Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCC

The Crown appealed from an order setting aside a rape conviction and directing a new trial after the trial judge admitted similar fact evidence of an earlier rape.

The accused admitted sexual intercourse but asserted actual consent or an honest belief in consent.

The Supreme Court held that the absence of consent by a previous complainant was irrelevant to the present complainant's lack of consent, and that prior misconduct evidence was inadmissible where its only value was to show the accused was the sort of person capable of disregarding non-consent.

The prior incident did not involve a similar claim of mistaken belief in consent, so the evidence could not properly rebut that defence.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order was upheld.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal which found section 205 of the Lands and Forests Act to be intra vires the provincial legislature.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the provincial legislation regarding obstructing a peace officer is valid and not superseded or rendered inoperative by section 118 of the Criminal Code.

L'intimé a été déclaré coupable d'homicide involontaire coupable et d'avoir causé illégalement un incendie à la suite du même événement.

La Cour d'appel a appliqué le principe Kienapple pour annuler la déclaration de culpabilité relative à l'infraction secondaire.

La Cour suprême du Canada a rejeté le pourvoi de la Couronne, confirmant l'application du principe Kienapple.

The appellants appealed their convictions for criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, finding that the Court of Appeal of Quebec did not err in upholding the trial judge's convictions.

The appellant challenged a conviction entered after the Crown commenced indictment proceedings on charges identical to informations previously dismissed by a provincial court judge who had erroneously concluded he lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that the earlier court had competent jurisdiction, the accused had been put in jeopardy once pleas were entered, and the dismissals remained effective unless rescinded, quashed, or reversed.

Applying the autrefois acquit principles discussed in R. v. Riddle, the Court concluded that the Crown could not ignore the prior dismissals and simply commence new proceedings.

The plea should have succeeded and the appeal was allowed.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder after killing a man who was allegedly assaulting a third party.

The trial judge instructed the jury on self-defence and the use of force to prevent the commission of an offence, suggesting that excessive force could reduce murder to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that there is no 'qualified' defence of excessive force under section 27 of the Criminal Code that reduces murder to manslaughter; it is either a complete justification or no defence at all.

However, the Court upheld the order for a new trial because the trial judge's charge to the jury was confusing, improperly included self-defence when there was no factual foundation, and failed to adequately explain the relationship between section 27 and the intent required for murder.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after a burned body was found in his car and he faked his own kidnapping.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on self-defence but did not instruct them that excessive force in self-defence could reduce murder to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there was insufficient evidence to even put the defence of self-defence to the jury.

Furthermore, the Court held that under the Criminal Code, there is no qualified defence of excessive force in self-defence that would automatically reduce murder to manslaughter.

The appellant, a travel agent, received funds from clients for airline tickets but failed to pay the tour operator, leaving clients without tickets or refunds.

He was convicted of theft.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal was based on a question of fact, not law.

The Court affirmed that while mere expectations do not amount to a direction under section 292 of the Criminal Code, expectations known to the recipient as a result of express instructions constitute a valid direction.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that had allowed the accused's appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial based on fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in law because the accused had not satisfied the first principle of the test for admitting fresh evidence, namely that the evidence could not have been adduced at trial by due diligence.

The judgment at trial was restored.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found several errors of law in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the appellant's alibi, drunkenness, and identification evidence, but dismissed the appeal by applying the curative proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the application of the proviso was an error of law.

The Supreme Court held that the application of the proviso always involves a question of law and is reviewable.

However, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the proviso, as the verdict would necessarily have been the same even if the errors had not occurred, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant pleaded guilty on three different occasions before the same judge to nine criminal charges.

The judge sentenced the appellant for all charges at the same time, ordering the sentences for each of the three groups of charges to be served consecutively.

The appellant appealed, arguing the judge lacked the power to impose consecutive sentences under the Criminal Code because the convictions occurred at different sittings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a judge may order a sentence to be served consecutively to another sentence they have previously imposed or are imposing at the same time.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in heroin.

The principal evidence against them was the testimony of an accomplice.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the danger of convicting on uncorroborated accomplice evidence and pointed out evidence capable of being corroborative.

The appellants appealed, arguing the supporting evidence was too remote.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, abrogating the strict and highly technical common law rules regarding accomplice corroboration derived from R. v. Baskerville.

The Court held that there is no special category for accomplices and that trial judges should use a common sense approach, giving a clear and sharp warning only when the credit of a particular witness warrants it.

The appellant was ordered to pay a fine or serve a three-month term of imprisonment.

A warrant of committal was issued and executed after he had already served terms of imprisonment pursuant to other warrants.

The appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that executing warrants in succession illegally made concurrent sentences consecutive.

The Superior Court and Court of Appeal dismissed the application relying on s. 649(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal.

The appellants sought an injunction in the Federal Court Trial Division to prohibit the respondents from filing a Minister's certificate under s. 244(4) of the Income Tax Act in the Court of Sessions of the Peace.

The certificate established the date evidence came to the Minister's knowledge, which affected the limitation period for summary conviction tax evasion charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the filing of the certificate is merely a statutory mode of proof and does not constitute an administrative decision or the exercise of a discretionary power.

Therefore, the Minister was not acting as a 'federal board, commission or other tribunal' under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act, and the Trial Division had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction.

The Crown charged the appellant with conspiracy to violate the Export and Import Permits Act, but the indictment omitted reference to the alleged violation of United States law.

The trial judge refused the Crown's motion to amend the indictment and subsequently dismissed the case for want of evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and directed the trial to continue.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Court of Appeal lacked the authority to amend the indictment by substituting a different offence.

Furthermore, the Court held that an order for a new trial under s. 613(4) requires a full new trial, and it would be unjust to force the accused to proceed on an amended indictment, especially since the co-conspirator had been deported.

The United States District Court sought judicial assistance via letters rogatory under s. 43 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain documents and tape recordings for a criminal tax evasion trial in Florida.

The Alberta Court of Appeal held that s. 43 did not permit an order for the production of documents unless it was ancillary to oral testimony.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 43 should be given a broad, liberal construction in the interests of comity and permits an order for the production of documents alone.

The Court also held that illegally intercepted telephone conversations could be disclosed at the s. 43 hearing, provided they were only used against accused persons who were not parties to the communications.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breach of trust by a municipal officer and municipal corruption under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, expressing full agreement with the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for breach of trust by a municipal officer and municipal corruption.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, noting the case was practically identical to the companion case of Leblanc v. The Queen, and applied the same reasons to dismiss.

The appellant appealed a conviction for contempt of court arising from statements made at trial questioning the impartiality of the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The Court adopted the dissenting reasons of Mayrand J.A. in the Court of Appeal of Quebec, which found that the statements did not constitute contempt and the proper procedure was not followed.

The Government of Italy sought to extradite the respondent.

During the extradition hearing, the Extradition Judge refused to admit unsworn depositions taken in Italy.

The appellant applied for mandamus to compel the admission of the evidence, which was dismissed by the Federal Court Trial Division and the Federal Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that mandamus does not lie to review an evidentiary ruling where no question of jurisdiction is involved.

The Court also noted that while some of the unsworn depositions would be admissible because the deponents were warned of penal consequences for false testimony, mandamus was still unavailable.