CITATION: City of Hamilton v. Attorney General et al., 2015 ONSC 1043
COURT FILE NO.: C-383-04
DATE: 2015-02-20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
City of Hamilton
Plaintiff
Attorney General of Canada, Christine Stewart, David Anderson Herb Dhaliwal, Sheila Copps, Nancy Adams, Paul Bernier, W. Bill Bien, Edwin R. De Bruyn, Steve Burgess, Mike Cadman, Paula Caldwell, Robert Connelly, Rob Dobos, Margit Doneit, John Fischer, Rosaline Frith, Nicole Gagnier, Denise Gibbs, Cathy Gee, Jonathan H. Gee, Sid Gershberg, D. V. Gillman, Carole Giroux, Ian Glen, Michael Goffin, Francois Guimont, Len Good, Keith Grady, Barbara Hennessy, Michaela Huard, Wayne Hyatt, Louise Knox, Mary Komarynsky, Janice Kostash, Olivier Lalande, Deb Lauder, Patrice Leblanc, Sharon Leonhard, Simon Llewellyn, Nancy Maguire, Laud Matos, Claire Michaud, John Mills, Tom Muir, Brad Parker, L.S. Parsons, Raymond Pierce, Richard Pratt, Ulana Perovic, Kim Ray, David Robinson, Michael Rayner, Guy Riverin, David Robinson, Craig Ryan, Nathalie Seguin, Michael Shaw, Ron Shimizu, Mike Shiomi, Jeff Stein, Rob Stevens, Donna Stewart, John Struger, Gerry E. Swanson, Lucie Tessier, Lisa Vitpls, Wayne Wouters, Bruce Young
Defendants
Scott Smith, Ross Earnshaw, for the Plaintiff
Glynis Evans, for the Defendants
HEARD: Monday, February 9, 2015
Judgment
Introduction
[1] This is a motion brought by the plaintiff for an order bifurcating the issues of liability and damages. It seeks an order that liability be tried first. A trial will take place on damages only if it is successful on the liability trial.
Background
[2] The Red Hill Creek Expressway (RHCE) is a highway around the south and east borders of the City of Hamilton (Hamilton). It joins highway 403 with a road known as the Lincoln Alexander Highway running along the Niagara Escarpment on the south border of Hamilton and runs north through the Red Hill Creek Valley (RHCV) to the Queen Elizabeth Highway (QEW). This road may be conveniently called the Valley Expressway (VE).
[3] The planning for the RHCE began in the 1950’s. There was opposition from the outset because of concerns of the effect of the construction of the RHCE on the RHCV which is a natural area. It was approved by a Joint Board on October 24, 1985 after a hearing that lasted 99 days. Construction began on June 26, 1990. On December 17, 1990 the provincial government withdrew funding for its construction through the RHCV (the VE). On January 15, 1985 the federal government passed the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). In late 1995 the provincial government restored funding for construction of the RHCE through the RHCV.
[4] On May 4, 1999, David Andersen, the Minister of Fisheries in the federal government requested Christine Stewart, the Environment Minister in the federal government, to order an environmental assessment of the RHCE under the CEAA. She did this on May 6, 1999.
[5] Hamilton brought an application in Federal Court in the fall of 1999 for judicial review of this decision. In Hamilton-Wentworth v. Canada [2001] F.C.J. No. 627 (HW) released on April 24, 2001, Justice Dawson held that the CEAA did not apply to the RHCE. Her decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal on November 24, 2001in Hamilton-Wentworth v. Canada [2001] F.C.J. No. 1700.
[6] Hamilton issued a notice of action on April 1, 2004 and a statement of claim on September 29, 2004 against the Attorney General of Canada, Christine Stewart, David Anderson, Sheila Copps and many of their advisors. Sheila Copps, who represented Hamilton in Parliament, was a Cabinet Minister in the federal government. She had formerly been a Minister of the Environment. Hamilton provided particulars of its allegations in its statement of claim to Ms. G. Evans, counsel for the defendants in letter dated November 25, 2005 from Mr. D. Estrin, counsel for Hamilton. The defendants filed a statement of defence dated February 2, 2006. There are currently 43 defendants against whom Hamilton is proceeding.
[7] The CEAA s. 74(4) states that the Act does not apply to a physical work on which construction commenced before June 22, 1984 unless the construction was in respect of a modification of the project. Project is defined in s. 2 of the CEAA to include physical work. Section 11 states that an environmental assessment must commence before irrevocable decisions are made.
[8] In HW Justice Dawson held that “construction” was not limited to actual physical construction but included planning and preparation for actual physical construction. Construction defined in this way had begun long before June 22, 1984. This meant that s. 74(4) made the CEAA inapplicable to the RHCE. The plan to move the Red Hill Creek as part of the construction of the RHCE was not a modification but a continuation of the project of the construction of the RHCE. She also held that irrevocable decisions had been made related to the construction of the RHCE before the CEAA came into effect on January 19, 1995. Hence s. 11 of the CEAA also made it inapplicable to RHCE. She held further that there was no federal head of power that could support the referral of the RHCE for an environmental assessment.
[9] Hamilton alleges that David Anderson and Christine Stewart and their many advisors knew that the CEAA could not apply to the RHCE when Christine Stewart, on the advice of David Anderson, ordered an environmental assessment under the CEAA. It was far advanced towards completion when Minister Stewart made the order. Hamilton alleges that Christine Stewart made the order for an assessment under the CEAA not for environmental reasons but to stop the construction of the RHCE because it was unpopular in Hamilton.
[10] Hamilton alleges misfeasance in public office against the defendants. They also alleged that the resulting delay in the construction of the RHCE caused the city losses by reason of cancellation of contracts and increased construction costs.
[11] The defendants deny that they knew the CEAA did not apply to the RHCE prior to the judgments in federal court in April and November, 2001. They also deny that the RHCE was near completion when the order was made for an environmental assessment in May, 1999.
[12] The following paragraphs in the pleadings illustrate the positions of the parties.
Statement of Claim
The defendants knew, when they determined to use their public office to stop the City completing the Expressway, that the City would be harmed in the result, in that the Expressway had previously been approved in a 99 day public hearing environmental assessment process in which the Environment Minister had declined to participate, that physical construction of the Expressway commenced in June 1990, that as of 1999 the Expressway was 60% complete, that approximately $200 million of public monies had already been spent on the project, that 97 buildings on the right of way had been demolished for its construction, and that completion of the Expressway had long been legally approved as a key infrastructure component of the planning and development policies of the City and of the Province of Ontario.
The defendant Copps, who in the 1980’s had strongly opposed initial approval and construction of the Expressway, and who continued to strongly oppose its completion, in 1999, with knowledge of CEAA gained as a former Environment Minister, importuned, enjoined and solicited her Cabinet colleagues, including the other named Ministers, to apply CEAA to the Expressway with the objective of invoking a procedure by which she and the other defendant Ministers could review the need for the Expressway and stop its completion, despite knowing that the use of CEAA for this purpose was illegal and unconstitutional and would materially harm the City.
Despite being warned by the City, and in any event knowing that application of CEAA to the Expressway was illegal, unconstitutional and unfair, these defendants acted to stop completion of the Expressway and harm the City by purporting to apply CEAA with reckless indifference to their lack of statutory and constitutional authority to do so, with knowledge that there was no valid scientific basis to do so, and with the intent to harm the City in its legitimate objective.
Alternatively, the defendants abused their public office by engaging in targeted malice towards the City’s completion of the Expressway for the purpose of appeasing a minority of public opinion in Minister Copp’s riding opposed to the Expressway and to allegedly protect migratory birds.
Alternatively, the defendants intended to harm the City by demonstrating an actual intent to prevent or imperil completion of the Expressway, with knowledge that their course of conduct would cause harm to the City, or by their reckless indifference or wilful blindness to the harm that was foreseeable.
Statement of Defence
The defendants deny that they acted with any malice, and specifically that they acted with targeted malice towards the City’s completion of the Valley Expressway for purposes of appeasing a minority of public opinion in the defendant Sheila Copps’ riding, as alleged at paragraph 21 of the Claim, or to appease any political constituency, as alleged at pages 7, 13, 18 and others of the Particulars.
The defendants did not know and could not reasonably have known that the City would be harmed, as alleged, by a decision to subject the project to an environmental assessment process including a review panel. In particular, the defendants were not aware of the extent of the preparations that had been made by the City for the construction of the Valley Expressway. In any event, the defendants deny that the City suffered any of the harm alleged.
The defendants deny that they knew of the allegations made in paragraph 16 of the Claim, and repeated in various paragraphs of the Particulars, with respect to the harm allegedly caused to the City. In any event, the defendants deny that the allegations made in paragraph 16 of the Claim are true.
The defendants deny that they were recklessly indifferent to the potential harm to the City in increased costs, contract interruptions, and delays caused by a CEAA review panel, as alleged in paragraph 20 of the Claim.
The Law on Bifurcation
[13] The Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to bifurcation of a trial state the following:
6.1.01 With the consent of the parties, the court may order a separate hearing on one or more issues in a proceeding, including separate hearings on the issues of liability and damages.
This Rule came into force on January 1, 2010.
[14] Since the rule came into effect, there is divided authority on whether a court has jurisdiction to bifurcate a non-jury trial on the issues of liability and damages absent consent of the parties. In Wm. Whiteley Ltd. v. Gauthier 2010 ONSC 396, [2010] O.J. No. 149, the plaintiff sued the defendant for misappropriation of proprietary information and property when he was employed by the plaintiff. Justice Turnbull denied the defendant’s motion to bifurcate discoveries and the trial on the issues of liability and damages. He held that as a result of Rule 6.1.01 he lacked jurisdiction to do so in the absence of the consent of the parties. He noted that the rules committee in recommending the enactment of Rule 6.1.01, which came into force on January 1, 2010, rejected Justice Osborne’s recommendation that bifurcation of a trial be available to the parties on motion or on the court’s own initiative. He held that in any event he would not have ordered that the trial be bifurcated because the evidence on liability and damages could be overlapping (para. 9).
[15] In Trinity Anglican Church v. Janeiro [2012] O.J. No. 3791 Justice Campbell adopted the reasoning of Justice Turnbull in Whiteley that he lacked jurisdiction to order that a trial be bifurcated. He stated the following:
[3] … The clear and unequivocal language of the rule permits the court to order bifurcation only "with the consent of the parties". If the court maintained a jurisdiction to order bifurcation in the face of opposition from the parties such a result would void the opening language in the rule. This rule makes it clear that the "consent of the parties" is a necessary pre-condition to the discretionary jurisdiction to make an order of bifurcation.
[16] In Soulliere (Litigation guardian of) v. RobitailleEstate 2013 ONSC 5073, [2013] O.J. No. 3631, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his mother. She lost control of the vehicle which slid into the path of oncoming traffic. The plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries. On the application of one of the defendants, Justice Smith held that the wording of Rule 6.1.01 did not remove the inherent jurisdiction of the court to bifurcate a trial. He declined to do so on application of one of the defendants because the plaintiff was ready for trial. To do so would have meant substantial delay which would have been unfair to him.
[17] Elcano Acceptance Ltd. et al.v. Richmond et al. (1986), 1986 CanLII 2591 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (2d) 56 was decided before Rule 6.1.01 came into effect. The plaintiff sued the defendants who were its former lawyers. It alleged that they were negligent in drafting promissory notes. The trial judge separated the issues of liability and damages, held against the defendants on the issue of liability and ordered a reference on damages. The Court of Appeal in the judgment of Justice Morden held that a trial court had an inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate a trial on the issues of liability and damages but that it was not properly exercised in this case. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Justice Morden stated the following:
[10] The fact that the power to split a trial is not expressly conferred does not, of course, mean that it may not be part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court and we accept that it exists on this basis, to be exercised in the interest of justice. Resort to it has, in fact, been usefully made: (citations omitted)
[11] However, since it is a basic right of a litigant to have all issues in dispute resolved in one trial it must be regarded as a narrowly circumscribed power. This approach is supported by the familiar statutory admonition which is continued in s. 148 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1984 (Ont.), c. 11:
As far as possible, multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided.
There is also the judicial admonition of Meredith C.J.C.P. in Waller v. Independent Order of Foresters (1905), 5 O.W.R. 421 at p. 422: "Experience has shewn that seldom, if ever, is any advantage gained by trying some of the issues before the trial of the others is entered upon ... ". The power should be exercised, in the interest of justice, only in the clearest cases. We would think that a court would give substantial weight to the fact that both parties consent to the splitting of a trial, if this be the case. On the other hand, a court should be slow to exercise the power if one of the parties, particularly, as in this case, the defendant (see Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant (1878), 11 Ch. D. 918 at p. 928), objects to its exercise.
[18] Air Canada v. West Jet, [2005] O.J. No. 5512 was also decided before the enactment of Rule 6.1.10. Air Canada alleged that West Jet had obtained confidential information from a website designed for its employees on passenger load and route information which West Jet used to its competitive advantage. It sought disgorgement from West Jet of any profit that it had realized as a result of its use of Air Canada’s confidential information. Air Canada brought a motion for an order for bifurcation of the issues of liability and damages and a trial on liability first and then a trial on damages only if it was successful on establishing liability on West Jet. Justice I.V.B. Nordheimer denied the motion. He held that to be successful on liability, Air Canada would need to prove that it had suffered a detriment by the use of West Jet of its confidential information. West Jet alleged that any losses that Air Canada suffered in the relevant period was a result of mismanagement by Air Canada and not the result of the use of Air Canada’s information which it denied that West Jet used and that the information was confidential. To explore this defence would result in an overlap of evidence that was relevant to liability as well as damages. Justice Nordheimer also narrowed the 14 factors listed by Justice Tobias in Bourne v. Saunby (1993) , 23 C.P.C. (3d) 333 as being relevant as to whether it was appropriate to grant severance to 5 factors. Justice Nordheimer stated the following:
[21] In response to the plaintiffs' claim, the defendants have asserted that the detriment alleged by the plaintiffs did not arise from any misuse of confidential information by the defendants (assuming such misuse occurred) but rather from other factors. The defendants say that, if WestJet gained passengers and revenue and other advantages during the relevant period, those benefits accrued to WestJet as a result of a host of mistakes and mismanagement by the plaintiffs and not as a result of WestJet having access to Air Canada's information.
[22] The question at this stage of the proceeding is, of course, not whether the defendants will ultimately be able to establish that contention. The point is that the defendants are entitled to make those allegations in response to the claims made against them and to canvass the available evidence in an effort to prove those allegations. The plaintiffs fairly complain that these allegations will greatly expand the scope of the litigation and, consequently, the amount of discovery and production as well as the likely length of the trial. That result cannot be seriously disputed. At the same time, however, complications that naturally flow from litigation cannot be eliminated at the expense of either side's right to fully prosecute or defend a claim.
[23] The consequence of this conclusion is that dividing the proceeding into two parts, liability and damages, will not obviate the need for some exploration of the assertions made by the plaintiffs regarding the alleged detriment they have suffered or of the defendants' response to those assertions. As a result, the bright line that the plaintiffs would draw between the liability issues and the damages issues is, in fact, a great deal more faint.
And:
[31] In Bourne v. Saunby (1993), 23 C.P.C. (3d) 333 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Mr. Justice Tobias identified fourteen factors to which a court might have reference in deciding whether to order bifurcation. With respect, I do not find such a large number of factors to be necessarily helpful in deciding the issue. In addition, some of the factors outlined by Mr. Justice Tobias appear to me to engage common considerations. I will also say that it seems to me to be preferable to refer to the second portion of the trial process as the remedies trial as opposed to the damages trial since, as this case points out, the relief to be granted may be broader than just a consideration of damages. In the end result, I would re-state those factors in a more limited form, as follows:
(i) Are the issues of liability clearly separate from the issues of remedies? Consideration might be given to whether the remedies issues are interconnected with, or dependent on, the liability issues; whether the same or different witnesses will be called on the liability and remedies trials and whether the judge hearing the remedies trial would benefit from having seen and heard the evidence from the liability trial.
(ii) Is there an obvious advantage to all parties by having the liability issues tried first? This would include a consideration of whether there is a realistic prospect that the determination of the liability issues would put an end to the action.
(iii) Will there be a substantial saving of time and expense if bifurcation is granted? This would include consideration of whether the determination of the liability issues might shorten the remedies trial either by eliminating available remedies or narrowing the scope of relief that can be sought.
Will the overall timeframe of the proceeding be unduly lengthened by granting bifurcation? This would include a consideration not only of whether the liability and remedies trials taken separately would be longer in total court time than if done together, but also whether there is likely to be an inordinate delay in having both trials completed recognizing that appeals may be taken in the intervening period once the liability trial has been concluded.
(v) Do the parties agree that bifurcation is appropriate? The parties are in the best position to understand the advantages and disadvantages of bifurcating the proceeding and, as observed in Elcano Acceptance, considerable weight should be given to their views on the question.
Analysis
[19] I agree with Justices Turnbull in Whiteley and Campbell in Trinity that Rule 6.1.01 is clear that bifurcation can only be ordered if the parties consent. However, if I am wrong on this and I do retain a discretion to order bifurcation of a trial as was the case before the Rule 6.1.01 came into effect on January 1, 2010 I will consider whether it should be done on the facts of this case.
[20] The principles to be applied are those set out in Elcano and Waller as follows:
It is a basic right of a litigant to have all issues in dispute resolved in one trial
It is a narrowly circumscribed power
It should be exercised in the interests of justice only in the clearest of cases
Substantial weight should be given to the lack of consent of one of the parties.
[21] I will attempt to apply the factors set out by Justice Nordheimer in Air Canada. I adopt the summary of those factors in the factum of the defendants prepared by Ms. Evans at para. 36 as follows:
a) Are the issues of liability clearly separate from the issues of remedies (damages)?
b) Will there be a substantial saving of time and expense if bifurcation is granted?
c) Will the overall timeframe of the proceeding be unduly lengthened by granting bifurcation?
d) Is there an obvious advantage to all parties by having the liability issues tried first?
e) Do the parties agree that bifurcation is appropriate?
[22] There are 3 issues in the lawsuit as follows:
Did the defendants commit the tort of misfeasance in public office by ordering an environmental assessment of the RHCE?
Did the resulting delay in constructing the RHCE cause Hamilton to suffer losses?
What are the losses?
[23] Hamilton moves for an order for bifurcation – that the issue of liability be tried separately and a determination be made first whether the defendants committed misfeasance in public office. However, this issue cannot be tried without considering the second issue of whether as a result of the ordering of an assessment Hamilton suffered loss.
(a) Are the issues of liability clearly separate from the issues of remedies (damages)?
[24] Hamilton submits that all the defendants are complicit in the decision of Christine Stewart to order an environmental assessment of the RHCE in May, 1999. Hamilton submits that the RHCE was so far advanced in the spring of 1999 that the defendants should have realized but did not realize that CEAA could not apply. Justice Dawson found that it did not apply because it was exempted by s. 74(4) of the CEAA. This was because construction as she defined it took place before June 24, 1984 and the VE was an extension of the original project and not a modification of it. She also held that irrevocable decisions had been made before January 19, 1995 when the CEAA came into force which made it exempt under s. 11 of the CEAA. Further, there was no head of federal power that could support the referral of the RHCE for an environmental assessment.
[25] Hamilton submits that the defendants committed the tort of malfeasance in public office when they ordered in May, 1999 that the RHCE be subject to an environmental assessment under the CEAA. Their real object of their doing so was to stop the expressway because it was unpopular in parts of Hamilton and particularly in the riding represented by Sheila Copps. To prove misfeasance in public office by the defendants Hamilton must prove that the intention of the defendants in ordering an environmental assessment was to harm Hamilton or they knew it could harm Hamilton and were reckless or indifferent if it did. They also must prove that Hamilton suffered loss or damages as a result of their damages.
[26] The elements of the tort of misfeasance in public office were set out in the judgment of Justice Iacobucci in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 as follows:
[32] To summarize, I am of the opinion that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort whose distinguishing elements are twofold: (i) deliberate unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions; and (ii) awareness that the conduct is unlawful and likely to injure the plaintiff. Alongside deliberate unlawful conduct and the requisite knowledge, a plaintiff must also prove the other requirements common to all torts. More specifically, the plaintiff must prove that the tortious conduct was the legal cause of his or her injuries, and that the injuries suffered are compensable in tort law. (emphasis added)
[38] ... misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort that requires subjective awareness that harm to the plaintiff is a likely consequence of the alleged misconduct. At the very least, according to a number of cases, the defendant must have been subjectively reckless or wilfully blind as to the possibility that harm was a likely consequence of the alleged misconduct... (citations omitted)
[27] In a more recent case the Court of Appeal in St. Elizabeth Home Society v. City of Hamilton, 2010 ONCA 280, [2010] O.J. No. 1515 in the judgment of Justices Rouleau and Laskin stated the following:
[20] Misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort. The tort is meant to provide a measure of accountability for public officials who do not exercise their duties of office in good faith. To make out this tort, a plaintiff must prove four elements:
(e) The public official deliberately engaged in unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions;
(e) The public official was aware that the conduct was unlawful and was likely to injure the plaintiff;
(e) The public official's tortious conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and
(e) The injuries suffered are compensable in tort law. (emphasis added)
See Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 at para. 32.
[21] At its core, the tort targets officials who act dishonestly or in bad faith. As Iacobucci J. said in Odhavji, public officials who deliberately engage in conduct that they know to be inconsistent with the obligations of their office risk liability for the tort. Conversely, public officials who honestly believe their acts are lawful, and do not intend to cause harm or know that harm would likely result from their actions, fall outside the ambit of misfeasance in public office. In this way, the required mental element achieves a balance between curbing unlawful, dishonest behavior and enabling public officials to do their jobs free from claims by those adversely affected by their decisions.
[28] Hamilton realizes this. Mr. Estrin in his affidavit at para. 11 in support of this motion states the following:
(a) The Defendants were public officials who were involved in that capacity when the harm alleged by the City occurred;
(b) The Defendants:
(i) acted with the intention of harming the City (targeted malice); or
(ii) engaged in deliberate acts or omissions which were unlawful, with knowledge of their being unlawful and that they would likely harm the City, or were recklessly indifferent or wilfully blind to their illegality and to the harm this would probably cause to the City; and
(c) The City suffered damages as a result of the unlawful conduct of the Defendants. (emphasis added)
[29] The defendants deny that Hamilton suffered any losses as a result of the ordering of an environmental assessment under the CEAA. The issues of liability and damages are interrelated. Hamilton must prove that the defendants by ordering an environmental assessment under the CEAA both intended to harm Hamilton or were reckless that Hamilton would suffer harm and that Hamilton did suffer harm as a result.
[30] Hamilton seeks to have the trial bifurcated and that it be permitted to have a trial first on liability alone. However, to be successful they would have to introduce evidence that they suffered damages as a result of the actions of the defendants. The defendants deny that they intended to harm the city or were reckless or indifferent as to whether Hamilton suffered harm. They also deny that Hamilton suffered any loss or damages as a result of their actions. They do not consent to bifurcation. The issues of damages and liability are interrelated. The defendants are entitled to have all issues decided in a single trial.
(b) Will there be a substantial saving of time and expense if bifurcation is granted?
[31] Both parties would be sure to appeal an adverse result of a trial on liability. At least much of the same evidence would need to be heard on a trial on liability as on a full trial. The answer to this question is no.
[32] The answer to the questions posed in the judgment of Justice Nordheimer in Air Canada which are summarized by Ms. Evans in c, d and e above are all no.
Result
[33] I find that Rule 6.1.01 ousts my jurisdiction to order bifurcation and even if I have the jurisdiction, the law prior to the enactment of the Rule requires that I do not. The motion is dismissed. The defendants may make submissions in writing within 10 days of receipt of this judgment and the plaintiff may have 10 days to respond.
P.B. Hambly, J.
Released: February 20, 2015
CITATION: City of Hamilton v. Attorney General et al., 2015 ONSC 1043
COURT FILE NO.: C-383-04
DATE: 2015-02-20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
City of Hamilton
Plaintiff
Attorney General of Canada, Christine Stewart, David Anderson Herb Dhaliwal, Sheila Copps, Nancy Adams, Paul Bernier, W. Bill Bien, Edwin R. De Bruyn, Steve Burgess, Mike Cadman, Paula Caldwell, Robert Connelly, Rob Dobos, Margit Doneit, John Fischer, Rosaline Frith, Nicole Gagnier, Denise Gibbs, Cathy Gee, Jonathan H. Gee, Sid Gershberg, D. V. Gillman, Carole Giroux, Ian Glen, Michael Goffin, Francois Guimont, Len Good, Keith Grady, Barbara Hennessy, Michaela Huard, Wayne Hyatt, Louise Knox, Mary Komarynsky, Janice Kostash, Olivier Lalande, Deb Lauder, Patrice Leblanc, Sharon Leonhard, Simon Llewellyn, Nancy Maguire, Laud Matos, Claire Michaud, John Mills, Tom Muir, Brad Parker, L.S. Parsons, Raymond Pierce, Richard Pratt, Ulana Perovic, Kim Ray, David Robinson, Michael Rayner, Guy Riverin, David Robinson, Craig Ryan, Nathalie Seguin, Michael Shaw, Ron Shimizu, Mike Shiomi, Jeff Stein, Rob Stevens, Donna Stewart, John Struger, Gerry E. Swanson, Lucie Tessier, Lisa Vitpls, Wayne Wouters, Bruce Young
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
P.B. Hambly,J
Released: February 20, 2015