what X said with Society social workers.

[260] Immediately following his apprehension, X came back to school for one more day before changing schools. When asked as to his deportment, Ms. O testified that X was bright, cheerful and excited.

[261] Ms. O also noted that X’s oppositional-defiant behaviour was similar to the behaviour Ms. O observed from L when he was in her class.

[262] Ms. O was asked to explain the progression of the deterioration of X’s behaviour during the school year. Ms. O described that X’s behaviour deteriorated as September 2014 progressed and the deterioration continued until the end of October 2014, when his disruptive behaviour was occurring almost on a daily basis. Further, it was noted by Ms. O that X having problems with his school work, or changing activities in the classroom, could be events that triggered his outbursts; Ms. O referred to X’s inability to “check” his emotions and that the severity of his behaviours increased progressively over time.

[263] Ms. O’s evidence is significant and probative. It is consistent with Dr. Sas’ sage prediction as to what would happen to X if he remained in Ms. G’s care.

C. The Apprehension

[264] The apprehension of X without a warrant on October 28, 2014 was made at school and, later that day, A.J. was apprehended. Both X and A.J. were returned to the M foster.

[265] I accept the evidence of Ms. Kaczynski and Ms. Tuszinski that when they interviewed X he made disclosure to them that included the following:

(a) that the previous day his mother had put soap in his mouth because he had called his mother a bad word and that he said that he told his mother she was a “meany”;

(b) that his mother responded by calling him a name;

(c) that he was made to sweep the floors and must have missed a piece of glass that caused A.D. to cut her foot;

(d) that he had to bring laundry downstairs and clean up outside;

(e) he was spanked on his bare bottom when he got into trouble;

(f) his mother slapped him across the face and it made him sad;

(g) that his mother will hurt him when she is angry, but not A.J.;

(h) X said he usually did not have breakfast because his mother sleeps;

(i) that he knows what court was: that “it’s where you go to fight”; and

(j) that his mother told him that if she lost at trial she would kill herself and, if she won, she would go to the police.

[266] I also accept Ms. Tuszinski’s evidence that at one point Ms. Kaczynski left the room where X was being interviewed, to speak to a teacher, and during that time X reported to Ms. Tuszinski that his mother spanks him a lot when he is in trouble and that this last occurred on a school day and X did not know why he had been spanked.

[267] Again, the above statements by X are considered solely in the context of explaining why the Society apprehended X and A.J. and the statements are not considered for their truth. The one exception would be X’s statement that court is a place “where you go to fight.” That statement is considered solely for the purpose that it was in fact made by X.

[268] During the day of the apprehension, Ms. Kaczynski and Ms. Tuszinski both attended at X’s school. Their investigation included speaking with X. I accept Ms. Kaczynski’s evidence that she attempted on three separate occasions that day to speak to Ms. G about the situation and about the Society concerns and that on each of those three occasions Ms. G refused to speak to Ms. Kaczynski, telling Ms. Kaczynski that she was a “liar.” I accept Ms. Kaczynski’s evidence that her three attempts to engage Ms. G to discuss this matter were as follows: in a telephone conversation prior to Ms. G coming to the school; an attempt was made by Ms. Kaczynski to speak to Ms. G while she was at the school; and a third attempt was made by Ms. Kaczynski, accompanied by Ms. Tuszinski, when she attended at the residence of Ms. G.

[269] I find that Ms. Kaczynski made every reasonable effort to engage Ms. G regarding the events as they were unfolding that day including the disclosure from X. Ms. G’s conduct in refusing to speak to Ms. Kaczynski and referring to Ms. Kaczynski as a “liar” was most unreasonable. Given the long history of this case, given the evidence that had already been called at trial before the trial was reopened, and taking into account X’s disclosure at least to the extent admitted by Ms. G as discussed below and Ms. G’s refusal to speak to the Society workers, I find that the apprehension of X and A.J. was justified.

D. Ms. G’s Evidence in Relation to Circumstances Surrounding the Apprehension

[270] The various disclosures that were made by X to the Society social workers were denied by Ms. G during her evidence with the exception of X having soap in his mouth because he had called his mother a bad word.

[271] Ms. G explained that on the Monday morning (this being prior to the day of the apprehension) that they were running late because X did not want to go to school. She stated they were in the shower; that X just refused to go to school; he refused to clean himself; that he crossed his arms and would not respond to Ms. G that they are running late and they need to get ready to go.

[272] Ms. G testified she started cleaning X and then he started swearing and calling her names. Ms. G stated she did not “pour a bottle of soap in his mouth”, but rather that there were soap bubbles on her hands and as Ms. G put it “he just said one swear word too many and I slipped my fingers into his mouth …” Ms. G claimed that this was a tear-free baby shampoo which she understood to be non-toxic.

[273] It was clear that Ms. G intended there to be some soap in X’s mouth because she stated the following in her evidence-in-chief: “I decided he’d get a nasty taste in his mouth and he might stop swearing and being rude and he might start getting ready to go.”

[274] During cross-examination, Ms. G was asked whether her conduct constituted physical punishment. Ms. G then responded by stating that there is a difference between punishment and discipline with punishment being done for power and discipline being done “out of love” – a statement that belies what Ms. G likely would have learned at the numerous parenting courses that she had attended. Ms. G did concede in cross-examination that her discipline of X on that occasion was not appropriate.

[275] Given Ms. G’s repetitive tendency during the trial to minimize her own conduct I suspect strongly that her discipline of X that day went beyond slipping soapy fingers into his mouth; nevertheless even accepting Ms. G’s conduct as described by her, it represents inappropriate physical discipline; it is abusive and demonstrates, yet again, that Ms. G is ill-equipped to properly respond to defiant or aggressive behaviour from her children.

[276] It remains questionable whether Ms. G truly has any remorse for her conduct leading to X having soap in his mouth. I have little confidence, that if presented with the same situation as Ms. G had that morning when X was in the shower, that Ms. G would refrain from repeating her conduct. This concern is fortified by Ms. G’s apparent lack of remorse when, during an access visit supervised by Ms. Tuszinski (after X was apprehended in late October 2014), X told Ms. G that he had eaten a pear with a sticker on it, and Ms. G’s response was to ask him if it tasted better than soap.

[277] Ms. G further admitted during evidence-in-chief that since September 2014 she had spanked X once and possibly twice. One of the times that Ms. G spanked X, she believes occurred on Sunday, October 26, after the police had been there and Ms. Tuszinski had removed A.D. and L. Ms. G explained X was spanked regarding the fact that he “doesn’t like to clean up his toys and he wouldn’t listen to me.” This evidence is startling given the wealth of evidence thus far, as to the many times Ms. G was told that it was her responsibility to keep her residence clean and tidy; further, the spanking was abusive.

[278] Ms. G then, during her evidence-in-chief, changed her evidence, saying that she actually spanked X only once. I rather doubt this recantation.

[279] When asked by her lawyer what constitutes spanking, Ms. G stated that spanking is a legal act of physical discipline on a child between the ages of 2 and 12 with an open hand. Ms. G was asked, notwithstanding her understanding of the law of spanking children, whether she could refrain from spanking X if this court should make such an order.

[280] It is important to put this question posed to Ms. G during her evidence-in-chief in context. Ms. G’s position was that all the children should be returned to her. She would be expecting this to be pursuant to a supervision order. Ms. G was testifying on the reopening of the trial after the two remaining children that she had in her care were apprehended while the trial judgment was under reserve. She had just admitted to spanking X and putting soap in his mouth.

[281] It would be reasonable to assume that a witness in Ms. G’s tenuous position during a trial would quickly, unhesitatingly and unequivocally respond that she would not spank X if ordered to refrain from that form of physical discipline.

[282] It is noteworthy that after Ms. G was asked this question she paused for quite a long time before saying anything. She was clearly thinking about her answer.

[283] Ms. G responded by saying that when she is under a supervision order she would have “every intention” to try and follow the order. However, Ms. G then testified that she could not promise Ms. McParlan that she would never cry in front of her children. Ms. G then mused whether she could make that promise if something happened in the heat of the moment. Ms. G then framed the question during her testimony that if the court made a supervision order, that the order is likely going to be for six or twelve months, and then she asked herself whether she could restrain herself during the period of the supervision order and she then answered her own rhetorical question with a “yes.”

[284] The hesitation and ruminations that Ms. G went through, coupled with her demeanor in answering this question, are most concerning; Ms. G leaves the court with little to no confidence that Ms. G can in fact refrain from physical discipline of X, or for that matter any of her children. Also of significant concern is the fact that X and his two eldest siblings have behaviour issues and special needs, and that Ms. G appears to believe that she has the right to continue spanking her children. Mr. G’s children require understanding and proper child-focused intervention when they are acting out – not spanking, or soap in their mouths, or being required to eat until they vomit.

[285] There was evidence from Ms. G that on August 7, 2014 she had signed a release, as requested by Ms. Kaczynski, for information from the school board and the nursery school regarding X and A.J.. Later that day, Ms. G wrote a letter to the Society dated August 7, 2014, rescinding the consent that she had given that day to Ms. Kaczynski.

[286] Ms. G testified that when she sent the letter (and this is confirmed in the letter) that she had looked at the interim supervision order made in March 2013 and found that there was no provision in that order requiring her to sign consent forms.

[287] Ms. G in fact was wrong. There was a requirement in that order that provided for Ms. G to sign releases of information. However, during her cross-examination, Ms. G engaged in what can only be described as a tortured interpretation of the relevant paragraph in the order; Ms. G convinced herself that the effect of the order was that she was under no obligation to sign any consent as requested by the Society unless she agreed to sign it, and that it was within her discretion whether to agree to sign it.

[288] As cross-examination continued, Ms. G testified that the provision in the interim supervision order that required the condition of her home to be at an “acceptable” level of cleanliness and free from hazards at all times meant that she was the one who would determine if the condition of the home was “acceptable.”

[289] Also of some concern regarding the letter sent by Ms. G (withdrawing her consent) is that Ms. G purports to withdraw her consent not only for A.J. and X, who were in her care at the time, but she also withdraws her consent for A.D. and L (who were in Society care and for whom she had no authority to sign or withdraw consents) and also for R. The reference in particular to R, is most concerning as it continues to reflect Ms. G’s disengagement from reality and corroborates the concerns of Dr. Sas (and the Society) as to the fantasies that Ms. G continues to harbour regarding R.

[290] Ms. G testified that since her letter she had not signed any further consents for disclosure regarding X and A.J.; this would therefore have prevented the Society from getting information directly from the school regarding the number of times X had been late starting September 2014 and would have prevented the Society from getting up-to-date information as to how A.J. was doing at the daycare.

[291] I find that Ms. G was in breach of the condition of the interim supervision order requiring her to sign the necessary consents for release of information.

[292] During her cross-examination Ms. G agreed that she was likely in breach of the conditions that required her to refrain from use of any form of physical punishment on the children. I find as a fact that Ms. G did breach those conditions.

[293] I also find Ms. G breached the following terms and conditions contained in the interim supervision order: that she failed to ensure that X maintains regular attendance at school and attends school on time; and that she failed to ensure that her residence is maintained at an acceptable level of cleanliness and free from safety hazards at all times.

[294] During cross-examination by Mr. Price, Ms. G admitted that she recently sent a letter to the Society asking that X and A.J. be removed from the M foster home. Ms. G agreed that the letter detailed various complaints about the care of the children in the M foster home and that Ms. G had set a deadline of January 4, 2015 to have the children removed from this foster home. This letter was not filed in evidence and there was no evidence as to the nature of the alleged complaints.

[295] Ms. G then agreed that in this letter she stated that the Society had five says to remove the children from the M foster home before Ms. G would personally take the letter and various documents and disclosures she had received from the Society regarding her case, and other information, to the Toronto Star to see if the Toronto Star wanted to start an exposé on the Society’s treatment of her family. Ms. G then confirmed that the children had not been moved and when asked whether she went to the Toronto Star testified “it’s in the works.”

[296] Ms. G did indicate that she had also written to the Child and Family Services Review Board.

[297] Ms. G’s letter to the Society is part of her campaign against the Society and its workers. It demonstrates that Ms. G continues to wage her “war” with the Society.

[298] Also, it was Ms. G’s position during cross-examination by Mr. Price that she did not engage in any conduct after the initial conclusion of the trial that warranted the trial being reopened.

DISCUSSION – S.B.G.

[299] Undeniably, Ms. G has had a troubled history parenting the four children who are the subject of this application.

[300] Ms. G was born […], 1981. She is currently age 33.

[301] There was some evidence from Ms. G at trial, including evidence from her mother and T.B. and K.W. showing that, at times, Ms. G could manage her children appropriately and could keep her residence reasonably clean and free of clutter. However, regrettably, there was substantial, significant and overwhelming evidence at trial that Ms. G is unable to adequately parent her children on any consistent basis. The evidence of Dr. Sas supports this conclusion.

[302] The turmoil that the children have faced, going in and out of care over the years, has been set out earlier in these reasons.

[303] Ms. G’s inability to adequately parent her children has a multi-faceted etiology as discussed below.

[304] Dr. Sas’ evidence occupied one full day of trial. In addition, her assessment reports constitute evidence pursuant to s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act (the “Act”).

[305] It is important to clear up any suggestion made by Ms. G that Dr. Sas should not have done the assessment on the basis of bias or any other reason.

[306] The bias issue seemed to be hinted at during trial by Ms. G. However, I reject categorically any suggestion that there was bias on behalf of Dr. Sas.

[307] Dr. Sas testified it was unusual for her to do an assessment on the same family for a third time. It is important to note that Dr. Sas was ordered by the court to do this third assessment.

[308] Dr. Sas testified, and I unequivocally accept her evidence on this point, that Ms. G did initially complain that Dr. Sas was doing this assessment. However, Ms. G had also complained about Dr. Sas doing the first two assessments. Dr. Sas explained that in speaking with Ms. G, that Ms. G reasoned that the first assessment was negative, that the second assessment was positive and therefore Ms. G agreed, although perhaps somewhat reluctantly, that Dr. Sas should go ahead and do the third assessment and that she was not objecting to Dr. Sas doing the assessment. I also accept Dr. Sas’ evidence that Dr. Sas suggested to Ms. G that she should discuss this matter with her lawyer if she had any ongoing concerns.

[309] I find on the record before me that there was no basis for Dr. Sas to decline to complete the court-ordered assessment. In fact, a consideration in Dr. Sas being ordered to do the assessment was her past involvement and familiarity with this family and the children.

[310] I find that Dr. Sas had a unique vantage point where she was able to conduct the current assessment and compare her current findings with her findings in the previous two assessments.

[311] Dr. Sas observed Ms. G with the children on various occasions during the current assessment and this included attendances at Ms. G’s home. I accept the statement in the current assessment that Dr. Sas has spent considerable time with Ms. G and her children (page 25). The observations that were made by Dr. Sas, and the conclusions reached by Dr. Sas during the assessment process, were not shaken or undermined in any significant way, if at all, during cross-examination. I found Dr. Sas to be a credible and reliable witness; where any conflict arises between the evidence of Dr. Sas and Ms. G, I prefer the evidence of Dr. Sas.

[312] Dr. Sas devoted not insignificant time to evidence regarding Ms. G’s grief over her loss of R. During the current assessment, Ms. G reported to Dr. Sas that she thought of R “every week” and in reality “thought of him all the time.” Ms. G described yearning for R several times a day. Ms. G described it was “partly true” that life without R was hard to bear. Dr. Sas reported that Ms. G blamed the Children’s Aid Society that was involved with R for problems that arose in Ms. G’s care of, or relationship with, R. Ms. G indicated to Dr. Sas that R was “stolen” from her through the deceit and the maliciousness of that agency.

[313] I accept Dr. Sas’ conclusion (at page 15 of the current assessment report) that Ms. G suffers a complicated grief and PTSD relating to her loss of R and, further, that there is a “glaring absence” of Ms. G accepting any personal responsibility for Society involvement with R in the first place.

[314] Dr. Sas goes on to state that an individual suffering from a complicated grief may benefit through intensive grief therapy. In Ms. G’s case, Dr. Sas views grief therapy for Ms. G as being a “long shot” given Ms. G’s need to hold on to her belief that R was “stolen.” Dr. Sas states that Ms. G will not be able to move forward until she can accept the role of her parenting deficiencies in R’s Crown wardship. I accept the characterization that grief therapy is a “long shot.” Ms. G’s grief is long-standing and pervasive; there is no reasonable basis to believe that Ms. G can, or will, address this through counselling or therapy, now or any time soon.

[315] The evidence supports the conclusion, which I make, that Ms. G is unable to deal with her children over any sustained period of time when the children are exhibiting behavioural problems. Ms. G becomes overwhelmed. She lacks the necessary parenting skills to effectively cope with and manage children who engage in challenging, defiant and at times aggressive behaviour. When overwhelmed, Ms. G will lapse into physical discipline or will engage in abusive conduct as she did during the “cheesecake incident” and spanking X and putting soap in X’s mouth.

[316] Ms. G has difficulty managing a routine for herself. She stays up late at times and may spend time on the computer “blogging” and communicating about her children and the court case. The children, as a result, have been frequently late for school.

[317] Ms. G is an individual who gets frustrated by her children’s challenging behaviour. This causes Ms. G to lash out by verbally abusing her children (for example calling A.D. a “bitch”) and, worse, writing on the internet about the children and their behaviours.

[318] Ms. Pariser’s evidence covered a period with a starting session of November 15, 2011 up to and including a session on October 10, 2012, during which time all four children were in Ms. G’s care; this evidence also underscored the constant difficulties, frustrations and challenges that Ms. G had in adequately parenting the children on a consistent basis.

[319] Ms. G at times was not a reliable witness when called upon to recall her past behaviour. Ms. G told Mr. Price during cross-examination that she did not recall calling A.D. names. Ms. G was then presented with copies of the internet postings (Exs. 2 and 3) and asked if those were her postings. Ms. G took a number of minutes, in the witness stand, flipping through and looking at the exhibits, before confirming that those exhibits were her postings.

[320] Those postings included referring to A.D. as a liar and a thief. Ms. G only diminished her fragile credibility by trying to deflect responsibility for her conduct by claiming, during cross-examination, that she had been told by Ms. Kaczynski to “vent” on Facebook.

[321] During her cross-examination, Ms. G was referred to her comments made to Ms. Pariser during the session on May 7, 2012 where Ms. G said that she ends up calling A.D. a “bitch” at least once a week because A.D. is rude and disrespectful to her. Ms. G’s awkward attempt, during cross-examination, to explain the use of this term served only to underscore her bad judgment.

[322] Ms. G’s explanation during cross-examination that her children were apprehended in November 2012 because Ms. McParlan “lied” is not in the least supported by the evidence; rather this is symptomatic of Ms. G’s self-deception, throughout the trial, that she has been victimized by a nefarious conspiracy of alleged liars and perjurers.

[323] There is also the “duct tape” incident that involved Ms. G planning to duct tape the children’s mouths and her mouth in an effort to keep the children quiet. This plan never came to fruition as apparently disclosure was made by one of the children at school before the plan could be implemented. In cross-examination by Mr. Price, Ms. G agreed that this is not a technique she learned in parenting class; Ms. G stated she had learned it watching television. This incident occurred not too long prior to the apprehension of the children in November 2012.

[324] Regarding A.J., Ms. G explained during cross-examination by Mr. Price that she had contacted Mr. W after having had no contact him for over a decade; she described her pregnancy with A.J. as planned.

[325] Ms. G explained her reason for getting pregnant was that she thought this would bring the family closer together. It was Ms. G’s perception that matters at home were reasonably well-controlled; that L’s behaviours were well managed; that the children were all in school; she had adequately addressed the condition of her home. In fact, Ms. G’s “perception” was a substantial misconception.

[326] I concur with Dr. Sas that Ms. G’s decision to have another child demonstrated poor judgment. I also find that Ms. G engaged in some measure of denial, or self-deceit, in failing to recognize her own limitations and that she was not able to handle the increased stress of having to care for a fourth child, especially considering A.D.’s and L’s special needs, and growing evidence that X was beginning to engage in defiant and other harmful behaviour.

[327] In cross-examination, both prior to and after the trial was reopened, Ms. G gave evidence as to a list of witnesses who had testified at trial who were either “mistaken” or had “misled the court.” Ms. G labelled many who testified for the Society as “liars.”

[328] Ms. G testified it was her intention to obtain trial transcripts and then take transcripts to the police so that those persons can be charged. Some society workers who testified are included in this list.

[329] It was Ms. G’s evidence that she had been audio-recording her meetings with society workers for a period of time; she also audio-recorded Dr. Sas and also audio-recorded some medical and dental appointments she was at where either a society worker or a foster parent was present. Ms. G stated that these recordings were made without knowledge of the persons present. Ms. G was also audio-recording supervised access visits at the Society facility but these recordings were with the knowledge of the Society.

[330] It is Ms. G’s intention to “prove” the alleged perjury by referring to the transcripts of the audio tapes. It is salient that during the trial none of the tapes or transcripts were produced. There is ample evidence at trial to conclude that Ms. G has a manifest and irrational hostility towards the Society. This conclusion is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Sas; furthermore Ms. G has conscripted the children towards her viewpoint of the “us” versus “them” mentality in her ongoing “war” with the Society, and this has adversely affected in particular the two eldest children, A.D. and L. This finding was also corroborated by the observations of Dr. Sas. Even X, at age seven, speaks about court being the place where you “go to fight.”

[331] Ms. G’s involvement of the children in her conflict with the Society is not in the children’s best interests. Similarly Ms. G’s bad judgment in constantly exposing the children to issues involving R is harmful and not beneficial to the children; I agree with Dr. Sas’ evidence that it was wrong for Ms. G to continue to celebrate R’s birthday with the other children.

[332] I accept Dr. Sas’ evidence that Ms. G is an intelligent person. Dr. Sas commented that she is not aware of any parents who have taken more parenting courses than Ms. G. Although Ms. G is intelligent, however, Dr. Sas found that Ms. G lacks judgment, and that this lack of judgment is not cognitive-based.

[333] There was overwhelming evidence throughout the trial that Ms. G time and time again displayed a concerning lack of insight into the effects of her own behaviour on her children. Ms. G was quick to blame others for the problems that the children were having; I find that Ms. G’s lack of insight into her own conduct represents a significant obstacle in effectively parenting her children. This finding is also supported by the same conclusion reached by Dr. Sas.

[334] Dr. Sas’ assessment indicated that Ms. G during her childhood had sustained familial trauma of abuse and rejection. Dr. Sas’ conclusion that Ms. G remains socially isolated and only has a few support persons is supported by the evidence at trial. As indicated earlier, Ms. G did appear to mend to some extent her relationship with her mother, as the latter testified to at trial. However, Ms. G had reported to Dr. Sas she had little social life and stated that the children “were her life.” It was pointed out by Dr. Sas, somewhat sadly, that the most consistent and supportive figure in Ms. G’s life for over a decade has been Ms. Olds, the Society family support worker.

[335] Dr. Sas’ current assessment dealt with mental health issues affecting Ms. G. Dr. Sas pointed out, in relation to R, that Ms. G continued to harbour “unification fantasies” and “that there would be a reunion in the near future” with her and R and all the children. I accept Dr. Sas’ conclusion that Ms. G’s unresolved grief over R “remains a significant mental health issue and it continues to impact her life choices and her lack of ownership of her parenting difficulties” (page 12).

[336] Ms. G is currently in receipt of ODSP.

[337] There was no issue taken with Dr. Sas’ description of Ms. G being a person who is on ODSP for mental health reasons and that Ms. G has been diagnosed with chronic PTSD, anxiety and depression in the past (page 8). During her evidence-in-chief Ms. G confirmed that she continues to take anti-anxiety medication prescribed by her physician.

[338] Dr. Sas administered the PAI (Personal Assessment Inventory). I accept Dr. Sas’ conclusion as follows (at page 17):

In summary the clinical findings on the PAI were concerning and suggest that she is an individual with traits of paranoia, anxiety, interpersonal difficulties, social detachment, She [sic] tends to lack empathetic awareness, and has a tendency to externalize blame onto others. She is suffering from chronic PTSD, as well as unresolved and complicated grief, and does not seem capable of moving forward.

[339] Dr. Sas’ current assessment noted that Ms. G presently was not receiving any therapy in relation to her childhood trauma.

[340] I accept Dr. Sas’ findings and conclusion categorizing Ms. G as a moderate hoarder, and that she likely qualifies for a formal diagnosis of “Hoarding Disorder.” I accept Dr. Sas’ evidence that hoarding is associated with substantial health risks and impairment of function. In particular, Dr. Sas states, and I accept, the list of adverse effects that can be suffered by children who live with a parent who hoards. I accept Dr. Sas’ findings that Ms. G demonstrates the tendency of hoarders to lack insight into their behaviour, resist intervention and defensively rationalize their acquiring and saving. Dr. Sas stated that Ms. G was not willing to acknowledge a hoarding problem (pages 26 – 27).

DISCUSSION – PROTECTION FINDING REGARDING A.J.

[341] The evidentiary record supports a finding, which I make, that A.J. is a child in need of protection pursuant to sections 37(2)(b), 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii).

[342] The following statutory findings are made pursuant to s. 47(3):

a) the full name of the child is A.J.B.G., age 2 and one-half;

b) Christian religion has been practiced;

c) the child is not an Indian or native person; and

d) the child was apprehended in London twice from the care of the mother, Ms. G, and placed in foster care each time: in November 2012 and in October 2014.

DISCUSSION – DISPOSITION

[343] In relation to A.D., L and A.J., s. 65 of the Act provides for the various dispositions that may be made “in the child’s best interests.” In relation to A.J., the dispositions that may be made are set out in s. 57(1) and also must be made “in the child’s best interests.”

[344] The court is required to consider a list of relevant factors in relation to a child’s best interests. Those factors are set out in s. 37(3) of the Act:

37(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall take into consideration those of the following circumstances of the case that he or she considers relevant:

1. The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.

2. The child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.

3. The child’s cultural background.

4. The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.

5. The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family.

6. The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community.

7. The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity.

8. The merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent.

9. The child’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.

10. The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.

11. The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.

12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

13. Any other relevant circumstance.

A. Disposition for A.D.

[345] A.D. has had a significant history of turmoil being in and out of care. This has undoubtedly left her with emotional scars. She has special needs and is on medication. She has behavioural issues.

[346] For A.D., it is important to have a stable residence with consistent and appropriate parental supervision by persons who are able to understand and appropriately manage her special needs.

[347] Ms. G has no identifiable capacity to parent A.D. adequately. There is a strong likelihood that placing A.D. with Ms. G will result in A.D. being subjected to verbal and physical abuse by Ms. G. A.D.’s behaviour can be challenging and Ms. G’s inability to consistently manage such behaviour elevates substantially the risk of physical and emotional harm to A.D.

[348] I accept Dr. Sas’ conclusion that A.D. has an attachment to her mother; also, there was evidence at trial as to A.D. having a desire to maintain contact with her mother. A.D. seemed to vacillate as to whether she wanted to live with her mother or stay in her foster home. However, there is no supervision order that can be crafted that could remotely protect A.D., if placed with her mother. Ms. G has a history of breaching conditions; she will most likely do the same if a further supervision order is made. Further, any placement with Ms. G faces a significant prospect of break-down.

[349] Currently, A.D. has been in continuous care for over two years. She needs permanency planning and she requires a secure, nurturing and child-focused environment that meets her needs emotionally and is also physically safe.

[350] I accept the following conclusions reached by Dr. Sas relating to A.D. in the current assessment (at page 23):

The reality is that despite A.D. having a definite attachment to her mother, she needs to live in a stable, organized home which combines routines and structure with nurturance, a home which is lower in stress and drama than her biological mother’s home. She is at an impressionable age and needs a good maternal role model. She also can ill afford to be sent home to her mother’s, only to have to come back into care six months later because her behaviour is out of control, she is late for school all the time, and she is living in filth and chaos and having to assume too much responsibility for her age. She needs the consistency and positive relationship she has with her foster mother to help her navigate the next few years as she moves into adolescence.

[351] Dr. Sas’ current assessment was most thorough; this included Dr. Sas attending at the foster home. I accept Dr. Sas’ evidence as to her observations that A.D. and also L would present as being “happy” when they got off the school bus and ran into the foster home.

[352] Dr. Sas added that when A.D. talked about her foster home, she was “light and airy”; that when Dr. Sas asked A.D. about visits with her mother, Dr. Sas testified that A.D. would get sullen and angry.

[353] A.D. is doing well in the G foster home, and the G’s are prepared to adopt her, and also L, should the children be available for adoption. It is in the best interests of A.D., and L, to be adopted.

[354] Ms. G’s long-standing unresolved grief regarding the loss of R, her actions in grooming her children to despise the Society, and the impact on Ms. G’s life of her own mental health issues are significant additional factors that preclude Ms. G from being able to parent A.D.

[355] Dr. Sas recommends that A.D. and L should be made Crown wards as soon as possible.

[356] The least intrusive order that is consistent with A.D.’s best interests is Crown wardship.

B. Disposition for L

[357] L is prone to extreme outbursts of anger and aggressive conduct. The evidence supports the conclusion that L’s challenging behaviour is extreme, exceeding A.D.’s behaviour.

[358] The reasons as discussed above in relation to the disposition of A.D. apply equally to L (except as may be noted below) and it is not necessary to repeat those reasons.

[359] A.D. and L are fairly close in age. Although A.D. is older, the children were only born a year and a half apart. Accordingly, L and A.D. have a somewhat similar history in moving between foster homes and their parents’ homes over the years. L would have suffered emotional turmoil similar to A.D.

[360] Dr. Sas’ current assessment regarding L contained an added sense of urgency, stating (at page 24) that L “… absolutely cannot be placed back in the home with his mother. Given his temperament, his anxieties and other issues, he cannot thrive in that environment.” I accept this evidence.

[361] Dr. Sas has testified that she observed L at his mother’s home as being tense, anxious, quiet and withdrawn. Dr. Sas contrasted this behaviour with L’s demeanour coming “home” (meaning to the foster home) after school – he was fine and happy. I accept this evidence.

[362] I find that L would face a substantial risk of physical and emotional harm if placed with Ms. G. She cannot meet his needs. The evidence at trial suggested that L did not want to return home; during sessions with Ms. Pariser, Ms. G was upset on hearing that L seemed to prefer staying at Vanier rather than returning home.

[363] Subsequent to Dr. Sas’ evidence in mid-June 2014, L was moved from his foster placement at the G foster home to a residential placement at Vanier. This occurred as a result of increasingly out-of-control behaviour at the G foster home.

[364] Ms. Tuszinski testified about this on the reopening of the trial. Ms. Tuszinski’s evidence, that I accept, indicates that the move to residential care occurred in early 2015; however, L is having increasing visits with his foster parents that include weekends.

[365] There was no evidence called on the reopening of the trial to suggest that there were any changes in relation to L’s foster parents intending to adopt him should he be available for adoption.

[366] Given the totality of the evidence, however, even if it should turn out that L would have to live in residential care for an extended period of time, or perhaps not return to the G foster home, this would not have any impact on the disposition that is in L’s best interests. For L, in particular, any return to Ms. G’s care would be inimical to his best interests, and the potential of a break-down would be extremely high.

[367] L has a significant need for structure and a stable home placement where his special needs can be met in a child-focused manner. The evidence supports a finding that L was doing reasonably well at the G foster home. Given his history of extreme behaviours, it is not surprising that he was moved to interim residential care. L’s best interests require him to remain in Society care, to pursue a return to the G’s, with adoption.

[368] The least intrusive order that is consistent with L’s best interests is Crown wardship.

C. Disposition for X

[369] Dr. Sas gave testimony as to what likely would happen to X in the next “3 or 4 or 5 years” in the context of returning to his mother’s care. It was Dr. Sas’ evidence, which I accept, that much of what happened to the older siblings would also be faced by X.

[370] I accept and agree with the following conclusions reached by Dr. Sas regarding X and A.J. (page 28):

Consideration should be given to making the younger children crown wards as well and placing them together in the same adoptive home as they will soon follow the trajectory of the older children. X is well on his way on that road (home behaviors) and A.J. like A.D. has already come into care as an infant which is very sad. I recognize that this is a difficult and heart wrenching thing to do to the children as they were returned to her care, and there is an attachment between X and his mother and between A.J. and his mother, but I am convinced that allowing them to remain in their mother’s home will only prolong the inevitable and it will be harder later on and they will experience the same things their siblings have, as a result of their home condition and their mother’s marginal parenting.

[371] Sadly, Dr. Sas’ prediction was most prophetic, given the apprehension of X and A.J. in late October 2014.

[372] It is noted that Dr. Sas’ recommendation of Crown wardship for X was based on her finding that X’s negative behaviours at home were unlike X’s behaviours in other settings, including the classroom (see page 12).

[373] However, the testimony of X’s teacher, given on the reopening of the trial, provides cogent additional evidence that X is now engaging in out-of-control behaviour and aggression at school. This recent evidence serves only to fortify Dr. Sas’ conclusions and recommendations regarding X.

[374] All the issues discussed above as to why Ms. G is unable to parent L and A.D. apply equally to X.

[375] X’s behaviour issues are escalating. He is now age seven and in grade two. If X was returned to Ms. G’s care, he too would face a strong likelihood of being subjected to more physical and verbal abuse, and living in a physically chaotic environment.

[376] X, like his older siblings, requires the security of a stable, loving and physically safe and clean home environment with caregivers who can meet his needs and who can respond to any aggressive behaviour in a calm and child-focused manner. X’s current foster home placement meets all of these needs.

[377] I acknowledge that X and A.J. have lived with Ms. G all their lives except for a cumulative period of over eight months starting with the first apprehension in November 2012.

[378] However, similar to A.D. and L, any supervision order placing X with Ms. G would not adequately protect him. Ms. G cannot be expected to adhere to the necessary terms and conditions that would have to be part of a supervision order. No supervision order will protect X from verbal and physical abuse, provide him with a clean and safe physical environment, and ensure that he attends school on time.

[379] Most importantly, however, is that a supervision order, and also a temporary wardship order, must have as its focus a plan of care where there is a reasonable expectation that a parent will address necessary issues, including taking appropriate courses, treatment or parent education, to alleviate the presenting protection concerns.

[380] The evidentiary record, including the evidence and conclusions of Dr. Sas, supports the finding, which I make, that the constellation of issues that impact adversely on Ms. G’s inability to adequately parent her children is deep-rooted and is not amenable to change in the foreseeable future. There is no reasonable prospect of Ms. G working cooperatively with the Society given the obsessive degree, without just cause, to which she reviles the Society and its workers – many of whom she brands as “liars.”

[381] X (and A.J.) are in a secure view-to-adopt foster home. It is not in X’s (or A.J.’s) best interests to consider a supervision order or a temporary wardship order as that will only postpone the inevitable. Any attachment he has to Ms. G does not change this result.

[382] Ms. G has demonstrated that she is unable to parent her children even when she only has two children to care for, which was the case after X and A.J. were returned to her care in March 2013 on an interim basis.

[383] The least intrusive order that is consistent with X’s best interests is Crown wardship.

D. Disposition for A.J.

[384] There are a number of similarities between A.J. and X, including the fact that both children have always been in the care of Ms. G, except for the times they were both in Society care.

[385] A.J. is quite young and he has not yet reached the age where one would expect that he would have behaviour problems. However, much of the discussion in relation to X as to why Ms. G is unable to parent him also applies to A.J.

[386] Similar to X, there is no reasonable basis on the evidence to consider a plan of care that would have A.J. returned to Ms. G, either pursuant to a supervision order, or a period of temporary wardship followed by a supervision order.

[387] During her testimony, Dr. Sas was asked about her opinion as to leaving only A.J. in the care of Ms. G. I accept Dr. Sas’ evidence that A.J. would be left with the responsibility of meeting Ms. G’s emotional needs in light of her having lost her other four children. Also, Dr. Sas addressed a concern, which I accept, regarding her observations of Ms. G failing to provide A.J. with enough stimulation. Dr. Sas also expressed a concern, which I accept, that Ms. G is largely socially isolated and that A.J. would grow up in an atmosphere of social isolation.

[388] Most important, however, and for the same reasons as discussed in relation to the three eldest children is that leaving A.J. with Ms. G will serve only to expose him to the following: a strong likelihood of potential apprehensions; living a chaotic life in a chaotic environment; being exposed to Ms. G’s long-standing unresolved grief regarding R; being exposed to the potential risk of physical or emotional abuse; not having his needs met because of Ms. G’s mental health issues; and being groomed to despise the Society.

[389] Similar to his siblings, no supervision order will adequately protect A.J., and there is no reasonable expectation that Ms. G will abide by supervision conditions or work with the Society in a child-focused way. Any return of A.J. to Ms. G’s care will inevitably follow the path of his other siblings.

[390] A.J. is in the same stable view-to-adopt foster home as X and the evidence presented at trial is that, if available, X and A.J. will be adopted by the same family, a result that is in the best interests of A.J. (and X).

[391] Although A.J., similar to X, was found by Dr. Sas to have an attachment to his mother, this fact is insufficient to make a less intrusive order.

[392] The least intrusive order that is consistent with A.J.’s best interests is Crown wardship.

ACCESS

[393] There is a statutory presumption against access to a Crown ward as contained in s. 59(2.1) of the Act:

59(2.1) A court shall not make or vary an access order made under section 58 with respect to a Crown ward unless the court is satisfied that,

(a) the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and

(b) the ordered access will not impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

[394] The onus is on the person who seeks access to a Crown ward to prove on a balance of probabilities that: (1) the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and (2) that access will not impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption (see Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region v. C.(J.), 2007 CanLII 8919 (ON SCDC), 2007 CarswellOnt 1680 (Div. Ct.) at para 23). Further, “beneficial” has been held to mean “advantageous,” and “meaningful” has been held to mean “significant” (Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region, supra, at para. 29).

[395] There was credible evidence from a number of witnesses that Ms. G attempts to engage the children in inappropriate discussions during access visits. This includes supervised access visits. Ms. G engaged in conduct amounting to an obstinate persistence in wanting to enmesh the children in inappropriate discussions, including her attempts to denigrate or criticize the Society and its workers in front of the children. This is a relevant factor that needs to be considered in relation to access.

A. Access by Ms. G to X and A.J.

[396] It was the position of the Society that, if either X or A.J. was made a Crown ward, the order should be silent as to access to Ms. G.

[397] It was the position of the Children’s Lawyer, in relation to X, that there should be supervised access between X and Ms. G, to occur four times annually, with the access to be closely supervised and suspended if Ms. G was unable to refrain from discussing adult issues.

[398] A.J. is very young. X, although older, is still only seven years of age. Although Dr. Sas did note that X and A.J. did have an attachment to Ms. G, her recommendations did not provide a specific proposal for access to Ms. G (page 28). Further, X engaged in negative conduct after supervised access visits as explained by his foster mother.

[399] A factor that I consider is the necessity to shield X and A.J. from being subjected to Ms. G’s constant complaints about the Society and her obsession with R. Ms. G has engaged in this conduct, even during supervised visits; this will undermine the foster placement.

[400] Further, the evidence supports a finding, which I make, that Ms. G harbours some hostility to X’s and A.J.’ foster parents. Ms. G has not, in the past, refrained from speaking negatively about foster parents, and the fact that a visit is supervised is unlikely to restrain Ms. G from making negative comments about the foster parents.

[401] It was further stated by the Divisional Court in Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region, supra, that once there is an order for Crown wardship, the focus of the Act shifts to establishing a permanent and stable residence, preferably through adoption: para. 22.

[402] In the present case, the Society’s obligation to all four children who are now Crown wards is to make all reasonable efforts to assist each child to develop a positive, secure enduring relationship within a family unit through adoption: s. 63.1, para. 1 of the Act.

[403] As stated in Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region, supra, at para. 38, the fact that children love their mother, and she loves them, and that the children enjoyed some of their visits with their mother, does not equate to a relationship between the mother and the children that is beneficial and meaningful to the children.

[404] Given the ages of A.J. and X, the evidence does not support a finding that their attachment to their mother is such that access would be beneficial and meaningful to either child. I find on the whole of the evidence that Ms. G has failed to meet the onus on her to establish, in relation to A.J., that the relationship between A.J. and Ms. G is beneficial and meaningful to A.J. I further find that Ms. G has failed to establish that the relationship between herself and X is beneficial and meaningful to X.

[405] Given the above findings, it is not necessary to consider s. 59(2.1)(b) which is the second element of the test. However, had I considered same, a factor would be Ms. G’s hostility towards the current foster parents of X and A.J.

[406] In relation to A.J. and X, the order shall be silent with respect to access between A.J. and Ms. G and between X and Ms. G.

[407] However, as indicated in Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region, the fact that an order is silent as to access does not preclude the Society from implementing some contact or communication between the child and the parent in the child’s best interests. That principle is now recognized specifically in s. 59(4) of the Act which provides as follows:

59(4) If a society believes that contact or communication between a person and a Crown ward is in the best interests of the Crown ward and no openness order under Part VII or access order is in effect with respect to the person and the Crown ward, the society may permit contact or communication between the person and the Crown ward.

[408] Further, the Society is also aware of its obligation under s. 141.1.1(2) as follows:

141.1.1(2) Where a society begins planning for the adoption of a child who is a Crown ward, the society shall consider the benefits of an openness order or openness agreement in respect of the child.

B. Access by Ms. G to A.D. and L

[409] The position of the Children’s Lawyer was that both A.D. and L should have access four times annually, with the access to be closely supervised and to be suspended if Ms. G is unable to refrain from discussing adult issues.

[410] In relation to A.D., the Society submitted that Ms. G would have access a minimum of six times per year for a period of four hours each time, to be supervised at Society discretion, and with the access to be subject to a number of terms and conditions as set out in a draft order that the Society had prepared. In relation to L, the Society submitted that if access was to occur that it should occur in accordance with his wishes to a maximum of 24 hours per year to be supervised at Society discretion with no visit to be longer than 4 hours in duration.

[411] The difference in ages between A.D. and L, as compared to their siblings, is a significant factor. There was evidence at trial, in relation to A.D., that she not only wanted to have access with her mother but she also struggled in expressing a desire in whether she wanted to live with her mother or in the foster home.

[412] There was evidence at trial regarding the importance to A.D. of maintaining a relationship with her mother. Also, Dr. Sas specifically recommended that there should be access for both L and A.D. due to their ages and feelings of attachment to their mother (page 27).

[413] In relation to L, the evidence at trial indicated that he did not share the same desire in seeing Ms. G as did A.D. Also, the fact that he was put in residential care recently could have some impact on access.

[414] I find on the evidence, including the recommendations of Dr. Sas, that the relationship between A.D. and Ms. G is beneficial and meaningful to A.D., and that the relationship between L and Ms. G is beneficial and meaningful to L. In making this finding, the concerns discussed above in relation to X and A.J. as to Ms. G discussing R and her dislike of the Society with the children, are also relevant in relation to A.D. and L; however, as A.D. and L are older, the potential negative effects of such conversations are not as great as with X and A.J.. I also find that access between each of A.D. and L, and Ms. G, is in each child’s best interests.

[415] In relation to s. 59(2.1)(b), I find that the access that is ordered below will not impair either A.D. or L’s future opportunities for adoption. In coming to this conclusion, I have considered Ms. V.G’s evidence that if there was a Crown wardship order with access that it would not impact on the G’s having A.D. and L in their care.

[416] The order below includes various terms and conditions that are imposed as a condition of access; also, the order recognizes that A.D.’s need to see her mother is more pronounced than that of L.

C. Inter-Sibling Access

[417] The position of the Children’s Lawyer is that A.D., L and X should each have access to each other, and that the orders should be structured such that each child is an access holder and access recipient. In relation to A.J. (who was not represented by the Children’s Lawyer), it was the position of the Children’s Lawyer that A.D., L and X should continue to have access with A.J. even though the strength or level of benefit to each of the older children retaining a relationship with A.J. is not consistent as between the three older children.

[418] The Society did not oppose inter-sibling access between all of the children. The Society proposed that the access be a minimum of four times per year, with each visit to be a duration of not less than two hours.

[419] The frequency of access proposed by the Children’s Lawyer was four times annually for a period of at least two hours each, to be closely supervised by foster parents, adoptive parents or by the Society, whichever the case may be.

[420] Given the current situation, the plan would be for X and A.J. to remain in the M home and to be adopted by them. Accordingly, any access order between X and A.J., in those circumstances, would not be necessary. Similarly, if the G’s move forward to adopt both A.D. and L, then an access order between A.D. and L would not be necessary.

[421] However, it remains important to consider an inter-sibling access order that would encompass a permanent arrangement for the children, different than contemplated in these reasons.

[422] On the facts, A.D. and L have spent much time together, having been in foster care together, although when they were younger there were occasions when they were not in the same foster home. Secondly, A.J. and X have always been together, either in the care of Ms. G or in foster care.

[423] I agree with the submission of the Children’s Lawyer that the level of relationship between each of the siblings is not the same but I also accept that it is important for each child to maintain a relationship with all of his or her siblings.

[424] Accordingly, I find on the evidence that the relationship between each child and each of his or her siblings is beneficial and meaningful to that child.

[425] I also find that an access order that allows any child to have access to his or her other siblings will not impair that child’s future opportunities for adoption. I take into account the evidence that the G’s and the M’s had been cooperating with each other in order to ensure that the children in their respective care have had contact with each other. There is no reasonable basis to conclude that this would not continue into the future.

[426] I find that it is in each child’s best interests to have access with all of his or her siblings.

ORDER

[427] A separate order shall issue for each of the children, A.D., L, X and A.J., stating that each child is made a ward of the Crown and is placed in the care of the Society.

[428] The Crown wardship order in respect of A.J. shall provide for access as follows:

1. A.J. shall have reasonable access to each of his siblings, A.D., L and X, a minimum of four times annually, not less than two hours each time, as arranged by the Society, in consultation with each child’s foster parents or caregivers, any such access to be supervised as may be directed by the Society, with the Society to have discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised, and with the Society to have discretion to approve increases in access, and other forms of access including electronic communication, or telephone access, as may be in the best interests of the children. This access order, in relation to each sibling, applies during any time when A.J. is not residing with that sibling.

[429] The Crown wardship order in respect of X shall provide for access as follows:

1. X shall have reasonable access to each of his siblings, A.D., L and A.J., a minimum of four times annually, not less than two hours each time, as arranged by the Society, in consultation with each child’s foster parents or caregivers, any such access to be supervised as may be directed by the Society, with the Society to have discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised, and with the Society to have discretion to approve increases in access, and other forms of access including electronic communication, or telephone access, as may be in the best interests of the children. The access order, in relation to each sibling, applies during any time when X is not residing with that sibling.

[430] The Crown wardship order in respect of L shall provide for access as follows:

1. L shall have access to his mother, Ms. G, a minimum of four times per year, for a period not to exceed three hours each time, such access to be supervised at the discretion of the Society by either the Society or its approved agent, with the Society having discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised and, if so, to what extent, and with the Society also having the sole discretion to determine any increase in access as may be in L’s best interests, and all access shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:

a) Ms. G shall not speak negatively to L about, nor discuss with him, the fact that he is in the care of the Society or placed in the care of foster parents;

b) Ms. G shall not mention to L, talk about or discuss with him, the prospect of him returning home to reside with Ms. G at some future time;

c) Ms. G shall not mention or discuss with L her eldest child who was adopted, at any time, nor shall Ms. G engage or involve L in, or expose L to, any activities related to communication with her eldest child who was adopted, for any reason;

d) Ms. G shall refrain from writing or posting, or causing directly or indirectly to be written or posted, on any internet website, blog, or any social media sites including but not limited to Facebook and Twitter, the following:

i. any information about access visits between L and Ms. G;

ii. any information about the lives of A.D., L, X and A.J. while each child remains in the care of the Society;

e) Ms. G shall at all times endeavor to make the access visits a positive experience for L;

f) should any access visit occur in Ms. G’s residence, then Ms. G shall permit a Society worker to attend at her home on either an announced or unannounced basis during such access visit;

g) the Society’s discretion to increase access includes approving access to occur in the community and at Ms. G’s residence, and approving who may be present during the access, and Ms. G shall ensure that no other person is present except as approved in advance by the Society.

h) the Society shall have the discretion to terminate or cancel any access visit or visits if Ms. G fails to comply with any one or more of the above conditions, or if L refuses to attend the visit.

2. L shall have reasonable access to each of his siblings, A.D., X and A.J., a minimum of four times annually, not less than two hours each time, as arranged by the Society, in consultation with each child’s foster parents or caregivers, any such access to be supervised as may be directed by the Society, with the Society to have discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised, and with the Society to have discretion to approve increases in access, and other forms of access including electronic communication, or telephone access, as may be in the best interests of the children. This access order, in relation to each sibling, applies during any time when L is not residing with that sibling.

[431] The Crown wardship order in respect of A.D. shall provide for access as follows:

1. A.D. shall have access to her mother, Ms. G, a minimum of six times per year, for a period not to exceed four hours each time, such access to be supervised at the discretion of the Society by either the Society or its approved agent, with the Society having discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised and, if so, to what extent, and with the Society also having the sole discretion to determine any increase in access as may be in A.D.’s best interests, and all access shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:

a) Ms. G shall not speak negatively to A.D. about, nor discuss with her, the fact that she is in the care of the Society or placed in the care of foster parents;

b) Ms. G shall not mention to A.D., talk about or discuss with her, the prospect of her returning home to reside with Ms. G at some future time;

c) Ms. G shall not mention or discuss with A.D. her eldest child who was adopted, at any time, nor shall Ms. G engage or involve A.D. in, or expose A.D. to, any activities related to communication with her eldest child who was adopted, for any reason;

d) Ms. G shall refrain from writing or posting, or causing directly or indirectly to be written or posted, on any internet website, blog, or any social media sites including but not limited to Facebook and Twitter, the following:

i. any information about access visits between A.D. and Ms. G;

ii. any information about the lives of A.D., L, X and A.J. while each child remains in the care of the Society;

e) Ms. G shall at all times endeavor to make the access visits a positive experience for A.D.;

f) should any access visit occur in Ms. G’s residence, then Ms. G shall permit a Society worker to attend at her home on either an announced or unannounced basis during such access visit;

g) the Society’s discretion to increase access includes approving access to occur in the community and at Ms. G’s residence, and approving who may be present during the access, and Ms. G shall ensure that no other person is present except as approved in advance by the Society.

h) the Society shall have the discretion to terminate or cancel any access visit or visits if Ms. G fails to comply with any one or more of the above conditions, or if A.D. refuses to attend the visit.

2. A.D. shall have reasonable access to each of her siblings, L, X and A.J., a minimum of four times annually, not less than two hours each time, as arranged by the Society, in consultation with each child’s foster parents or caregivers, any such access to be supervised as may be directed by the Society, with the Society to have discretion to determine whether the access should be supervised, and with the Society to have discretion to approve increases in access, and other forms of access including electronic communication, or telephone access, as may be in the best interests of the children. This access order, in relation to each sibling, applies during any time that A.D. is not residing with that sibling.

“Justice Victor Mitrow”

Justice Victor Mitrow

Date: March 13, 2015

CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.B.G., 2014 ONSC 6137

COURT FILE NOs.: C1355/02-19, C1355/02-20

DATE: March 13, 2015

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex

Applicant

• and -

S.B.G. and G.W.

• and –

S.B.G. and C.A.

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MITROW J.

Date: March 13, 2015